Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East by Murre-van den Berg, H.L. & Goldstein-Sabbah, S.R.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/168502
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
Modernity, Minority, and the Public Sphere
Leiden Studies
in Islam and Society
Editors
Léon Buskens (Leiden University)
Petra M. Sijpesteijn (Leiden University)
Editorial Board
Maurits Berger (Leiden University) – R. Michael Feener
(Oxford University) – Nico Kaptein (Leiden University)
Jan Michiel Otto (Leiden University) – David S. Powers (Cornell University)
volume 4
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/lsis
Modernity, Minority, and
the Public Sphere
Jews and Christians in the Middle East
Edited by
S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah
H.L. Murre-van den Berg
leiden | boston
This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc License, which
permits any non-commercial use, and distribution, provided no alterations are made and
the original author(s) and source are credited.
We wish to thank the nwo in particular for their support in providing the funding for language editing and
making the volume available in Open Access so that our work can be shared with the larger academic
community.
Cover illustration: The Funeral of King Hussein, Jerusalem, June 4, 1931, American Colony (Jerusalem).
Photo Dept., photographer, lc-m32- 50380-x [p&p], Repository: Library of Congress Prints and
Photographs Division.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Goldstein-Sabbah, S. R., editor | Murre-van den Berg, H. L. (Hendrika Lena), 1964- editor.
Title: Modernity, minority, and the public sphere : Jews and Christians in the Middle East / edited by S.R.
Goldstein-Sabbah, H.L. Murre-van den Berg.
Other titles: Leiden studies in Islam and society ; v. 4.
Description: Leiden : Brill, 2016. | Series: Leiden studies in Islam and society ; volume 4 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016018308 (print) | LCCN 2016024319 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004322905 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9789004323285 (E-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Religious minorities–Middle East–Congresses. | Minorities–Middle East–Congresses. |
Jews–Middle East–Congresses. | Christians–Middle East–Congresses. | Muslims–Middle
East–Congresses. | Middle East–Ethnic relations–Congresses.
Classification: LCC DS58 .M64 2016 (print) | LCC DS58 (ebook) | DDC 305.6/70956–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016018308
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.
issn 2210-8920
isbn 978-90-04-32290-5 (paperback)
isbn 978-90-04-32328-5 (e-book)
Copyright 2016 by the Editors and Authors.
This work is published by Koninklijke Brill nv. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes
& De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.
Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect the publication against unauthorized use and to authorize
dissemination by means of offprints, legitimate photocopies, microform editions, reprints, translations, and
secondary information sources, such as abstracting and indexing services including databases. Requests for
commercial re-use, use of parts of the publication, and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke
Brill nv.
This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
List of Contributors viii
part 1
A Chronology of Space
1 Searching for Common Ground: Jews and Christians in theModern
Middle East 3
H.L. Murre-van den Berg
2 The Changing Landscape of Muslim-Jewish Relations in theModern
Middle East and North Africa 39
D.J. Schroeter
part 2
Arabic and Its Alternatives
3 Standardized Arabic as a Post-Nahḍa Common Ground: Mattai bar
Paulus and His Use of Syriac, Arabic, and Garshuni 71
T.C. Baarda
4 Jewish Education in Baghdad: Communal Space vs. Public Space 96
S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah
5 Preserving the Catholics of the Holy Land or Integrating Them into
the Palestine Nation (1920–1950)? 121
K.M.J. Sanchez Summerer
vi contents
part 3
Urban Presence
6 Ottoman Damascus during the Tanzimat: The New Visibility of
Religious Distinctions 155
A. Massot
7 The King is Dead, Long Live the King! Jewish Funerary Performances in
the Iraqi Public Space 185
A. Schlaepfer
8 Jerusalem between Segregation and Integration: Reading Urban Space
through the Eyes of Justice Gad Frumkin 205
Y. Wallach
part 4
Transnationalism
9 Refugee Camps and the Spatialization of Assyrian Nationalism in
Iraq 237
L. Robson
10 The League of Nations, a-Mandates andMinority Rights during the
Mandate Period in Iraq (1920–1932) 258
H. Müller-Sommerfeld
11 “Soundtracks of Jerusalem”: YouTube, North African Rappers, and the
Fantasies of Resistance 284
A. Boum
Index 311
Acknowledgements
The current volume results from a research project funded by the Netherlands
Research Council (nwo): Arabic and its Alternatives: Religious Minorities in
the Formative Years of the Modern Middle East (1920–1950) whose members
organized a conference at Leiden University entitled Common Ground: Chang-
ing Interpretations of public space in theMiddle East among Jews, Christians, and
Muslims in the 19th and 20th Century in October of 2014. The conference was
organized in cooperation with the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society
(lucis) at Leiden University, and we are grateful for their support in addition
to the support of thenwo.Wewish to thanknwo inparticular for their support
in providing the funding for language editing and making the volume avail-
able as Open Access so that our work can be shared with the larger academic
community. Also to be mentioned in our acknowledgment of thanks is Valerie
Joy Turner, our tireless language editor, who endeavored to ensure linguistic
coherence and consistency throughout the volume and our student assistant
Farah Bazzi, who helped both in the organization of the original conference
and the preparation of this volume. Finally, we want to express our gratitude
to the whole team of editors at Brill for their cooperation in the preparation of
this volume.
The editors
List of Contributors
Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah
is a Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University in the Netherlands. She is a member
of the Arabic and its Alternatives: Religious Minorities in the Formative Years
of the ModernMiddle East (1920–1950) research project funded by the Nether-
lands Research Council (nwo). Her research interests focus on the history of
Jews in the ArabWorld. Prior to her doctoral research she worked in academic
publishing.
Anais Massot
is a Phd student at Leiden University and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales (ehess-Césor). Her Ph.D. research, for which she received
a doctoral contract funded by Hesam Université (Paris Nouveaux Mondes)
explores inter-confessional relations and political changes in Damascus in the
late 18th and early 19th centuries.
HannahMüller-Sommerfeld
is a scholar of religious studies at the Religionswissenschaftliche Institut of
the University of Leipzig. She is specialized on the history and dynamics of
religious minorities in the Middle East and Europe. Müller-Sommerfeld wrote
her dissertation on the Romanian historian of religions Mircea Eliade. She
has published (as Hannelore Müller) furthermore monographs on the modern
history of Karaites (2010) and two volumes on various religious communities in
theMiddle East (2009, 2014). Currently, H. Müller-Sommerfeld is preparing the
publication of her post-doctoral research about religion, international politics
and law during the monarchy in Iraq.
HeleenMurre-van den Berg
received her Ph.D. from Leiden University in 1995 and is currently director
of the Institute of Eastern Christian Studies at Radboud University, Nijmegen
since June 2015. Earlier, she taught history of World Christianity at Leiden Uni-
versity. She has published extensively on Christianity in the Middle East, espe-
cially on the Syriac/Assyrian traditions and the interactions between Western
and Middle Eastern Christians in the period from 1500 onwards. The current
volume results from a research project funded for by the Netherlands Research
Council (nwo): Arabic and its Alternatives: Religious Minorities in the Forma-
tive Years of the Modern Middle East (1920–1950).
list of contributors ix
Laura Robson
received her Ph.D. from Yale University and is currently Associate Professor of
modern Middle Eastern history at Portland State University in Portland, Ore-
gon. Her research focuses primarily on histories of ethnic and religiousminori-
ties in the twentieth century Arab world. She is the author of Colonialism and
Christianity in Mandate Palestine (University of Texas Press, 2011) and editor
of Minorities and the Modern Arab World: New Perspectives (Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, 2016). Her articles have appeared in a number of scholarly journals,
including the Journal of Palestine Studies, Comparative Studies of South Asia
Africa and the Middle East, the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth His-
tory, First World War Studies, History Compass, and Mashriq and Mahjar. She
is currently working on a book investigating the history of ethnically based
population transfers and partitions across Iraq, Syria, and Palestine during the
interwar period.
Aline Schlaepfer
holds a Ph.D. inMiddle Eastern Studies from the University of Geneva. She was
a visiting research student at the School of Oriental and African Studies in Lon-
don, and a lecturer at theUniversity of Geneva. Shewas awarded a postdoctoral
fellowshipby the SwissNational ScienceFoundation and is nowa research affil-
iate at the American University of Beirut (cames), where she currently lives.
Her research interest focuses on modern Arab intellectual history, history of
Arab nationalism and the history of Jews in Arab lands. She is the author of
Les intellectuels juifs deBagdad.Discours et allégeances (1908–1951), Leiden, Brill,
2016.
Daniel J. Schroeter
is the Amos S. Deinard Memorial Chair in Jewish History at the University of
Minnesota. His works include The Sultan’s Jew:Morocco and the SephardiWorld
(Stanford University Press, 2002), and Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society
and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844–1886 (Cambridge University
Press, 1988); both books were translated to Arabic and published in Morocco.
He co-edited with Emily Gottreich, Jewish Culture and Society in North Africa
(Indiana University Press, 2011), and is an editor and contributor to the Ency-
clopedia of the Jews in the Islamic World (Brill, 2010). He was the 2014–2015
Ina Levine Scholar-in-Residence at the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Cen-
ter for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, and is working on a book with Aomar Boum on Morocco and the
Holocaust.
x list of contributors
Karène Sanchez Summerer
is Assistant Professor at Leiden University. Her research considers the Euro-
pean linguistic and cultural policies in Palestine (1860–1948), with a focus
on French heritage in a comparative perspective; the educative and sanitary
Catholic andAnglicanmissions inOttoman andBritishMandate Palestine. She
is currently working on two research projects: the role of language and educa-
tion among the Palestinian Catholic communities (The Netherlands National
Research Agency nwo project ‘Arabic and its alternatives. Religion and Lan-
guage Change in the Formative Years of the Modern Middle East (1920–1950)’,
2012–2017); and the engagement of Christian missions in Humanitarianism in
the Middle East (nwo project ‘Engaging Europe in the Arab World: European
missionaries and humanitarianism in the Middle East; 1850–1970’, 2015–2018).
Tijmen Baarda
started in October 2012 a Ph.D. programme within the nwo project ‘Arabic
and its Alternatives’ led by Professor Heleen Murre-van den Berg. His research
concerns the intellectual endeavours of the Syriac Christians of Iraq in the
period 1920–1950, including their publications and educational activities, with
a special focus on themanydifferent languages they used. In his Ph.D. thesis, he
aims to answer the question how the diverse group of Syriac Christians of Iraq
positioned themselves towards the Iraqi state and society and other Christians
in the Middle East, by using and teaching Arabic, Syriac, Neo-Aramaic and
other languages, and how they responded to and took part in phenomena such
as Arab and Assyrian nationalism.
Aomar Boum
is an Associate Professor of sociocultural anthropology at the University of
California, Los Angeles, and faculty fellow at the Université Internationale de
Rabat, Morocco. A native of MʾHamid oasis of southern Morocco, Boum has
a varied research focus that revolves around ethnic and religious minorities,
Islam, anthropology of religion, youth, festival, historiography, and sociology of
Morocco, NorthAfrica, sub-SaharanAfrica, and theMiddle East. He is coauthor
of the 2006 and 2016 editions of the Historical Dictionary of Morocco and A
Concise History of the Middle East (2015). He has also published many articles
onMorocco and religiousminorities, as well as the bookMemories of Absence:
How Muslims Remember Jews in Morocco (2013). Currently he is finishing
a book manuscript with Daniel Schroeter on the monarchy and Holocaust
politics in Morocco.
list of contributors xi
Yair Wallach
is a Lecturer in Israeli Studies at the department of Near and Middle Eastern
Languages and Cultures, soas, University of London. His interests are in urban
and visual culture in modern Israel/Palestine from the late Ottoman period to
the present day. Before joining soas he was a research associate in the project
“Conflict in Cities” at the University of Cambridge. He has written on the use of
maps as visual symbols in Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, Muslim-Jewish
acculturation, and on urban texts (signs, graffiti and banners) in the public
sphere of modern Jerusalem.

part 1
A Chronology of Space
∵

© h.l. murre-van den berg, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004323285_002
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc License.
chapter 1
Searching for Common Ground: Jews and
Christians in theModernMiddle East
H.L. Murre-van den Berg
In the late 1990s, the taxi driver of a Tehran cab changed the cassette tape to the
engaging sounds of the Hebrew song Hava Nagilah (‘Let us rejoice’), a Jewish
favorite for festive occasions. Not quite knowing whether I was being provoked
into anti- or pro-Israel sentiments, I somewhat cowardly indicated approval
without asking for details. While the tape played on, the conversation was not
pursued further, and I later asked some Iranian friends what they made of it.
They laughed at my discomfort and told me Israeli music was quite popular
in Tehran and easily procured at the bazaar. As long as politics were kept out
of it, the culture of the archenemy was not a problem. It was only later that I
learned about the thrivingmusic culture in Iran and in the ArabMiddle East of
which Jews and Christians formed an intrinsic part. Especially in Iran, Jewish
ensembles were popular among all classes of the population and HavaNagilah
was often performed at weddings, even after the majority of Jews left Iran in
the years following the Islamic Revolution.
While the link between this earlier musical scene and the 1990s interest
in Israeli music is perhaps an indirect one, both phenomena point to music
as a locus of interaction and sharing even between communities that are
antagonistic. Often, this thriving and thoroughlymixedmusic culture has been
quoted as an example of how people of different religious communities in the
Middle East could live and party well together, sharing a common local culture.
The Tehran example indicates that this may have been too rosy a picture of
how these societies functioned in thepast andpresent, not only because shared
cultural practices do not necessarily imply shared outlooks on society, but also
because even seemingly innocent songs have political overtones thatmight not
always be shared by those who pass them on, but which remain part of the
song’s afterlife for thosewhowant to see it.1 At the same time, cultural practices
1 The song Hava nagila (composed in Palestine, 1920s) has a nationalist ring, with the vocabu-
lary of the refrain ‘uru, ahim,’ ‘Awake, brothers,’ echoing, among others, George Antonius’ title
and motto on Arab nationalism (taken from a nineteenth-century poem by Ibrahim Yazeji,
4 murre-van den berg
such as these continue to be used and interpreted as my friends interpreted
them, as a sign of communality over borders created by religion and politics. It
is precisely this ambiguity, between the political and the ostensively neutral,
that provides space for the participation of those to whom politics proper
would otherwise be closed off.
This volume discusses cultural practices that in different ways constituted
common ground between the various groups that made up Middle Eastern,
especially ArabMiddle Eastern societies in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. It does so based on the premise that such cultural issues never
constitute a separate domain apart from political and economic participa-
tion, but that they are part and parcel of patterns of interaction with all kinds
of political implications. These cultural practices, therefore, address issues of
power and presence of the so-calledminorities inmultiple ways. Thus, without
dealing with the political participation of non-Muslims in Muslim dominated
states as such, this volume aims to focus on the ways in which non-Muslims
contributed to creating and developing spaces of encounter. These spaces of
encounter sometimes took the form of actual political debates, but also took
the form of literal spaces of encounter with public rituals or participation in
language and educational reform. It is these types of common ground that con-
stitute the main theme of this volume.
The contributors of this volume all participated in a conference that was
organized in September 2013 by a Leiden research group based in the Insti-
tute for Religious Studies at the Faculty of Humanities, in cooperation with
lucis, the Leiden Centre for the Study of Islam and Society. This research
group, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (nwo)
works on a project entitled Arabic and its Alternatives: Religious Minorities
in the Formative Years of the Modern Middle East (1920–1950). The project’s
focus is mostly on the British mandate areas of Iraq and Palestine, and this
is reflected in the fact that most contributions to the conference and in this
volume have the same strong focus on these two emerging states. This intro-
duction and some of the contributionsmake a start in contextualizing theways
in which non-Muslims in the Britishmandate areas acted andwere acted upon
against the background of the larger ArabMiddle East, also in FrenchMandate
“Arise, ye Arabs, and awake”), Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National
Movement (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938). Compare also Naum Fayiq’s poem in Classical
Syriac, “Awake, Son of Assyria” (1920), see David Gaunt, “Relations between Kurds and Syriacs
and Assyrians in Late Ottoman Diyarbekir,” in Joost Jongerden, Jelle Verheij, Social Relations
in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870–1915 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 250.
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areas. For that reason, the Maghreb is explicitly included, with its vibrant Jew-
ish communities in mostly French-ruled contexts. This inclusion allows for a
comparison of the two largest non-Muslim communities not only in contexts
where the two communities lived alongside each other, but also where one of
them dominates the local scene.
Rather thanmerely introducing the main themes of the search for common
ground as described by this volume’s authors, this introductory article pays
special attention to the developments within the Christian communities, par-
allel to Schroeter’s article on the Jewish communities. Over the last decades,
the interwar developments of the Middle Eastern Christian communities have
attracted considerable research attention. Thorough work has been done on
the Coptic Christians in Egypt,2 as on Palestine’s Christians, often from the per-
spective of the wider nationalist movement, but not exclusively so.3 Recently,
the Assyrians in Iraq and Iran, after many years of near neglect, have found
historians to write their story.4 The post-World War i history of the Armenian,
Syriac Orthodox and the various Catholic communities of Lebanon, Syria and
Iraq, however, is scantily covered. Especially Lebanon’s Christian history is usu-
ally subsumed in more inclusive narratives that do not always topicalize a spe-
cific ‘Christian’ experience.5While this is understandable from the perspective
of those who want to emphasize the inclusive nature of Lebanese history, it
2 Vivian Ibrahim, The Copts of Egypt: The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity (London/
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Heather Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary
Encounters in An Age of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
3 Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2011), Noah Haiduc-Dale, Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism
and Nationalism, 1917–1948 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), Roland Löffler,
Protestanten in Palästina. Religionspolitik, Sozialer ProtestantismundMission in dendeutschen
evangelischen und anglikanischen Institutionen des Heiligen Landes 1917–1939 (Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer 2008).
4 Sargon George Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in Twentieth
Century Iraq (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), DavidWilmshurst, TheMartyred
Church, A History of the Church of the East (London: East &West Publishing, 2011).
5 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: the Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris,
2004/2014); For a specific focus on the Armenians, see Nicola Migliorino, (Re)Constructing
Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the Sate in the Aftermath of a
Refugee Crisis (New York: Berghan Books, 2008). A recent thesis addresses Maronite identity
in this period via the analysis of literary production: Amaya Martin Fernandez, “National,
Linguistic, and Religious Identity of Lebanese Maronite Christians through their Arabic
Fictional Texts during the Period of the FrenchMandate in Lebanon” (Ph.D. diss Georgetown
University, 2009).
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obscures both the many links to and the important differences between the
Christian history of the various Arab countries. Before discussing the major
themes of this volume from such a comparative and historiographic perspec-
tive, a number of crucial concepts that underlie the discussion need to be intro-
duced. The most important of these are minority, modernity and the public
sphere.
Minority, Modernity, and the Public Sphere
The term ‘minority,’ as common as it is nowadays, in actual usage but also in its
impliedmeanings is inextricably connected to twentieth-century nationalism.
As has been shown for the emerging state of Syria, the term ‘minority’ started
to be used in the context of the formation of the nation state, in a fluid context
in which different identities vied for prominence, and in which international
dynamics, especially those connected to the League of Nations, played amajor
role.
While in today’s parlance Jews and Christians are seen as prototypical
minorities in the Muslim world, this was generally not the case when the term
started to be used in the period followingWorldWar i. In fact, most Christians
and Jews would resist the term and the accompanying political isolation that
camewith it, seeing it as an imposition fromthemandate governments inEgypt
and Syria, often linked to earlier policies of Western protection of Christian
and Jews. An imposition, that is, that denied their longstanding cultural and
economic participation as well as limiting their possibilities of political partic-
ipation in the new states.6 Especially in Egypt, Coptic Christians successfully
resisted the label ‘minority’ precisely to ensure their position at the heart of
the debates about the future of the Egyptian state.7 In their rejection of a spe-
6 Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of
Community in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Gudrun
Krämer, “Moving out of Place: Minorities in Middle Eastern Urban Societies, 1800–1914,”
in Peter Sluglett (ed.), The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse, ny:
Syracuse University Press, 2008), 182–223; Tsolin Nalbantian, “Going Beyond Overlooked
Populations in Lebanese Historiography: The Armenian Case,” History Compass 11, no. 10
(2013): 821–832.
7 See especially SabaMahmood, ReligiousDifference inaSecularAge:AMinorityReport (Prince-
ton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016); Mahmood discusses minority discourses in
Egypt against the background of larger discussions about the state, secularism and exclusion,
both in the Middle East and Europe.
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cialminority status, these Jews andChristians distanced themselves fromother
groupswho for internal and external reasons came to identify asminorities, like
the Assyrians in Iraq and the Armenians and Syriac Orthodox in Lebanon and
Syria. Not coincidentally, most of them were recent arrivals in the new nation
states, which explains at least some of the mutual suspicion and hostility. In
this volume, the contributions by Robson and Müller-Sommerfeld deal with
the complicated process of minoritization of the Assyrians that took place in
mandate Iraq.
Gradually, however, the term minority began to refer more and more to
all Christians and all Jews, whatever their origins and cultural-linguistic back-
grounds. Despite these non-Muslims’ legal rights resulting from full citizenship
(at least for most of them), they were not seen as belonging to the core of the
nation state and often were excluded formally or informally from crucial posi-
tions. Processes like these have been described for Palestine, about which both
Sanchez Summerer (this volume) and Haiduc-Dale stress the agency of Chris-
tians (whomostly sidedwithMuslim Palestinian nationalists) and Druze (who
were more easily brought over to the Zionist side) in defining what kind of
minority they wanted to be.8 Also the Copts, in the later decades of the twenti-
eth century, started to revert on their rejection of the minority label, if only to
ensure governmental protection and international support.
Discussions about minoritization are the flip side of those about the com-
munalities undergirding the nation state. In the so-called ‘Arab provinces’ of
the former Ottoman Empire (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Pales-
tine), state formation following World War i led to an ongoing debate about
what exactly are the characteristics of the model citizen.9 While the concept
of the ‘Arab’ state seems to presuppose an Arab ethnicity (‘race’ in the terms
of the time) as the basis of the nation state, the debate over what ‘Arab’ was,
8 In addition toHaiduc-Dale’s Arab Christians, see also his “Rejecting Sectarianism: Palestinian
Christians’ Role in Muslim–Christian Relations,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 26,
no. 1 (2015): 75–88. Robson (Colonialism and Christianity) stresses the importance of British
policy that divided Palestinian society along religious lines.
9 Nadine Méouchy, Peter Sluglett, Gérard D. Khoury, The British and French Mandates in Com-
parative Perspectives / Les mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative (Lei-
den: Brill, 2004); Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (London: Tauris,
2007); Sami Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (2002): 205–215; Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citi-
zens: RepublicanRights, Paternal Privilege, andGender in FrenchSyria andLebanon (NewYork:
Columbia University Press, 2000), KaisM. Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State
under the Mandate (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003).
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who could be counted as Arab, andwhat the status of non-Arabs in these states
should be, was by no means resolved. Does ‘speaking Arabic’ count as ‘being’
Arabic? Who is allowed to ‘become’ Arab, and who wants to become Arab?10
Meanwhile, the debate over religion that had already started in the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century continued. Does one need to be aMuslim to
be a full citizen? And if not, onwhat grounds could non-Muslims participate in
these societies?11 These ongoing debates underline that who is and who is not
a ‘minority’ is never clear-cut, is bound to change over time, and can and will
be consciously changed by those involved.
When talking about the ‘Arabness’ of the region’s Christians, often the term
‘Arab Christians’ is used. However, this term is rather vague, often including all
Christians that historically or in the contemporary period used Arabic in their
communities, the language of liturgy, written communication and literature,
if not also as a spoken vernacular.12 Such a definition then would include the
Syriac andCoptic communitieswhousedArabic alongside Syriac orCoptic, the
Maronites who were almost completely Arabic-speaking and writing but differ
greatly towhat extent they consider themselves ethnically ‘Arab’, and theGreek
Orthodox and Greek Catholics, who may still use Greek in the liturgy, but are
overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and writing and in the contemporary period
tend to see themselves as ethnically Arab. Thus, in the modern period, Arab
Christians ismostly a blanket term for Christians from themajority of churches
in the Middle East that are literate in Arabic and often also use an Arabic
vernacular, regardless whether they consider themselves ethnically Arab or
not. However, it could also be used polemically in nationalist discussions, to
gauge one’s stand on ‘being’ an Arab or not, supporting Arabism in some of its
forms, or not. Suffice it to say that, as we shall see further on, being described as
10 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle
East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language
and National Identity (Washington, dc: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Peter Wien,
Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941
(soas/Routledge Studies on the Middle East, 2006), Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in
the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003).
11 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ussama Makdisi, A Culture of Sectarian-
ism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000).
12 So David Thomas’ essay ‘Arab Christianity’ in Ken Parry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to
Eastern Christianity (Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 2–22.
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an ‘Arab Christian’ does not automatically imply supporting Arab nationalism
and even less implies identifying as ‘Arab’.
In anattempt to avoid the ambiguities andcontingencies implied in the term
‘minority,’ often the term ‘community’ is used. For most of the authors in this
volume, Jewish and Christian ‘communities’ indeed form the starting point of
their analyses.However, the term ‘community’ bringswith it its own set of ques-
tions,most importantlywhether ornot the concept of ‘community’ ismalleable
and changeable according to circumstances and therefore just as slippery for
analysis as ‘minority.’ While this is certainly true in an absolute sense (com-
munities change in outlook, characteristics, and size), in the states under dis-
cussion here, ‘communities’ are usually defined by the less subjective notion
of legal categories. The term ‘community’ thus follows the legal structures of
the states under investigation, structures thatwere inherited from theOttoman
Empire andbefore, structures that assign a legal status to one’s religious belong-
ing.13 As an aside, it is important to note that when interpreting ‘community’ as
roughly the translation andmodern continuationof theOttomanmillet, impor-
tant differences between the two concepts are glossed over. First, inmanyways
millet, in the nineteenth-century pre-Tanzimat sense, had the clear meaning of
referring to those groups that occupied social and political subordinate posi-
tions vis-à-vis the majority of Muslims, rather than to different religiously or
ethnically defined subgroups in general. Also after these groups were officially
granted equal rights in theOttoman state, they continued tobe seen as separate
millets, whereas Muslims were not.14 Second, not all non-Muslim communi-
ties were considered a millet in the way other non-Muslims were: Maronites,
13 Krämer, “Moving out of Place”; Schroeter and Goldstein-Sabbah in this volume. As such,
communities can also be counted, by their own leaderships as well as by the state. How-
ever, reliable statistics are fewand far between. In general it is assumed that over thewhole
of the ArabMiddle East, Christianity declined from about 20 percent of the population in
the early twentieth century to less than 5 percent towards its end. Despite the tremen-
dous human impact of the genocide of Armenian, Syriac, and Assyrian Christians in the
eastern Ottoman provinces, the main factor for decline in Christians is the lower popula-
tion growth of Christians in relation to that of Muslims, see Hannelore Müller, Religionen
im Nahen Osten 1: Irak—Jordanien—Syrien—Libanon (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag,
2009).
14 See Robson (Colonialism and Christianity) on this process in Palestine; according to her
analysis, the British applied the Ottomanmillet system to Muslims also, effectively creat-
ing an additionalmillet. Whilemillet in this new sense is certainly a new phenomenon for
the Muslim community, it must be noted that the termmillet had been used for Muslims
before the nineteenth century, when the terms millet and ṭaʾifa were less strictly defined
and hence could also be used for the Muslim sub-group of the population.
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Druze, and Assyrians living outside the direct reach of Ottoman tax collectors
and state officials enjoyed a social and political independence unimaginable
for non-Muslims at the heart of the Ottoman state. This included the right to
carry arms and fight along their Kurdish or Druze neighbors that belonged to
the same tribal federations.15 Thus, while the relationship to the state differed
between millets and the majority of Muslims, as well as between raya (sub-
servient ‘flock’) and ashiret (independent clans), the importance of the com-
munity was the same for pretty much everyone. Belonging to such a group was
predicated on and governed by overlapping religiously-inspired legal frame-
works that mutually reinforced each other and bound people to the group in
which they were born.
Though the rhetoric about the abolishment of the millet-system might sug-
gest otherwise, not only did these legal structures survive in the new nation
states, but often their importance increasedunder the influence of colonial and
post-colonial bureaucratic demands. Put differently: legal equality between the
different communal groups was to be strived for, but not the disappearance of
the formal barriers between the groups. Based on the religion of one’s father (or
mother, in the case of Jews), every person ‘belonged’ to a religious community,
a belonging that in most states was and continues to be explicitly mentioned
on one’s identity papers. Independent from personal devotion or active com-
munal identification, this legal status, unless explicitly changed by conversion,
positions its members within a specific community. This implies that the reli-
gious leaders of these communities have power over important issues such as
marriage, child custody, divorce, inheritance issues, and burial.16 While such
‘communities’ also change over time, the legal framework precedes any inter-
pretation of these groups as ‘minority’, by themselves or by others. These legally
defined communities therefore formaworkable starting point for analysis, pre-
cisely in order to be able to describe the varied positions members of these
communities (in the legal sense) take in the societies to which they belong.
15 Joachim Jakob, Ostsyrische Christen und Kurden im Osmanischen Reich des 19. und frühen
20. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: lit Verlag, 2014), Géraldine Chatelard, Briser la mosaïque: les
tribus chrétiennes de Madaba, Jordanie, xixe–xxe siècle (Paris: cnrs éditions, 2004).
16 Legal systems in many of the contemporary states of the Middle East are built along the
same lines; this is true in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria; see, e.g., Chibli Mallat,
“The Lebanese Legal System,” in The Lebanon Report (1997) 2, 29–44; Esther van Eijk,
“Family Law in Syria: A Plurality of Laws, Norms, and Legal Practices,” (PhD thesis, Leiden,
2013), and Michael M. Karayanni, “Two Concepts of Group Rights for the Palestinian-
ArabMinority under Israel’s Constitutional Definition as a ‘Jewish andDemocratic’ State,”
International Journal of Constitutional Law 10, no. 2 (2012): 304–339.
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The formation of the nation states, so important in understanding the con-
cept of minority, also begs a brief discussion of the modernization processes
that took place in the Middle East. If anything, changing concepts of com-
munity and especially of people’s expectations of their participation in the
states to which they belonged are closely tied to themonumental changes that
took place between 1850 and 1950, from the early days of the Tanzimat in the
OttomanEmpire, to the independentArab states created in the 1930s and 1940s.
These changes included new expectations of education with regard to profes-
sional and personal development, of changing gender roles including women’s
participation in society, of social care and standards of health, of literature and
popular culture asmuchas expectations of newstandards of religiousdevotion,
training, and leadership, and, indeed, of societal participation and democracy.
In an intricate interplay between Western (including Russian) influences via
missionaries,welfare organizations, literary exchanges andpolitical, economic,
and diplomatic ties, and local demands and pressures at the local and state
levels, the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire started to look for ways to
reorganize their society.17
As Keith Watenpaugh describes, the modernization processes that took
place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries first and foremost
created a middle class that embodied the ideals just referred to.18 This class
consisted ofMuslims aswell as Jews andChristians, though Jews andChristians
made up a disproportionally large part of them: they, more than Muslims,
had access to new forms of education, and via education to new kinds of
jobs, new kinds of literature, and thus to new ideas about society, both within
their own communities and with an eye toward the wider society. Among
these ideas were also those about the importance of Arab identity and the
17 On the nineteenth-century processes, including the impact of western missionaries, see
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of
the Middle East (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2008), Heleen Murre-van den
Berg, NewFaith in Ancient Lands:WesternMissions in theMiddle East in theNineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2006), Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From
Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press,
2006), AdamBecker,Revival andAwakening:AmericanEvangelicalMissionaries in Iranand
the Origins of Assyrian Nationalism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), and Paul
Sedra, From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth
Century Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); further Schroeter,Massot, andGoldstein-Sabbah
in this volume.
18 Keith David Watenpaugh, BeingModern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colo-
nialism and the ArabMiddle Class (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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Arab nationalism that accompanied it, alongside other nationalisms of the day,
Turkish, Armenian, and Assyrian.
One further aspect of this modernization process that accelerated in the
early twentieth century is themodernization of religion and religious practice.
As recently described by James Grehan, perhaps themost important and influ-
ential domain where different communities mixed, mingled, and shared, was
that of religious practice. Outside formal prayer services in churches, mosques,
and synagogues, but often with the involvement of religious leaders such as
priests, imams, and rabbis, there existed a domain of religious practices that
were shared by all in the region, regardless of religion and religious commu-
nity. The veneration of saints, the practice of ‘magic,’ and an elaborate reper-
toire of bodily movements, were practiced by Christians, Jews, Druze, Sufis,
Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims, often with rather little differentiation as to narrative
interpretation.19 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, religious
reformers of all religions increasingly began to interpret these practices as old-
fashioned, uninformed, rural, and superstitious. Such interpretations led to an
increase in the standardization of religion with regard to theological teach-
ing and ritual practices as much as with religious institutions such as schools
and church buildings, and a decline of such practices that very visibly erased
borders between religions.20 Notably, many of the practices survived until the
present day, either unacknowledged or scorned by the religious establishment,
or integrated into more ‘acceptable’ religious practices. Obviously, in the mod-
ernist interpretations of ‘common ground,’ which has been the starting point of
the contributions in this volume, this older form of shared cultural practices is
no longer considered relevant, even if it continues to exist andmay even consti-
tute an alternative ground for communality between religious groups. Inmany
cases, however, these sacred spaces become locations of contestation, over reli-
gious modernization, in service of ethnic and national belonging.21
19 James Grehan, Twilight of the Saints: Everyday Religion in Ottoman Syria and Palestine
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
20 In themissionarymodernizationproject these themesplayeda crucial role; see the studies
mentioned in n. 17.
21 Dionigi Albera and Maria Couroucli. Sharing Sacred Spaces in the Mediterranea (Bloom-
ington, in, Indiana University Press, 2012), Glenn Bowman, Sharing the Sacra: The Politics
and Pragmatics of Intercommunal Relations around Holy Places (New York, ny: Berghahn
Books: 2012). On Christian politicization of the Holy Sepulcher/Church of the Resurrec-
tion, see Raymond Cohen, Saving the Holy Sepulchre: How Rival Christians Came Together
to Rescue their Holiest Shrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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While the above is certainly too brief a summary of the extensive and sophis-
ticated debates that have taken place in analyzing processes of modernization
and nation formation, the basis that undergirded the idea for this volume and
the conference that preceded it, is that these changes enabled and encouraged
Christians and Jews to rethink their position in society. It is from this rethinking
that, implicitly or explicitly, many of the cultural practices that are described
in this volume arose.
What further resulted from these modernization processes was a reshap-
ing of the actual and metaphoric space where debates over society could take
place. While it would be a mistake to suggest that no public space between
state and government on the one hand and the private sphere of family and
close relations on the other existed in theMiddle East before the twentieth cen-
tury, the twentieth century indeed brought new forms and spaces, spaces in the
Habermassian sense, where debates over the common good were open to the
participation of thosewhowanted to be part of it. Social and literary clubs with
mixedmemberships (in term of gender and religion), newspapers in standard-
ized languages, a powerful women’s movement22 and non-sectarian political
parties all brought new participants to a discussion that before the twentieth
century would have been conducted in much smaller and more closed circles,
such as the houses of the ruling elites, (all-male) coffeehouses, sharia courts,
religious schools, bathhouses, markets or religious festivals. This public sphere
continued to evolve and change, but all of these changes allowed for a greater
variety of people to be part of it, even if actual political participation, under
mandate rule or under later autocratic Arab rulers, was still limited to a few.23
The way in which Jews and Christians, as part of the majority or as minori-
ties, participated in the emerging Arab states was characterized by a variety of
22 For an overview, see Ellen L. Fleischmann, “The Other ‘Awakening’: the Emergence of
Women’s Movements in the Middle East, c. 1900–1940,” in Karen Offen (ed.), Globalizing
Feminisms, 1789–1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 89–139. Among many
others, see also Ellen L. Fleischmann, The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian
Women’s Movement, 1920–1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Marina
Warner, Memoirs of an Early Arab Feminist: The Life and Activism of Anbara Salam Khalidi
(London: PlutoPress, 2013; Arabic original, Beirut 1978).
23 Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Nehemia Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in
Muslim Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Peter Sluglett (ed.),
The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse, ny: Syracuse University
Press, 2008); Seteney Shami, Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere
in theMiddle East andNorthAfrica (NewYork: Social Science ResearchCouncil, 2009); also
Schroeter in this volume.
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actions that are often overlooked when talking about the public sphere. It is
in the variety of such actions, from public mourning to participation in Arab
literary culture, from rap music to political demonstrations, from a preference
for French-language education tomoving to newly-builtmixedneighborhoods,
frompolitical and cultural assimilation to themajority to the separatist nation-
alisms of Assyrians and Armenians, that the full breadth of the societal choices
of the various religious communities can be shown. In the following sections,
four major themes of this volume will be discussed in more detail: the literal
space of the urban landscape, the language (especially Arabic in educational
contexts), the creation of national identities and the violence that often accom-
panied it, and, finally, transnationalism as a force to be reckoned with in the
creation of national common ground. These four themes roughly correspond
to the subdivision of the contributions to this volume, with Daniel Schroeter’s
introductory overview article on the Jews in the Middle East touching on all of
these issues, as does the final article byAomarBoum.HisworkonNorthAfrican
hip hop artists in many ways provides a counterpoint to the other essays, with
its startingpoint inMuslimyouth that use the transnational commongroundof
YouTube to address issues of exclusion and belonging, of political participation
and political impotence. Note that while the main focus of this volume and its
introduction is on the first half of the twentieth century, the analysis and some
of the examples stretch back to the nineteenth century and move forward into
the later twentieth and even early twenty-first century, in an attempt to look
at these developments from a broader perspective than the mandate period as
such.
Urban Space and Public Presence: Performances of Community
With images of the destruction of Syria’s urban centers and historic monu-
ments vividly in mind, one is reluctant to open Stefan Weber’s magnificent
two-volume work on the architectural history of Damascus in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century.24 However, doing so is perhaps the easiest way of
understanding something of the momentous changes that took place in the
urban landscape of the Middle East in this period, in Damascus as well as in
other cities of the region. His documentation of building activities such as the
24 StefanWeber, Damascus: OttomanModernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918) (Pro-
ceedings of the Danish Institute in Damascus, 2 vols.) (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press,
2009).
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sumptuous private homes in some parts of the Old City and the new neighbor-
hoods outside the city, vividly illustrates the era of economic growth and pop-
ulation increase. More changed, however, thanmerely the scale and the luxury
of urban planning. New types of buildings were allowed to appear, changing
the outlook of the city in more fundamental ways. Some of these were con-
nected to new institutions and public services, such as government buildings,
post offices, and railway stations. Other buildings arose in conjunctionwith the
increasing presence of westerners in the city, like consular buildings, mission-
ary schools, andhospitals. And yet others embodied the socio-political changes
of the period: new churches were built in the heart of the Old City.
While there had always been churches inDamascus, somemore publicly vis-
ible than others, the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century made it
possible for Christians to renew and expand their old buildings and to build
new churches when and where they were needed. As described by Anais Mas-
sot in her article about Damascus in this period, the Christians of Damascus,
supported politically and financially by western Christians, made ample use of
these possibilities. Two neighborhoods of the Old City, one near Bab Tuma and
the other between the Straight Street and Bab Sharqi, changed extensivelywith
renewals of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate and new church complexes for
the Armenians, Syriacs, and Greek Catholics. Similar changes also took place
in Jerusalem, as they did in Beirut.25
Yet another form of non-Muslim public presence became much more com-
mon in post-Tanzimat times. Before the nineteenth century, Christian proces-
sions outside church grounds were rarely allowed. In her book on Copts in
seventeenth- andeighteenth-centuryEgypt, FebeArmanios describes the spec-
tacle of sending off a group of Christiansmaking pilgrimage to the Easter festiv-
ities in Jerusalem,much the sameway as Christians andMuslims would see off
those embarking on the hajj to Mecca.26 When properly negotiated and paid
for, such exceptions to the general rules of non-Muslim invisibility in the public
domain were allowed; these occurred for the most part in neighborhoods that
were predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims. After the Tanzimat reforms,
such permissions were asked for and given more frequently, and this added
another element to the public visibility of Jews and Christians.
25 See the contributions by Schroeter, Massot, andWallach in this volume. For an analysis of
more recent urban development in in multi-religious cities, see Chad F. Emmett, Beyond
theBasilica: Christians andMuslims inNazareth (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press,
1995).
26 Febe Armanios, Coptic Christianity in Ottoman Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
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Both Schroeter and Massot describe a third element of the rules of the
newly emerging urban landscape, that of changing sartorial practices. Here
the development is in the opposite direction, away from differentiation. Tanz-
imat reforms meant that clothing no longer served to differentiate the various
groups of society. In earlier periods, certain clothing and colors, especially of
headgear that generally served to identify a wide range of different ranks and
functions of members of society, had been restricted to Muslims. More impor-
tantly, with the Tanzimat, men of all religions started to discard the various
types of traditional gear, including turbans, in favor of the fez or, in Iraq, the
siddara. This had begun in the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century,
middle-class urbanwomenof all religions followedby shedding the veil, remov-
ing yet another outward sign of gender and religious differentiation. As a result,
individuals were less easily recognized as belonging to one community or
another. At the same time, the religious communities as a whole becamemore
visible in the public domain; they were allowed to build large complexes with
churches and synagogues, schools, and hospitals. They also organized expres-
sive public processions that showed off the differences between Christians of
various kinds as much as between Muslims and non-Muslims. While this may
seem contradictory, both the mostly unproblematic public display of Chris-
tian symbols and buildings, and the new sartorial practices underline the same
basic point: modernization and its new norms of public presence started to
override the importance of distinguishing betweenMuslims and non-Muslims.
Notably, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sartorial practices again started to
reflect religious differences asmuchas regional and class differences, especially
for women. Muslim women tended to take up ‘Islamic’ dress in its different
forms while Christian women (if not forced by law or social pressure to dress
‘Islamic’) emphasized their freedom to dress ‘western’. At the same time, how-
ever, they started to wear visible cross pendants to identify as Christian.27
Yair Wallach, in the context of early twentieth-century Jerusalem, discusses
another aspect of the urban developments of the time, which is the emergence
of new types of neighborhoods. In all of the cities featured in this volume, Dam-
ascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Essouira, and Tunis, newneighborhoodswere
created outside the traditional city centers. In some cities such building activ-
27 Much has been written about the subtle codes of a variety of veiling practices, see among
others, Jenny B. White, “The Paradox of the New Islamic Woman in Turkey” in Inger
Marie Okkenhaug and Ingvild Flaskerud, Gender, Religion and Change in the Middle East.
Two Hundred Years of History (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2005), 123–136, Julia Droeber, The
Dynamics of Coexistence in the Middle East: Negotiating Boundaries Between Christians,
Muslims, Jews and Samaritans. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).
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ities had already begun in the nineteenth century, and took off in earnest in
the early twentieth century. These new middle-class neighborhoods exempli-
fied a new ideal of living, with freestanding buildings, preferably for individual
families (even if extended family living remained the norm), with gardens sur-
rounding them instead of the closed inner courtyards of the traditional houses.
Important for our discussion today, as also described by Wallach with regard
to his main protagonist Gad Frumkin, is the fact that these neighborhoods
were much more mixed as to religion than was the case in the old city cen-
ters. Though most of the old neighborhoods were not strictly segregated (see
Wallach’s description of Jerusalem, where he counters the popular images of
a city divided into four distinct neighborhoods), many neighborhoods would
indeed have amajority population of one religion,with small groups of families
belonging to other religions. What bound the inhabitants of these new neigh-
borhoods together was not the earlier communal concerns, but their shared
vision of what modern life should entail.
For many, these changing ideals about modern life included ideals about
the nation state, also when the fundamental principles of the new states were
yet to be negotiated. The ways in which the Jewish community of Baghdad
participated in the mourning ceremonies over the death of two successive
monarchs, King Fayṣal in 1933 and King Ghāzī in 1939, are indicative of their
desire to be part of that newly emerging national community, in the varying
political contexts of each event.Here the possibility of expressing itself publicly
as a Jewish community emphasizes the community’s adherence to national
ideals and its symbols, symbols that in that period included the Hashemite
monarchy’s rule over Iraq. In her contribution, Aline Schlaepfer examines the
Jewish community’s sincere sympathy for Fayṣal and much more cautious
assessment of Ghāzī, then juxtaposes the two occasions of mourning, first
for Fayṣal, then the much more expressive mourning for Ghāzī. Her analysis
underlines the political rather than emotional nature of these public stagings
of grief: at the time of Fayṣal’s death, the Jewish community still felt relatively
secure about their own position in Iraqi society, by the time Ghāzī died in 1939,
the Iraqi government’s flirtations with Nazism and the increased politicization
of Zionism in the wider Arab world made it all the more important to express,
as publicly and explicitly as possible, their adherence to the Iraqi state’s pan-
Arabist stance.
Such a message of ‘religious harmony and solidarity’28 has become a staple
of the rituals of nation states in theMiddle East and elsewhere,where occasions
28 Schlaepfer, this volume.
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of grief, joy or external threat are used to express solidarity and conformity
to the nation state. One of the earliest recorded events are the public cele-
brations, all over the Ottoman Empire, of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908.
Everywhere people of different religions went out into the streets together, cel-
ebrating the constitutional changes that were expected to bring more freedom
and more democratic rights to all citizens of the Ottoman state. These public
demonstrations in support of Ottomanism were joined by people of all reli-
gions, but certainly not by everyone in every group. Wallach writes about Gad
Frumkin, a young Ashkenazi Jewish journalist who reported on these celebra-
tions in Jerusalem, where Sephardic Jews participated in great numbers, but
Frumkin’s own Ashkenazi peers were conspicuously absent.29 Here, in con-
trast to the mourning rituals described by Schlaepfer, participation was not
communally staged, and might have been mostly an individual affair. Clearly
some parts of the Jewish community were much more interested in these new
Ottoman ideals than others.
These changing relationships between the various communal components
of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states constituted also a cause for
violence that often has been interpreted as ‘intercommunal.’ Massot’s detailed
analysis of the context of the events in Damascus in 1860, when Christians in
the Old City quarters were murdered and much of their property was looted
and destroyed, shows that this is a far too easy generalization. Indeed, the eigh-
teenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century saw an increased
politicization of the various non-Muslim communities, a politicization that
created what has been called a ‘sectarianism’ different from the forms of com-
munal identity that existed in the eighteenth century andbefore. This new type
of communal politics included, among other things, foreign protection of vari-
ous communities, with the British extending protection to Jews and Druze, the
French to the Eastern andOriental Catholic Christians, and the Russians to the
Greek (‘Rum’ or ‘Antiochian’) Orthodox. Such political protection, by virtue of
earlier treaties between the Ottoman Empire and foreign states, also brought
economic benefits, at least for some. It is the combination of political empow-
erment with economic advances thatmade the changes of the nineteenth cen-
tury difficult to bear for those Muslims who in the process lost political and
economic power. Therefore, asMassot argues, it was no coincidence that those
hardest hit by the events of 1860 in Damascus were those Christians with the
most obvious foreign connections and those who profited most visibly eco-
nomically, i.e., those living in the prominent newly renovated neighborhoods
29 Wallach (this volume) bases himself on Frumkin’s journal.
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of Bab Sharqi and Bab Tuma rather than those living in more modest quarters
in the Maydan (Midan) neighborhood. While indeed Muslims attacked Chris-
tians, the conflicts are much better explained by economic and social rivalries
among certain parts of the population, where the increased opportunities for
one group were envied by another, than by more general tensions between
Muslims and Christians.30
Arabic and Its Alternatives: Language and Education as Tools of
Belonging
When talking about ‘common ground’ and the role of the public sphere, the
importance of a common language can hardly be overstated. In discussions
on the emergence of the Arab states, therefore, the importance of Arabic is
explicitly emphasized.More in-depth analyses, however, on types ofArabic and
how they functioned as a means of communication between the various sub-
groups of these societies, are mostly lacking.31 Early nationalist authors such
as George Antonius and Edmond Rabbath, in their English and French writ-
ings stressed the link between spokenArabic and the Arab ‘race,’ with language
and race together forming the basis of the ideology of Arab nationalism on
which the emergent states were based. However, to account for the multiple
30 On the mid-nineteenth century violence in Lebanon/Syria, see Makdisi, A Culture of Sec-
tarianism, and recently Feras Krimsti, Die Unruhen von 1850 in Aleppo: Gewalt im urbanen
Raum (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2014). Similar violence took place in the Hakkari
Mountains (present-day Turkey) in the 1840s and 1850s; no monograph has yet been
devoted to it, but see the relevant chapters in J.F. Coakley, The Church of the East and the
Church of England. A History of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Assyrian Mission (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992), John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters
with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Powers [Studies in Christian
Mission 26] (Leiden: Brill, 2000), andWilmshurst, TheMartyred Church.
31 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Arabic and Arabic nationalism,
see Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity (Washington, dc: George-
town University Press, 2003), and from the same author, Arabic in the Fray: Language
Ideology and Cultural Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). For a recent
overview of a more strict sociolinguistic approach, see Reem Bassiouney, Arabic Sociolin-
guistics: Topics inDiglossia, Gender, Identity, andPolitics (Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity
Press, 2009). For the Lebanese case, see John E. Joseph, Language and Identity: National,
Ethnic, Religious (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Franck Salameh, Language,
Memory, and Identity in the Middle East: The Case for Lebanon (Lanham, md: Lexington
Books, 2010).
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ways in which Arabic was part of the different communities that made up the
states they envisaged (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine), Arab nationalists allowed for
a rather flexible interpretation of what counted as Arabic, and, more impor-
tantly, for ‘assimilation’ and ‘devenir arabe’ with regard to culture and ethnic
belonging.32 Thus ‘being Arab’ was not necessarily an essentialist given, even
if, ultimately, ‘Arabness’ wasmeasured against a community’s linkwith the ulti-
mate Arabness of the Arabian Peninsula.33 However flexible this nationalist
ideology may have been (intended as it was to include as many groups as pos-
sible), it needed a clearly defined form of practiced Arabic to support it. This
‘Modern Standard Arabic’ (msa, or fuṣḥa), as it came to be called, was to func-
tion as ameasuring rod for the degree of commitment to Arabness, as a symbol
for a unity that did not yet exist.
However, the success of Modern Standard Arabic depended on the fact that,
true to its origins in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary renewal,
it was much more than a nationalist tool.34 The standardized form of the
ClassicalArabic language emergedwhen theneed for new types of learning and
communication grewoutside theboundsof traditional religious learningbased
on the holy writs of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Members of literary and
journalistic circles transcended religious and regional differences and further
developed this particular form of Arabic that gradually, sometime between the
early and final decades of the nineteenth century, became the lingua franca
of the Middle East. As a lingua franca it was well placed to transcend a host
of linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences that threatened the success of
state formation. The successful duo that supported the emergent nationalism
was, therefore, linguistic modernization and standardization supported by the
modernization and standardization of education. It worked the other way
round as well: successful nation building (with the help of and in opposition to
the mandate powers) enhanced the importance of msa through state support
and control of education.
32 Rabbath, Unité Syrienne et devenier arabe (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1937), 43, 97. On the
related issue of the categories of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ in Palestine, see Jonathan Marc Gri-
betz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
33 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 17. On Antonius’ linguistic ideologies, see Heleen Murre-
van den Berg, “The Language of the Nation: The Rise of Arabic among Jews and Christians
(1900–1950)”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2016), doi: 10.1080/13530194.2016
.1138641.
34 M.M. Badawi, Modern Arabic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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It is essential, however, to keep in mind that the link between national-
ism and educational and linguistic reform is by no means exclusive: a well-
developed lingua franca can easily be put to other uses, usages that may easily
contradict the tenets of particular nationalisms, be it in enabling rival political
ideologies such as communism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism, or in empow-
ering subgroups to pursue their own specific aims—from a Christian inter-
denominational ecumenism to trans-regional business practices. The multi-
ple functions of language, be they ideological, pragmatic or both, is one of
the main themes of the essays in the second part of the volume. The role of
Arabic in education, especially in private education as supported by western
missionary and philanthropic organizations, and in private essays and letters,
provides the starting point of the contributions by Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah,
Karène Summerer-Sanchez, and Tijmen Baarda.
Before discussing inmore detail themain conclusions of these three papers,
the specific characteristics of the common ground we discuss in this section
need to be delineated. Schools, especially those privately financed, constituted
a particular kind of middle ground between public and private. As Goldstein-
Sabbah argues in her paper on Jewish education in Baghdad, the administra-
tion of the various Jewish schools consciously devised their curricula and their
public presence with a view towards the Iraqi Nation, similar to (and partly
in conjunction with) the way the community devised the public rituals dis-
cussed by Schlaepfer. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Sanchez Sum-
merer’s paper, which describes how Catholic schools in Palestine reacted to
the changing times of themandate period. In addition, theCatholic Palestinian
schools, more so than those in Baghdad, also constituted places of encounter
just by virtue of their mixed population of pupils from Jewish, Muslim, and
Christian families. Put differently, themodern schools of the twentieth century
became places where, on a small scale, the sometimes conflicting ideological
and pragmatic aims of the sponsoring communities, parents, and wider public
(including governments) had to be negotiated in order to arrive at a workable
curriculum. Thus, what was negotiated in the schools reflected discussions in
the religious communities themselves, with all the nuances and differences
that came with it.
Two major conclusions emerge from the contributions of Sanchez Sum-
merer, Goldstein-Sabbah, and Baarda. The first is that in the two very different
contexts, that of the Jewish community in Baghdad and that of the Catholics
in Jerusalem, teaching of (and in) Arabic increased considerably over time
(with the support of the clergy, especially the Melkite patriarch), in order to
keep pace with the increased importance of Arabic at all levels of society
in both Iraq and Palestine. Basing himself on private correspondence within
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the Syriac community in northern Iraq, Baarda comes to a similar conclusion:
here too the use of Arabic was widespread and its standardized form gained
ground over and above non-standard forms.35 However, the second conclusion
of these papers must be that the strengthening of Arabic in each of these three
cases was less straightforwardly connected to nationalism and modernization
than one may have expected, mainly for two reasons: the interference of and
tensions with governments and external donors who favored languages other
than Arabic, and the conflicting ambitions within the communities them-
selves.
In Palestine, the Catholic schools that were sponsored and organized by
French congregations had to negotiate between the demands of the British
Palestinian government and those of the local population. French, which had
been an important language in Palestine until World War i, lost its status
under the mandate, and the official languages of the country became Arabic,
Hebrew, and English. Furthermore, the mandate system favored clear distinc-
tions between the Jewish-Hebrew system on the one hand, and the Arabic-
Palestinian system on the other. The Catholic schools that had previously func-
tioned mostly in a French-language context had to include English and more
Arabic in their curriculum in order to provide their pupils with the means to
function well in the local job market. In general, it seems that these develop-
ments were supported by the Arabic-speaking Catholics of Jerusalem, as they
probably were byMuslim parents that sent their children to these schools. This
change in focus implied that what in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury had effectively become the francophonie of Middle Eastern Catholicism,
now returned to its earlier arabophone leanings. As Sanchez Summerer notes,
the Vatican, which sought the creation of an ‘Arab’ Christianity, supported this
change. Ironically, French did indeed remain part of the curriculum, butmostly
because of its worldly, rather than its religious benefits.36
35 While the importance of Arabic among the Jews of Baghdad has been noted earlier (see
Goldstein-Sabbah and Schroeter in this volume), Schroeter points to the much more
varied picture for the rest of the Middle Eastern Jewish world. In many other places,
spoken forms of Arabic, and the written Judeo-Arabic, were replaced not by modern
Arabic, but by French (in North Africa) and English, or by Hebrew; for Hebrew, see
Wallach; note that his protagonist argued for better knowledge of Arabic in the Jewish
community.
36 On the importance of Arabic in the Catholic world of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, see Bernard Heyberger, Les chrétiens du Proche Orient au temps de la réforme
catholique (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athenes et de Rome 284; Rome: École
Françaises de Rome, 1994); Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Classical Syriac, Neo-Aramaic
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In Baghdad, too, government pressures led to an increase in Arabic teaching,
although the language had not been completely absent from Jewish communal
schools in thenineteenth andearly twentieth century. TheAlliance schools, the
most prestigious ones, with external funding, employed an Ottoman Turkish
curriculum that also included French and Ottoman Turkish. However, Arabic
also quickly gained importance in business and administration, perhaps more
than it did in Palestine, and soon the schools wholeheartedly cooperated in
increasing the amount and the level of Arabic. At the same time, as in Palestine,
English was added to the curriculum, after having been nearly absent from
most Baghdad schools.
As Goldstein-Sabbah notes in her overview of the Jewish communal school
system, the time devoted to Arabic varied considerably from one school to
another, with considerable differences not only between the more expensive
Alliance schools and themuch cheaper religious schools, but also between the
boys’ and girls’ schools of the Alliance. By comparing these different curricula
against the background of the governmental public schools, Goldstein-Sabbah
differentiates between the various goals of language teaching within the Jew-
ish community. Most goals were pragmatic and geared towards the future
roles of boys and girls in and outside the Jewish community. Well-off fami-
lies wanted their sons to know Arabic and English, because these were basic
essentials needed to compete for jobs in public administration and commerce.
Girls needed no such skills, and were taught high level French in addition to
more homely subjects such as sewing, embroidery, and hygiene. Girls of the
poorer families had little access to education; their parents had to make tough
choices whether to send their male siblings to the governmental schools for
a secular education in Arabic or to a free communal school that would teach
mostlyHebrewand religion.While all of this appears to be the rather pragmatic
outcome of needs and financial possibilities, Goldstein-Sabbah notes the inter-
play of these developments with larger changes in society. Not only was Arabic
first introduced at a larger scale under government pressure in the 1920s, but
when, in the 1940s, the nationalist rhetoric becamemore encompassing, all the
and Arabic in the Church of the East and the Chaldean Church between 1500 and 1800,” in
Holger Gzella, Margaretha L. Folmer (eds.), Aramaic in its Historical and Linguistic Setting
(Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission 50;Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008),
335–352; Carsten Michael Walbiner, “Some Observations on the Perception and Under-
standing of Printing amongst the Arab Greek Orthodox (Melkites) in the Seventeenth
Century,” in Philip Sadgrove (ed.), Printing and Publishing in the Middle East (jss suple-
ment 24) (Oxford/Manchester, 2008), 65–76; and Georg Graf, Geschichte der christlichen
arabischen Literatur, 5 vols (Vatikanstadt, 1944–1955).
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schools increased their level of Arabic teaching, including the Laura Kadoorie
girls’ school and the religious Midrash Talmud Torah schools.
The growing importance of Modern Standard Arabic can also be examined
from the perspective of the language itself. Baarda’s contribution takes its start-
ing point in the Syriac communities of Iraq, to see how scholars used the lan-
guage in their correspondence in the 1920s. The two scholars whose Arabic
he analyzes, Mattai bar Paulus of Mosul (1861–1947) and Nematallah Denno
(1884–1951) both belonged to the Syriac Orthodox Church. Mattai was a dea-
conandanaccomplished scribe of Syriacmanuscripts, Nematallahpresumably
also knew Classical Syriac, the ecclesiastical language of the Syriac Orthodox
Church. Despite their scholarly proficiency in Classical Syriac, both used Ara-
bic in their writings: Mattai in his letters to Alphonse Mingana (c. 1870–1937),
another Syriac scholar who had continued his career in Great Britain (Birm-
ingham), Nematallah in a biographical note aboutMattai that presumably was
also sent to Mingana.37 As Baarda notes, such usage of Arabic for personal and
scholarly communication is not unexpected, because in the Syriac Orthodox
communities of northern Iraq, Arabic had long been established as a spoken
vernacular and in the form of a substandard ‘Middle Arabic’ form for writing,
including the translation of Classical Syriac texts. This form of substandard,
dialectally influenced Arabic was, until the early twentieth century, usually
written in Syriac script, and as such indicated by the term ‘Garshuni.’ In the
twentieth century, the use of Garshuni quickly diminished, and standardized
Arabic in Arabic script increased. It is surprising that Mattai and Nematallah
used two diametrically opposed forms of written Arabic, in ways contrary to
what we knew so far. Mattai writes with a well-formed Arabic handwriting,
but includes a number of substandard grammatical forms that do not take
into account the recent standardizations of Arabic. Nematallah, by contrast,
writes in Garshuni but in perfectly standardized Arabic. Perhaps the expla-
nation is to be found in different educational trajectories: Mattai was trained
earlier in traditional schools andNematallah, being younger, was educated in a
moremodern school. However, we knowalmost nothing about these twomen’s
personal histories, so this remains conjectural. Even more conjectural are the
possible reasons for the Garshuni in Nematallah’s text. Did he want to impress
Mingana with his Syriac handwriting? Or did he agree with those in the Syriac
community who thought that for internal purposes clergy and scholars should
use the Syriac script (even for Arabic) to express their solidarity with the Syr-
37 Nematallah’s text ended up in the collection ofMattai’s letters toMingana in Birmingham;
see Baarda in this volume for the details.
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iac Christian community? Or did he intend to emphasize his Syriac communal,
nationalist, leanings? Or was the text originally addressed to a different, local
northern Iraqi clerical audience that would have preferred Syriac script?
Whatever the reasons for Nematallah’s remarkable choice of Garshuni, its
mere occurrence alerts us to the fact that the general picture of a straightfor-
ward development inwhichArabic becomes standardized and other languages
lose ground, may need further refinement, if only to account for the erratic
ways inwhich individuals at variouspointsmade their ownchoices. If anything,
these examples, like the trajectories of the curricula of the communal schools in
Baghdad and Jerusalem,make clear that the choice of Arabic was not necessar-
ily one that wasmotivated by Arab nationalism, even if the Christians involved
may have been loyal supporters of Iraqi or Palestinian nationalist aims.
The Rough Edges of the Nation State: Between Belonging and
Expulsion
Commongroundbetween the various communities thatmake up a nation can-
not always be found. Many contributions in this volume touch on the negative
side of the search for communalities, the failures, the stories of exclusion and
expulsion, rather than integration. Peaceful coexistence or at the very least
benign neglect were not always possible. Violence against non-Muslims, as
discussed in Massot’s article, usually arises from a complex interplay of socio-
economic and political factors, playing out on a particular subgroup, which in
that moment embodies societal anxieties. The violence against Christians in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included these same ingredi-
ents, but then became exacerbated by nationalist ideologies that generalized
the violence to an extent theseChristian communities hadnot yet experienced.
It was mostly Turkish nationalism, in conjunction with the very real interna-
tional pressures upon the Ottoman Empire from Russia, France and England
that paved theway for the genocide onArmenian and Syriac Christians in East-
ern Anatolia, Hakkari and northwestern Iran. The Christian communities of
North Iraq, as well as those from Lebanon/Syria, weremostly spared—it seems
that for the Young Turks, the Arab provinces warranted a different political
regime. In addition, the Armenians had incurred Turkey’s wrath by passively
or actively supporting the Russians, hoping to gain some kind of independence
out of it—providing yet another pretext for the wholesale expulsion of Arme-
nians from Eastern Turkey, an expulsion in most cases accompanied by the
gruesome murder of the adult men and followed by the deaths of many who
were put on marches to the Syrian desert.
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Much has been written about the Armenian genocide, while the simulta-
neous massacres on Syriac, Assyrian and Chaldean Christians yet awaits full
inclusion into the scholarly debate about this violent episode of Middle East-
ern history. The expulsion and population transfer that befell the so-called
‘Greek’ Christians of Anatolia (who were mostly Turkish speaking) falls mostly
outside the scope of this volume.38 What is especially relevant for the current
volume, is the fact that many of the genocide survivors, especially those from
the Armenian and Syriac communities, ended up in the Arab mandate states,
in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Although there had beenmodest
Armenian and Syriac communities in most of these countries, there numbers
swelled considerably by the new arrivals. This was the case especially in Beirut
andAleppowhichwelcomed large Syriac andArmenian populations. In places
like Jerusalem, BethlehemandAmman, the communitieswere practically new.
While the actual civil status of these refugeesdiffered fromplace toplace and
country to country, most at some point received citizenship and were officially
integrated into the new states. However, despite the fact that often they were
not so different from the Christian communities that had already longtime
roots in a particular region, many of these communities assumed a low profile
and in many respects can be seen as the first Christian minorities. Most came
with little Arabic and preferred to maintain the language and culture of their
Anatolian hometowns. Also after many had caught up on Arabic and had
managed to build up their lives again, their connection to the new Arab states
was fundamentally different from that of the Christians who had lived there
formany generations. Formost, and inmost locations, aminority position that
allowed for the development of separate Syriac or Armenian identities fitted
their needs well.39
Such type of minority integration, however, did not fit the wishes of the
Assyrians from Hakkari many of whom had ended up in a refugee camp in
38 On the Armenian genocide, Taner Akcam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and
the Question of Turkish Responsibility (London: Constable & Robinson, 2007) Hans Lukas
Kieser: Der verpasste Friede: Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei,
1839–1938 (Zürich: Chronos, 2000); on the Syriac genocide, called Sayfo/Saypa (‘Sword’),
see David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern
Anatolia during World War i (Piscataway, nj: Gorgias Press, 2006) and Florence Hellot-
Bellier, Chroniques demassacres annoncés: Les Assyro-Chaldéens d’ Iran en duHakkari face
aux ambition des empire, 1896–1920 (Paris: Geuthner, 2014).
39 Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “A Center of Transnational Syriac Orthodoxy: St. Mark’s
Convent in Jerusalem,” Journal of Levantine Studies 3, no. 1 (2013): 61–83, Migliorino,
(Re)Constructing Armenia.
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Baʿquba. Their refusal to be integrated as Christian minority tragically ended
in government-sanctioned massacre in Semele (North Iraq) in 1933. In sev-
eral contributions to this volume, this event, which until recently had received
rather limited academic treatment, is discussed. In current literature, the mas-
sacre of at least 360 disarmed men and a few women in the village of Semele
by army troops led by army commander Bakr Sidqi (against a background of
looting and killings in Assyrian villages in a wider area of north Iraq), is seen
as a telltale event in the formation of the Iraqi state.40 While in Assyrian his-
toriography the events have often been interpreted as the logical outcome of
British betrayal in combination with long-term anti-Christian sentiments in
Iraqi society,41 authors such as Husry and Zubaida stress the difficult position
in which the Assyrians had placed themselves, a position that made them an
easy target in a period of uncertain leadership and fierce discussions about the
direction of the Iraqi state. At the time, many Iraqis understood the violence
against these Assyrians as part of a national struggle against a rebellious group
with British sympathies, a group that could count on little sympathy from the
general population in Baghdad and other urban centers like Mosul and Basra,
be they Christian, Jewish or Muslim.
As shown by Schlaepfer, in that context Bakr Sidqi’s military actions worked
in uniting the rest of population in support of the new government. The Assyri-
ans themselves, though united in horror about what happened, were internally
divided over the political course that had led to these massacres; many did not
endorse the patriarch’s attempt to advocate a separate status for the Assyrian
Christian community, a status with greater legal and temporal powers for the
40 See the discussion of the literature by Sami Zubaida, “Contested Nations: Iraq and the
Assyrians,”Nations and Nationalism 6, no. 3 (2000): 363–382 and my interpretation of the
importance of the event for the Assyrians in Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Light from
the East (1948–1954) and the De-Territorialization of the Assyrian Church of the East,”
in Wim Hofstee and Arie van der Kooij (eds.), Religion beyond its Private Role in Modern
Society (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 115–134. The earlier work of Joseph, The Modern Assyrians
and Khaldun S. Husry, “The Assyrian Affair of 1933,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies 5 (1974), 161–176 (i) and 344–360 (ii), as well as the contemporary analysis by
R.S. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935),
remain important. For a recent re-evaluation of the sources from an Assyrian perspective,
see Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History.
41 Assyrian historiography is based largely on Yaquw bar Malek Ismail, Āturāyē w-trēy plāšē
tbīlāyē, h.d., Āturāyē men 1914 hal 1945 (‘Assyrians and the Two World Wars, i.e., Assyrians
between 1914 and 1945’; Tehran: Maṭbaʿtā d-sīʿta seprāytā d-ʿallīmē Āturāyē, 1964); Yusuf
Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians (Chicago: The Assyrian National Federation
and The Assyrian National League of America, 1935).
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patriarch and some kind of regional independence, and therefore fundamen-
tally different from that of other Christian communities in Iraq. Many of the
Assyrians, like the Chaldeans with whom they shared a long common history
in northern Iraq, preferred non-preferential treatment by the Iraqi government
and were inclined to acknowledge the state’s power, relinquish dreams of a
separate homeland, and allow restricting the clergy’s powers to the spiritual
realm.42
The contributions by Laura Robson and Hannah Müller-Sommerfeld
address the importance of a refugee camp for displaced Assyrians and Armeni-
ans in understanding the dynamics of the failed inclusion of the Assyrians into
the Iraqi state. The Baʿquba camp, not far from Baghdad, was set up under the
responsibility of the League of Nations and administered by British officials. It
arose from the need to cater to the tribal Assyrians who had been forced to flee
first the Hakkari province (in today’s eastern Turkey) to Urmia (in northwest-
ern Iran), from where they joined the Russian and Armenian armies in their
fight against Turkish and Kurdish troops.When the situation in Urmia deterio-
rated after the Russians retreated early in January 1918 and Turkish andKurdish
forces oncemoremarched up to Urmia in Iran, many Assyrians decided to flee
towards British-ruled territory in Iraq, preferring British protection opposed to
Persian protection. In this period, the Assyrian leadership had been made to
believe that the British would support not only resettlement in their ancestral
homelands in Hakkari, but also some kind of Wilsonian semi-independence.
Thus, for the Assyrians from Hakkari, the camp in Baʿquba essentially was a
temporary provision before they could return to the north.43
While differing in their analysis of the causes, both Robson and Müller-
Sommerfeld underline the significance of the camp in creating a newminority
identity for the Assyrians. In the camp, the Assyrians were treated as stateless
refugees, who, being largely dependent on the British colonial administration
for jobs, education, and sustenance, were inspired to re-invent themselves in
the post-war era away from Iraqi society. Robson stresses the way in which
the camp, by virtue of its specific organizational and spatial set-up, fostered
42 Murre-van den Berg, “Light from the East,” andMüller-Sommerfeld in this volume. On the
Chaldeans in this period little has been written so far, but see Wilmshurst, The Martyred
Church.
43 For more detail, see the contributions by Robson and Müller-Sommerfeld in this volume;
the standard work for this period is John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians; see also the
overview work byWilmshurst, TheMartyred Church. The most detailed discussion of this
episode, based on many new sources, is found in Hellot-Bellier, Chroniques de massacres
annoncés; she also traces the history of the much contested British promises (497–506).
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separate ‘national’ identities for the Assyrians and the Armenians. The two
groups were separated as much as possible from each other and from Iraqi
society, with educational programs in the camp focusing on preparing pupils
for a future return to a ‘homeland’ with some kind of separate existence from
the Iraqi or Turkish states. Whereas Robson emphasizes the British agency
in this respect,44 Müller-Sommerfeld, by studying the so far largely untapped
archives of the League of Nations, shows that the Assyrians themselves were
keen to fully employ the League of Nations’ system of minority protection in
their favor. Her study of the archives underlines the divisions within Assyrian
society, not only between those in the camp (mostly from Hakkari) and those
outside the camp (Assyrians that had always lived in what was to become the
state of Iraq), but also among the Assyrians from Hakkari, who had conflicting
regional and familial interests. Earlier tribal and regional subdivisions often
translated into different political positions among those who contested the
leadership of the patriarchal family.
In the final analysis, the outcome of the process was that the Baʿquba camp,
instead of easing the transition from being stateless refugees to becoming
integrated citizens of the Iraqi state, sanctioned their separate trajectories.
Even after it had become clear (Lausanne Conference, 1922–1923, final decision
in 1925) that the Assyrians would not be allowed to return to Hakkari, nor
would they be granted (semi-)independence within the new borders of Iraq,
both the British and the League of Nations failed to convince the Assyrians
to come to terms with this loss. The deep chasm between the nationalist
hopes of the Assyrian leadership, especially the party supporting the young
patriarchMar ShimunEshai (in office 1920–1975), and the avowedaimofBritish
and Iraqi government officials to integrate the Assyrians in a multi-ethnic
and multi-religious Iraq, played a crucial role in developments leading up to
the dramatic events of the summer of 1933. The patriarch was unwilling to
consider proposals for the resettlement of the Hakkari Assyrians in other parts
of northern Iraq, and even more unwilling to relinquish his temporal powers
over the community and limit his leadership to the spiritual. Probably driven
by fear of whatmight happen to the Assyrians once their British protectors had
left Iraq, the patriarch refused to let the Hakkari Assyrians integrate into Iraqi
society. Mar Shimon Eshai’s refusal to adapt to the changing circumstances
and instead to allow for the armed resistance of Assyrians in the north, were
important factors in the chain of events that led to themassacre of Semele. This
played out at a moment in time when power struggles in Iraq’s administrative
44 Cf. also Sanchez Summerer in this volume.
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circles had destabilized the country and the events were easily framed as yet
another indication of the Assyrian threat to Iraqi national unity. It was only
towards the end of 1948 that the patriarch, who was forced into exile in 1933,
officially relinquished his temporal powers and the Assyrian community in
many ways became like other non-Muslim communities in Iraqi society: full
citizens of an Arab state rather than a minority waiting for its full rights.45
The story does not end here, though. While the Assyrians from Baʿquba
obtained Iraqi citizenship and settled in the north or in Baghdad, or emigrated
to nearby Syria wheremanyHakkari Assyrians found a place to live,46 or places
further away, the tensions surrounding their place in Iraqi society were not
over. Though some of the most ardent Assyrian nationalists emigrated to Syria
or the United States, the old separatist nationalism remained popular among
Assyrians in the north, in the slipstream of Kurdish nationalism. Suffering with
the Kurds under Saddam’s genocide in the 1980s, the Assyrians profited from
independence from Saddam’s Iraq in the early 1990s and were able to build
up a Syriac (Aramaic)-based educational system and other cultural institu-
tions.47 Different from the Armenian and Syriac refugees that settles in Syria
and Lebanon, the Assyrians found it difficult to settle for amere quietistminor-
ity existence. At the same time, full cultural and linguistic integration, such
as sought after by many Chaldeans, was practically anathema to the Assyri-
ans, even if individuals, especially after World War ii, would make different
choices.
Thus, in conclusion, one could attribute the Assyrians’ clash with the Iraqi
nation state to a combination of their well-developed and thoroughly modern
sense of their own national identity (based on an older tradition of political,
social, and cultural independence), and their displacement, vulnerability, and
colonial complicity in the post-war era. In deciding what was the most impor-
45 See Müller-Sommerfeld, this volume; Joseph, TheModern Assyrians, 175 ff.
46 Shabo Talay, Die neuaramäischen Dialekte der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien: Ein-
führung, Phonologie und Morphologie (Semitica viva, Bd. 40; Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz,
2008).
47 On Assyrians and Chaldeans in the twentieth century, see Herman Teule, Les Assyro-
Chaldéens. Chrétiens d’ Irak, d’ Iran et de Turquie (Turnhout: Brepols 2008); Heleen Murre-
van den Berg, “The Syriac Churches,” in Ken Parry, The Blackwell Companion to Eastern
Christianity (Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 249–268; Wilmshurst,
The Martyred Church; and J.F. Coakley, “The Church of the East since 1914,” in J.F. Coakley
and K. Parry, “The Church of the East: Life and Thought,” Bulletin of the John Rylands
University Library 78, no. 3 (1996): 179–198, Suha Rassam, Christianity in Iraq: Its Origins
and Development to the Present Day (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2005).
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tant factor in this, wemust take into accountMüller-Sommerfeld’s observation
that in addition to the Assyrians, two other groups in Iraq started using the
vocabulary of minorities: the Kurds and the Bahaʾis. Other Christians and the
Jews refrained from doing so; they, with whatever uncertainties they may have
felt for their future, identified at least superficially with the nationalist defini-
tions of Iraq, with its combination of Arabism and state secularism. Clearly, the
state’s emphasis onArabic andArabismexcludedKurds,who emphasized their
own different ethnic identity; this was an exclusion that was mitigated only
slightly by some cooptation of Kurds in the central government. The exclusion
of the Bahaʾis reminds us that this state secularism was predicated on Islamic
definitions of acceptable religions, and thus in practicemostly excluded newer
religions such a Bahaʾism. In hindsight we may say that this implicit Islamic
premise of acceptable religious difference proved the starting point for more
extremist interpretations at a later phase.
Transnational Dynamics
Meanwhile, another nation state in the making was to create its own minori-
ties, inside and outside the country. The creation of the state of Israel, with the
official backing of the United Nations, changed the rules of who belonged to
the majority population overnight. This was the case in the confines of the
new-born state of Israel, where many Palestinians were forced to flee during
the war of 1948 and those that remained became minorities in a state that was
predicated on Zionism, Judaism, and Hebrew. In reaction to this, Jewish com-
munities in many places in the Middle East were cast as unwanted minorities,
whether or not they identified with this new state and its non-Arabic identity,
andwhether or not they themselves preferred to see themselves as such. These
events underline how issues of majority andminority are related not merely to
the nation state as such, but to the nation state in its regional and transnational
connections. That is, processes of minoritization and the success or failure of
‘common grounds’ cannot be understood without also taking into account the
process of migration (caused by varying degrees of material violence as well
as social, economic, and politic pressures) and the emergence of transnational
communities.
As referred to above, World War i led to the emergence of a number of
refugee communities of Syriac, Assyrian, and Armenian Christians, mostly
from today’s Turkey. These population movements changed the social dynam-
ics ofmany places in the ArabMiddle East: these Christians becameminorities
in urban areas such as Jerusalem, Beirut, Aleppo, Baghdad, Cairo, and Mosul,
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whereas the rural Jazirah region in northeast Syria was transformed by the
influxofChristian farmers fromeasternAnatolia and later byHakkariAssyrians
expulsed by Iraq.48 In addition, large groups of Syriacs, Assyrians and Armeni-
ans moved outside the region, to the Americas, to the southern states of the
ussr, and to Europe. In the process they created ever expanding transnational
networkswith nodes both in and near their places of origin and throughout the
rest of the world. These nodes and networks that were created in the interwar
years made use of trajectories and expatriate communities that were estab-
lished in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then too, violence and
social pressure played a role in stimulating migration (the first large group left
Lebanon/Syria after the massacres of 1860), though longstanding commercial
networks (especially those created by Persian Armenians in the seventeenth
century) and contacts in the Christian world (Catholic networks of the six-
teenth century onwards and Protestant connections built in the nineteenth
century) were just as important.49
Thus it is no surprise that these transnational networks play a role in many
of the contributions to this volume even if these networks, as such, are not the
principle theme. When one reads the articles in the volume from this perspec-
tive, one is inclined to assume that the rapid expansion of these transnational
networks often impeded the further development of common ground that pro-
vides space for discussions about the common good. The transnational space
that the Iraqi Jews created for themselves, in which they were culturally, famil-
ially, commercially, and religiously bound to Asia, Palestine, England, France,
and America, made it easier to disconnect themselves from Iraq when societal
pressures increased. Similarly for the Assyrians from Hakkari, whose ties with
Russia, Lebanon, Europe, and America dated from before World War i.
48 Sedah Altuğ, “Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, Land and Violence in the
Memories of World War i and the French Mandate (1915–1939)” (PhD, Utrecht University,
2011); Talay, Shabo, Die neuaramäischen Dialekte der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien. Ein-
führung,PhonologieundMorphologie (Wiesbaden:Harrasowitz, 2008), idem,Neuaramäis-
che Texte in den Dialekten der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz,
2009).
49 Albert Hourani, Nadim Shehadi, The Lebanese in theWorld: A Century of Emigration (Lon-
don: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), Naures Atto, Hostages in the Homeland,
Orphans in the Diaspora: Identity Discourses among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the Euro-
pean Diaspora (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011), Murre-van den Berg, H.L. (2002),
“Migration of Middle Eastern Christians to Western Countries and Protestant Missionary
Activities in theMiddle East. A Preliminary Investigation,” in The Journal of Eastern Chris-
tian Studies [Formerly Het Christelijk Oosten] 54, 1–2, 39–49.
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The situation was somewhat different for the Catholics in Jerusalem and
Palestine at large. While their connections to the French-Catholic world ini-
tiallymayhaveheld themback in their identificationwithArab andPalestinian
nationalism, in later decades these wider Catholic networks stimulated their
identification with the region, rather than with the West in general or France
in particular. Thus, depending on the further religious and political develop-
ments within these networks, they either grew into alternative communities
or into support structures for local identification. Though overall the Catholic
(and the Protestant) network might have been more effective in stimulating
local rootedness, in the end its effects are the same as with the other transna-
tional networks. The mere existence of such networks made the communities
vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty to the state, while at the same time these
networks increased the access of the communities to opportunities outside the
region.
In the period following World War ii, the benefits of migration mostly went
both ways, with the transnational connections and transcultural skills that
camewith it serving theChristian communities in theMiddleEast.When in the
1960s and 1970s the Arab countries were eager to take further steps on the road
of cultural and economic westernization, it was often the Christians that func-
tioned as cultural brokers. Christians were relatively well educated and much
more acquainted with western mores and habits; they spoke the languages of
theWest as well as the languages of the region, in literal and metaphoric ways.
As a result, they occupied crucial and highly visible positions in public life, in
education, journalism, music, literature and arts, science and medicine, thus
contributing actively and publicly to the creation of a common ground.
From the late 1970s onwards, however, this fragile equilibrium started to
break down. The Christians’ position as cultural brokers was challenged by
the double effect of a quickly growing well-educated Muslim middle class
that competed for the same jobs in societies that increasingly looked in other
directions than Europe and America for ideological inspiration, cultural role
models, and economic power, be it to Turkey, China or the Gulf.50 At the same
time, political instability in the region made for increased migration of the
Christian communities. Palestinian Christians followed their co-religionist to
50 Tarek Mitri, “Christians in the Arab East: An Interpretation of Contemporary History,” in
Habib Badr, et al., Christianity: A History in the Middle East (Beirut: Middle East Council
of Churches, 2005), 933 pp; Translated from: Al Masiḥiyya ʿAbra Tārīkhihā fī al-Mashreq
(Beirut: Middle East Council of Churches, 2001), 851–867; Najib George Awad, And Free-
dom Became a Public-Square: Political, Sociological and Religious Overviews on the Arab
Christians and the Arabic Spring (Vienna/Berlin: lit Verlag, 2012).
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the America’s after the war of 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and
the West Bank. Massive migration from Lebanon started in 1975, when both
Christians andMuslims fled the devastations wrought by the Civil War. Coptic
Christians started to leave Egypt from the 1970s onwards, first to other places
in the Middle East, then also to the America’s, Europe, Australia and Africa.
Meanwhile, the small Syriac community from Turkey was caught in the war
between the Turkish army and the pkk (1980s–1990s). From 1990 onwards,
political and economic pressures pressured Iraq’s Christians to migrate, seeing
ever increasing numbers from 2003 onwards when during what grew to be a
straightforward civil war, Christians were targeted expressly, mostly by Sunni
extremists.
All of this did not immediately break down the communality betweenChris-
tians and Muslims that had been created in the first part of the twentieth
century. Much of the structures and places of encounter remained intact. The
combination, however, of numerical and cultural marginalization of the Chris-
tianswith the increased political clout of the diaspora communities,made for a
different dynamic, both within the Christian communities and between them
and the rest of society. It is then that the concept of minority again becomes
important. For the first time also those communities that for most of the twen-
tieth century resisted the label of ‘minority’, seeing themselves as part of the
‘majority’ community of Arabs, such as theCopts, theGreek (Antiochian/Rum)
Orthodox and Greek Catholics, started to use the label. As has been recently
described by SabaMahmood, the complex interplay of realizing that the equal
rights that had been expected never fully materialized, the pressures of minor-
ity discourses originating in the diaspora communities and in international
organizations, and the internal, Middle Eastern rhetoric about the state, all
contributed to theminoritization of those Christians that, different from those
displaced in the various wars, had never left their countries of origin and had
always been loyal supporters of the Arab states.51
Much of the transnational dynamics affecting Jews and Christians in the
Middle East is not so different from what happens in other parts of the world
where a combination of socio-political, economic and cultural factors gave rise
to large expatriate diasporic communities that maintain a connection to their
homelands. There is one cultural factor, however, that is fairly unique, which
is the fact Jerusalem and the surrounding region occupy a special place in
three religions, the adherents of two of them together, Christianity and Islam,
counting for over half of the world’s population. Whereas certainly not every
51 Mahmood, Religious Difference.
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Christian or Muslimworldwide is invested in the so called ‘holy places’, at least
part of the cultural and political interest in the region from other parts of the
world can be explained by these cultural-religious connections. Much of the
missionary and humanitarian efforts from Catholics and Protestants in the
modern period arose from a heightened interest in the state of Christianity in
the lands of its birth, trying to save and preserve it, not only for its own sake,
but as much for that of global Christianity, many parts of which consider the
Holy Land as part of their religious heritage. The rise of Zionism (including its
Christian varieties) and the ensuing Israeli state further added to the global
public with stakes in the region. While sometimes these global interests in
the region have contributed to the creation of common ground, often the
multiplicity of actors and stakeholders has exacerbated many of the processes
of contestation and exclusion described above.52
Boum’s article highlights the importance of Jerusalemas a cultural and polit-
ical symbol for Christians andMoslems of theMiddle East, taking the perspec-
tive of the disenfranchised youth of North Africa. Their hip hop songs sample
the rich repertoire of cultural themes that were produced in earlier phases of
Arab resistance to the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, a repertoire that ranges
from the violent and aggressive videos of Islamists, to the melancholy work of
Fayrūz, the Christian Lebanese singer (NihādWadīʿ Ḥaddād, b. 1934). However,
while the texts and symbols of these North African musicians are explicitly
aggressive and activist, overall the political and cultural effects of these videos
remain limited. Not only is the number of people that watch these videos not
as high as the topicality of the issue leads us to expect, but more importantly,
their activist stance has little to no effect on the politics of North African states,
while the rappers, even if they attract the attention of the security forces, do
not seriously threaten the status quo. As such, the musicians are reproached
by other young North African activists who would rather invest more time in
real life political activism than in online cultural expressions.53
52 See, e.g. several articles in the edited volume Journal of Levantine Studies 3, no. 1 (2013),
Steven Kaplan and Merav Mack’s “Editors’ Note”, Galia Sabar, “Between Israel and the
Holy Land, between the Global and the Local: The Role of African Initiated Churches
within African Transnational Migration to Israel,” Adoram Schneidleder, “The Imagined
Christian Ecumene and the Quest for Return: Christian idps in Israel and the 2009
Visit of Benedict xvi,” Michelle Syen, “E-Transnationalism: The Case of the Christian
Zionist Community in Israel,” and Steven Kaplan, “The Transnationalism of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Tawahedo Church in the Holy Land.”
53 For a discussion of the fast growing field of research on online cultural expressions and
identity politics, see Boum’s contribution in this volume.
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Meanwhile, the ongoing civil war in Syria, with constantly rising numbers of
casualties, homeless refugees, and devastated urban landscapes, has produced
its own varieties of global performances, with musical expressions intended
to address the world’s silence in the face of cultural and political disaster. A
case in point is the controversial video clip produced by two Syrian sisters from
Sweden, Faia and Rihan Younan from Aleppo.54 ‘To our countries’ (li-biladi)
consists of a mixture of classically phrased political statements written and
recited by Faia (an Edinburgh-trained journalist), and tied in with fragments
of songs by Fayrūz sung by Rihan (including the song on Jerusalem discussed
in Boum’s volume); the video clip was shared widely, both in the West and the
Middle East. The minimalist video conveys the pain over what is happening
in the Middle East; it skillfully distributes blame without naming anyone in
particular, and brings together in one nostalgic narrative the cases of Syria,
Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine while glossing over differences of religion and
politics. While many people appreciated the sisters’ efforts to bring the woes
of the Arab world to the fore, critical voices soon chimed in, most importantly
because the sisters were seen as supporting the Assad regime. Others criticized
their perceived one-sided blaming of the West for the Middle East’s problems,
and yet others blamed the sisters for denying their ‘Assyrian’ background and
glossing over the way in which the Assyrians were treated by the Arabs. Where
the sisters and their crew thought they could transcend differences of religion,
region, and ethnicity by creating hope built upon the idealized Middle East of
Fayrūz’s generation, others saw this as hopelessly naïve and old-fashioned, and
in no way relevant to resolving the real conflicts in the Middle East.55 Indeed,
verbal contests about how clips like this one contribute to lasting peace in the
Middle East continue against the background of youth who take matters into
their own hands by joining the armed struggle against the Assad regime and
more generally against what is seen as the West oppressing Muslims.
54 YouTube, ‘To our countries’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GO52i0xui8), posted 9
October 2014, 1,786,114 viewings (13 February 2015).
55 For more extensive discussions, in addition to the postings on YouTube, see http://www
.taz.de/Youtube-Video-Li-Biladi/!148495/ (largely positive; last seen 28 January 2015), Eli
Shalal, http://www.aljadid.com/content/twisted-logic-younan-sisters-and-julia-boutros-
sing-same-deceptive-tune (very critical; last seen 28 January 2015), building on an article
by Martina Sabra on Qantara.de (http://de.qantara.de/inhalt/syrisches-antikriegs-video
-to-our-countries-peinlicher-medienhype; last seen 28 January 2015); see also Daily Star
(31 October 2014) http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Oct-31/276015-
supporters-opponents-of-assad-in-viral-video-confrontation.ashx (last seen 28 January
2015).
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What then, does thismean for the dynamics betweenmajorities andminori-
ties in the states of the Middle East, what does this mean for the creation
andmaintenance of common ground?Most importantly, perhaps, the transna-
tional and global stage of cultural practices is here to stay. Whether in the form
of YouTube videos, online political activism, world politics, Christian Zionism
and Catholic advocacy for Middle-Eastern Christians, or in the attempts by
ngos, unhcr, and unesco tomitigate the worst effects of war and strife, or in
violent jihadist actions, all actors perform on a global stage and seek a global
public that is asked to choose sides. Even if much of that involvement does not
go beyond ‘liking’ and ‘retweeting’, it considerably widens the circle of people
that have a stake in thedevelopments on the ground.Certainly, thepositive side
of this is the fact that abuses of power, gross injustice and oppression ofminori-
ties can find a hearing much quicker and in wider circles than before, putting
extra pressure on governments to adjust their policies and protect minorities.
At the same time, however, these global performers all too easy may lose sight
of the complicated dynamics of local context, the value of silent diplomacy
and saving face in difficult situations—valuing applause on the global scene
over concrete results on the ground. Minorities of all kinds thus may suffer
as much as gain from such global involvement, especially where the state is
weak and unable to protect those who for political, cultural or religious rea-
sons are not considered part of the majority that exemplifies the unity of the
state.
Conclusions
The overview by Schroeter of Jews in the Middle East and the varied case
studies that are brought to the fore in this volume vacillate between opposite
positions, one in which we can see a wide range of possibilities of finding
common ground and the other, which makes obvious the limits to that same
endeavor. Yes, there is a common ground, but it is fragile and its survival is
verymuchdependent on the circumstances. These circumstances therefore are
important in the analyses of this volume, and indicate the importance of stable
and strong states that allow for a variety of interpretations of the definition
of and criteria for citizenship. These definitions and criteria must be enforced
against those that challenge it by advocatingmono-cultural, mono-ethnic, and
mono-religious societies. The case studies also point to the importance of
understanding how communities that are seen as minorities (whether they
like it or not), deal with that minority status. Are they able to negotiate the
boundaries of their separateness with a view towards the common good of
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these societies as a whole? Or do they, with or without outside support, focus
on their own survival only and so willingly and unwillingly contribute to their
isolation?
The case studies show that, time and again, common ground was found: in
Arabic as the language of the nation, in shared educational and cultural activ-
ities, and in political parties and social activism, even though that sometimes
also led to new fissures and schisms—schisms, however, not between the all-
to-easy essentialized boundaries between religious or ethnic communities, but
between people with different opinions and different social and regional back-
grounds. History tells of many occasions in which religion was not a hindrance
to cooperation, when Jews and Christians, despite their numerical minority
within a society that structures itself on religion, could function optimally in
society at large. It is from these cross-cutting cleavages, and the ways in which
these cleavages were bridged time and again, that we can draw hope for the
future, even if today’s trends seem bound towards greater uniformity and less
tolerance towards those who do not fit.
© d.j. schroeter, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004323285_003
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chapter 2
The Changing Landscape of Muslim-Jewish
Relations in theModernMiddle East and North
Africa
D.J. Schroeter
Mr. Hatchwell, or Si Hatweel as he was also known to the local residents,
was one of the few remaining Jews who inhabited the elite casbah quarter
in the Moroccan town of Essaouira (or Mogador as it was formerly called by
Europeans) in 1981. In thinking about how changing patterns of public space
in the nineteenth century Middle East and North Africa (mena) affected and
transformedMuslim-Jewish relations, I am reminded ofmy conversationswith
him that year. I recall one day strollingwith him in Essaouira, where he proudly
showedme the places of importance to him—lieux demémoire—anail on the
wallwhere the Paquet steamship line ofMarseilles once posted their schedules,
the former foreign consulates that were located in the casbah quarter, the sign
commemorating the visit in 1884 of the intrepid Father Charles de Foucauld,
whose account of his travels in Morocco disguised as a native rabbi remain the
most celebrated of the pre-colonial period.1 He bumped into an elderlyMuslim
similar in age, precipitating a warm embrace and a few dance steps, almost
like a reunion between two octogenarians, Muslim and Jew, both respected
members of the Chambre de Commerce.
Jacob Hatchwell came from a family that moved from Marrakesh to Essa-
ouira in the late nineteenth century, joined the elite Jewish merchants who
lived in the casbah, and engaged in an import-export trade with Manchester,
London, and Hamburg, the latter after the expansion of German commercial
interests on the southern Atlantic coast of Morocco in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.2 Essaouira was already in decline as an international
1 Not only is Charles de Foucauld an iconic figure in French colonial literature, but stories
about him, and his guideMardochée Aby Serour, are remembered byMuslims in the south of
Morocco where they traveled. See Aomar Boum, Memories of Absence: HowMuslims Remem-
ber Jews in Morocco (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2013), 18–28.
2 On German expansion in Morocco, see Pierre Guillen, L’Allemagne et le Maroc de 1870 à 1905
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1967). With the exponential growth of German ships
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port of tradewhenmembers of the family emigrated fromMorocco, openingup
stores or import-export firms in various in locales: London, Brighton, Alexan-
dria, and Cairo, or set up business in more prosperous locations in Morocco,
especially Casablanca and Safi. Several Hatchwells ventured to South America
following in thewake of the rubber boom, and settled in Iquitos in the Peruvian
Amazon. Jacob’s brother David was among the few remaining Jews in Iquitos;
many left with the declining rubber economy or had intermarried and assim-
ilated into the Amazonian Indian population. The family stayed connected
through visits to Essaouira and a correspondence back and forth between three
continents in Judeo-Arabic, French, English, and Spanish.3
At the timeofmy encounter,Mr.Hatchwellwas the owner of the rathermod-
est Hotel Beau Rivage, formerly managed by his late wife, above the popular
Café de France located in the large Place du Chayla (now named Place Moulay
Hassan), which is accessed from the port.4 At the time I lived in Essaouira in
1981, Mr. Hatchwell’s main occupation seemed to have been acting as the agent
for the Pullman coach company, the “deluxe” sleeper coach line of buses that
traveled overnight between Agadir and Casablanca, making a stop in Essaouira
at about 11 pm. Four places were reserved for Essaouira, and to obtain a ticket
one was required to pay a visit to Mr. Hatchwell in his house in the casbah,
where he received customers in his “European salon,”which boasted anupright
piano and a portrait of Queen Victoria hanging on the wall.5 On one occasion,
I met his elderly sister there, who babbled in the incoherent though fluent
English that she had learned at the English girls’ school (long since closed)
attended by Essaouira’s Jewish elite.
calling at the port of Essaouira, the Deutsche Seewar Company of Hamburg was authorized
to build and operate a meteorological observatory in the harbor of Essaouira. Le Guido—le
magazine d’Essaouira, no. 32 (2011), 5–7.
3 Archives of the Hatchwell family of Essaouira are found in the library of the Centre de la
Culture Judéo-Marocaine (Brussels) (http://www.judaisme-marocain.org/); it contains both
personal and business correspondence and documents. On Moroccan Jewish emigration
to the Amazon, see Susan Gilson Miller, “Kippur on the Amazon: Jewish Emigration from
Northern Morocco in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Harvey E. Goldberg (ed.), Sephardi
and Middle Eastern Jewries, History and Culture in the Modern Era (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1996), 190–209. On Jews of Iquitos, see Ariel Segal, Jews of the Amazon: Self-
Exile in Earthly Paradise (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1999).
4 See the description in the memoir by David Bensoussan, Le fils de Mogador (Montreal: Les
Éditions Du Lys, 2002), 77–79.
5 SeeDaniel J. Schroeter,Merchants ofEssaouira:UrbanSocietyand Imperialism inSouthwestern
Morocco, 1844–1886 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 58–59.
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Most of the Jews of Essaouira had lived in the overcrowdedmellah, the Jew-
ish quarter built in 1808 where no Muslims lived.6 The casbah, by contrast,
always housed both Muslim and Jews of the elite, foreign merchants and con-
suls, and government officials. The Attias synagogue in the casbah, built in the
late nineteenth century, imported woodwork from Manchester,7 while homes
of the affluentwere embellished by furniture and other English accoutrements,
as was the case in the Hatchwell household.8 Among the Jewish elite, English
was often spoken and a number of English expressions were a part of everyday
Judeo-Arabic speech in Cultural affinities to England lingered in the twenti-
eth century, especially among the elite, but French influence became more
pronounced in the Protectorate period largely owing to the Alliance Israélite
Universelle school (whereMr. Hatchwell studied), thoughArabic remained the
dominant language of the Jewish masses of the mellah—Jewish space, where
nonetheless the elite Jews of the casbah rarely, if ever set foot. Thus Mr. Hatch-
well’s walking tour did not include the mellah, which in 1981 was the poor-
est, most overcrowded and dilapidated quarter of the town. Only a few Jews
still resided there: a plumber and his family, and a jeweler. One distillery of
mahya, the ubiquitous eau de vie once produced by Jews throughout Morocco,
remained in the mellah, where there was frequently a long queue of Mus-
lims waiting their turn to purchase a supply. Jews had long provided Muslims
with forbidden alcoholic beverages, and it was a reason for Muslims to ven-
ture into Jewish space, a common phenomenon in other places in mena as
well. Yet crossing ethno-religious boundaries into Jewish space for forbidden
fruits could also be a source of friction. In 1906, when rural revolts were ram-
pant inMorocco and when foreign intervention had exacerbated internal divi-
sions and interreligious tensions,Anflus, a rebellious local tribal leader, invaded
Essaouira with his followers and expelled Jews from the medina, the popular
Muslim quarter that they had begun to inhabit. During Anflus’ brief occupa-
tion of the town and before orderwas restored by central authorities, Jewswere
6 In an 1807 decree, Mawlay Sulayman ordered Jews in a number of cities to sell their homes
and to move to mellahs within boundaries to be demarcated. In Essaouira, however, some
elite Jews were allowed to live in the casbah quarter alongside Muslims and foreigners.
Daniel J. Schroeter, The Sultan’s Jew: Morocco and the Sephardi World (Stanford, ca: Stanford
University Press, 2002), 90–93.
7 Dilapidated and no longer in use, there are plans to restore the Attias synagogue and convert
it into a Jewish museum. See Le Guido—Magazine d’Essaouira no. 38 (2013) 5–8.
8 On transformations of domestic space and European furnishings in the nineteenth-century
Ottoman Empire, see Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000), 151–154.
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forced to remove their shoes when walking past a mosque or Muslim shrine,
compelled to release their slaves, and mahya distilleries were shut down. As
the story goes, some of the authorities thought it better that the Jews should
remain outside the medina, but the mahya distilleries were quickly restored
and back in operation.9
With the partial exception of Tangier, Essaouira was in some ways unique
to Morocco: it was a small cosmopolitan town before European influence
had begun to significantly influence Moroccan society. It had a rather special
elite connection to England and an openness and conviviality existed between
ethnic and religious groups and between Europeans and Moroccans in an era
when foreignerswere all but banned from themajor inland cities ofMarrakesh,
Fez, and Meknes. And yet, though Essaouira was an atypical case, there are
many aspects of this vignette that can be seen as a microcosm reflecting the
transformation of the public sphere, one in which new encounters and new
spaces redefined patterns ofMuslim-Jewish relations, not only inMorocco, but
in many parts of mena.
There is another reason to begin the discussion with a story from the recent
past. By studying Jews that remained in the Islamicworld after themass emigra-
tion, we shift the focus from the narrative of failed integration and departure
that dominates most scholarship on Muslim-Jewish relations in the modern
period. The study ofMuslim-Jewish relations has been shaped by the traumatic
mass emigration from the societies in which Jews once lived. The incontrovert-
ible fact that themajority of Jews inmenadepartedduring theperiod from1948
to the early 1960s and the virtual absence of Jewish communities from mena
outside Israel seems to provide powerful evidence of the impossibility of Jews
integrating into the countries in which they lived. This has been explained in
twoways that essentially reflect the Israeli-Palestinianpolitical divide.One side
argues that the Islamic world provided a haven for Jews, and that the peace-
ful coexistence that prevailed through the Middle Ages was undermined by
colonialismandZionism.Colonialism, by its systemof divide and rule, by favor-
ing Jews over Muslims, drew Jews over to the side of the colonial occupiers,
while Zionism, in the age of decolonization completed the process of sever-
ing Jews from their native lands. The other side emphasizes a constant state
of conflict throughout history and hardly differentiates the modern from the
9 aiu (Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle)/Maroc xxxiii.e.582, 2 September 1906,
9 September 1906, Benchimol; al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (15 September 1906). The occupation of
Essaouira by Anflus remains in the historical memory of the Jews. See Salomon Haï Knafo
and Asher Knafo, La vie juive a Mogador (Ashdod: Ot Brit Kodech, 2009), 137–138.
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medieval period. This side presents non-Muslims as living in a state of oppres-
sion, dubbed “dhimmitude,” a neologism that has gained much currency in
recent years; it thereby implies a primordial condition that is rooted in the
origins of Islam itself.10 The emerging Arab states, in this paradigm, failed to
develop civil societies towhich non-Muslims belonged, because they remained
“Islamic” to the core. Thus it is argued that Jews left because of Islam and the
appeal of a Jewish state that would empower them. The years of colonialism
and decolonization are considered unimportant except insofar as they helped
exacerbate pre-existing tensions and precipitated a final rupture by removing
Jews from their dhimmi condition, exposing their new status asminorities, and
introducing European style anti-Semitism into mena.11
While these stances are oppositional, they share a sense of the inevitability
of mass departure; both emphasize conflict and exclusionary categories and
identities that developed inMiddle East andNorth African societies inmodern
times; the first sees the divisions as entirely a product of the modern era, while
the other assumes that the divide was always present. Both approaches are
teleological, predicated on the belief in failure, or the impossibility of Muslim-
Jewish coexistence either because of internal or external circumstances. Con-
sequently, scholarship has all but ignored new patterns of coexistence,modern
10 The idea of the oppression of Jews and non-Muslim minorities, and the notion of “dhim-
mitude” has been influenced by the many publications of Bat Yeʾor, The dhimmi: Jews
and Christians under Islam (Rutherford, nj: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; Lon-
don: Associated University Presses, 1985; originally published in French in 1980); Islam
and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (Cranbury, nj: Fairleigh Dickinson Univer-
sity Press/Associated University Presses and Lancaster, uk: Gazelle Book Services Ltd.,
2002).
11 This latter approach to the understanding of Jews in the Islamic world is found in the
last chapter of the often cited book by Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, nj:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 154–191; also in idem, Semites and Anti-Semites (New
York: Norton, 1986). A recent example of a book that follows this approach is the volumi-
nous and richly documented study by Georges Bensoussan, Juifs en pays arabes: le grand
déracinement, 1850–1975 (Paris: Tallandier, 2012). For a critical evaluation of the historiogra-
phy, see Mark R. Cohen,Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in theMiddle Ages (Princeton,
nj: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3–14; Daniel J. Schroeter, “From Sephardi To Orien-
tal: The ‘Decline’ Theory of Jewish Civilization in The Middle East and North Africa,” in
Richard Cohen and Jeremy Cohen (eds.), The Jewish Contribution to Civilization: Reassess-
ing an Idea (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2007), 125–148; Joel Beinin,
The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of aModern Diaspora
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 14–19; Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A
History of Jews in Modern Iraq (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2012), 9–10.
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developments that enabled new encounters and a common ground to develop
betweenMuslims and Jews in the period before the mass exodus that began in
the late 1940s.
Much of the focus on the Jews of the modern Middle East and North Africa
has been on the question of legal status, which is fundamental for understand-
ing changes in the position of Jews and minorities in predominately Muslim
societies. The Ottoman Empire, under pressure from foreign powers and an
internal impetus to preserve the empire, undertook reforms to eliminate the
traditional dhimmi status of non-Muslims. From the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane
(1839) to the Hatt-i Humayun (1856), the Tanzimat reforms effectively trans-
formed non-Muslims from protégés of the Islamic state to Ottoman citizens
with civil rights. Yet it was still an empire composed of many ethno-religious
groups and the statemaintained its system of separate communities, now reor-
ganized into millets that would be closely kept under the surveillance of the
Ottoman Porte. Egypt, still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire but ruled
by an independent dynasty, enacted a series of reforms that eliminated dhimmi
status; thus someof the inequalities that existedduring the timeofMuḥammad
ʿAlī were removed and then dhimmi status was abrogated and in 1882 non-
Muslims were granted full civil equality.12 The condition of mena Jews came
under the scrutiny of the European powers and their emancipated Jewish citi-
zens and organizations, notably the Alliance Israélite Universelle (founded in
1860); both found an important goal in the protection of the Jews and their
“emancipation,” though each for its own, sometimes, overlapping purposes.13
Islamic law, degrading to non-Muslims, was seen as responsible for keeping
Jews in their abject state.
Following the Hatt-i Humayun, the British and French put pressure on the
Bey of theHusaynid dynasty of Tunisia, nominally part of theOttoman Empire,
to implement the Tanzimat reforms. The execution of Batto Sfez, accused of
12 For a survey of the changing legal status of the Jews of mena, see Norman A. Stillman, The
Jews of Arab Lands inModern Times (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 8–18;
Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 134–141.
13 There is a considerable literature on the Alliance Israélite Universelle and its impact in
mena. See especially Aron Rodrigue, Jews and Muslims: Images of Sephardi and Eastern
Jewries in Modern Times (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); idem, French
Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in
Turkey 1860–1925 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Michael M. Laskier, The
Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco, 1862–1962 (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1983).
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blaspheming Islam, provided the opportunity: under threat of the French fleet
bombarding Tunis, Muhammad Bey issued the so-called “fundamental pact”
(ʿahd al-amān, literally, “the pact of security”) which embodied the princi-
ples of the Ottoman reform movement as they related to religious minorities,
removed civil inequalities that effected the Jews (here we should be reminded
that in the Maghrib, with the disappearance of indigenous Christians in the
Middle Ages, the only dhimmis were Jews; Christians were regarded as for-
eign). These changes were stipulated in the Constitution of 1861, which in
effect formally ended the laws that defined the legal status of Jews as dhim-
mis.14
Outside the Ottoman Empire, in Morocco and Iran, the rulers of these inde-
pendent dynasties also came under increasing foreign pressures to “emanci-
pate” their Jews. In these cases, it was the Anglo-Jewish leader and global advo-
cate of emancipation, Moses Montefiore, who campaigned and obtained in
1864 and 1865, respectively, imperial decrees that guaranteed that Jews would
be treatedwith justice.15 In the case ofMorocco, the sultanmade it clear that he
was only reiterating the law that already guaranteed the Jews just treatment,16
and dhimmi status remained. The French Protectorate, established inMorocco
in 1912, was legitimized by the idea of preserving native institutions; the Pro-
tectorate maintained the monarchy, an Islamic ruler with Muslim and Jewish
subjects. While the civil inequalities associated with dhimmi status were elimi-
nated, Jews remained indigenous dhimmi subjects of the sultan, now under the
supposed tutelage of the French.17
The end of the Ottoman Empire brought colonial rule and eventually inde-
pendence to much of the Arabic speaking world, which was divided into new
nation states. In most places Jews—no longer dhimmis or members of amillet
14 Paul Sebag, Histoire des Juifs de Tunisie: des origins à nos jours (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991),
116–121; Yaron Tsur, “ʿAhd al-Amān,”ejiw, 1:93–94.
15 Mohammed Kenbib, Juifs et Musulmans au Maroc, 1859–1948 (Rabat: Université Moham-
med v, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1994), 123ff.;
Abigail Green,MosesMontefiore: Jewish Liberator, Imperial Hero (Cambridge, ma: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 300–319, 365–367; Michel Abitbol, Le passé d’une
discorde: Juifs et Arabes depuis le viie siècle (Paris: Perrin, 1999), 168–172; Daniel Tsadik,
Between Foreigners and Shiʿis: Nineteenth-Century Iran and its Jewish Minority (Stanford,
ca: Stanford University Press, 2007), 57–59.
16 Aḥmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī, Kitāb al-Istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣā (Casa-
blanca: Dār al-Kitāb, 1956), 9:113.
17 Daniel J. Schroeter and Joseph Chetrit, “Emancipation and its Discontents: Jews at the
Formative Period of Colonial Rule in Morocco,” Jewish Social Studies 13, 1 (2006): 170–206.
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with well-defined boundaries—became minorities, often with tenuous rights
and an uncertain future. Arab nationalism and nationalist politics appealed to
a very few, with the major exception of Iraq, and most left en masse when the
opportunity was presented.
The change in legal status of Jews, from dhimmis who were discriminated
against to unassimilable minorities, is the focus of many studies on Jews in the
modern mena and offers an explanation of important changes in the position
of Jews in mena society. Yet the emphasis on the Jews’ status—legal, politi-
cal, social—has tended to dominate discussions with the result of precluding
important questions about how Jews interactedwith non-Jews in the emerging
public sphere that was reshaping the landscape of the modern mena.
To think about the emerging public sphere of Muslim-Jewish interaction in
the modern mena, it is important to consider what constituted those spaces,
both public and private, whereMuslims and Jews interacted in the premodern
period. In urban structures, Islamic law distinguished between the private, res-
idential sector, represented spatially by residential quarters with alleyways and
culs de sac, and public space, with wide open thoroughfares where suqs were
located.18 Throughout the cities of mena, including Tunis, Cairo, Damascus,
Aleppo, and Baghdad, Jews were concentrated in specific residential quarters,
and in the case ofMorocco, in some locales it was compulsory for Jews to live in
Jewish quarters, which became known asmellahs.19 These quarters thus might
be defined as Jewish space, where family and religious life was located and
where ethno-religiousboundarieswere conceptually constructed. Itwas, above
all, the market place, the suq, in both urban and rural settings that functioned
as a shared public space where Muslims and Jews intermingled.20 The move
18 Besim Selim Hakim, Arabic-Islamic Cities: Building and Planning Principles (London: kpi,
1986), 63;AndréRaymond,Grandes villesarabesà l’ époqueottomane (Paris: Sindbad, 1985),
172–174.
19 See Daniel J. Schroeter, “Le quartier juif et la cité islamique,” in Shmuel Trigano (ed.),
Le monde sépharade: histoire et civilisation, 2 vols. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006), 2:565–
583; idem, “The Jewish Quarter and the Moroccan City,” in George K. Zucker and Yedida
K. Stillman (eds.), New Horizons in Sephardic Studies (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1993), 67–81. For a focus on minority space in the Mediterranean city and its
historiography, see the introduction by Susan Gilson Miller, in Susan Gilson Miller and
MauroBertagnin (eds.),TheArchitectureandMemoryof theMinorityQuarter in theMuslim
Mediterranean City (Cambridge, ma: The Aga Khan Program at the Harvard University
Graduate School of Design, 2010), 10–33.
20 Clifford Geertz, drawing from his research on Sefrou in Morocco, focuses his attention
on the suq as an institution that characterizes mena as a whole. See “Suq: The Bazaar
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from the interiority of the home and neighborhood to themarketplacemarked
a quotidian spatial passage from the private to the public. It is also significant
that Muslim religious endowments (habus in the Maghrib, waqf in the Middle
East), which onemight think of as the quintessential Muslim space, were often
leased for commercial uses as funduqs, shops, and coffeehouses and as such
were an important domain of Muslim-Jewish interactions.21 In Morocco, Jews
were tenants ofhabusproperties inplaces thatwereoutside the Jewishquarters
in the marketplaces and commercial “public” districts of cities.22 Rural mar-
kets as well functioned as a space where Muslims and Jews intermingled and
exchanged goods and services. In Morocco, shared sacred spaces, or intermin-
gling during the times of pilgrimages (mawsims or hillulot), also became places
of commercial exchange, thus complicating any notion of a sharp dichotomy
between the sacred and the profane. Jewish peddlers and traders were woven
into the fabric of the rural economy in many parts of mena,23 as expressed
in a Moroccan proverb “A suq (market) without Jews … is like bread without
salt.”24
Economy in Sefrou,” in Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, Meaning
and Order in Moroccan Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123. See
also EugenWirth, “Villes islamiques, villes orientales?Une problematique face au change-
ment,” in Abdelwahab Bouhdiba and Dominique Chevalier (eds.), La ville arabe dans
l’ Islam (Tunis: Université de Tunis, Centre d’études et de recherches économiques et
sociales, 1982), 198–226.
21 For an argument that proposes the waqf as a key institution that constituted a public
sphere, see Haim Gerber, “The Public Sphere and Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire,”
in Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Nehemia Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in
Muslim Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 75–77.
22 The voluminous registers and archives of the habus administration of the French protec-
torate were found in the Bibliothèque Générale et Archives, Rabat, accessed in 1980–1981.
For Essaouira, numerous shops in the markets were leased to Jews. See also “Report on
Leasehold Makhzen and Habous Properties held in British Hands,” 10 May 1918, National
Archives of the uk, fo 835/164.
23 Boum, Memories of Absence, 29–55; “Morocco in the Nineteenth Century,” in Mark R. Co-
hen andAbrahamL.Udovitch (eds.), JewsAmongArabs: Contacts andBoundaries (Prince-
ton, nj: Darwin Press, 1989), 113–140; on Jerba and its vicinity, seeAbrahamL.Udovitch and
Lucette Valensi, The Last Arab Jews: The Communities of Jerba, Tunisia (Chur, Switzerland:
Harwood Academic, 1984), 100–106; on Muslim-Jewish relations in rural Yemen, see Bat-
Zion Eraqi-Klorman, “Yemen: Religion, Magic, and Jews,” Proceedings of the Seminar for
Arabian Studies 39 (2009): 125–134; on Libya, Harvey E. Goldberg, Jewish Life in Muslim
Libya: Rivals and Relatives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 68–81.
24 Boum, Memories of Absence, 13–14.
48 schroeter
Language is another aspect of this shared space in the marketplace. While
almost everywhere, Jews historically spoke their own languages, or dialects of
the dominant languages (Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Spanish, and so forth) within
Jewish or communal spaces, in the marketplaces, Jews, especially men, com-
municated in the vernaculars of their surroundings, yet were still distinguish-
able by their accents or sartorial customs, especially headgear. Jews were thus
oftenbilingual ormultilingual in theoftenmonolingual environments inwhich
they lived.25
While the demarcation of private and public space was expressed spatially
by divisions between residential Jewish quarters and the marketplace, this
did not imply a rigid separation between the private, communal space of the
Jewish quarter and the public sections of the city. Indeed the very concept
of insulated and largely self-contained dhimmi communities is belied by the
many ways in which communal boundaries were constantly negotiated, tran-
scended or transgressed in everyday life in many spaces besides the market-
place.26 Contrary to common assumptions about the legal separation of dhim-
mis, Jews often went to Muslim courts.27 In many places, Muslims frequently
shopped, purchased meat from kosher butchers, bought or consumed alco-
hol in Jewish quarters. In most of mena as well, though there was a tendency
for dhimmis to concentrate in ethno-religious neighborhoods, the boundaries
were permeable and Muslims would purchase, lease or reside in homes in the
Jewish quarters, as evidence from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Syria
shows.28
25 On dress, language, and distinguishing symbols of identity, see Udovitch and Valesi, The
Last Arab Jews, 24–29.
26 This has been clearly documented and analyzed for Marrakesh in Emily Gottreich, The
Mellah of Marrakesh: Jewish and Muslim Space in Morocco’s Red City (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 2007).
27 Studies of shariʿa court records and government archives demonstrate the extent towhich
Jews often sought justice in Muslim courts. See Amnon Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam:
Jerusalem in the SixteenthCentury (Cambridge,ma:HarvardUniversity Press, 1984); Jessica
Marglin, “In the Courts of the Nations: Jews, Muslims, and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-
Century Morocco” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2013).
28 Najwa al-Qattan, “Litigants andNeighbors: The Communal Topography of OttomanDam-
ascus,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44 (2002): 511–533. For the Middle East
generally, see Masters, Christians and Jews, 31–37; Antoine Abdel Nour, “Habitat et struc-
tures sociales à Alep aux xviie et xviiie siècles,” La ville arabe dans l’ Islam, 86–89; Abra-
ham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 44.
the changing landscape of muslim-jewish relations 49
Coffeehouses, widespread throughout the Ottoman Empire from the six-
teenth century, also constituted public space, and could be located through-
out the city and, as in the case of Damascus, could be found in residential
districts and markets, in both intra- and extra-mural quarters.29 Coffeehouses
became the unrivaled space of male social life and leisure, where people of
various social backgrounds gathered for conversation, news, games, and enter-
tainment. As primarily a space of Muslim male sociability, we cannot know
to what extent Muslims and non-Muslims intermingled in coffeehouses. Yet
it is well known in many places in mena that Jewish musicians performed
in coffeehouses to diverse crowds. If coffeehouses were the primary public
space of male sociability, bathhouses (hammam) provided women with gen-
dered public space.30 Outside the private space of the home, Muslim and non-
Muslim men and women, either in separate facilities or at separate times,
used the bathhouses as public spaces of socialization. There was, perhaps, con-
cern about how undressed Muslims and Jews might be distinguished; thus
sometimes they were given different towels or robes with particular mark-
ings.31
The change in status of Jews, from dhimmis to Ottoman or colonial subjects
or citizens, or to minorities in the nation states of mena did not necessar-
ily mean that premodern forms of social relations and spatial structures were
replaced with a secular society where Muslims and Jews interacted in a com-
monly shared public sphere. Yet new kinds of relations nevertheless developed
alongside the old and interacted with older types of Muslim-Jewish encoun-
ters. Port cities especially were conduits of change, bridgeheads of modernity
that led to the development of new kinds of common grounds. To take the
example of commerce, it was not so much that the suq was displaced but new
institutions and forms of interaction and exchange betweenMuslims and Jews
developed alongside the old. These included chambers of commerce, places of
exchange outside the suq, grocery stores, pharmacies, hotels, and so forth. In
Cairo and Baghdad, for example, Jews were often entrepreneurs in new, more
29 James Grehan, Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2007), 140–146.
30 Ralph S. Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval
Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 94–98; Quataert, The Ottoman
Empire, 158–159; on Aleppo, see Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve, 43–44, 231–235; on
Tunis, see Julia A. Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of
Migration, c. 1800–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 138–140.
31 Amnon Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge,
ma: Harvard University Press, 1984), 73, 138–139; Marcus, TheMiddle East on the Eve, 41–42.
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“modern” commercial sectors, from furniture and grocery stores to European
style department stores.32 Jews were innovators also in the development of
modern banks and financial institutions in the key cities of mena: Tangier,
Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Aleppo, and Baghdad. Because of their extensive net-
works with Europe, Jews were owners and agents for steamship and shipping
lines, and were important in the development of railroads and transportation,
and in general were instrumental in the introduction of modern industry and
technology.33
New commercial practices entailed new patterns of consumption and
brought together Muslims and Jews on common ground in new public spaces.
Modern shops were to be found also in developing public spaces, as cities
expanded extramuros, with newneighborhoods outside the traditional old city
walls, the nouvelle ville in French colonial terminology was distinct from the
medina. Outside the walls or traditional quarters, with shops, wider avenues
with spacious apartments, cafés, clubs and associations, theaters, cinemas,
music halls, sports stadiums, thepromenade andbeach,Muslimand Jews inter-
acted in public spaces in ways unimaginable in the past. Families strolled in
parks and the wide boulevards, where new fashions and hairstyles were dis-
played.34 Newmodes of interaction were reflected in changing residential pat-
terns, and as Jews began tomove toMuslimquarters, the result was both peace-
ful coexistence and increased tensions and violence as the older patterns were
disrupted.35 At the same time that the embourgeoisement of a growing sec-
tor of society causedMuslims, Christians, and Jews to intermingle in newways
32 On the transformation of Cairo’s commercial district and the development of department
stores, see Nancy Y. Reynolds, A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the
Politics of Decolonization in Egypt (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2012).
33 Gudrun Krämer, The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1915–1952 (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1989), 39–41; Beinin, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry, 44–49; Michael Menachem
Laskier and Reeva Spector Simon, “Economic Life,” in The Jews of the Middle East and
North Africa in Modern Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 41–43; and
Reeva Spector Simon, “Iraq,” in The Jews in theMiddle East, 362–363; Reeva Spector Simon,
“Banking,”ejiw, 1:335–337.
34 Sarah Abrevaya Stein, Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian
and Ottoman Empires (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 181–183.
35 For Tunis in the nineteenth century, see Abdelhamid Larguèche, “La communauté juive
de Tunis à l’époque husseïnite: unité, contrastes et relations inter-communautaires,” in
Histoire communautaire, histoire plurielle: la communauté juivedeTunisie: actes du colloque
de Tunis organisé les 25-26-27 février 1998 à la Faculté de la Manouba (Tunis: Centre de
Publication Universitaire, 1999), 176–177.
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as the new social class often cut across religious and ethnic divisions, ordi-
nary Jews and Muslims maintained their separate communal space. In some
places new inter-confessional tensions caused Jews to concentrate even more
inmainly Jewish quarters,36 intensifying the separation of poor Jews fromMus-
lims, and Jewish quarters became increasingly overcrowded slums, not only
reinforcing ethno-religious boundaries, but also reflecting the widening divi-
sion between social classes in each respective religious community, asMuslim,
Jewish, andChristians of the growingmiddle class resided in themodern, bour-
geois, more cosmopolitan European neighborhoods. And yet, the old Jewish
quarter remained an important symbolic marker of Jewish space. As has been
observed in literature on Jewish Baghdad, “the city’s ‘Jewishness,’ so to speak, is
a function of its cosmopolitan character, which depends both upon an implicit
recognition of the city’s intercultural essence, on the one hand, and on the per-
formance of communal identity through linguistic and spatial boundaries, on
the other,”37 an observation that could also be applied toCairo, Tunis, and other
major cities in mena.
Even in places where ethnic tensions and intra-communal divisions were
accentuated and expressed by reinforcing spatial segregation, modernity in
its many forms increased encounters between Muslims and Jews in shared
public spaces. Coffeehouses, for example, already numerous in mena in the
premodernperiod, continued to grow inmanyplaces,whilewith the increasing
degree of foreign influence and colonialism, taverns owned or run by non-
Muslims served alcoholic beverages to amixed clientele.38 The development of
this secular common ground—spaces of sociability, and the leisure activities
associated with them—at times provoked the reproach of both Muslim and
Jewish religious leaders, who believed that it was causing a laxity in morality
and religious practice.39 Yet even in the disapprobation of religious leaders,
36 Abdel-Nour, “Habitat,” 88–89.
37 Lital Levy, “Self and the City: Literary Representations of Jewish Baghdad,” Prooftexts, 26,
no. 1–2, (2006): 165.
38 Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 138–140; Zvi Zohar, Rabbinic Creativity in the Modern Mid-
dle East (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 259–261.
39 On rabbinical criticism of Jews engaged in leisure activity and laxity in religious practice,
see Zohar, Rabbinic Creativity, 116–117, 233–268; seeMatthias B. Lehmann, LadinoRabbinic
Literature and Ottoman Sephardic Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005),
82–88; on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Baghdad, see Shlomo Deshen, “Bagh-
dad Jewry in LateOttoman Times: The Emergence of Social Classes and of Secularization,”
ajs Review 19, 1 (1994): 37–40; on Syria, see Walter P. Zenner, “Jews in Late Ottoman Syria:
Community, Family and Religion,” in Shlomo Deshen and Walter P. Zenner (eds.), Jews
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whose authority was growing weaker in this period, we see the emergence
of new patterns of public discourse. Theories on the emergence of a civil
society and the Habermasian notion of bourgeois public sphere privilege the
development of secularism produced by the modern (European) state that
would enable access to all individuals, regardless of religion. Secularism was
indeed a factor in the new public sphere in mena, but for the vast majority of
people, secularization coexisted with the continuation of religious observance
and ethno-religious ties. Indeed, one can talk about a public sphere in which
Muslims and non-Muslims participated, without the corollary of the modern
secular state as it developed in the European setting.40 Indeed, one can better
understand the new shared public spaces, if one eschews the more linear or
hegemonic definition of Western modernity, and assumes rather that their
were “multiple modernities,” or a variety of trajectories in which to understand
the development of modernity in mena.41
Language also reflected the dialogue between the inner, communal space
and thewiderpublic, and the strategic positioningof Jews in thedominant soci-
ety.42 Jewish languages or dialects of the dominant languages (Judeo-Arabic,
Judeo-Spanish, and so forth) increasingly coexisted with European languages,
the latter linked to European networks of trade and eventually, empires. The
communal languages of the Jews from themid-nineteenth century also became
a part of a new secular public sphere, expressed especially in the proliferation
and dissemination of newspapers in Judeo-Spanish and Judeo-Arabic; Jews in
mena also participated in the Hebrew revival movement, by publishing arti-
cles in Haskalah newspapers in Europe.43 Though it varied from place to place,
among Muslims: Communities in the Precolonial Middle East (London: Macmillan, 1996),
180–184; on rabbinic criticism of Jews frequenting Muslim owned coffeehouses in Tripoli,
see Harvey E. Goldberg and Claudio G. Segre, “Holding on to Both Ends: Religious Con-
tinuity and Change in the Libya Jewish Community, 1860–1949,”Maghreb Review 14, 3–4
(1989): 170.
40 For a critical discussion of theories about the public sphere in Muslim societies, see the
introduction in Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine (eds.), Religion, Social Practice, and
Contested Hegemonies: Reconstructing the Public Sphere inMuslimMajority Societies (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 1–17; Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “The
Public Sphere and Muslim Identities,”European Journal of Sociology 43 (2002): 92–115.
41 S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129, 1 (2000): 1–29; Dale F. Eickelman,
“Islam and the Languages of Modernity,”Daedalus 129, 1 (2000): 119–135.
42 Joëlle Bahloul, TheArchitecture ofMemory: A Jewish-MuslimHousehold in Colonial Algeria,
1937–1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 87–88.
43 Stein, Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian and Ottoman
Empires (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Lehmann, Ladino Rabbinic Lit-
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French became the language of modernity for many Jews,44 especially because
of the network of schools established by the Alliance Israélite Universelle; after
its first school was opened in Morocco in 1862 they expanded throughout the
Mediterranean.45 Alliance schools, which promoted French language and cul-
ture, proliferated throughout mena; its teachers often came from one part of
the Mediterranean Basin, were trained in Paris, then dispatched to other parts
of the Mediterranean.46 Their network of schools further expanded in coun-
tries under French colonial rule, with the exception of Algeria, where, from
1870, Jews were French citizens and often attended state schools. English com-
peted with French, especially in Egypt and Iraq which were under British colo-
nial rule. At the Shammash high school in Baghdad, the language of instruction
was English, though theAlliance schools continued to offer a French education
and attract students.47 Education in European languages not only highlighted
differences between Jews and non-Jews, but also sharpened generational divi-
sions within Jewish communities, and transformed gender relations at home
and in society.
The Alliance is sometimes blamed for sowing divisions between Muslims
and Jews, or for being an instrument of imperialism because it was attached
to or identified with the language or culture of dominant colonial powers.48
Yet in places of French colonial rule, the French language also became asso-
erature, 26, 45–48; Joseph Chetrit, “Modaʿut ḥadashah la-anonomaliyut ve-le-lashon—
niṣanehah shel tenuʿat hasqala be-Maroqo be-sof ha-meʾa ha-19,”Miqqedem Umiyyam 2
(1986): 129–168; idem, “Haskala hébraique et haskala judéo-arabe à Tunis à la fin du xixe
siècle,” Entre orient et occident: Juifs et Musulmans en Tunisie (Paris: Éditions de l’éclat,
2007), 289–320; Joseph Chetrit, “La question linguistique dans la presse judéo-arabe de
Tunis à la fin du xixe siècle,” in Claude Nataf (ed.), De Tunis à Paris:Mélanges à lamémoire
de Paul Sebag (Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 2008), 47–71.
44 For the influence of French on Judeo-Arabic, the hybridization of Jewish languages, and
the development of bilingualism in North Africa, see Joseph Chetrit, “L’ influence du
français dans les langues judéo-arabes d’Afrique du Nord,” in Judaïsme d’Afrique du Nord
aux xixe–xxe siècles: Histoire, société et culture (Jerusalem: Institut Ben-Zvi, 1980), 125–159;
for a case study of Meknes, see idem, Diglossie, hybridation et diversité intra-linguistique:
Études socio-pragmatique sur les langues juives, le judéo-Arabe et le judéo-berbère (Paris:
Éditions Peeters, 2007), 431–460.
45 Michael M. Laskier, The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of
Morocco, 1862–1962 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
46 Rodrigue, Jews and Muslims; Frances Malino, “Institutrices in the Metropole and the
Maghreb: A Comparative Perspective,”Historical Reflections 32, 1 (2006): 129–142.
47 Bashkin, New Babylonians, 80–81.
48 Abitbol, Le passé d’une discorde, 220–228.
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ciated with the “modern,” public sector to which Muslims might also aspire.
Under colonial rule, French became a vehicle for advancement. It is certain
that Jews saw the value ofmodern education in aEuropean language, and in the
language of the colonizer, which, as a minority they realized could give them
an edge over Muslims;49 the gap between French-educated Jews and Muslims
was also noticed and commented on by Muslim intellectuals. Even more radi-
cally, education for women in European languages was seen as away to acquire
Western ways and manners, which was important for the marriage market or
for new forms of work and sociability in public spaces that were transform-
ing gender roles. Jewish girls, along with boys, acquired modern education in
various kinds of schools, not only of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, but also
in state schools, as in Algeria and Iraq, Italian schools in Libya, or Christian
and missionary schools, as was the case in Egypt. Jewish women also acquired
vocational skills in schools, which they used in their expanding public roles
in the workplace.50 If Muslim nationalists criticized the willingness of Jews to
attend French and other foreign schools, it was also recognized that Jews were
conduits of modernity that was facilitated by modern education in European
languages, and for some Muslims, this may have provided a model or incen-
tive to also becomemodern and even address the question of changing gender
roles.51 In some places in Egypt, Iraq, and Morocco, Muslims, though in small
numbers, enrolled inaiu schools.52 Frencheducationwas also seenbyMuslims
as important cultural capital in Egypt, as it was the lingua franca of the business
community from the late nineteenth century on and was essential for working
in the private economic sector. In Egypt, therefore, Muslims attended French
schools, including Christian missionary schools together with Egyptian Chris-
tians and Jews.53 The gap in the modern literacy of Jewish men and women
49 Sara Reguer, “TheWorld ofWomen,” in The Jews of theMiddle East, 242–243; Reeva Spector
Simon, “Europe in the Middle East,” in The Jews of the Middle East, 24; Keith Walters,
“Education for Jewish Girls in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Tunis and
the Spread of French in Tunisia,” in Emily Benichou Gottreich and Daniel J. Schroeter
(eds.), Jewish Culture and Society in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2011), 270–271.
50 Rachel Simon, Change within Tradition among Jewish Women in Libya (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1992), 99–102, 111–153; Krämer, Jews in Modern Egypt, 38, 80–81, 91,
192.
51 Walters, “Education for Jewish Girls,” 278.
52 In Tanta, Egypt, for example: Krämer, Jews in Modern Egypt, 111.
53 Frédéric Abécassis, “L’enseignement du français en Egypte dans les années 1920: une
nébuleuse à plusieurs degrés de francité.” Documents pour l’histoire du français langue
the changing landscape of muslim-jewish relations 55
relative to the Muslim population accelerated under colonial rule, but did not,
however, cause Muslims to reject the advantages of a modern, European edu-
cation, but rather, to decry the growing disparity between Muslims and Jews.
Although Muslims and Jews became increasingly divided politically dur-
ing the course of the twentieth century, the educated elite and intelligentsia
of both communities participated and communicated in new forms of pub-
lic discourse, in the writing and publication of newspapers and books, and
by engaging in debates in the public sphere. While in most Arabic-speaking
regions, local Jewish dialects remained, the status of Judeo-Arabic as the com-
munal language was challenged bymodern education. Judeo-Arabic wasmod-
ernized in places, as newspapers and the printing press began to publishworks.
A similar observation couldbemadeof Judeo-Spanish. In colonialNorthAfrica,
French language newspapers were becoming the official organs of the Jewish
communities. Alongside Jewish languages, European languages became public
languages, with the multiplication of newspapers of various political persua-
sions.54 Jewish-owned newspapers in French engaged in debate with Muslims
who also wrote in French-language newspapers.
For Jews in Egypt and especially Iraq, modern Arabic was also a public
language of the Jews. Historically, literary Arabic written in Arabic script had
rarely been the language of the Jews. This exclusion of the Jews from a mod-
ern Arabic education was perpetuated during colonial rule in the Maghrib,
because the French were anxious to maintain the distinctions between ethno-
religious groups, while the Jews saw European languages as “modern,” and Jew-
ish schools paid little or no attention to Arabic. It was only after independence
in Morocco, when the Alliance became known locally as the Ittihad Maroc
andwas partially subsidized by theMoroccan government, that the Arabic cur-
riculumwas mandated by the government and integrated into the Jewish edu-
cational system.55 The situation in the Arab Mashriq, or East, was somewhat
different. As Arabic speakers redefined their identities amid the rapid changes
in the late Ottoman period, a number of Jews participated in the nahḍa, the
renaissance of Arabic letters, and were educated in Arabic in Beirut and Cairo.
Arabic was taught in the Alliance schools in the Arab Middle East, especially
Iraq.
étrangère ou seconde 27 (2001): 97–114; idem, “Approche d’un champ: l’enseignement
étranger en Égypte, d’après la statistique scolaire de l’Égypte, 1921–1951,” Égypte/Monde
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54 For an excellent overview of the Jewish press in mena, see Rachel Simon, “Journalism,”
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In polyglot Egypt, with perhaps the most diverse community of the Middle
East, a result of waves of immigration from the late nineteenth century, Arabic
competed with a multitude of languages used by educated Jews—French, Ital-
ian, Ladino, etc. Italian and then increasingly French were the main languages
of the communal or Jewish schools. English gained headway from 1882, follow-
ing the British occupation of Egypt. With the plethora of communal, Christian,
and missionary schools that Jews attended, Arabic began to lose ground as the
spoken language of the educated, but remained dominant among the Karaites
and poorer Jews of Cairo and provincial towns.56
However, as the nationalist movement gained momentum in the interwar
years—the British granted nominal independence in 1922, though they main-
tained the upper hand in Egypt for many years—literary Arabic lingered on as
some Jews participated in the growing Arab public sphere in Egypt. The exam-
ple of the last Arabic language Jewish newspaper, al-Shams (published from
1934 to 1938), is indicative of this participation in the public sphere. The owner
and editor of the newspaper, Saʿd YaʿqūbMalkī, used the newspaper as a vehicle
to represent the Jewish community to the Egyptian public and government; he
supported an Egyptian reformist agenda as well as Zionismwhile emphasizing
the adoption of Arabic by the Jewish community and integration into Egyptian
society.57 Some Jewish intellectuals, political activists, and community leaders
sometimes supported both Zionism and Egyptian nationalism or joined the
nationalist Wafd party.58
The increasingly contradictory agenda of supporting both Zionism andArab
nationalism demonstrates not only the mounting tensions between Muslims
and Jews, but also underscored Jewish participation in the public sphere and
in political space that would have been unimaginable in the nineteenth cen-
tury.With the notable exception of Iraq, Jews remained largely on the sidelines
of nationalist politics in mena, uncertain of their future and in some places,
alienated by the Islamist reformist agenda of the nationalist and independence
movements. Further complicating their participation was the conflict in Pales-
tine and the increasing linkage, real or imagined, of Jews to Zionism. Yet we
can also note that the level of participation in nationalist politics by the pop-
ulation as a whole remained limited, and in some spheres of political life Jews
56 Krämer, The Jews in Modern Egypt, 26–29.
57 Lital Levy, “al-Shams,”ejiw, 4:341–342.
58 Ruth Kimche, Ṣiyonut be-ṣel ha-piramidot: ha-tenuʿah ha-ṣiyonit be-Miṣrayim, 1918–1948
(Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2009), 28–30, 166–169; Krämer, Jews in Modern Egypt, 28; Beinin, The
Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry, 33–35, 46.
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participated disproportionately to their numbers. Take, for example, the case of
communism, a kind of secular middle ground, where in theory one’s religious
background is irrelevant. In Iraq, Egypt, and Tunisia Jews were very active in
communist parties, and in Egypt and Tunisia in particular, were among some
of its founders and leaders.59
Some Jews went further than the rejection of Zionism that was characteris-
tic of communist parties; in Iraq in 1945, Jewish communists were the leaders
and founders of the anti-Zionist political organization, the League for Com-
bating Zionism, and its journal, al-ʿUsba (The league).60 In Morocco, on the
eve of independence, Jews joined Muslims in forming a new organization, al-
Wifaq, which announced in the main hall of the Chamber of Commerce in
Casablanca, their expression of national unity and solidarity regardless of reli-
gion; in 1956, al-Wifaq denounced the French, British, and Israeli aggression
against Egypt, and disseminated its statement to the public in Judeo-Arabic,
Arabic, and French, symbolically representing the communal languages of
each religious community respectively, while French represented the modern
public language shared by Muslims and Jews.61
Even in the participation of Jews in Zionist parties, especially those active
in Egypt and Tunisia in the interwar years, the very debates and denuncia-
tions thatZionist activismengendered, not only betweenMuslims and Jewsbut
also internallywithin the Jewish community, demonstrated the extent towhich
Jews andMuslims had become a part of a commonpublic sphere. Polemics and
debates, for example, were exchanged in 1948 between an Arabic daily news-
paper, al-Nahḍa and a French Jewish daily, Le Petit Matin, over the question of
the inclusion of Jews in the civil service in Tunisia; the polemics were exacer-
bated by the Israeli-Arab conflict.62 This is not to deny that Zionism eventually
59 Bashkin, New Babylonians, 141–161, 179–182; Habib Kazdaghli, Taṭawwur al-ḥaraka al-Shu-
yūʿiyya bi-Tūnis, 1919–1943 (Manūba: Manshūrāt Kulīyat al-Ādāb, Jāmiʿat Tūnis, 1992); Irm-
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diss., Université Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah-Fès, 2007), 429–435; Mohammad Kenbib,
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became irreconcilable to theArab public, and indeedwas eventually banned in
independent Arab states, but if we think of the public sphere as a space where
political opinion can be formed and debated, then Zionist politics was asmuch
a part of the public, political realm as Jews joining forces withMuslims in com-
munist movements, labor unions, or nationalist parties.
To the extent that one thinks of the public sphere as political space, Iraq
in the interwar years offers themost striking example of a developing common
ground.Despite themulti-ethnic sectarianism, perhapsmorepronounced than
anywhere else in the Arabic-speaking world, there was also a thriving, non-
sectarian nationalism in Iraq, where Jews articulated an identity in the Arab
public sphere.63 Iraq was unique in the sense that most Jews there were cit-
izens of an independent Arab nation state, were educated in modern Arabic
in their communal schools, attended state secondary schools in disproportion-
ate numbers, were actively engaged in the Arabic-language press, letters, and
arts, and worked in various public institutions. Jews published newspapers in
Arabic, notably al-Miṣbāḥ and al-Ḥāṣid, that also had Muslims contributors,
while some Jewish authors, feeling a part of the larger pan-Arab issues, also
published articles in Egyptian and Lebanese newspapers.64 A growing number
of Jews participated in and supported both Iraqi and pan-Arab nationalism;
they were clearly staking their future as citizens of an independent Iraq and
defining themselves as Arabs. Even in the 1940s, as tensions grew over the issue
of Palestine, a larger than ever Jewish public was being educated in Arabic and
participating in the Iraqi and Arab public sphere.
Iraq was, in many respects, a unique case, but it also raises “what if” ques-
tions about other parts of mena. It is no coincidence thatmainly amongmem-
bers of the Iraqi Jewish diaspora, including second-generation immigrants, the
term “Arab Jews” is used to describe the Jews of Arab lands and in this man-
ner they assign an identity for contemporary political reasons that did not
exist in most places in the past, at least in the way Jews represented them-
selves.65 Yet Iraq, with the partial exception of Egypt, presents a somewhat
different picture than the ideational construct of the Arab Jew. Nowhere else
were there so many Jews involved in the modern nationalist project. And in
Egypt, with its very hybrid cosmopolitan Jewish population, many Jews did
63 Bashkin, New Babylonians, 6–7.
64 Ibid., 24–37.
65 See Lital Levy, “Historicizing the Concept of Arab Jews in the Mashriq,” Jewish Quarterly
Review 98, 4 (2008): 452–469; Emily Benichou Gottreich, “Historicizing the Concept of
Arab Jews in the Maghrib,” Jewish Quarterly Review 98, 4 (2008): 433–451.
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not become Egyptian citizens. No more than 10,000 of Egypt’s 80,000 Jews
held Egyptian citizenship, about half were stateless, while 30,000 were citi-
zens of foreign states. The secular-liberal ideology that accompanied the 1919
nationalist uprising that promoted citizenship for all attracted some Jews to
become citizens, but Egyptian independence in 1922 was limited by the con-
tinued British presence andmaintenance of European privileges. The perpetu-
ation of communal courts, and the continuation ofmixed courts where foreign
citizens still retained the right to adjudicate, helped preserve the legal divi-
sions and separations that worked against the fuller membership of Jews in
the Egyptian nation.66 Had there been a similar experience of living as full
citizens in an independent Arab country as there was in the interwar years
in Iraq, perhaps Jews elsewhere might have become a part of the Arab public
sphere. By the time the Maghrib had achieved independence and ended colo-
nial rule, the state of Israelwas born and the age ofmass emigrationhad already
begun.
If colonialism in the Maghrib precluded the possibility of Jews becoming a
part of an Arab public sphere or identifying themselves as Arabs and mem-
bers of Arab nations, it did not prevent the development of a public sphere
where Jews and Muslims participated in a common Arab cultural milieu. Per-
haps the best example of this is in the world of mena music, certainly an
important space that could transcend religious and ethnic boundaries. Before
modern times, music making and performance functioned as a kind of spe-
cial common ground for Muslim-Jewish interaction. In many places in mena
Jewish musicians were disproportionate in numbers to their Muslim counter-
parts. While Jews made music for the internal communal world and in com-
munal languages, such as for the liturgy in synagogues, they also produced
and performed music of many different local genres for Muslim patrons, in
palaces and the homes of the wealthy, and in coffeehouses throughout the
Ottoman Empire, which reached a public beyond the elite. Orchestras and
musical ensembles were also sometimesmixed, withMuslim and Jewishmusi-
cians performing together. Essaouira, for example, was known for its Jewish
performers and artists, but also had mixed ensembles that played for Mus-
lims and Jews in the public sphere. Ironically, this shared space of “Judeo-Arab”
music as it is still called in France today reached its apogee in the colonial
era. Modernity and the public sphere under colonial rule greatly expanded
the spaces and venues for musical performance and production, both instru-
mental and vocal, and also contributed to the development of new genres.
66 Beinin, Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry, 6–7, 36–38.
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Muslims and Jewsparticipated on commonground, not only in the cafés, night-
clubs, concert and dance halls, and weddings, but in the development of a
recording industry, film industry, and in radio broadcasting.67 In Iraq, Salāḥ
al-Kuwaytī launched a modern school of Arabic music, and together with his
brother Dāʾūd helped develop the national Iraqi Radio Orchestra, which was
broadcast from the royal palace in the 1930s.68 In Algeria especially, the col-
laboration of Muslims and Jews was crucial for the preservation of a common
cultural heritage; new styles developed from the cross-fertilization of music
across the Mediterranean, and were performed and recorded in the many new
public spaces.69
Yet the expanding public realm of musical performance and production
also, like politics, produced tensions between Muslims and Jews. This was
perhaps most poignantly expressed by the 1961 assassination in Constantine
of Cheikh Raymond Leyris, the dominant figure in the Algerian music scene.
The commonMuslim-Jewish performance and production of music remains a
subject of memory long after the period of mass emigration, not only in mena,
but in the contested spaces among emigrant communities, both Muslim and
Jewish, from France to Israel.70
Nowhere is thismore evident—to return, so to speak, tomyplace of origin—
than in Essaouira. Long in decline, dilapidated, and rarely the destination of
tourists, it has in recent years been revived by the massive annual Gnawa
music festival and in new hotels along the beachfront and traditional houses
converted into hotels (riads, riyāḍs) within the walled town, often in homes of
the casbah formerly owned bywealthy Jews accommodating themany visitors.
The new tolerance, represented by the blending of African, Moroccan, and
world music at the festival, is promoted alongside the official and more elitist
representation of the Convivencia expressed in the common Muslim-Jewish
heritage of the Andalusian andNorth Africanmusical tradition, that wasmuch
a part of the town in the era when there was a thriving Jewish community, and
67 Edwin Seroussi, “Music,”ejiw, 3:501–519.
68 Edwin Serousi, “Salah and Daud al-Kuweiti,”ejiw, 3:194–195.
69 Hadj Miliani, “Crosscurrents: Trajectories of Algerian Jewish Artists and Men of Culture
since the End of the Nineteenth Century,” in Jewish Culture and Society in North Africa,
177–187.
70 Hisham D. Aidi, Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the NewMuslim Youth Culture (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2014), 260–261, 281–289; Ted Swedenburg, “Against Hybridity: The Case
of Enrico Macias/Gaston Ghrenassia,” in Rebecca L. Stein and Ted Swedenburg (eds.),
Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture (Durham, nc: Duke University Press,
2005), 231–256, 328–334.
the changing landscape of muslim-jewish relations 61
since 2003 publicly celebrated in the Festival des Andalousies Atlantiques.71
During the much more massive and popular Gnawa festival—the “Moroccan
Woodstock” as some have called it72—the Judeo-Arabmusical tradition takes a
back seat, relegated to lectures for small audiences in the riyāḍs, as the sounds
of the rhythmic, stringed gumbri and chants of the Afro-Moroccan Gnawa
performers waft through the streets of the casbah from the stage set up at the
square where Mr. Hatchwell, already in 1981 the remnant of a bygone age, once
owned his modest hotel.
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chapter 3
Standardized Arabic as a Post-Nahḍa Common
Ground: Mattai bar Paulus and His Use of Syriac,
Arabic, and Garshuni
T.C. Baarda
The need to have a common ground is most obvious where members of a
minority communitymust access the arenas defined bymembers of amajority
community. But common grounds are present in all situations in which differ-
ent communities meet, and even in intra-communal situations it can be nec-
essary to negotiate commonmeans of communication. In this paper, I look at a
case in which members of different branches of Syriac Christianity in manda-
tory Iraq communicated with each other; I examine the ways they used the
Arabic and Syriac languages, and how this varied according to the functions of
their language and their audiences.
While Arabic is by far the most dominant language in the Middle East,
the linguistic environment in the region is not straightforward at all and has
never been. Diglossia is a well-known phenomenon, as is the existence of
minority languages for both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.1 What
makes the situation even more complicated is the fact that most minority
Christian communities have a liturgical language that is normally not used
outside church contexts, but that does play a significant role in the expression
of the community’s identity.
This linguistic complexity is certainly the case for Syriac Christians, the
group of Christians central to this paper. The Syriac Christians formed a sig-
nificant minority in Mandate Iraq, especially in the northern part. Apart from
Neo-Aramaic, which is a group of dialects spoken and written by members of
the community until today, they used the liturgical language of Classical Syriac.
One particular case is central to this paper: the letters from the Syriac Ortho-
dox deacon Mattai bar Paulus of Mosul, to Alphonse Mingana, who was orig-
inally a Chaldean from a village close to the city of Zakho (modern northern
Iraq) and who later became known as an Orientalist in Britain. Mattai, a dea-
1 For an introduction to the phenomenonof diglossia, seeKees Versteegh,TheArabic Language
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 189–208.
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con, worked as a scribe for his church and produced numerous manuscripts.
Mingana, as an Orientalist, was his customer and a personal friend. The men
were from different branches of Syriac Christianity. A large number of letters
from Mattai to Mingana have been preserved and are available in the Special
Collections of the Cadbury Research Library in Birmingham, England. Com-
bined with a biography that was made about Mattai by the Syriac Orthodox
author Nematallah Denno, we can make interesting assertions about the vari-
ous choices Mattai made when communicating withMingana and in his other
writings.
In Mattai’s writings and his biography, he uses Arabic the most, rather than
Syriac or Neo-Aramaic. This is not very surprising. For many centuries Arabic
had had an important position with the Syriac Orthodox Christians, especially
as a written language, and in certain places it had even replaced Aramaic as
the spoken vernacular.2 But Arabic had never replaced Syriac and Aramaic
completely: it has always had a position alongside Syriac and Neo-Aramaic,
and it is this position that interests me most: what made an author decide to
favor Arabic over their “own” communal Syriac or Aramaic? And from another
perspective: to what extent did the author’s use of Arabic correspond to the use
of Arabic in the Muslim environment?
Using Arabic was a choice that in itself makes perfect sense from the per-
spective of Mattai bar Paulus, as a Syriac Orthodox Christian in Mosul he used
the language that he would normally use. But the documents do not show the
usage of Arabic alone. In specific places Classical Syriac is used as well, and
evenmore important, we see the use of Garshuni, which is the practice of writ-
ing Arabic in the Syriac alphabet. The mix of different languages and scripts
presents us with an ideal case to assess to what extent Christians, who had
Arabic at their disposal but who also had their own communal language, com-
municated on common grounds with their Muslim neighbors and their fellow
Christians fromother denominations. ThewayMattai andNematallah useAra-
bic is just as interesting. A considerable number of scholars have pointed out
that the nahḍa, the literary revival of the Arabic language that began in the
nineteenth century, is related to the linguistic integration of Christians into
the rest of the Arab world. Evidence for this is, however, mainly restricted to
Lebanon and Syria. Is this phenomenon, which in this article I refer to as the
nahḍa hypothesis, also true for the texts we consider here?
2 John Joseph, Muslim-Christian Relations and Inter-Christian Rivalries in the Middle East: The
Case of the Jacobites in an Age of Transition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983),
22.
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Even though the current case of an early twentieth-century Syriac Orthodox
scribe inMosul cannot be taken as representative of all Christian communities
in the Middle East, my aim in this article is not only to highlight the case of
Mattai bar Paulus, but also to show that Mattai’s case can serve as an example
by which we can study the process in which Christians in theMiddle East used
Arabic and other languages during the nineteenth and twentieth century to
create a commonmeans of communication.
After an introduction to the material, I briefly discuss the documents that
form the basis of this paper. I follow this with a comparison to developments
in Iraqi church inscriptions, where features in thematerial call for a discussion
of the notions of Middle Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, and the significance
of Garshuni; I address these in a separate section. In the last part of the arti-
cle I discuss the common grounds betweenMuslims and Christians on the one
hand, and among Christians from different denominations on the other. As I
argue, Mattai appears to be in a different position than that of other contem-
porary Syriac Christians.
Twentieth-Century Manuscript Production: The Scribe Mattai bar
Paulus and His Letters to Mingana
Mattai had always been based in Mosul, the most important city of northern
Mesopotamia that was incorporated, during the years after World War i, into
the new state of Iraq. Northern Mesopotamia, known for having a majority
of Kurdish inhabitants, is in fact a place of great religious and ethnic variety.
Harry Charles Luke, who worked for the British Colonial Office at the time of
the British mandate in Iraq, shows that the British had also seen this when
they entered Mesopotamia: “There are few parts of the world (outside the
Caucasus, than which there is no more intricate mosaic of races) so baffling
to the ethnographic mapmaker as the district which was once known as the
Vilayet of Mosul.”3 While the vast majority of the population wasMuslim, both
Kurdish andArab, all branches of Syriac Christianitywere present inMosul and
the surroundings.
Compared to cities like Beirut and Damascus, Mosul was a relatively periph-
eral city in the Ottoman Arab world, at least with regard to its intellectual
activity. Pierre-Jean Luizard noted that in the latest phase of Ottoman history,
Mesopotamia, and especially Mosul, lagged behind in comparison to other
3 Harry Charles Luke, Mosul and its Minorities (London: Hopkinson, 1925), 13.
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places in the Arab world; he wrote that the intellectual elite had yet to rise,
though it had already developed in the Levant and in Egypt.4 While Mosul was
an important regional center, as well as an important place of Syriac Christian-
ity, it was not central to the new intellectual developments spreading across
the rest of the Arab world.
It was in Mosul that Mattai bar Paulus5 (1861–1947) was active. He was a
deacon (shammās in Arabic andmshamshōnō in Syriac) of the SyriacOrthodox
Church, and in this function he worked as a scribe. We do not know much
about him. We know himmainly through Alphonse Mingana, to whomMattai
delivered a large quantity of manuscripts. A considerable number of these
were produced by Mattai on Mingana’s request. Mingana mentions Mattai
a few times in his publications, most notably in his catalogue of the Syriac
manuscripts in his own collection.6 In 1959, the Dominican scholar J.M. Fiey,
who stayed in Mosul for a long time, mentions him first in his description of
the city’s Christian buildings. He calls him a “copiste jacobite fameux” (famous
Jacobite copyist) and mentions that he met with him in person.7 Later, in
1967, Fiey writes, in the context of a manuscript that Mingana used in one of
his works, that Mattai was a deacon whose full name was “Matti b. Paulos, b.
Naʿmat-Allah, b. ʿAwdichoʿ, b. Potros” and that he used to work for Mingana. It
is especially interesting that hementions that Mattai did not know any foreign
language.8
Mattai is mentioned in the The Scattered Pearls: A History of Syriac Litera-
ture and Sciences by the late Syriac Orthodox patriarch Ignatius Afram i Bar-
4 Pierre-JeanLuizard, La formationde l’ Irak contemporain: le rôlepolitiquedesulémaschiitesà la
fin de la domination ottomane et aumoment de la construction de l’Etat irakien (Paris: Editions
du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1991), 81 and 84.
5 Mattai’s name has an abundance of forms, and Mattai himself did not use the same form
consistently.Wewill see some of the names that he used himself later on. Inwestern scholarly
literature he is most commonly known as Matti/Mattai bar Paulus andMatthew, son of Paul.
6 A. Mingana, Catalogue of the Mingana Collection of Manuscripts, now in the Possession of
the Trustees of the Woodbroke Settlement, Selly Oak, Birmingham, part i: Syriac and Garshūni
manuscripts (Cambridge: Heffer, 1933).
7 J.M. Fiey, Mossoul Chrétienne: Essai sur l’histoire, l’archéologie et l’ état actuel des monuments
chrétiens de la ville de Mossoul (Beirut: Imprimerie catholique, 1959), 30. Fiey, a well-known
Catholic priest and scholar, wrote this description after a stay of twenty years in Iraq. While
the book was meant to describe the Christian monuments of Mosul, it also gives interesting
information about the situation of the Christians during his visit (1939–1959).
8 J.M. Fiey, “Auteur et date de la chronique d’arbèles,”L’orient syrien, revue trimestrielle d’Etudes
et de Recherches sur les Eglises de langue syriaque, publiée avec la collaboration du Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique 12 (1967): 269.
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soum, who writes that “[d]eacon Matthew Paul transcribed more than forty
volumes of different subjects, including commentaries on the Pentateuch, the-
ology, ecclesiastical jurisprudence, history, literature and asceticism. They are
preserved in different libraries. He is still living and has passed his eighty-sixth
year of age.”9 He is alsomentioned in a chapter on Syriac scribes, at the end of a
long list.Mattai is the only deacon in the list, the others held higher ranks in the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, and he is the only one of whom Barsoum writes more
than just his name and year. J.F. Coakleywrites that the number ofmanuscripts
that Barsoum ascribes to him, forty, is too low.10
As stated, Mattai belonged to the Syriac Orthodox Church, while Mingana
was originally a Chaldean. Both are Syriac churches which, together with the
Syriac Catholic Church and the Church of the East, use Classical Syriac as their
liturgical language. Without going into the historical or theological details, it is
important to mention that the Syriac Orthodox Church belongs to the western
branch of Syriac Christianity, and the Chaldean Church belongs to the eastern
branch. This difference is significant in relation to the Syriac language, which is
written in three different but similar scripts. The oldest of the three, esṭrangelō,
is used by both branches, but the younger two are specific to the church: West
Syriac Christianity has a script called serṭō, and the eastern branch has a script
that is calledmadhnḥōyō, which simply translates to “eastern”—therefore it is
usually referred to as East Syriac script. The use of the scripts therefore reveals
to which community the writer belongs, even if the text would otherwise not
reveal it.11 Besides a difference in script, there is also a difference in the tradition
of pronunciation, but because this is not terribly relevant in relation to written
material, I do not go deeper into that.12
9 Ignatius Aphram i Barsoum, The Scattered Pearls: A History of Syriac Literature and Sci-
ences, trans. and ed. Matti Moosa (Piscataway, nj: Gorgias Press, 2003), 22. There is a
translation of Ighnāṭiyūs Afrām Barṣawm, Al-luʾluʾ al-manthūr fī tārīkh al-ʿulūmwa-l-ādāb
al-suryāniyya (Aleppo, 1956) which I did not have access to.
10 J.F. Coakley, “A Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts in the John Rylands Library,”Bulletin
of the John Rylands Library 75 (1993), 113. Coakley must be right, as there are already fifty
manuscripts in the Mingana collection (see below).
11 This is, for instance, apparent in modern-day Ankawa, a Christian city close to the Iraqi
Kurdish capital of Erbil, where many signs on the street have three languages: Kurdish,
Arabic, and Aramaic. The Aramaic is printed in East Syriac script. Though upon inquiry
people say that none of the Syriac branches is favored, the script reveals that the Eastern
branch is dominant.
12 It is, however, important for the transcriptionof Syriacwords. In this paper, theWest Syriac
pronunciation has been followed consistently in transcriptions, which is characterized by
the use of the long ō for the East Syriac long ā and for the merging of b and v in b as well
as p and f in f.
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There aremany links betweenMattai and AlphonseMingana (c. 1870–1937).
Mingana was originally a Chaldean Christian who lived close to Zakho in
modern Iraq, but in 1913 he broke with his church and moved to Britain.13 In
Britain he became known as an Orientalist with an extensive collection of
manuscripts that he collected during his travels to the Middle East and from
manuscript sellers in Europe and the Middle East. Mattai was thus one of the
people who provided Mingana with manuscripts.
In his Catalogue, Mingana was normally not very informative about the
provenance of the manuscripts that were part of his collection, but he gave
information about the age of the manuscripts and the copyists, usually by pro-
viding a summary of the colophon. Mattai always made himself known in his
colophons, and thus we know that he produced about fifty of the manuscripts
in this collection—part of these were simply bought by Mingana, but a con-
siderable number were copied especially by Mattai for Mingana’s collection;
Mingana acknowledged this in various places in his Catalogue.14 This is prob-
ably what Fiey meant when he writes that Mattai worked for Mingana (see
above). A few manuscripts copied by Mattai are further to be found in the
John Rylands Library in Manchester (United Kingdom); these were brought
there by Mingana. The Syriac manuscripts in Manchester were cataloged by
J.F. Coakley, who identifies twenty-five manuscripts of this collection as acqui-
sitions byMingana. Four of thesewere copiedbyMattai, but none onMingana’s
request.15
13 The sources concerning this dispute are obscure and partly contradict each other, but
for our present purpose it is interesting that Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje mentions, in
correspondence with Theodor Nöldeke in 1925 many years after his move to Britain in
1913, that the Catholics did not want to be in contact with him anymore. C. Snouck Hur-
gronje, Abdoel-Ghaffaar: Sources for the History of Islamic Studies in the Western World,
vol. 1: Orientalism and Islam: The Letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to Th. Nöldeke from the
TübingenUniversity Library, publishedbyP.Sj. vanKoningsveld (Leiden:Documentatiebu-
reau Islam-Christendom, Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, 1985), 335. There is an indication
that Mingana had developed positive feelings toward the Syriac Orthodox Church: right
after his election, he writes about their patriarch Ignatius Afram i Barsoum, that he is the
“highest ecclesiastical dignity found in this world.” Cadbury Research Library, da66/1/3/5
(“Correspondence concerning the Church of Malabar”), letter fromMingana to Barsoum,
dated 3 January 1933. The letter was written in English instead of Arabic or Syriac because
at that time Mingana was not able to use his right hand, while for English a typewriter
could be used. Another letter, dated 8December 1932, expresses his fear that “a great num-
ber of the members of the Syrian Church of India will join the Church of Rome.”
14 See for instance Mingana, Catalogue, 1:429.
15 Coakley, “A Catalogue,” 112–113.
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Mingana is not the only manuscript collector who commissioned or pur-
chased Mattai’s manuscripts. Coakley’s catalog reveals that part of the Syr-
iac manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, the manuscripts of Mingana’s
patron James Rendel Harris, were sold to Harvard University in 1905.16 A quick
search in the digital catalog of the Harvard libraries shows that some of these
manuscripts were copied by Mattai, long before Mingana went to Britain.17
Mattai cannot be found listed in the indices of four important manuscript
catalogs that describe Syriac manuscripts in various ecclesiastical libraries in
and close to Mosul. The catalogs describe libraries from different denomina-
tions, including the Syriac Orthodox.18
Mingana’s personal archive in the Cadbury Research Library in Birmingham
contains a vast amount of personal correspondence in English, French, and
German, mainly with other scholars around Europe and the United States.19
One folder of the Mingana papers contains a good number of documents in
Arabic and Syriac, and except a number of letters from the Syriac Orthodox
patriarch Barsoum (written in Syriac) most of the documents are letters from
Mattai bar Paulus. Only the letters from Mattai to Mingana are preserved—
from the letters that went to the other direction nothing is available.20 All the
letters are in Arabic and in Arabic script.
In this article, I consider the material in two parts. First, there is the large
amount of correspondence betweenMattai bar Paulus andAlphonseMingana.
16 Ibid., 107.
17 Many thanks to Dr. Jan van Ginkel (Leiden University), who mentioned the existence
of Mattai’s manuscripts among Rendel Harris’ manuscripts. He also pointed out that
documents on Mattai might also be present in the Rendel Harris’ correspondence, of
which at least part is available in the Special Collections of the John Rylands Library.
18 Fahāris al-makhṭūṭāt al-suryāniyya fī l-ʿIrāq, part one, Maktabāt al-Mawṣil wa-aṭrāfihā,
and part two, Makhṭūtāt ʿAqra, dayr mār Mattā, Duhūk, kanīsat mār Kūrkīs fī Barṭalla,
muṭrāniyya al-suryān al-urthūduks fī l-Mawṣil (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿa al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī l-
ʿIrāqī, 1977–1981). The indices of these volumes, which were prepared by the Iraqi scholar
BenjaminHaddad, include an indexof scribes. Theother twocatalogs areBihnāmDāniyāl,
Fahāris al-makhṭūṭāt al-suryāniyya fī Barṭalla (Duhok: Dār al-Mashriq al-Thaqāfiyya, 2013)
andBihnāmSūnī, Fahārismakhṭūṭāt bīʿatwālidatAllāhMaryam—al-ṭāhira fī Baghdēdā—
Qaraqōsh (Duhok: Dār al-Mashriq al-Thaqāfiyya, 2010), both kindly provided by Father
Shlīmūn Īshō Khōshābā at Dār al-Mashriq in Duhok, Iraq.
19 The fonds is called Papers of Alphonse Mingana, carrying finding number da66. Its
comprehensive inventory can be found in the library’s excellent online catalog.
20 This is probably becauseMingana wrote toMattai in Arabic or Syriac script, so that it was
not possible to produce carbon copies of the letters, as he (or his secretary) didwith letters
that he wrote in European languages.
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Second, the Mingana papers contain a document written by the prominent
Syriac Orthodox writer Nematallah Denno.
Mattai’s Letters to Mingana
Almost a hundred letters from Mattai to Mingana are present in the Mingana
papers. They are dated from 1926 to 1935, a year afterMingana’s second journey
to the Middle East (both the first and the second journey brought him to
Mosul), and up until two years before Mingana’s death. All the letters are
written in Arabic. The letters were written on sheets that were usually folded in
half, so that each sheet consisted of four pages to write on. Some letters consist
of multiple sheets and sometimes only half a sheet is inserted. In other cases
Mattai used a full sheet without folding it in half.
Mattai’s handwriting is identifiable as ruqʿa, which is an Arabic script that
was probably developed during the second half of the eighteenth century
in the Ottoman chancery.21 Ruqʿa is nowadays the most popular script for
handwriting, especially in the Middle East (though not in North Africa). The
fact that Mattai used ruqʿa for his correspondence is not surprising, as the
script had become standard for correspondence throughout the Arab lands of
the Ottoman Empire after first being used in the Turkish-speaking Ottoman
government.22 This tells us that Mattai was able to use the standard script in
the same way as his Muslim contemporaries. This is interesting in light of his
biography by Nematallah Denno.
The use of ruqʿa is usually accompanied with the application of many liga-
tures. Because the script is utilized for daily tasks, it is oftenwritten quickly and
with absence of many diacritical dots. Adam Gacek writes that ruqʿa is never
written with the auxiliary signs used to denote vowels in Arabic.23
21 Arabic has a number of different scripts, the most common are naskh, nastaʿlīq,maghribī
and ruqʿa. Printed Arabic script is usually an adaptation of naskh. Adam Gacek, “Ruqʿa,”
in Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, ed. Kees Versteegh et al. (Leiden: Brill,
2008), 4:98–100.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. The Arabic script has some characters that are only distinguishable from each other
by diacritical dots. The dots are a relatively late invention and while they are considered
obligatory, at least in printed texts, they are often omitted in manuscripts and other
handwritten material. In addition, there are auxiliary signs to indicate the short vowels,
the absence of a vowel (sukūn), gemination (shadda), and the glottal stop (hamza). These
are normally not written but are used in places to overcome ambiguity.
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While the letters are generally written in Arabic, a considerable number of
them contain text in Classical Syriac. The Syriac text is written, as one would
expect, using the serṭō script ofWest Syriac Christians, of whichMattai’s Syriac
Orthodox Church is part. Syriac script is mainly used to list titles of Syriac texts
and books that Mattai could provide to Mingana. The main text is never in
Syriac.
A detailed examination of one of the letters reveals some interesting aspects
of Mattai’s use of both languages. Below is the letter sent byMattai to Mingana
on 4 October 1926 and the first letter in the collection—at that time Mingana
was living inManchester. A photograph of the letter is given and the beginning
is transcribed and translated below:
موصل٤تشرينالاول١٩٢٦مانجستر
حضرةالاجلالاكرمالدقتور·ا·منكنىالمحرم
بعدالسلاموالسؤالاعرضوصلنيتحريركمالمورخ٧ايلولوشرحكمصارمعلومذكرتمرسل
لـكمالـكتبمعالبوستهونوضععليهمعنوانكمالاعتياديصارمعلومواليومقومنالـكممع
البوستهرزمةعدد\٢داخلكلواحدكتابينوعليهمنمرات
نمره١qrܒ焏ܕܣ熏ܢ煿ܕܣ
٢qrܒ焏ܦ熏r犟ܐܘܢܓܠq熏ܢܕq熏qܢ爯
٣qrܒ焏ܕܡ焏ܡrܐܕܡrܝܢrܣqوفيداخلهورقه/٢٨ܦrܕqܣ焏ܕܥ煟ܢ
٤qrܒ焏ܙܩ熏ܪܐܡܠqܡ焏أوراققديمهلـكثير
Mosul, 4 October 1926, (to) Manchester
The great and noble Doctor A. Mingana, the reverend
After a salutation and inquiry [of yourwell-being] we present [our letter].
I received your writing dated 7 August, and we understood your explana-
tion. Youmentioned [that you would like for us to] send the books to you
by mail, and we [will] put on them your usual address, [the one] that we
know. Today we arranged for you by mail two packages, each of which
contains two books, carrying the numbers:
Number 1 Kthōbō d-sunhōdōs (Book of the synods)
2 Kthōbō Fūshōq ewangeliyōn d-Yuḥanan (The book Commen-
tary on the Gospel of John)
3 Kthōbō d-mimrē d-Mōr Narsai (Book of homilies of Mar
Narsai) and therein 28 leaves Fardaysō da-ʿDen (Garden of
Eden), very old leaves
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4 Kthōbō zqurō mlaḥmō (Book of good composition)24
The transcription above is as faithful to Mattai’s handwriting as possible. Aux-
iliary signs have only been reproduced where they were present in the original
text, and the same is true for the dots above the tāʾ marbūṭa and under the alif
maqṣūra, which are often omitted in handwritten texts. Certain features are
not visible, such as the wayMattai marks numbers with a line with a little hook
underneath, in the usual practice. In some cases the noun towhich the number
belongs is written under the number and the line, indicated in the transcrip-
tion with a slash (/). The year at the top of the letter is indicated with a similar
line, but the cipher indicating the thousand (١) is integrated in the line. Fur-
ther note should bemade of the fact that Mattai uses the western Christian era
instead of the Seleucid era (“of the Greeks”), which was still in use.
Looking at theorthography, there are somepeculiar features. Theuppermost
line of the letter tells us that it was sent toManchester; this is written in Arabic
as مانجستر Mānjastir, while the modern spelling is مانشستر Mānshastir. Mingana
is addressed as a doctor, for whichMattai uses the word دقتور duqtūr instead of
دكتور duktūr. These deviations from the usual practice can be explained by the
age of the letters and the fact that these words were less well established than
they are nowadays.
Mattai was quite consistent in writing all the diacritical dots that are neces-
sary to distinquish a number of Arabic characters, but he often leaves out the
two dots above the tāʾ marbūṭa and of the final yāʾ, for which no regularity can
be found. While vowel signs were not used in this letter, a few other letters do
have themona somewords. The latter fact is contrary toGacek’s statement that
ruqʿa is never written with auxiliary signs (see above), and this demonstrates
that Mattai employed a special kind of ruqʿa.
Themost interesting aspect of these letters isMattai’s use of Arabic.We have
seen that Mattai uses a script that was the most common among contempo-
rary Muslims in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire. While it can be said
that the use of auxiliary signs, even sparingly, is not common practice with this
script, it is clear that Mattai used them in a professional way. The orthogra-
phy shows some peculiarities, but these relate to European words that were
not commonly used when Mattai wrote his letters. By looking at the syntax
and other grammatical aspects, we find that even this small piece of writing
stimulates discussion of a number of issues.
24 All cited letters are to be found in the Cadbury Research Library, Birmingham, da66/3,
unless otherwise indicated.
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In both Classical and Modern Standard Arabic grammar, plural inanimate
nouns are considered feminine singular grammatically. While their forms are
the same as those of animate plural nouns, they behave as feminine singular
nouns in termsof agreement.We see inMattai’s texts that hedoesnot apply this
rule: plural inanimate nouns are simply treated as plurals and the agreement
is as such. Interestingly, Mattai is quite consistent in carrying out this “incor-
rect” agreement. The first instance is the word الـكتب al-kutub (the books); a
few words later he refers to writing عليهم ʿalayhim (upon them), which is the
preposition ʿalā with a masculine plural pronominal suffix. Standard Arabic
grammar would require that one refer to them/the books using a feminine sin-
gular pronominal suffix, which would be عليها ʿalayhā.
There are different possibilities as to the origin of these peculiar features
of Mattai’s Arabic. Classical Syriac was probably the language in which Mattai
wrote themost, as the vast majority of themanuscripts he copied were texts in
this language. This language does not have the same rules of agreement—these
are a specific feature of Arabic. Another factor relates to colloquial Arabic: in
this region it is very common to ignore the agreement rules of Standard Arabic,
or to apply them only sometimes. Thus Mattai’s practice could also reflect, in
one way or another, the colloquial Arabic of the region of which Mattai was
most probably a native speaker.
While the letter consists of three pages (the third page is on the left half of
the backside of the leaf), Mattai’s signature is visible in the lower left corner
of the photograph, after which the text continues for a few lines. Under the
signature we see Mattai’s name in Arabic ( الشماسمتىبولوس al-shammāsMattā
Būlūs), and also his name in Latin characters, which can most probably be
deciphered as “Matti Balis.” In some other letters Mattai writes his name in
Syriac as well, where it appears in various forms. In a letter dated 14 February
1928 hewrites ܡr爟ܡrܝ Msham.Mataywith a line above the firstword,which
is a commonway of indicating an abbreviation in Syriac manuscripts. Another
form is found in a letter dated 23 August 1927, where it is ܡrܡrܢ焏ܡrܝ
ܦ熏ܠ熏ܣ MshamshōnōMatay Fawlōs.
The Mingana papers contain one letter from Mattai in English. This letter
is not part of the large stack of letters in Arabic, but can be found in the main
collection of Mingana’s correspondence, which was held, for the most part, by
European and American scholars. The English letter is one of condolence to
Mingana’s Norwegian wife, Emma Mingana, and was sent three months after
Mingana’s death.25 It is remarkable that Mattai wrote this letter in English in
25 University of Birmingham, Cadbury Research Library, da66/1/5/6, dated 25 March 1938.
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light of the statement by Fiey that Mattai did not speak any foreign language.
As Fiey met with Mattai several times, it does not seem probable that Fiey was
wrong about this.Mattaimust havehad access to someonewhocouldwrite this
letter in English. There are numerous obvious mistakes, but apart from those,
the English is remarkably good.
Mattai’s Biography by Nematallah Denno
Mingana’s archive in Birmingham, the Mingana papers, contains a very inter-
esting document that is not written by Mattai, but that is about him. It is
written by the Syriac Orthodox writer Nematallah Denno (1884–1951),26 who
was a prominent writer for a periodical called Lisān al-mashriq (Tongue of the
east, 1946–1951).27 The caption at the top of the document informs us that it
is a tarjama (biography) of Mattai; indeed it contains a wealth of biographical
information about him, although the nature of the laudatory text is such that
onewould almost be inclined to call the document a letter of recommendation.
It is not clear how this document became part of Mingana’s archive. The
document has a printed letterhead and is dated 21 November 1929, but does not
carry the name of the addressee. Assuming that it was addressed to Mingana,
it seems improbable that the document was meant to recommend Mattai to
Mingana, as, at that time, they had already been cooperating for many years. It
is possible that Mingana was in need of biographical information aboutMattai
for other reasons, but then the question remains why he did not ask Mattai
himself for this information.
Like Mattai’s letters, this document is written in Arabic, but the script is dif-
ferent than that ofMattai.WhileMattai useda commonArabic script,Nematal-
lah wrote this document in Syriac script. This practice, called Garshuni, used
to bewidespread for Syriac Christians in a variety of places. Just like later forms
of Judeo-Arabic, the Arabic language was rendered in Syriac script by using
one Syriac character for each character that would have been used for Arabic,
26 More information can be found in Rudolf Macuch, Geschichte der spät- und neusyrischen
Literatur (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976), 440–441. Just like Mattai, Nematallah’s name has
various forms and I prefer to use here the rendering in Latin characters that he used
himself.
27 The periodical was at the beginning called al-Mashriq and carried also the Syriac title
(Leshōnō d-)Madhnḥō. The periodical is exhibited in the Syriac Heritage Museum in
Ankawa (Iraq), where Nematallah is mentioned in the description. Inquiry among local
scholars made clear that Nematallah was well known, while Mattai was not.
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that is to say, the Arabic orthography was completely reproduced, it is only the
graphemes that were different.
By examining this document, of which the top part is shown, some aspects
of Nematallah’s specific use of Garshuni emerge. In contrast to the text of the
document itself, the printed letterhead is not in Garshuni: the part at the right
is completely in Arabic, and the part at the left is in French, with the exception
of the upper left part, which is in Syriac. The Arabic part has at the top a
calligraphic version of Nematallah’s name ( نعمةاللّٰهدنو Niʿmat Allāh Dannū),
followed by the name of the place (Mosul, Iraq) and the telegraph address,
which is simply his name followed by the name of the city. The bottom part
is the place and date, with the place (Mosul) and the first two ciphers of the
year preprinted. Like the preprinted text, the date is completed using Arabic in
Arabic script instead of Garshuni. The script type is again sophisticated ruqʿa.
The first line of the left part of the printed letterhead is in Syriac. As “Nemat-
allah” is an Arabic name, this part of the name is in Garshuni, while the part
rendering “Denno” is different from its Arabic counterpart, written with two
dalath-s while it has one dāl in Arabic ( ܢܥܡ煿̈ܐܠܠ煿ܕܢܢ熏 ). Interestingly, the
name of the place (Mosul, Iraq in Arabic) is given in Syriac as ܳܐܬܘܪ܀ܒqr
ܢ煿rq爯 Ōthur, Bayt Nahrin. While Bayt Nahrin means Mesopotamia and refers
to Iraq, thewordŌthur (Assyria) can indeed refer to the city ofMosul. Although
the part on the left below the line in Syriac can be identified as French, the city
ofMosul is spelled in the Englishway (instead of “Mossoul” in French), and Iraq
has the odd spelling of “Irag” (French “Irak”).
Below I illustrate the main body of the document again by transcribing and
translating the beginning of it (lines 1–8). For the sake of Arabic readers, I
transcribed the Garshuni into Arabic characters. Nematallah’s handwriting is
so clear that transcription is not necessary.
ترجمةالشماسمتىفولوسالسريانيالارثودوكسي
هوالشماسمتىبنفولوسآلنعمتاللّٰهالموصليابصرالنورفيالموصلمسقطراسهسنة
١٨٦١ورضعلبانالتقويوالفضيلهعنابويهالورعينواستاذهالفاضلالمرحومالقسيوسف
عقراويوكانيومئذشماساومعلمافيمدرسةكنيسةالطاهرةالطائفيةوتلقنفيالمدرسة
المذكورةمبادئالسريانيةوالعربيةوالعلومالدينيةفاحرزنصيباصالحامنها.وُشبِغخاصةً
بالسريانيةفتهّذبفيها.فأتقنطقوسهاوبرعفياناشيدهاالدينية.والطقسالسريانياغنى
الطقوسالمسيحيةبالاناشيدالعديدةالمختلفةالتيتربوعلىالالفينغمةوزنًاولحنًا.فعَُّدالشماس
متيبكلجدارةاكبراساتذةالطقسالسرياني.
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Biography of the DeaconMattai Paulus the Syriac Orthodox
He is the deacon Mattai, son of Paulus, of the family of Niʿmat Allāh, of
Mosul. He saw the light in Mosul, his place of birth, in the year 1861; he
sucked milk of devotion and virtue from the fatherhood of piety, and his
teacher was the late priest Joseph ʿAqrāwī—he was at the time deacon
and teacher in the confessional school of the al-Ṭāhira church—and he
learned at thementioned school the foundations of Syriac andArabic and
the religious sciences, and he obtained his good fate through it. He loved
especially the Syriac language, which was the language of instruction.
He was proficient in its rituals and distinguished himself in its religious
hymns. The Syrian liturgy is richer than the other Christian liturgies with
numerous different hymns, exceeding two thousand songs, both with
meter and melody. Therefore, Matthew the deacon is considered with all
appropriateness the greatest master of the Syrian liturgy.
Not long ago George Kiraz finished a volume on Syriac orthography as part of
a large project that aims to explain Syriac grammar in a comprehensive way;
thus far, it contains the most complete description of the practice of Garshuni.
Nematallah’s use of Garshuni appears to comply to the body of Garshuni
literature that Kiraz has taken into account.28 This still leaves a considerable
amount of freedom for the user of Garshuni in terms of the way Arabic is
rendered. Because the Syriac alphabet has only 22 characters andArabic has 28,
a few characters are left ambiguous. Garshuni solves this by adding diacritical
dots, but this is not obligatory. In addition to that, Syriac has no tāʾmarbūṭa and
no alif maqṣūra, so that for these respectively a he and yodh have to be used. In
the case of tāʾ marbūṭa it is possible to mark it explicitly by adding two dots on
top of a he, as in the Arabic script, but this is not possible for the alif maqṣūra.29
Where the Arabic script can indicate short vowels, gemination, and the glottal
stop, this is also possible in Garshuni, as exactly the same auxiliary signs are
used (the vowel signs and sukūn, shadda, and hamza). Nematallah is relatively
generous in adding diacritical dots and auxiliary signs; he even added them in
some cases where no ambiguity would arise.
Below the end of the quotation above there is another bit of Syriac. Because
it is in the same script, this is not immediately visible when looking at the
28 GeorgeAntonKiraz, AGrammarof theSyriacLanguage:Orthography (Piscataway:Gorgias
Press, 2012), 1:294–298.
29 This is not possible because the Syriac yodh that is used to render both Arabic yāʾ and alif
maqṣūra never has dots, while in Arabic the alif maqṣūra is marked by the omission of the
dots.
standardized arabic as a post-nahḍa common ground 85
document. I have transcribed it with Syriac characters where the Arabic part is
in Arabic script (lines 13–14):
واكثرهامنالمخطوطاتالضخمةكتفسيرالكتابالمقدسܕܒrܨܠqܒqܘq焏ܘܬ
qq̈ܡrܐܘܐܘܨܪܐܪ̈ܙܐܘܡܢrܬܩ熏ܕr̈焏ܘܡqrܒܢ熏ܬܙq̈ܢ焏ܕܒr
ܥܒrq焏الخ.
Most of them are from voluminousmanuscripts such as the commentary
of the Bible by Bar Ṣalibi, “Cream of Wisdom”, “Storehouse of mysteries”,
“Candlestickof theSanctuary”and theChroniconbyBarHebraeus, etcetera.
I have indicated the Syriac part of the quotation with italics. As in the letter by
Mattai discussed above, Nematallah switches to Syriac to mention the titles of
Syriac books. This is not surprising in itself, though he also uses Syriac for the
words surrounding the titles and names of the authors. This is visible because
of the Syriac word d- (of, by), which does not exist in Arabic. The most curious
phenomenon in this quotation is the part translated as “the commentary of
the Bible by Bar Ṣalibi.” Nematallah renders the title of the book in Arabic, and
then immediately switches to Syriac for theword d- (of, by) and the nameof the
author. A couple of lines earlier (not quoted) he rendered the name in Arabic
as ابنالصلبي Ibn al-Ṣalbī (lines 9–10).
Arabic, Syriac, and Garshuni in a Different Context: The Case of
Inscriptions in Iraq
In his catalog of inscriptions on Syriac Christian churches in Iraq, Amir Harrak
discusses the languages that were used. Harrak’s catalog comprises a wide time
range, which shows very clearly certain trends through the centuries. As in the
present case, the inscriptions are in Syriac, Arabic, and Garshuni. The oldest
inscriptions are written in Classical Syriac only, but in the thirteenth century
Arabic begins to appear, and its use increases continually over the following
centuries. Garshuni comes into use in the seventeenth century—before that all
inscriptions in the Arabic language also use the Arabic script. From the nine-
teenth century, however, the use of Garshuni for inscriptions in Arabic starts to
decrease, while Arabic in Arabic script continues to increase. Harrakmentions
that there is no evidence for the use ofGarshuni in inscriptions in the twentieth
century, and Classical Syriac was only occasionally used in this time.30
30 AmirHarrak, Syriac andGarshuni Inscriptions of Iraq, Répertoire des inscriptions syriaques,
part 1: Texts (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 2010), 42–43.
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The use of Garshuni in inscriptions displays two interesting features. First,
many of the inscriptions are in colloquial Arabic rather than Standard Arabic.
This was particularly true in the eighteenth century, while in the nineteenth
century the Arabic in Garshuni started to “become more sophisticated”; this
development is in line with the decline of Garshuni at the same time (the
Arabic became standardized, both in language and in script). Second, most of
the Garshuni inscriptions are translations from Syriac, and because of that the
Arabic of the Garshuni inscriptions contain Syriac features to a great extent.31
In comparing the use of languages in inscriptions, a few observations are
interesting to our case. First, as mentioned above, from the beginning of the
twentieth century on Garshuni was not used for inscriptions, and this corre-
sponds to the general trend of Garshuni dying out with the beginning of the
nahḍa. Second, while in Harrak’s inscriptions (before the twentieth century)
Garshuni inscriptions appear in the colloquial Arabic of Mosul, our Garshuni
writings use only Standard Arabic.
Harrak’s data suggest a link between the standardization of Arabic and the
disappearance of Garshuni beginning in the nineteenth century and conclud-
ing in the twentieth century. Our data seem to point in a different direction:
Mattai’s Arabic is in Arabic script while it is not completely standardized, and
Nematallah used Garshuni, but his language follows the common rules. Before
addressing the question of how this can be interpreted, I delve more deeply
into the varieties of Arabic that we see in the documents.
Middle Arabic, the Emergence of Modern Standard Arabic, and
Garshuni in aWider Perspective
The phenomena we have seen concerning the language of the authors dis-
cussed thus far does not stand on its own and has been studied by others. Nev-
ertheless, in the context of the early twentieth century the data are somewhat
marginal, and existing research on Arabic provides less anchors to posit the
material under consideration than one would normally have. In this respect, I
discuss three issues: (1) Middle Arabic and the possibility of applying this term
toMattai’s letters, (2) the emergence ofModern Standard Arabic, and the ques-
tion: to what extent do our documents fall under it, and (3) the significance of
Garshuni. Positing the material in the discussions concerning these three phe-
nomena will not only help us to understand its significance for the way Mattai
31 Ibid.
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and Nematallah used languages in communication, but it will also showwhere
the material can be used for the further study of the linguistic phenomena in a
general sense.
In his introductory book on the Arabic language, Kees Versteegh gives a
simple definition of Middle Arabic as “the collective name for all texts with
deviations from Classical grammar,”32 but it is generally only applied to pre-
modern texts that were presumably meant to be in Classical Arabic but which
show a considerable number of deviations from the standard, many of which
have their origin in colloquial Arabic.33 HadMattai’s letters been written a few
centuries earlier, they would almost certainly be described as Middle Arabic
because of the peculiar features I describe above, and with recent research in
mind it is worthwhile to ask if perhaps the term ought to be applied toMattai’s
texts.
The term Middle Arabic became especially well established after the stud-
ies by Joshua Blau, which are still almost always referred to when the phe-
nomenon is discussed.34 But research on Middle Arabic has not stood still
and a few developments are worth mentioning. In the introduction to a vol-
ume on Middle Arabic and Mixed Arabic that appeared after the third con-
ference of the Association internationale pour l’étude du moyen arabe et des
variétés mixtes de l’arabe, Johannes den Heijer gave a very useful description
of recent developments that arose from the variety of conference contribu-
tions.35 One conclusion is that the definitions of Middle Arabic and Mixed
Arabic (the latter term traditionally refers to spoken Arabic that does not fully
comply with the standard, but is also not completely colloquial) should not be
32 Versteegh, The Arabic Language, 114.
33 Theword “Middle” inMiddleArabic is ambiguous, as it can refer to a timeperiod (between
Classical andModern Standard Arabic) and to the fact that the language ofMiddle Arabic
is positioned between the standard and the colloquial. Most authors assume the latter
meaning, even though Middle Arabic texts are usually considered to fall in the period
between the peak of Classical Arabic and the emergence of Modern Standard Arabic,
which makes the situation even more confusing.
34 See for instance Joshua Blau, A Handbook of Early Middle Arabic (Jerusalem: The Max
Schloessinger Memorial Foundation, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002), which
contains an outline of “Middle Arabic grammar” accompanied by a number of texts
through which the reader can get acquainted with Middle Arabic texts and its peculiar
features.
35 Johannes den Heijer, “Introduction: Middle and Mixed Arabic, a New Trend in Arabic
Studies,” in Liesbeth Zack and Arie Schippers (eds.), Middle Arabic and Mixed Arabic:
Diachrony and Synchrony (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 1–25.
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limited to a certain period of time. In other words, while Middle Arabic usu-
ally refers to texts written between 800 and 1800,36 andMixed Arabic generally
refers to modern spoken Arabic, this restriction is by no means necessary: the
same framework that is used to analyze a medieval Middle Arabic text can
be applied to analyze modern forum discussions on the Internet.37 The dif-
ference between Middle Arabic and Mixed Arabic is therefore only that the
former term is used for written texts, and the latter for oral material. Indeed
preliminary evidence shows that there are similarities in the phenomena in
modern andmedieval substandard texts, and only the use of a common frame-
work can reveal that.38 This idea is rather new, as the research onMiddleArabic
and Mixed Arabic only gained momentum during the last decade. More and
detailed research on Middle (and Mixed) Arabic texts from the widest possi-
ble timespan is needed.39 No mention is made of texts that lie between the
medieval andmodernperiod, such asMattai’s, but they certainly fall underDen
Heijer’s definition.
A further important consideration is the question of whether it is possible
that an author made a deliberate choice to write in Middle Arabic. Versteegh
asserts that this is not the case, but Den Heijer questions this.40 Studying
(written) Middle Arabic next to (spoken) Mixed Arabic is also useful in this
sense, because it has been established that for spoken Arabic it is possible that
onemight deliberately use an intermediate formbetween the standard and the
colloquial.41 Also in Mattai’s case this question has to be asked.
Den Heijer’s discussion makes it evident that texts like Mattai’s could form
a very important contribution to the study of Middle Arabic. Alone, they form
too small a body of evidence tomakemore general assertions concerning post-
medieval Middle Arabic, because we cannot yet determine to what extent
Mattai’s personal language represents a wider phenomenon. For our purposes
the value of Den Heijer’s discussion lies in the fact that it allows us to posit
Mattai’s Arabic as a form of Middle Arabic, even if it is neither the phase of
Middle Arabic that was already firmly established (that of medieval texts) nor
the one that appears in the conference volume to which Den Heijer wrote the
introduction (on modern substandard texts).
36 See, for instance, Versteegh, The Arabic Language, 114.
37 Den Heijer, “Introduction,” 10.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 22–24.
40 Versteegh, The Arabic Language, 114, and Den Heijer, “Introduction,” 10–12.
41 For instance in Versteegh, The Arabic Language, 191, where a proposed continuum of
standard to colloquial spoken Arabic is cited.
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SeeingMattai’s Arabic asMiddleArabic is one thing, but ifMattai’s intention
was towrite according to the standard, ofwhich standard arewe speaking?And
what was the standard that Nematallah apparently applied? The second issue
is therefore the emergence of Modern Standard Arabic and to what extent our
writers were influenced by that.
The standard form of Arabic is generally referred to as lughat al-fuṣḥā (“the
pure language”), regardless of what time period one is speaking about. West-
ern scholarship normally makes a distinction between Classical Arabic and
Modern Standard Arabic. There are good reasons for this, among them the
obvious differences in vocabulary and grammar, especially syntax. A consid-
erable volume of literature has been written on the emergence of Modern
Standard Arabic, though this mainly deals with the necessity of creating new
words formodern concepts, and the involvement of language academies in cre-
ating those.42 Discussions have also taken place about a grammatical reform
of the language; in the end this had very little effect.43 This is not to say that
there are few grammatical differences between Modern Standard Arabic and
Classical Arabic. On the contrary, grammars have beenwritten that deal explic-
itly with Modern Standard Arabic and provide ample evidence of significant
differences, especially in terms of syntax and vocabulary. In this respect I men-
tion the work by Badawi, Carter, and Gully, which, apart from giving a syn-
chronical description, also compares modern forms with their classical coun-
terparts.44
Unfortunately, apart fromhownewwords have been added toModern Stan-
dardArabic, this research tells us very little about howModern StandardArabic
came to be. We know the end result (Modern Standard Arabic), but we do not
know howModern Standard Arabic actually developed, that is to say, how the
language changed over time in different contexts (places, religious communi-
ties, and individual authors). Because of this it is difficult to assessMattai’s ideal
(taking for granted, again, that he was aiming for the standard) and Nematal-
lah’s Arabic with regard to whether we should see this as Modern Standard
Arabic, or as a preliminary phase between Classical Arabic and Modern Stan-
dard Arabic.
42 See, for instance, RachedHamzaoui, L’académie de languearabe duCaire: histoire etœuvre
(Tunis: Université de Tunis, 1975).
43 Versteegh, The Arabic Language, 184–186. See the whole chapter (173–188) for a general
overview of the emergence of Modern Standard Arabic.
44 Elsaid Badawi, M.G. Carter, and Adrian Gully, Modern Written Arabic: A Comprehensive
Grammar (London: Routledge, 2003). As only written texts are used, the authors deploy
the termModern Written Arabic rather than Modern Standard Arabic.
90 baarda
The third issue is the use of Garshuni and its significance. Various rea-
sons for authors and scribes to write in Garshuni have been proposed, the
most prominent of those being that it is a way to express Syriac identity.
This is because Garshuni copies Arabic orthography and is therefore easy to
learn for someone who knows the Arabic language and the Syriac script.45
It is an understandable solution for people who want to express themselves
in the language they felt most comfortable with (in many cases Arabic, not
Syriac) while at the same time expressing their Syriac identity through the
script. But as we have seen, Nematallah’s use of Garshuni is very late com-
pared to the Garshuni in the inscriptions studied by Harrak, which cease in
the nineteenth century. In a more general sense, Garshuni is considered to
have been in decline as Arabic script increased from the beginning of the
nahḍa.46
Common Grounds: Arabic as the Best Solution
The three issues described in the section above have one thing in common:
they position the writings that form the basis of this paper in a preliminary
phase between the premodern and themodern. As to the use of Middle Arabic
(Mattai) and Garshuni (Nematallah), current literature suggests that the two
writers were continuing traditions that might be considered anachronistic in
the twentieth century. In this respect it is useful to take into consideration
the beginning of the nahḍa, the period or movement of cultural revival (or
“renaissance”) in the Arab world.
The early history of the nahḍa is a controversial subject. Traditionally, schol-
ars have considered it to have begun either with Napoleon’s invasion in Egypt
1798, or later, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Initially, west-
ern influence was seen as the main catalyst of the nahḍa—most obviously
Napoleon’s invasion, but also the influence of westernmissionaries that spread
45 F. del Río Sánchez, “El árabe karshūnī come preservación de la identidad siríaca,” in
P. Bádenas de la Peña (eds.), et al., Lenguas en contacto: el testimonio escrito (Madrid:
Editorial csic, 2004), 185–194.
46 Alessandro Mengozzi, “The History of Garshuni as a Writing System: Evidence from the
Rabbula Codex,” in F.M. Fales and G.F. Grassi (eds.), Casemud 2007: Proceedings of the
13th Italian Meeting of Afro-Asiatic Linguistics, Held in Udine, May 21st–24th, 2007 (Padova:
s.a.r.g.o.n. Editrice e Libreria, 2010), 300. For a recent and innovative history of the
nahḍa, see Boutros Hallaq and Heidi Toelle (eds.), et al. Histoire de la littérature arabe
moderne, part 1: 1800–1945 (Arles: Actes Sud, 2007).
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through the schools they established. More recent scholarship has tried to
change this narrative by pointing to internal developments in the Middle East
that started well before 1800.47
In a recent monograph, written to establish a new narrative drawingmainly
uponArabic sources, Abdulrazzak Patel devotes an entire chapter to one devel-
opment that is very interesting in relation to our sources: “The Reintegration of
Pre-modernChristians into theMainstreamofArabic Literature.” Fromapprox-
imately 1600 to 1800, Christians once again became active participants in the
Arabic literary realm, which they had been well-known participants of during
the translation movement and through the thirteenth century. According to
Patel, “[b]y the nahḍah the reintegration of Christian writers into the main-
stream of Arabic literature was complete and an inter-religious, almost supra-
religious, space had evolved where Christian writers were no longer hampered
by specific religious or theological considerations.”48 This process can there-
fore be seen as a “preparatory” internal development that opened the way for
the nahḍa to begin full scale.
Other authors have noticed similar developments. In the course of the
nahḍa, the languageof literary productionbecamemore standardized, creating
a link between the nahḍa and the emergence of Modern Standard Arabic, and
new textual genres began tobedeployed, such as novels and articles in journals.
Christians took part in the nahḍa like Muslims, and already in the eighteenth
century we can see that they adapted genres that had been deployed solely by
Muslims.49 During the nahḍa Christians and Muslims began to use the Ara-
bic language in the same sorts of ways; the tendency of Arab Christians to use
Garshuni less is an explicit case of this.50
The documents presently under consideration show a picture that does not
comply to this nahḍa hypothesis, as I will call this link between the nahḍa
and the integration of the Christians’ use of Arabic. Mattai writes in non-
standard Arabic, while Nematallah’s Arabic, though it complies to the stan-
dard, is written in Garshuni, both practices associated with pre-nahḍa behav-
ior. The fact that no Garshuni inscriptions are present in Iraq in the twenti-
eth century, and the fact that the inscriptions in Arabic became more stan-
47 Abdulrazzak Patel, The Arab Nahḍa: The Making of the Intellectual and Humanist Move-
ment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), in particular 4–5.
48 Ibid., 69.
49 Farouk Mardam-Bey and Hilary Kilpatrick, “L’état des lieux dans le monde arabe à la
fin du xviiie siècle,” in Hallaq and Toelle (eds.) Histoire de la littérature arabe moderne,
70.
50 Mengozzi, “The History of Garshuni as a Writing System,” 300.
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dard in the nineteenth century, reinforces the nahḍa hypothesis and therefore
further distinguishes the practices of Mattai and Nematallah from the wider
trend.
Our documents also bear witness to the use of the Classical Syriac language.
While Mattai wrote a large number of manuscript colophons in Syriac (in
addition to those he wrote in Garshuni), in his letters the Syriac is limited to
the titles and the names of authors of books he could deliver, as well as his
signature in some cases. This resembles the few examples of Syriac that we
find in Nematallah’s document, where we also find it used for book titles and
authors, and as part of the trilingual printed letterhead.
Given that the two languages were used by both authors, the question
is what reasons did they have to choose one or the other for these specific
situations. Mattai was certainly able to write in Syriac, as Nematallah accounts
for it and Mattai shows it through the colophons he authored. For Nematallah
we do not have enough evidence from the documents, but we can speculate
that he was likely also able to write in Syriac. Certainly they assumed that their
intended readers (Mingana andpossibly someone else)were able to read it. But
writing amanuscript colophon is different thanwriting a letter: a colophon has
amore or less fixed structure and uses a limited set of formulas.Writing a letter
discussing modern-day problems (such as the cost of sending manuscripts
by mail) is something for which a living writing tradition was needed, and
while it is known that contemporary Syriac authors did write original texts
in Syriac, we do not know if such a tradition was available to Mattai, and
if so, if he was acquainted with it. The fact that Mattai even wrote some of
his manuscript colophons in Garshuni suggests even more that he was not
completely comfortable in composing Syriac. This leaves uswith the possibility
that they used Classical Syriacwhen it was needed (for book titles and authors)
or for small symbolic pieces of text (Mattai’s signature andNematallah’s printed
letterhead).
The nahḍa hypothesis, discussed above, holds that during the period of the
nahḍa Christians and Muslims used the Arabic language in similar ways and
created a common standard in terms of language, script, and genres. In this
way, the Arabic language in its standardized form created a very important
new common ground between Christians and Muslims. Most of the evidence
for this hypothesis, however, is based on material from Syria and Lebanon,
mainly from Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic authors. This includes
all of the authors that Patel discusses in his chapter on this topic. Mattai and
Nematallah, based in Iraq, didnot fully participate in this newcommonground.
While this can be seen as an argument against the nahḍa hypothesis, with the
current evidence it is more likely an indication that the Mosul center of Syriac
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Christianity, at least with regard to its representatives Mattai and Nematallah,
did not keep pace with Syria and Lebanon. Luizard’s assertion that intellectual
life in the city of Mosul lagged behind the rest of the Arab world, mentioned at
the beginning of this paper, is in line with this hypothesis.
Mattai’s and Nematallah’s practice was nevertheless not an obstacle for
their communication with Mingana, thanks to the fact that he was also of
a Syriac Christian background, albeit from another denomination. By using
Arabic in Arabic script in his letters, Mattai might have wished to put Mingana
at ease, as he was (originally) an East Syriac Christian, not a user of Garshuni
withWest Syriac (serṭō) characters. Nematallah did not feel constrained to use
Garshuni, but we do not know the intended readership of his document. It can
be said, therefore, that the communicationbetweenMattai andMingana forms
another common ground—one common to Syriac Christians.
Conclusion
Mattai’s letters to Mingana and Nematallah’s biography show the use of a
variety of languages and scripts. While this variety in itself is not surprising—it
has always been a feature of Syriac Christian textual production—preferences
for certain languages or scripts and ways of usage changed over time and
differed according to place and denomination. The material addressed in this
article shows that, by using non-standard Arabic, Garshuni, and occasionally
Classical Syriac, Mattai and Nematallah deployed a style that was specific
to Syriac Christianity. In comparison, contemporary writing of other Syriac
Christians shows a move towards a common standard with Muslims and the
use of Arabic; there is no indication that Mattai and Nematallah took part in
this movement, or they did so to a lesser extent.
The post-nahḍa common ground of standardized Arabic, which I called the
nahḍa hypothesis above, was not in use by everyone. Mattai and Nematallah
are only one case. If other textual material from the early twentieth century
written byMiddle Eastern Syriac Christians andminorities in general becomes
available, wewill be able tomap amore detailed viewon the assumed common
linguistic ground based on a standardized form of Arabic that began to form at
the beginning of the nahḍa. At the same time, this will be of importance for the
study of non-medieval Middle Arabic and the emergence of Modern Standard
Arabic.
We have not heard the last word onMattai bar Paulus. The large body of let-
ters calls for comprehensive study, both to facilitate a linguistic analysis for the
wider study of late Middle Arabic and/or early Modern Standard Arabic, and
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because of its relevance for Syriac Orthodox Christianity in early twentieth-
century Mosul. In addition, comparing the letters with the manuscripts in the
Mingana collection might provide valuable information about the acquisition
history and policy of Alphonse Mingana, which is still largely unknown. Pub-
lishing an edition of Mattai’s letters is therefore a possibility that might be
worth taking into consideration, as it would also shed light on this period of
renewed use of Arabic among Syriac Christians.
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chapter 4
Jewish Education in Baghdad: Communal Space vs.
Public Space
S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah
The Levant of the early twentieth century was a place of rapid political, social,
and cultural transformation. This era ushered in a new, for lack of a more
precise term, “modern” era for the region characterized, inpart, by aburgeoning
middle class and an increase in intercommunal dialogue that resulted from
new forms of public space.1 The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the
combining of three formerOttoman provinces—Baghdad, Basra, andMosul—
into a new Iraqi state led to numerous challenges in unifying an ethnically
and religiously diverse population and caused decades of political instability.
However the British mandate and early years of the Iraqi state are also viewed
as a time of religious pluralism and an attempt to build an inclusive secular
state2 with the city of Baghdad as its political, cultural, and economic center.
In Baghdad, as in many other Middle Eastern cities, the modern era meant
the creation of new public spaces, such as chambers of commerce, modern
companies, hotels, and cinemas to name a few examples.3 One type of area
not often associated with public space are schools run under the auspices of
religious communities. However, in Baghdad, schools run by religious authori-
ties were a key factor in forging the new national identity; they often served as
public spaces and as public symbols for religious communities to demonstrate
their belonging to the nation.
In Baghdad the first modern schools teaching secular subjects were estab-
lished under the authority of religious communities. This is ironic when mea-
sured against conventional ideas of modernity and the role of modern edu-
cation. In the case of the Jewish schools, as we would expect, these schools
1 Keith D. Wattenpaugh, BeingModern in theMiddle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism
and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2006) for a full discus-
sion on modernity and the middle class in the Middle East.
2 Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford, ca: Stanford
University Press, 2008).
3 See Daniel Schroeter’s chapter for a greater discussion on these new public spaces. I am
grateful to Prof. Schroeter for his help and comments in putting together this chapter.
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strengtheneda religious/ethnic (Jewish) consciousness.However, they also fos-
tered a national (or public) consciousness, and facilitated the development
of ties with the larger (non-Jewish) society. In one space, namely the schools,
students developed a simultaneous awareness of both the communal and the
public, thereby shattering the assumption of a dichotomy between “commu-
nal” (or sectarian) and public (or national) space.
In this chapter I look at the importance of educationwithin the Jewish com-
munity of Baghdad as an example of how the boundaries between public and
communal spacebecameblurredbeginning in theMandateperiod. I argue that
the Jewish schools of Baghdad had a fluid identity. The schools simultaneously
strengthened the Jewish community’s ties to the emergent Iraqi nation while
fostering ties to the transnational Jewish world through their engagement with
foreign philanthropic Jewish organizations. In this manner, the schools were a
public platform for the community to show its integration into the new state
and its desire to participate in its construction while leveraging and strength-
ening its ties with Jewish communities outside Iraq. I apply this thesis to the
schools that fell under the jurisdiction of the Jewish community of Baghdad.4
4 This fact is demonstrated most clearly in the English language report from 1930 entitled
Report of the Jewish Schools Committee on the Jewish Schools in Baghdad 1930. The report was
most likely prepared for the Anglo-Jewish Association, to demonstrate how the association’s
contributions had been spent, and help make the case for allocating additional funds to the
Baghdad schools. For this chapter I have also used a 1924 letter from the office of the chief
rabbi to Judah Magnes while he was still living in New York (later, the first Chancellor of
Hebrew University). The letter was written in response to a request for information on the
Jewish community of Baghdad for the Jewish Encyclopedia and therefore describes in great
detail the functioning of the Jewish community of Baghdad, and gives detailed information
on its revenues and expenditures. Both of these documents describe the Jewish schools
from the perspective of a communal leader wishing to present their community to Jews
living outside Iraq and the tone is one which shows both the community’s commitment
to modernity and the preservation of Jewish culture. The two documents belong to the
collection of material on the Jewish community of Iraq held at the Central Archive for
the History of the Jewish people at the Hebrew University Givat Ram campus. For general
demographic information I have taken the numbers used by Hanna Batatu in his The Old
Social Classes & the Revolutionary in Movement in Iraq (Princeton, nj: Princeton University
Press, 1978). For Jewish demographic information I have used Hayyim J. Cohen’s book, The
Jews of the Middle East: 1860–1972 (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1974), which contains
demographic data onLevantine Jewry based onprimary sourcematerial and surveys from the
1950s. The volume fortuitously contains a whole section dedicated to education in Iraq. For
general information on Iraqi education I have used the numbers and curriculum details from
the 1948 study by Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi commissioned by the American
Council on Education; it also provides a summary history of education in Iraq beginning
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By looking at the evolution of these schools during the formative years of the
Iraqi state, we can see how the community positioned itself vis-à-vis the state
and other Jewish communities.
Although the type of education offered by these schools was diverse in
nature I consider them as a single unit because of their dependence on the
lay council for financial administration. Officially there was no singular unified
Jewish school system but a grouping of schools that had varying attachments
to either the spiritual council of the Baghdad Rabbinate (al-Majlis al-Ruḥānī),
or the Jewish Lay Council (al-Majlis al-Jismānī), the twomain official organs of
the Jewish community. From the 1920s onward all of these schools were under
the official jurisdiction of the “School Committee” which reported directly to
the lay council,5 a fact that coincides with a decline in the rabbinate’s power
over the community and a strengthening of the authority of the lay council.
The school committee made decisions primarily related to the distribution of
funds, though it also controlled some decisions on curriculum, and the hiring
of faculty.
Communal reports from the era differentiate between four types of Jewish
schools in Baghdad:
1. Religious schools, such as the Midrash Talmud Torah established in 1932,
which was essentially a religious school with elementary studies in Arabic.
After 1840 the Yeshiva of Baghdad6 offered religious education and, begin-
ning in the early twentieth century, limited secular education. The Midrash
Menashe Saleh school was founded in 1935 and offered both religious and
secular subjects on a par with the Iraqi national curriculum.7
2. The Alliance Israélite Universelle girls and boys schools, based on a French
curriculum.
3. The community schools followed a modified government syllabus teaching
biblical Hebrew and Jewish history instead of Islamic studies, and added
extra hours to the school week for English lessons (in comparison to the
government schools).
4. The Shamash school, a community school based on the English curriculum.
during theMandatePeriod. Finally, I have supplemented these sourceswith information from
the autobiographies of students who attended these Jewish schools during the said period.
5 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East, 122–123.
6 Orit Bashkin, “ ‘Religious Hatred Shall Disappear from the Land’ Iraqi Jews as Ottoman
Subjects, 1864–1913,” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 4, no. 3 (2010), 308
(doi:10.1386/ijcis.4.3.305_1).
7 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East, 115.
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Towards the end of the 1920s the Iraqi government also began to build
public schools in the Jewish quarter; these were aimed at instructing Jewish
students8 but these schools had no affiliation with the lay council of the Jewish
community and therefore cannot be considered community schools because
the communitywasnot responsible for the curriculumor the funding, although
the majority of the teachers in these schools were Jewish graduates of the
communal schools.9
The argument that the education students received in the Jewish school
system both enabled intercommunal understanding and prepared Jews to par-
ticipate in public space itself has been discussed in great detail by authors such
asOrit Bashkin, Abbas Shiblik, andNissimRejwan.10 Learning to read andwrite
classical/standard Arabic was key to this participation. With access to Arabic
literature and culture, Jewish students were able to engage with the emergent
society as a whole, a phenomenon that Bashkin defines as practicing Arab Jew-
ishness.11 It is my contention, however, that these schools, as institutions, were
tools for the community to demonstrate its commitment to the nation and
thereby become public spaces themselves, an idea not developed in the afore-
mentioned works.
In this paper I equate Jewish Arabization with Jewish participation in the
new public spaces both physically (such as employment in the civil service and
teaching public schools) and intellectually during theMandate and early years
of the Iraqi state. Some striking examples of this are found in autobiographies.
For example, it is during the Mandate period that we begin to find references
to beloved children’s books in Arabic and subscriptions to Arabic literary mag-
azines.12 This is also the period during which the first Arabic language peri-
odicals appeared in Iraq, most notably al-Ḥāṣid and al-Misbāḥ, whose Jewish
editors were graduates of the Alliance schools.13 By receiving an education in
formal Arabic youthwere exposed to a dialect that was distinct from the Judeo-
Baghdadi spoken in Jewish homes, and this exposure prepared them for a life
beyond the community. It allowed Jews who later joined the Iraqi civil service
8 Report of the Jewish Schools Committee on the Jewish Schools in Baghdad 1930, 6 cahjp
—Hebrew University doc. Iraq File—6382.
9 Abbas Shiblik, Iraqi Jews: A History (London: Saqi Books, 2005).
10 Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq (Stanford, ca: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2012); idem, The Other Iraq; Shiblik, Iraqi Jews; and Nissim Rejwan, The Jews
of Iraq: 3000 Years of History and Culture (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985).
11 Bashkin, New Babylonians.
12 Ibid., 23, 244.
13 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East: 1860–1972, 125.
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and foreign companies to converse in a style similar to that of their non-Jewish
colleagues.14 Finally, neither the faculty nor the student body of these schools
was homogenous in composition, with the exception of the Midrash Talmud
Torah. Records indicate that non-Jewish children, particularly those from the
Chaldean community, were among the student body, although this tapered off
in the 1930s as more Christian schools were opened, as the Iraqi government
began to open more state schools, and as the general level of public education
improved. Finally, non-Jewish teachers were regularly employed in the Jewish
schools, particularly for the study of Arabic. The interactions with non-Jewish
students and faculty gave the Jewish students regular meaningful contact with
individuals outside their community.
The schools were also tools of the community that served to show its loyalty
to the monarch and the state. One example of this expression of loyalty can
be seen in the schools’ active participation in the pageantry of the state. For
example, at the invitation of the community, King Faysal visited the Alliance
Laura Kadoorie girls’ school in 1924 with Jaʿfar al-ʿAskarī then prime minister
of Iraq; they made a similar visit to the Rachel Shahmon community school
a year later. Prince Ghazi, the minister of education at the time, attended the
graduation ceremonyof al-Wataniyya community school in 1925.15AndasAline
Schlaepfer16 discusses in her chapter, the Alliance school in Basra publicly
mourned the death of King Ghazi in 1949 with teachers fashioning black arm-
bands for the students and faculty to wear. These examples demonstrate the
ways in which the schools, as institutions, were used to further the idea of the
Jewish community as an integrated sector of Iraqi society.
As Hannah Mueller-Sommerfeld mentions in her chapter on the role of the
League of Nations on theMandate in Iraq, Jewish communal leaders, although
initially desiring British citizenship,17 accepted the idea of being citizens in an
Iraqi state, urged the community to be loyal citizens, and stressed integration
as opposed to segregation; this is evidenced by the above-mentioned very pub-
lic overtures within communal space. And yet, “Arabization” is only one side
of the coin. The Jewish community also officially asked for the preservation of
14 Naim Kattan, Farewell Babylon (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), 11–16. This is evidenced in
an anecdote he tells of a Jewish friend who speaks in the Judeo-Baghdadi dialect among
their non-Jewish friends.
15 Bashkin, New Babylonians, 39.
16 I would like to thank Aline Schlaepfer for her invaluable suggestions in preparing this
chapter.
17 Norman A. Stillman, Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (Philadelphia: Jewish Publica-
tion Society, 1991) 256–258.
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the “free opportunity for economic and educational development” as themain
pillars of their community, which guaranteed their history and communal life
in Iraq. These requests were relatively mild compared to Assyrian hopes for
independence, but were certainly in line with the rights that other religious
and ethnic communities hoped to gain in the new state.18 It was this balance
between integration into the new Iraqi society and the preservation of their
communal identity that was key to the Jewish schools of Baghdad. Part of this
preservation of communal identity went beyond the borders of Iraq, as some
schools worked to forge what can be considered a modern Jewish identity, i.e.,
one not grounded in theology or local family bonds but based on a transna-
tional Jewish identity. Thus the schools presented students with the ideas of
Jewish nationalism, taught students about foreign Jewish communities, and
gave students the opportunity to study abroad in foreign Jewish schools orwith
the help of scholarships from foreign Jewish humanitarian organizations. By
understanding the fluidity betweenpublic and communalwithin these schools
we can begin to understand how the Jewish community navigated between
public and communal space within the Iraqi state.
The Development of a Jewish School System
On the eveof theMandate the Jewish communitywas the oldest andmost orga-
nized provider of secular education for boys and girls in Baghdad, the seeds
for the system having been planted a century before. Although Jewish educa-
tion in Baghdad had a long tradition, beginning with the fabled Abbasid-era
yeshivot,19 these schools had ceased to exist by the eighteenth century, concur-
rent with the general decline of the city due to plague and political instability
through the mid-nineteenth century. It was not until 1832 that a new religious
school opened, the Midrash Talmud Torah, which educated 2,049 students
divided into 27 classes; thiswas followedby the BaghdadYeshiva in 1840 for stu-
dents wishing to continue their education. These schools focused on religious
instruction, teaching such as subjects as the Talmud, Zohar, and other religious
works, but notably they also provided education in elementary Hebrew and
18 Müller-Sommerfeld, in this volume.
19 Yaron Ayalon and Ariel I. Ahram, “Baghdad,”Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, ed.
Norman A. Stillman (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 2:602–617; Brill online, accessed 11 April 2014:
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic
-world/baghdad-SIM_000468.
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Arabic.20 Prior to attending the Midrash, young boys were sent to some thirty
ustadhs, literally one-room schoolshouses where young boys received religious
education by rote until they were old enough to help support their families
or continue their education at the Yeshiva. The curriculum and hierarchy in
these types of establishments was analogous to theMuslim and Christian edu-
cational options of the time, limited to boys whose parents could afford the
school fees, they were organized either by schoolmasters in private homes or
by the religious leadership in larger institutions and endowed by a waqf set up
by wealthy members of the community. Other options for education included
apprenticeships for those entering trade or private tutoring for the wealthy.
Although technically, girls could attend the ustadhs (but not the Midrash Tal-
mud Torah) in reality, few if any girls ever attended.21 It is more likely that
upper class girls received private tutoring, as the existence of correspondence
by women from the nineteenth century demonstrates that some had the abil-
ity to read andwrite in both Hebrew and Latin scripts, although this was surely
the exception.22
For the Jewish community this limited choice in education began to change
when the Alliance Israélite Universelle opened its first school in Baghdad in
1864, at the request of members of the community who had heard about the
recently opened Alliance boy’s school in Tetouan, Morocco. By way of compar-
ison, the first elementary school teaching secular subjects to Muslim boys in
Baghdad was established in 1869 by Midhat Pasha.23 So although at the time
of the British Mandate the Jewish community had developed the most exten-
sive network of schools, the importance of modern education also had advo-
cates in other religious communities in nineteenth-century Baghdad, albeit
access to these schools was limited to a privileged few. The original Alliance
school (later named in honor of Albert Sassoon) met with limited success; it
closed shortly after it opened, then reopened a few years later. Protests from
the religious authorities regarding the concept of secular education were rel-
atively mild, it is possible that the Rabbinate did not feel threatened by the
Alliance because of its small size and high school fees, in comparison the
Midrash Talmud was less costly and better established. The end of the con-
flict between the Alliance school and the Rabbinate came when the chief
20 Maurice M. Sawdayee, The Baghdad Connection (Self published, 1991), 25; David Sassoon,
The History of the Jews in Baghdad (London: SimonWallenberg Press, 2006), 17.
21 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East: 1860–1972, 114.
22 The Sassoon archives at Hebrew University have nineteenth-century correspondence
from women in both Judeo-Arabic and French.
23 Rejwan, Jews of Iraq, 181.
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rabbi, Abdullah Somekh, sent his son to the Alliance school, although he him-
self was head of the Midrash Beit Zilkha, a branch of the Midrash Talmud
Torah.24
When an Alliance girl’s school opened in 1893, it was the first of its kind in
Iraq. By 1920 Jewish schools enrolling both boys and girls had been established
in Basra, Mosul, Hilla, ʿAmara, and Kirkuk. Parallel to the expansion of the
Alliance system, Jewish communities in Iraq began to build their ownmodern
schools beginning with what was initially a coed school, Noam (also referred
to as Haron Saleh) in 1902;25 they also slowly integrated more secular subjects
into the religious schools.26 Over time these new options made the role of the
Alliance less important than in many other Jewish communities in the Islamic
world,27 where often the Alliance schools were the only Jewish education
option.
The ideology of the Alliance Israélite Universelle was to educate modern
Jews to be productive members of modern society.28 This philosophy corre-
sponded to the philosophy of the Jewish community and in particular the lay
council with regard to the community’s integration into the new Iraq during
the early years of the Iraqi state. These schools represented one way that the
local Jewish community could leverage their international connections for the
betterment of their local community. The importance of this is twofold, first,
these schools cannot be compared to missionary schools, whose objective, at
least in part, was to convert their pupils and their families. The Jewish commu-
nity actively requested that these schools be established and continued to seek
guidance and aid from the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Anglo-Jewry Associ-
ation, and later the Joint Distribution Committee even after the management
of the schools had officially been transferred to the lay council’s school com-
mittee. Once the management of the schools was under local authority, these
organizations began to function as philanthropic organizations; they were no
longer administrators offering grants both for the regular budget and for special
initiatives. This continued support was essential to the stability and the growth
of the schools, especially in thewake of the destructionwrought byWorldWar i
24 Sasson Somekh, Baghdad Yesterday: The Making of an Arab Jew (London: Ibis Editions,
2007), 55. See also Schlaepfer in this volume.
25 Jewish Schools Report, tables, page 2.
26 The chief rabbi’s office makes a note of this fact in its letter to Magnes.
27 Rejwan, The Jews of Iraq, 186.
28 Aron Rodrigue, “Alliance Israélite Universelle Network,” ejiw, 1:171–180; Brill online, ac-
cessed 11 April 2014: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews
-in-the-islamic-world/alliance-israelite-universelle-network-COM_0001600.
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andwith the challenge of expanding education to a community where few had
themeans to pay fees andwere therefore dependent on scholarships and other
types of subventions. Second, the actions of these foreign philanthropists ben-
efitted Iraqis of other confessions who either attended these schools or used
the public health clinics (sometimes located in the school) that they were also
instrumental in opening. In more general terms these schools played a role
in educating the first generation of Iraqi civil servants (both Jewish and non-
Jewish).29 Therefore the presence of foreign Jewish philanthropy did not lead
to increased sectarianism but benefitted the residents of Baghdad as a whole,
beyond simple enrollment figures.
Although information exists as to the enrollment at the Alliance schools
from their founding it is difficult to situate this information within a larger
context as there is little reliable demographic information for the province
of Baghdad from the Ottoman period and it is therefore difficult to estimate
the number of Jews residing in Baghdad during the late nineteenth century.
With that in mind we can safely state that although modern education was
expanding in the Jewish community throughout the nineteen and early twenti-
eth century, reachingmore andmore students each year, it remained limited to
a privileged few; for example, in 1900 there were 296 boys and 166 girls enrolled
in all of theAlliance schools in “Mesopotamia,” the term theAllianceusedwhen
referring to the region prior to the formation of the Iraqi state.30 However, the
community’s decision to open its own schools with lower enrollment fees, in
addition to expanding the capacity of the Alliance schools during the first two
decades of the twentieth century, demonstrates the communal desire to reach
a wider social spectrum of students. This desire is clearly stated in an English
language report from the 1930s entitled Report of the Jewish Schools Committee
on the Jewish Schools in Baghdad 1930.31
To understand the centrality of the Jewish schools to the community itself
and to place the evolution of the Iraqi education system between 1920 and 1951
in context, it is important to compare the size of the Jewish community with
that of the general population both as a whole and in relation to those who
had access to education. In the early 1920s the population of the city of Bagh-
dad32 was approximately 200,000 people. Of the general population there were
29 Shiblik, Iraqi Jews, 40.
30 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East 1860–1972, 117. A complete table listing the children
enrolled in Alliance schools is included.
31 Jewish Schools Report.
32 This number refers to the province of Baghdad, as opposed to the city itself.
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somewhere between 65,000 and 80,000 Jews living in the province of Bagh-
dad, at least 55,000 of them living in the city of Baghdad itself.33 Proportionally,
this means that a least a quarter of the city’s population was Jewish, making
the Jewish community the single largest religious/ethnic group in the city and
as Nissim Rejwan (among others) argues, the best educated as a communal
whole.34 In 1920, the Jewish community of Baghdad lists sevenprimary and sec-
ondary schools plus three vocational schools educating 4,030 boys, 1,481 girls
for a total of 5,521 pupils.35 By comparison, in 1920 in the whole of Iraq there
were only 88 primary and 3 secondary schools (for a total of 8,110 students) for
a national population of around 3 million.36
This means that during the 1920s a large percentage of those who received
a modern education were Jewish. And as the Jewish schools dedicated more
hours to the study of foreign languages the Jewish students had a strategic
advantage over those educated in the public schools who received less training
in English and French. One consequence of this was that the graduates of
Jewish schools greatly benefitted from the British presence in Iraq during the
British Mandate, as there was a sharp increase in white-collar employment
opportunities with the increase in foreign companies in Baghdad, and an
expanded civil service.
By the 1930s, educational opportunities for the general population had
increased. The national population had grown to over 4.5million inhabitants37
and it now had 335 primary and secondary schools with 27,467 male pupils
6,573 female pupils and an additional 293 children in coeducational kinder-
gartens. The Jewish school systemhad also grown alongwith its population but
not at the same speed as the nation. For a population of around 65,000 Jews in
Baghdad, in the 1930s there were ten primary and secondary schools with 5,031
boys and 2,151 girls plus an additional 700 poor girls receiving vocational train-
ing.38
33 Page 3 of a 1924 report from the office of the Chief Rabbi to Judah Magnes, in Jerusalem,
p3/2464 Iraq plan cahjp.
34 Rejwan,The Jews of Iraq, 210–211. Other groups included Sunnīs, Shīʿīs, Persians, Kurds, and
Chaldeans.
35 Jewish Schools Report.
36 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 35; Roderic D.
Matthews and Matta Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East: Egypt, Iraq,
Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon (Washington, dc: American Council on Education,
1949).
37 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 40.
38 Jewish Schools Report cahjp, Jerusalem.
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Based on the growth of the public schools between 1920 and 1930 one could
postulate that the Jewish schools became less central to the community and
the nation as a whole. This idea was suggested by scholars such as Shiblik and
Twena,39 the main argument in support of this claim being the newly founded
government schools. This assumption is corroborated by a 1930 school report
from the Jewish lay council, which notes the establishment of a public boys
school in the Jewish quarter40 and the relative stagnation in the number of
boys attending the Jewish schools.41 Until this point those students unable to
pay school fees or secure scholarships could only attend the Midrash Talmud
Torah or a vocational program, neither of which offered the possibility to
prepare for entrance exams for secondary schools, which in turn opened up the
possibility of employment in foreign firms or the civil service—both channels
to social mobility. And yet, the Jewish school system continued to expand as
the table below indicates; therefore, it is impossible to argue that the Jewish
schools lost their relevance in the wake of expanded public education. There
are multiple reasons for the continued relevance of the Jewish schools. First,
Jewish schools maintained higher academic standards, this was a result of
the lower student-teacher ratio and the larger proportion of teachers with
a secondary education.42 For secondary education the Jewish schools were
among the few institutions that offered students the possibility to prepare for
the French Baccalaureate (in the case of the Alliance schools), or the London
matriculation examinations (in the case of Shamash school); other options in
the city were private, primarily Christian, institutions with comparable school
fees.43 Up until the dissolution of the community the Alliance schools and the
Shamash school remained the gold standard of both primary and secondary
education in Baghdad. This was particularly true in the opportunities they
presented for girls. Finally, the continued communal investment resulted in
lower school fees, and the free vocational opportunities for poor children and
orphans all helped the schools to remain relevant. Even during the uncertainty
of the 1940s and World War ii, the Farhūd,44 and general political tensions
between the Jewish community and the state, six new communal schools were
39 Shiblik, Iraqi Jews, 41.
40 Jewish Schools Report cahjp, Jerusalem, 2.
41 The overall number of Jewish students increased between 1920 and 1930 as the small
decline in the number of boys was offset by an increase in attendence by girls.
42 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East 1860–1972, 121.
43 Matthew and Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East, 209–213.
44 The Farhūd was the anti-Jewish riot that broke out in the wake of the coup d’etat in 1941;
in it approximately 180 Jews were killed and millions of dollars in damage was sustained.
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built, including two between 1948 and 1949.45 With these facts in mind, it is
clear that the Jewish schools remained crucial to the community. The opening
of public schools worked to further expand the educational opportunities for
Jewish youth but did not reduce the student base of the Jewish schools, which,
as the table below illustrates, continued to grow steadily.
Schools under the supervision of the Jewish
community in Baghdad (primary and secondary)
Year Number of schools Number of pupils
1920 8 5,511
1930 11 7,182
1935 12 7,911
1945 14 10,021
1949 20 10,391
See table in Cohen Hayyim J.46
Public Schools in Iraq (Primary & Secondary)
Year Number of schools Number of pupils
1920 91 8,111
1930 335 36,595
1940 791 104,490
1945 949 108,945
See table Matthew and Akrawi47
In the early twentieth century the Jewish schools faced challenges similar to
those of the state run schools, namely a lack of funds and a lack of trained teach-
ers.48 In a 1924 letter from the office of the chief rabbi to Judah Magnes (the
first chancellor of HebrewUniversity), the secretary to the chief rabbi carefully
45 Shiblik, Iraqi Jews, 40.
46 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East 1860–1972, 123.
47 Matthews and Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East, 140.
48 Jewish Schools Report, 8; Stephen Hensley Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950 (London: Interna-
tional Book Center: 1968), 110.
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explains the finances of the community. In the case of the Jewish community
the most significant revenue came from the gabelle, essentially a tax levied
on the sale of kosher meat. In addition to this, the community also received
money from the rents on three buildings they owned and the sale of sheep
intestine casings from slaughtered animals, all traditional sources of commu-
nal revenue.49 For the purpose of financing education the community solicited
external financial aid fromwealthy Baghdadi Jews residing in the Far East (such
as Albert Sassoon and Elias Kadoorie) and from foreign Jewish philanthropic
agencies, specifically the aforementionedAlliance Israélite Universelle and the
British Anglo-Jewish Association (established in 1871), and also from the Amer-
ican Joint Distribution Committee (established in 1914), thereby reinforcing
their links to foreign Jewish communities. They also received regular contribu-
tions from the Iraqi government, however these funds were extremely limited,
representing less than 4 percent of the annual budget.50
Overall, education was one of the main expenditures of the Jewish commu-
nity;51 the communal organization of schools became more structured as the
Rabbinate yielded considerable power to the lay council, which by 1920 was
composed of white-collar professionals and merchants, the majority of whom
were graduates of the Alliance and community schools.52 By the end of the
1920s the Jewish community had a mature established school system, whereas
the national education system in Iraq was still in its infancy. This is partially
because the Mandate government allocated insufficient funds to education
in Iraq for fear of developing an educated class that would be unable to find
suitable employment.53 The Jewish schools surely suited the British, as these
schools provided graduates from an indigenous community that was known
for its sympathy towards the British presence in Iraq.
In addition to these challenges, the Iraqi ministry of education obviously
faced challenges that were not shared by the Jewish community, particularly
the fact that they had to deal with a larger more diverse population both
geographically and culturally. Thus the Jewish school system was able to grow
and expand their services faster to a larger segment of its population than the
general school system; they built new schools, lowered general school fees, and
providedmore scholarships tomeet the demands of the community. Evenwith
49 The chief rabbi’s office makes a note of this fact in the letter to Magnes, 19.
50 Shiblik, Iraqi Jews, 40. Jews Schools Report, 1–3.
51 The chief rabbi’s letter provides an overview of the budget, 20.
52 Shiblik, Iraqi Jews, 45.
53 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: ContrivingKingandCountry (NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 2007), 193–194.
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the loss of students that resulted from some opting to attend public schools
for financial reasons and others attending non-Jewish private schools after
moving to newmiddle-class suburbs during late 1930s and 1940s,54 the number
of Jewish schools and students enrolled in them continued to grow up until the
dissolution of the community at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s.
The Jewish schools consistently employed trained teachers who brought an
international flavor to the profile of the schools. Initially, in the nineteenth
century, the certified teaching staff in the Jewish schoolswasmadeupof foreign
Jewish faculty, primarily teachers from other parts of the Muslim world who
had been trained at the Alliance teacher’s school in Paris. Once the community
had its own graduates, they too began to fill the ranks of faculty in the schools,
although some had little more than primary school training. In the 1920s the
Jewish community took several steps to improve the quality of teaching in
schools by sending local teachers to secondary education evening classes. And
yet, the presence of foreign Jewish teachers remained prevalent in the schools
well into the 1940s. Examples of this include the hiring of Mr. A.G. Brotman in
1926 to assist the schools’ committee and oversee education, and in 1928 two
additional teachers were recruited for the Shamash school, one from England
and another from Beirut. Beginning in 1925 the community invited Jewish
teachers from Palestine to Baghdad to instruct students in Hebrew language,
literature, and Jewish history. All of the teachers fromPalestinewere eventually
deported when the ministry of education prohibited the study of Modern
Hebrew and Jewish history education in the communal schools in 1935; in
addition the teaching of Zionismwas banned.55 Even the local Jewish teachers
brought an international flavor to the schools as many of those with higher
education had been educated in Europe or elsewhere in the Middle East or
even the United States.56
By the 1920s the faculty of the Jewish schools also began to include non-
Jewish teachers. This was partly due to the paucity of Jewish teachers skilled in
teaching Arabic language and literature. It appears, however, that well into the
1940s, the schools hired only Jewish headmasters, many of them trained in the
United Kingdom or France. For example, the Alliance continued their policy
54 Somekh, Baghdad Yesterday, 47. An example of this is Sasson Somekh, whose family
moved to Bustan al-Khass in 1937 where he attended a private elementary school run
by a Christian woman for a few years until he later transferred to the Shamash high
school.
55 Lev Hakkak, The Emergence of Modern Hebrew Literature in Babylon from 1735–1950 (West
Lafayette, in: Purdue University Press, 2009), 19.
56 Somekh, Baghdad Yesterday, 59.
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of employing former students from other areas of the Muslim world who had
studied at the enio in Paris, whereas the Shamash school employed a series of
British schoolmasters, the most well known being Emile Marmorstein and the
aforementioned Adolf Brotman. Ironically, even as the Jewish schools began
to hiremore non-Jewish teachers, the public schools were pressured to employ
Jewish teachers, particularly in the schoolswhere themajority of studentswere
Jews. This diversity of faculty greatly affected the students, giving them varying
perspectives on the world at large, as the examples below illustrate.
Sasson Somekh received his introduction to Iraqi politics from his Arabic
language and literature teacher at the Shamash school, Muhammad Sharara.
Somekh recalls Sharara eschewing semi-official government textbooks in favor
of lectures in which he could share his leftist political views—this was in the
late 1940s when those suspected of having communist affiliations were impris-
oned or even executed.57 Teachers also brought the concept of Jewish nation-
alism into the classroom, sometimes in very subtle ways. Violette Shamash,
who attended the Alliance Laura Kadoorie school in the 1920s, remembers her
teacher Mme. Sabbagh, from Paris, teaching the children Hatikva, the then
unofficial anthem of the Zionists in Palestine; it was only later in life that she
learned the significance of the song.58
The influence of teachers on students was of course also found in public
schools. In his biography, Nissim Rejwan recalls the days he attendedMadrasat
Ras El-Qarya. Ras El-Qarya was one of the public boys’ schools in the Jewish
quarter that catered almost exclusively to Jewish students and for the most
part employed only Jewish teachers. Rejwan recalls a teacher named Dawood
Afandi who taught Hebrew Bible.59 Afandi, according to Rejwan, devoted a
whole lesson in the spring of 1933 to a discussion of the need to boycott German
products in solidarity with the Jews of Germany.60 This anecdote illustrates
how even in a government run school a classroom could become the place of a
communal discussion; the idea of boycotting Germany had developed outside
Iraq and was imported by Zionist circles present in Baghdad. It also offers an
57 Ibid., 77–80.
58 Violette Shamash, Memories of Eden (Surrey: Forum, 2008) 35–36. Shamash mentions
the teacher being from Paris although given her last name and the average profile of an
Alliance teacher it is more likely that she was originally from somewhere in North Africa
and was educated at the enion in Paris.
59 Rejwan refers to the teacher as Dawood Afandi, however it is likely that Afandi simply
refers to his title.
60 Nissim Rejwan, The Last Jews in Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland (Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, 2004), 59–60.
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exampleof a teacherdiscussing a very sensitivepolitical subject, evenas certain
factions in the Iraqi government were professing Nazi sympathies, primarily in
protest against British colonialism.
Curriculum
The first Alliance school in Baghdad followed the Franco-Ottoman education
model. Neither Arabic, the local language, nor Ottoman Turkish, the language
of the administration, was central to the curriculum although bothwere taught
to varying degrees through the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Origi-
nally, when the Alliance girl’s school was opened in 1893, Arabic was not part
of the curriculum. This is not surprising as during the Ottoman period the lan-
guage of instruction in the Muslim schools was Turkish.61 And even in 1919 of
the 75 public primary schools in Iraq only 56 taught in Arabic, 11 taught in Turk-
ish, 7 taught in Kurdish, and one taught in Persian.62
It was not until the 1920s that Iraqi state legislation began to mandate the
study of Arabic. In 1924, in written correspondence from the office of the chief
rabbi to Magnes in Jerusalem, we see notes that the government was pressur-
ing the schools to teach in English andArabic, but that the schools were slow to
deviate from the curriculum developed by the Alliance. Although by this time
the majority of Jewish schools were already teaching some Arabic, this educa-
tional legislation, in addition to the growing importance ofArabic in commerce
and civil society, led to an increase in Arabic instruction throughout the Jew-
ish schools. By 1930 all Jewish schools in Baghdad taught Arabic and all but
one taught English. The one school not teaching English was the Alliance girl’s
school, LauraKadoorie, where Frenchwas themain language of education, and
Arabic was a distant second. If Laura Kadoorie represents one extreme in lan-
guage division, it is also far from the exception: instruction in Arabic was not
uniform throughout schools, grades, or genders, with schools allocating any-
where from 6 to 20 hours a week towards the study of Arabic.63
The lay council report of 1930 provides a clear breakdown of the subjects
studied divided by language and providing the number of hours dedicated
to each language for all but the Midrash Talmud Torah. By 1930 four schools
were being administered by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Albert Sasson
61 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 197.
62 Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950, 110.
63 See lay council curricula tables.
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figure 4.1
figure 4.2
(founded in 1863), Nouriel (founded in 1902), Noam (founded in 1902), and
Laura Kadoorie (founded in 1895). At the Alliance boy’s schools, Albert Sasson
and Nouriel, the curriculumwas divided between Arabic, French, Hebrew, and
English, with French and Arabic being the dominant languages. The allocation
of hours per language was such that as a student neared matriculation, the
time allocated to Frenchwould increase as the time for Arabic would decrease.
For the less dominant languages such as Hebrew and English, hours allocated
to Hebrew would decrease as hours allocated to English would increase. The
Alliance girls’ schools operated in a strikingly different way than what we see
in this report. At Laura Kadoorie and Noam the dominant language during
the entire duration of study was French, with Arabic second, and Hebrew far
behind.
For the community run schools there was significantly more Arabic in the
curriculum from their inception, regardless of gender. In addition, all of the
schools dedicated substantial time to the study of Hebrew and English. The
only communal schools which offered hours in French, and then only in the
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final two years, was the girl’s school Gan Manehem Daniel Saleh (founded in
1910); it offered four hours perweek in the final two years,most likely to prepare
girls whowished to continue their education through year eight at the Alliance
LauraKadoorie school, the only Jewish girl’s school offering courses for the final
three years of secondary education. For theboy’s community schools, Shahmon
(founded 1909), Wataniyya (founded 1923), and Kerem (founded in 1924), Ara-
bic was the dominant language. In the first years of education more time was
allocated toEnglish, though this slowly reversed as students progressed. Finally,
Shamash (founded in 1928), which was also a community school but with
an objective of preparing students to take the London matriculation exams,
focused almost exclusively on English in the later years. Figures 4.1–4.4 com-
pare the hours of study allocated to each language based on the numbers pro-
vided from the 1930 report.
When grouping the Alliance and communal schools together, the clearest
differentiation in curriculum is between the sexes. Arabic was not universally
included in the girl’s curricula until much later, a point illustrated in Sasson
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Somekh’s autobiography when he writes about the experience of his parents
at the Alliance schools. Born in 1909 Somekh’s mother learned to read and
write in French and English at the Alliance girl’s school in Basra, but was never
taught to read or write Arabic. His father, born in 1900 and educated at the
Alliance boy’s school in Baghdad, studied European languages in addition to
Arabic.64 This contrast relates to the fundamental philosophical differences
between boy’s and girl’s education in the Jewish community. Whereas boys
were educated to be successful in their chosen careers, have the means to
support their future families, and participate as active citizens of the state,
a women’s role was much more limited. The impetus behind educating Jew-
ish girls was based on the ideas of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
bourgeois society in western Europe and America. A girl’s education was sup-
posed to develop the qualities she needed to become a wife and homemaker,
girlswere essentially educated in domesticity. Educationwas synonymouswith
social prestige, making an educated girl a more desirable match on the mar-
riage market.65
Girls’ education began to change in the 1930s when some occupations
became open to women, such as teaching and nursing. However the differ-
ence in focus between boys’ and girls’ education is still evident when looking
at the gender divide in the curricula of 1930. The clearest indicator of this is the
importance of the Arabic language in boys’ education compared to girls’ edu-
cation, but there were other differences as well. In general, boys had three to
six more hours of class time per week than girls and more time was dedicated
to the “hard sciences,” whereas girls dedicated significant time to subjects like
embroidery, sewing, hygiene, and home economics.
These differences in and of themselves are not particularly surprising, given
the role of women in Iraq at the time. However, if we consider standard Arabic
as one of the main facilitators and markers of national identity, it is surprising
that this was deemedmore important for boys than for girls. One can postulate
that, initially, the study of Arabic was not ideological but pragmatic—it was
necessary for employment in the civil service and in commerce in the 1920s
and early 1930s. As upper and middle class women were not expected to work,
the importance of mastering Arabic was seen as less important. This fact is
illustrated in a 1924 letter written by David Sasson,66 then a teacher at the
64 Somekh, Baghdad Yesterday, 55–56.
65 Esther Meir-Glitzenstein, Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s (London:
Routledge, 2004), 117–118.
66 Sasson (no relation to the Baghdadi Sassoon Family) was a Persian born Jew educated at
the Alliance school in Tehran and the Alliance enio in Paris.
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Alliance girl’s school, in which he deplores the fact that families prefer for their
daughters to learn English over Arabic, even though English has less practical
use for these women. He goes on to note that girls who are not taught to
read Arabic will become women completely dependent on their fathers and
spouses.67 Eventually this changed: by 1930 Laura Kadoorie had dropped the
study of English in favor of Arabic, although only 6 to 9 hours a week were
allocated to the language.
In the 1930s the only girls who received a comprehensive education in
Arabic were those attending the one community girl’s school, Gan Menahem
Daniel Saleh. These girls received up to 22 hours of Arabic a week, making
it the dominant language of their education. However Gan Menahem Daniel
Saleh represented a minority of those girls who received an education, as the
school only had 306 students compared to the two Alliance girl’s schools that
enrolled, in total, 1,826 students.68AsArabic becamea symbol of thenation and
represented unity and integration, the number of hours dedicated to Arabic
increased for girls, particularly in the 1940s. We cannot know whether the
increase in Arabic was designed to facilitate women’s integration into Iraqi
society, or if the community wanted to demonstrate its commitment to Arabic,
or whether it was a result of simple pressure from the government ministry
of education, we do know, however, that it was an example of the growing
importance of Arabic as an Iraqi national symbol.
Beyond the gender divide, the other major difference in curriculum was
between the “religious” and the “secular” communal schools. Although all of
the secular Jewish schools taught Hebrew, Jewish history, and religious stud-
ies, a point regularly mentioned in the Jewish schools report, they remained
focusedon a secular education.Obviously, the twobranches of theMidrashTal-
mud Torah had a very difference perspective: linked directly to the rabbinate
and only open to boys, they offered the least “modern” education. The 1930 lay
council report does not discuss the curriculum of theMidrash Talmud Torah in
the same detail as it does the other schools, yet it doesmention that in addition
to being a religious school it offered elementary studies in Arabic. The teach-
ing of Arabic was most likely due to government pressure; after all, in the 1920s
the members of the communities attempted to persuade the rabbis to include
more secular subjects, but the initiative was largely unsuccessful. In general,
the Talmud Torah provided the lowest quality education among the Jewish
schools. This was due not only to the lack of breadth in the curriculum but also
67 Monique Nahon, Hussard de l’alliance (Paris: Editions du Palio, 2010), 84.
68 Jewish School Report, 3.
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to the overcrowded classes and the lack of qualified teachers, and little changed
in the school over the course of a century. It was also the most isolated from
Iraqi society. And yet the religious schools did not close, and continued to have
overcrowded classes until the 1950s. Knowing that the general bias of the com-
munity was toward modern education it is surprising the Midrash continued
to attract students. Somewhere between 1925 and 1930 the Midrash abolished
all school fees, thereby providing an option to those who could not afford the
fee-based Jewish schools and were weary of sending their children to public
schools. The abolishment of fees was perhaps their attempt to remain relevant
in the wake of the secular Jewish schools and the free public schools. It was not
until 1935 that a modern Talmud Torah was opened that offered a traditional
religious education, taught secular subjects from the state curriculum, and pre-
pared students to take the entry exams for secondary education. This school
was relatively successful, and is a testament to the fact that it was not opposi-
tion to religious education that turned people away from traditional education,
but a desire for a modern education for their children. However the student
body continued to be made up of boys from poor families, from which we can
infer that the Midrash was not the first choice for schooling among Baghdadi
Jewish families.69
Beyond the actual curriculum, these schools were social spaces that allowed
linguistic creativity in all languages to flourish. The school was a place that
allowed students to interact with others outside their family circle and to prac-
tice languages not regularly spoken at home. The alliance archives are replete
with elegant essays written in French by students comparing themselves to
heroes and heroines of French literature or equating Jewish Iraqi history with
French history. Although I have primarily focused on the study of English and
French versus Arabic, Modern Hebrew also flourished in Iraq. This is due in
great part to its instruction in the Jewish schools, although formally forbid-
den after 1935 it continued to be taught as biblical Hebrew.70 Lev Hakkak’s
book on modern Hebrew creativity in Iraq offers many examples of students
experimenting with the Hebrew language during the 1920s and 1930s, the best
example being the Shammash school’s Hebrew language periodical, Shemesh.
The school newspaper, written in Modern Hebrew and using Modern Hebrew
script, only lasted three years, but throughout that time was read throughout
the community.71
69 Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East: 1860–1972, 115.
70 Hakkak, The Emergence of Modern Hebrew Literature in Babylon, 189–190.
71 Ibid., 18–20.
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Linguistic creativity in Arabic in the schools is perhaps best demonstrated
through the “pageantry of the state,” these were the official ceremonies refer-
enced earlier, in which students would read poems by famous Arab poets, sing
traditional Arab songs, and give speeches demonstrating their loyalty to the
nation and the monarchy. In some cases students composed their own poems,
a testament to the high level of Arabic they had been taught. This multilingual
education benefitted Iraqi society as a whole, as it was the graduates of these
schools who were responsible for translating many of the great works of Euro-
pean philosophy and history into Arabic.
Conclusion
The Jewish community of Baghdad during the Mandate and early years of the
Iraqi state continued to function with the large measure of communal auton-
omy that it had for centuries prior, even as its constituents became more inte-
grated into the new Iraqi nation. The Jewish community, led in tandem by the
religious and lay councils, continued to levy taxes, act as the official representa-
tive of the community, and most importantly for our discussion, invest heavily
in the development of educational institutions. From this statement it would
be easy to assume that those schools attached to the Jewish community were
insular in nature or that their objective was to foster a purely communal iden-
tity. However, on closer inspection, we see that this is not the case. Instead, the
public policy of the Jewish communitywas to embrace the idea of the new Iraqi
nation and the Jewish community’s place in this new nation.
The Jewish schools were a tool to demonstrate this ideology both in their
principles but also as physical spaces in which the community could learn
about and engage with the greater nation. Schools were not, however, uniform
in their curricula: students received varying levels of access to Arab, Western,
and Jewish culture. The differences between individual schools is most clearly
delineated through the number of hours dedicated to the study of different
languages and the importance placed on secular subjects. Although it is clear
that the schools were agents of Arabization, and in this capacity acted as public
spaces, this is only one aspect of their identities. It ismore accurate to state that
Jewish students were given the tools to participate in the new state and society
that was being built, and they were also exposed to Western ideas and Jewish
culture. However, the extent of their exposure to these different cultures and
ideals varied based on gender and socioeconomic status. In very broad terms,
middle class males received the greatest exposure to Iraqi society either by
attending the community school or later public schools. The poorer families
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were more likely to send their boys to the Midrash Talmud Torah, the program
with perhaps the least external exposure or to communal vocational programs
available for both boys and girls.
The Jewish schools of this period were remarkable in that they were able
to produce Iraqi citizens who identified themselves with Arab nationalism,
who not only participated in the nascent secular society but also at times
became active architects of it.72 That being said, not all students received the
same degree of exposure to Arabic or the ideals of the new state. The most
striking difference, as mentioned earlier, is one of gender: on average less of
the curriculum for girls was dedicated to Arabic and they were taught by fewer
non-Jewish teachers.Girls also tended to leave school earlier thanboys tomarry
and this abbreviated education plus the reduced hours for the study of Arabic
limited their introduction to public debates. And yet, over time, even girls
began to have increased access to Arabic, the ideals of the nation, and public
space in general. As Bashkin notes, some Jewish girls did attend government
schools, particularly in the 1940s whenmore options were available, and it was
becoming socially acceptable for women to appear in public unveiled.73
The other difference in education was subtler, and relates to socioeconom-
ics. Although the school committeewas cognizant of the prohibitive expense of
schools and endeavored to provide scholarships and a sliding scale for tuition,
it never altogether abandoned fees for the Alliance or the community schools,
rather it offered scholarships for the best students. Therefore families not able
to afford these fees and not offered scholarships were faced with two diametri-
cally different options, either the free religious school that offered little by way
of secular education, or the public schools that were outside the community
and provided less exposure to foreign languages and therefore Western soci-
ety. The fact that the religious schools continued to exist is evidence that some
families still chose to forgo a secular education and exposure to secular society
in favor of having their children attend a Jewish school. However, even in this
construction there was flexibility: it was not unheard of for children to change
schools throughout their studies or to hire tutors for religious education.74
72 For a detailed discussion of the reception of the idea of the nation among Iraqi Jewish
intellectuals see the unpublished 2012 doctoral dissertation, Aline Schlaepfer, “ABagdad je
resterai! Réception et diffusiondu concept de ‘nation’ chez les intellectuels juifs deBagdad
entre la révolution jeune-turque et l’émigration (1908–1951),” (PhD diss., University of
Geneva, 2012).
73 Bashkin, New Babylonians, 87–88.
74 Schlaepfer, “A Bagdad je resterai!,” 42.
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In summary, in Iraq from the beginning of the Mandate period the bound-
aries between communal space and public space became increasingly blurred.
Given the diversity of students that the Jewish schools of Baghdad produced
and the fluid way in which the space functioned, it is clear that these schools
were able to function both as public and communal space. For the Jewish com-
munity of Baghdad, schools were a tool withwhich the community couldmake
itself relevant to the new nation while preserving its communal identity.
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Report from the office of the Chief Rabbi to Judah Magnes in Jerusalem dated 1924.
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chapter 5
Preserving the Catholics of the Holy Land or
Integrating Them into the Palestine Nation
(1920–1950)?
K.M.J. Sanchez Summerer
To British officials, Jerusalem appeared to be a divided city, with its differ-
ent ethnic and religious groups, they saw it as a vivid image of ‘Babel alive.’1
Ronald Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, underlined the multilingualism of
pupils when he visited the French Catholic school of the Collège des Frères,
and the ‘harmony’ between the pupils of different religions studying together.2
This diversity presented a challenge for the British administrators who, from
the early years of the Mandate, sought to expand and separate the educational
system along linguistic lines; as a consequence, the division of public space
became more prominent.3 Empowered by its role as official protectorate of
the Christians in the Levant, France played an important role in what it per-
ceived to be the “preservation of the Catholic community/minority of the Holy
Land.”4 French Catholic schools proposed one education for Christians, which
was opened to Jews and Muslims from the beginning of the twentieth century
onwards; these schools, set up before the Mandate (1904), challenged the gov-
ernmental education offered during the first years of the Mandate.
1 The religious and ethnic groups and the cacophony of languages were perceived as “one of
the principal attractions,” John de V. Loder to mother, 4 May 1918. Private Papers Collection,
Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford; quoted in J. Sherman,Mandate Days: British
Lives in Palestine, 1918–1948 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 38.
2 acj (Archives of the Jerusalem College of the Brothers of the Christian schools—Frères des
écoles chrétiennes, Jerusalem), Historique, 1926, “note de Ronald Storrs.”
3 Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2011).
4 It is not our intention to discuss the concept of ‘minority’ here.We refer to Benjamin Thomas
White and his general argument, according to which the political concept of “majorities”
and “minorities” makes sense only in the context of the modern state, especially the nation
state. We focus more on how the Catholics saw themselves between the two wars. Benjamin
Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East, the Politics of Community in
FrenchMandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
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In this paper I reveal a neglected aspect of colonial linguistic and religious
policy governing theCatholics of theHoly Land, the impacts of FrenchCatholic
education on the identity-building process carried out in Palestine, and their
reception by the Palestinian Catholic community. I focus on a discussion of
the missionary schools as public and communal spaces, meeting places for
missionaries, the elite, the middle classes, colonial, and religious powers. I also
seek to understand how language practices, beliefs, andmanagement intersect
with religious beliefs, convictions, and ideologies at the local and international
levels; the ways in which dominant discourses about language and education
were played out, negotiated through Catholic schools and their environment,
and I attempt to envisage the effect of a conflict in the conceptualization of
language as a tool, at the individual and group level.
How did France use its schools as a platform, as a French spearhead in the
Holy Land to confrontGreat Britain?Howdid the French language act as both a
‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ asset to the Christian community, but also, to a certain
extent, to the Jewish andMuslim communities? How did the Roman and local
Catholic actors perceive and use language as a tool for the defense of the
interests of the Catholic community? How did the local Catholic community
react to this religious language policy?
In the recent publications on Christianity in British Mandate Palestine, the
category of Palestinian Christian Orthodoxy has been studied more than the
Palestinian Catholic communities, though the latter were fundamental during
the growth of international institutions in Palestine and were instrumental to
France, and to a lesser extent to Italy, during and even after the establishment
of the protectorate for the Christians of the Holy Land. Thus far, the linguis-
tic aspects of the various Christian identities have been neglected. Historians
agree on the important role of Arab Christians during the Mandate, but dis-
agree on how Christians fit into the wider Arab society and to what degree
they relied on their religious affiliation at certain times. Works dealing with
Catholics in Palestine are for the most part interested in the holy places, diplo-
macy, politics, and religion, while the history of education and language use
of indigenous Catholics have yet to be explored.5 While the major works of
Y. Porath and D. Tsimhoni on Palestinian nationalism and Christians are based
onBritish interpretations of Arab society and highlight the intercommunal dis-
cord,6 the work of B. Spolsky and R. Cooper do not tackle the Catholic commu-
5 החינוך הערבי בפלשתינה בתקופת המנדט הבריטי , אדן , דבורה , 1989, 370.9 (91) e3.
6 Daphne Tsimhoni, “The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement dur-
ing the Formative Stage,” in G. Ben-Dor (ed.), The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict
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nity’s use of languages during the Mandate period in relation to their Muslim
and Jewish fellows, nor does the recent work of Haiduc-Dale on Christian com-
munities and communalism.7
Despite the close linkbetween thepreservationof and further dissemination
of the French language and the promotion of the Catholic religion in Palestine
under Ottoman and British rules, this aspect of colonial linguistic policy has
not been studied before;8 the focus until now has been on Egypt, Syria, and
Lebanon. The impact of language policies on Palestine has been underrated in
the different historiographies despite the conspicuous nature of the European
legacy in Palestine and despite the linguistic motivation of missionary educa-
tion, cited since the 1950s.More recently, Aslanov in his analysis of the position
of the French language in the Levant, maintained that religious factors were
moredecisive thanpolitical ones inpreserving the language.9Hedemonstrated
that the ‘preservation,’ and the ‘revival’ of French was not necessarily based on
an administrative or military occupation, and that the Levantine Francophone
communities should not be considered a simple corollary of colonial and impe-
rial policies, as it hadbeendeeply rooted in this areabeforeFrance enteredonto
the scene. However, he did not expand upon the part played by the schools in
the area.
(RamatGan: Turtledove Publishing, 1978), 73–98 and Yehoshuah Porath, The Emergence of the
Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929 (London: Cass, 1974) both believe that Chris-
tians did not organize communally and this led to an overall decrease in Christians’ impor-
tance throughout the Mandate.
7 Bernard Spolsky and Robert Cooper, The Languages of Jerusalem (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991) and Noah Haiduc-Dale, “Arab Christians in Palestine Communalism and Nationalism,
1917–1948” (PhD diss., New York University, 2010).
8 This absence could be explained by the fact that the study of French in Egypt has been
prevalent in the historiography of the French presence in the Levant, and in the study of the
traditional links between theMaronites of Lebanon and the French language. The Palestinian
case, which occupies a separate place though it remains in the Levantine Francophonie,
has been forgotten. Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in
the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John E. Joseph, Language
and Identity, National, Ethnic, Religious (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); John Myhill,
Language, Religion and National Identity in Europe and the Middle East (Amsterdam: John
Benjamins, 2006); Jean Riffier, Les œuvres françaises en Syrie—1860–1923 (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2000); Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine; Heather Sharkey,
American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in the Age of Empire (Princeton, nj:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
9 Cyril Aslanov, Le français auLevant, jadis et naguère. A la recherche d’une langueperdue (Paris:
Honoré Champion, 2006).
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Historical sociolinguistic studies of the Jerusalem communities and their
relations in the public space face specific challenges that relate to historical
inquiry; they contend with sometimes unreliable sources, with limited access
to reliable spoken language data, and “imperfect data.”10 The present study is
based on primary and secondary published sources and archival material. The
Latin Patriarchate and Vatican archival material on the Palestinian Catholic
community question whether the current studies on Catholics is representa-
tive of the variety of cultural and linguistic choices made by the Catholics dur-
ing the British Mandate period. In order to understand the social and cultural
dimensions of the use of languages in the Catholic communities, in contact
with other communities, I have based my analysis on the private archives and
photographs provided by various French schools,11 as well as the Latin Patri-
archal archives, the Congregation for Oriental churches archives (part of the
Holy See archives), the Vatican Secretariat of State archives, the Sainte Anne
Melkite seminar of Jerusalem archives, and the files of the Chief Secretary of
the Palestine government.12 In this paper I have tried to include the Catholic
10 BrianD. Joseph, “Historical Linguistics and Sociolinguistics: Strange Bedfellows or Natural
Friends?,” in Language andHistory, Linguistics andHistoriography, ed. Nils Langer, Steffan
Davies, andWim Vandenbussche (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 70.
11 Few memoirs of the schools’ alumni and magazines were published to voice the indige-
nous perspective on missionary educative activities, in contrast to the ones available in
the Lebanese and Egyptian cases. Some of the archival material was preserved and classi-
fied during a project (“Archiver au Moyen-Orient, faiseurs d’histoire, faiseurs d’archives,”
2006–2008) entered intowith the French consulate, the FrenchMinistry of ForeignAffairs
Archives Department, and the French National Research Agency cnrs (Centre national
de la recherche scientifique), in order to preserve and classify the archives of these schools
still remaining. The loss of certain archives can be partially explained by the political
events that have affected the schools, such as the 1947–1948 and 1967 wars.
12 The following acronyms will be used: acb (Archives of the Bethlehem College of the
Brothers of the Christian schools, Bethlehem); acj (Archives of the Jerusalem College of
the Brothers of the Christian schools—Frères des écoles chrétiennes, Jerusalem); acts
(Archives of the Custodia di Terra Santa, Jerusalem); amae (Archives of the French Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Paris and Nantes); amg (Archives of the General House of the
Brothers of the Christian schools, Rome); assj (Archives of the Sisters of Saint Joseph,
Jerusalem); ands (Archives of the Sisters of Zion, Jerusalem and Rome); asc (Archives of
the Sisters of the Charity, Soeurs de la Charité, Paris); bbde (Blue Books, Government of
Palestine,Department of Education); coca (Congregation forOrientalChurches archives,
Congregatio ProEcclesiisOrientalibus); lpa (LatinPatriarchateArchives, Jerusalem); jssa
(Jerusalem Schmidt Schule archives); meca (Middle East Centre Archives, Oxford), pro–
fo or wo (Public Record Office, Foreign Office or War Office, United Kingdom); sasa
(Sainte Anne Seminar archives); and vssa (Vatican Segretaria di Stato archives).
preserving the catholics of the holy land or integrating them 125
subnarrative and the possibility that it used religious identification in political
decision-making and societal relations (attempts to establish, resist, or modify
language policies ‘from below’). Local Catholic community archives (schools,
Latin Patriarchate and Melkite seminar archives) are underused resources for
Mandate era studies, while the Mandate archives give greater nuance to the
study of the writings of the Catholic community.
Histories of public space in the Holy Land tend to describe events as macro-
level phenomena.More recentworks point out the important role of languages
in Jerusalem public space and the different combinations in the old city of
Jerusalem (the new part of the town was more “cloisonné”).13 Examining these
phenomena through the lens of daily school life provides a counter voice and
offers an account of different kinds of combinations and competitions.14
Here I envisage the French schools as public, communal, and to a lesser
extent, private spaces. I focus on two main French Catholic schools that were
strategically located inside the old city of Jerusalem: the Collège des Frères,
situated near the NewGate opened in 1889, it was on the road ofmany Catholic
pilgrimages and on the line of separation between fighters in 1948 and 1967;
the second school was the Melkite (Greek Catholic) seminar and boys’ school
of Sainte Anne, situated on the Via Dolorosa, the French ‘lieu de mémoire’
in Jerusalem.15 Under French jurisdiction, it symbolized the ‘eternal’ links be-
tween France and the oriental Catholics, where French pilgrims gathered in
1853 and the meeting place of the French community in Jerusalem.16
13 Y. Wallach in his chapter in this volume examines the possibility of evoking “shared
spaces” in pre-1948 Jerusalem. He argues, as does Salim Tamari, that the Old City was
far more mixed in confessional terms than the European descriptions tend to present
it. Oral history and some memoirs of pupils of these Catholic schools point out these
intercommunalmoments betweenCatholics, other Christian communities, andMuslims,
also more often in the domestic space than in the public space. Here we focus on the
contacts in and around the two schools in the Old City. During the 1920s, the wealthier
families moved to the new part of town, while holding on to their family properties in the
Old City.
14 SalimTamari and IssamNassar (eds.),al-Qudsal-intidābiyya fī l-mudhakarāt al-jawhariyya
(Jerusalem: Instituteof JerusalemStudies, 2005) andSalimTamari,Yearof theLocust,ASol-
dier’s Diary and the Erasure of Palestine’s Ottoman Past (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2011).
15 Dominique Trimbur, “Sainte Anne, lieu demémoire et lieu de vie français à Jérusalem,” in
Chrétiens et sociétés—xvie–xxe siècles, nº 7 (2000), 39–69. The author analyzes the politi-
cal context of the French presence in Sainte Anne and the French political representation
via the area of the Church of Sainte Anne.
16 sasa, 2a1, La vie du séminaire des origines à la guerre de 1914–1918, “la France de Saint
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I begin by analyzing the Catholic communities and their importance for the
Europeanpresence, linguistic policy of theCatholic communities, andmission-
ary education policy in the Holy Land. I will then focus on the linguistic and
proto-national British agenda in Palestine, the educational and linguistic con-
flict between France and Great Britain, and its consequences for the process
of identity formation in the Catholic schools and on the links between lan-
guage and religion in educational policies. Finally, I examine the indigenous
Catholic reaction to the European presence and the Catholic perception of
the role of Arabic as a common ground with the Palestinian Muslim popula-
tion.
The Palestinian Catholic Communities and the Jerusalem
Educational Space
Catholic Communities, European Powers in Palestine, and
Educational Challenges
Considered the Holy Land by Christian European countries, from the mid-
nineteenth century onwardsPalestinebecame the theatre of European rivalries
and interference.17 For Great Britain, Palestine constituted the link between
Egypt, Iraq, and India, and the “holy city.”18 For France, who considered itself
as the ‘fille aînée de l’Eglise’ (the eldest daughter of the Catholic church) and
the protector of the Christian minorities in the Middle East, Palestine was per-
ceived as an essential area, near the French sphere of influence over Syria and
Lebanon, and as the “most French Land of the Levant.”19 The Sykes-Picot agree-
ments (1916) redrew the geopolitical map of the Middle East and considered
Palestine an international zone, and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) placed Pales-
Louis,” “la France éternelle” are evoked for both theMelkite seminar, the boys’ school, and
the church of Sainte Anne.
17 Henri Laurens, LaquestiondePalestine (1922–1947).Unemission sacréede civilisation (Paris:
Fayard, 2002); Dominique Trimbur, “Catholiques français et allemands en Palestine, xixe–
xxe siècles,”BulletinduCentrede recherche françaisde Jérusalem 18 (2007) 92–106;Anthony
O’Mahony, “The Latins of the East: The Vatican, Jerusalem and the Palestinian Christians,”
in The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, Religion
and Politics, ed. Anthony O’Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 90–114.
18 Ethan Bar-Yosef, The Holy Land in English Culture, 1799–1917: Palestine and the Question of
Orientalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
19 Maurice Barrès, Une enquête aux pays du Levant (Paris: Plon-Nouritt, 1923). Laurens, La
question de Palestine.
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tine under the responsibility of the British government, bringing a de facto end
to the French protectorate for Catholics (it ended de jure in 1924).20
The French Catholic schools were at the forefront of a renewal in edu-
cation and among the oldest European educational institutions in Palestine.
The Tanzimat reforms of 1869 led to the development of public schools (umu-
miyya)21 and the professionalization of western education;22 the Ottoman
reformers adopted a law that made elementary schooling compulsory for
Ottoman citizens for a minimum period of three years and provided educa-
tion that was no longer primarily religious.23 Europeans thus came to per-
ceive Palestine, and especially Jerusalem, as an educational arena.24 However,
the commercial and industrial French presence remained less developed than
in the coastal towns of Palestine,25 and the inner cities of Palestine offered
fewer public educational structures.26 Taking the reforms as an opportunity to
spread French education throughout Palestine, the French schools proposed a
curriculum—both classical and professional—valued by the Ottoman author-
ities;27 the last quarter of the twentieth century saw the rapid growth of the
French congregations teaching in French, then recognized by the Ottomans as
a semi-official language. The French Catholic establishments opened rapidly
across the Palestinian territory (one school opened every two to three years
until 1904). The brothers of the Christian schools and the sisters of Saint
20 The French Protectorate of Catholics takes its roots in the Capitulations given to France
and its citizens (ressortissants)—commercial, religious, juridical favors—in 1575; Cather-
ine Nicault, Jérusalem 1850–1948, des Ottomans aux Anglais, entre coexistence spirituelle et
déchirure politique (Paris: Autrement, 1999).
21 Divided into primary (ibtidāʾiyya, created in 1890) and secondary schools (rushdiyya,
created in 1902); Fortna, Imperial Classroom.
22 The French order of the Brothers of the Christian schools, from Jean Baptiste de la Salle,
were asked to help the Ottoman authorities to implement training schools for boys, amg,
nh701.
23 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, the Construction of a Modern Identity (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997), 86.
24 acj, Report of the German Archeological Institute, Schools for Arabs (Jerusalem, 1905).
25 Frederique Schillo, “Les commerçants français en Palestine pendant la période ottomane,”
in De Bonaparte à Balfour, la France, l’Europe occidentale et la Palestine, 1799–1917, ed.
Dominique Trimbur and Ran Aaronsohn (Paris: cnrs editions, 2008), 135–167.
26 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 136. French schools were not intended for French nationals as
there were only few in Palestine.
27 The 1901 Mytilène and the 1913 Constantinople agreements (for the preservation of the
rights of the Christian communities) gave schools that were established without official
permits the right to continue to function.
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Joseph’s establishments enrolled the majority of the Christian students.28 In
1895 private schools outweighed public schools, among the private institutions
the French schools preponderated.29 These schools aimed to educate not only
boys, but girls as well, and this relatively early when compared to the laws on
girls’ schools (of 1867) in France.
Competition with other missionary institutions, especially the British
schools,30 began in the 1860s for primary education, and at the end of the
nineteenth century for secondary institutions. The French educational model
operated differently than theGerman and English systems, which held that the
pupil’s mother tongue had to be mastered before any other language teaching
could take place.31 The Germans and English were unsettled by the concern
that teaching French would create a “confused linguistic identity” and become
a sign of the “degeneration” of Palestinian society,32 they focused on Arabic,
while the Catholics presented French (until 1920) as the language of Catholi-
cism. Furthermore, different Christian communities (Catholic and Orthodox)
opted for French Catholic institutions because they did not have community
schools.33
28 The most important French Catholic educational facilities established in Palestine (boys
and girls) were the following: Saint Joseph Sisters schools: 1848 Jerusalem (1849 Jaffa, 1853
Bethleem, 1872 Ramleh, 1873 Ramallah, 1875 Beit Jalah, 1889Nazareth, 1904Naplouse). The
Dames de Nazareth was established in Nazareth in 1855 but nowhere else in Palestine,
followed in 1856 by the Zion Sisters. The Brothers of the Christian schools (Frères des
Ecoles Chrétiennes) started by opening a school in Jerusalem in 1876, then the main
cities of Palestine followed; 1880 Rosary Sisters (Soeurs du Rosaire); 1883, Fathers of Zion
(Pères de Sion), 1886 the Charity Sisters (Filles de la Charité, Saint Vincent de Paul);
Karène Sanchez, Politiques, éducation et identités linguistiques, le college des frères des
écoles chrétiennes de Jérusalem, 1922–1939 (Utrecht: lot, 2009), annexes.
29 Vital Cuinet, La Turquie d’Asie, géographie administrative, statistique descriptive et raison-
née de chaque province de l’Asiemineure (Paris: E. Leroux, 1895), 563; Cuinet indicates that
of the schools for the Jerusalem region there were 8 public, 27 Catholic, 5 Protestant, and
3 Orthodox.
30 German and Russian institutions had two schools during the Ottoman period, and these
were partially closed after World War i. Italians did not run their own schools in the
Bethlehem and Jerusalem areas, but their influence was predominant in the Franciscan
schools for the poor Christian population.
31 Hans-GeorgWolf, “British and French Languages and Educational Policies in theMandate
and Trusteeship Territories,”Language Sciences 30, no. 5 (2008), 553–574.
32 acj, Report of the German Archeological Institute, Schools for Arabs (Jerusalem).
33 The Latin Patriarchate and the Custodia di Terra Santa archives contain educational
censuses. They show that the Sisters of Saint Joseph and to someextent, theBrothers of the
Christian schools worked partly for the local Catholic authorities, but also opened their
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In the field of language education, the European powers competed fiercely.
In the late nineteenth century, knowledge of languages was a way of accessing
‘modernity.’34 Each European institution claimed preeminence in addressing
its linguistic and religious community. Fully aware of the linguistic acquisi-
tion process as a marker of identity, France and Great Britain confronted one
another through their respective educational systems and also through the
local schools ‘inspired’ by the French and British models. French linguistic and
cultural influence constituted a response to British linguistic and educative ini-
tiatives.35 The Italian influence on the Catholic community, essentially via the
Custodia di Terra Santa who ‘insured’ the protection of the Catholics until the
rebirth of the Latin Patriarchate in 1847, was manifest in the spread of Italian
in the Franciscan schools; this lasted until the mid 1920s.36
For the French public and its government, in the early 1920s Palestine
remained “themost French land of the Orient,” at a timewhen the loss to Great
Britain of the French Catholic protectorate in the Holy Land was confirmed,
and the French therefore focused on the schools to preserve their influence.37
Even during British Mandatory rule, the French General Consulate continued
to support French educational work and assisted the French communities,
which were viewed by French officials to be “its residual influence in the Holy
Land.”38
own private sections that offered a more diverse curriculum; acts, Sisters of Saint Joseph
and Brothers of the Christian schools files.
34 Keith David Watenpaugh, BeingModern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colo-
nialism, and the ArabMiddle Class (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2006).
35 pro, fo 371, e3051/44.
36 vssa, 51 p.o. 56–57, 1924, Missione straordinaria di Mons. Doci in Turchia, promemo-
ria del Sig. Schiaparelli, Secretario Generale del Associazione Nazionale per soccorere
i missionari italiani: proposte per la laicizzazione della scuole religiose; vssa, 81 po 87
Palestina 1927–1938 Attegiamento dei Consoli, Note del Nuovo Console Generale italiano
A Gerusalemme Orazio Pedrazzi. ‘il Levante mediterraneo e l’Italia’, ‘Custodia e Italia’,
1927. For the Italian linguistic and cultural agenda during the Ottoman period, cf. Pier-
accini Paolo, “Schiaparelli e i Francescani. Fondazione e primi passi dell’Associazione
Nazionale per Soccorrere i Missionari Italiani (1886–1905),” Studi Francescani, vol 112, pp.
71–137.
37 amae, e312-1, R. de Caix to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 1920. From 1926, her
specific prerogative was restricted to the “reception of the liturgical honours” by French
representatives when entering Catholic churches.
38 In a letter to theMinister of ForeignAffairs, Robert deCaix, collaborator of theCivil French
High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon and primarily responsible for the development
of French policy in the Levant, stated that “[i]t is in the preservation of religious insti-
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French Catholic schools acted as a ‘spearhead’ for French linguistic and cul-
tural policy in theHoly Land.39 The Frenchmissionarieswere indeed perceived
as French ‘agents’ by the British authorities.40 Both schools appeared as French
places and spaces that were marked symbolically by flags, personnel, hymns,
and cultural references in the classrooms. The presence of French pilgrims (“a
pre 1789 French Revolution taste of France”) and the fanfare of Sainte Anne’s
school band playing French republican and Catholic hymns was supported by
the alumni and members of religious associations wearing banners written in
French and Arabic.41
Linguistic Challenges of a Diverse Community: Catholic Schools as
Spaces of Encounter?
In his study of the construction of a Palestinian identity, Khalidi showed that in
Palestine a (single) language did not always correspond to a (single) religious
community, and he highlighted their overlapping identities.42 The linguistic
landscape of Jerusalem was indeed characterized, at the end of the Ottoman
period, by a coexistence of Turkish (the official language of the empire, which
was spoken by relatively few outside what is now Turkey),43 Arabic (the lan-
guage of the majority and the language of instruction in Ottoman schools),
Yiddish, Hebrew, Greek, Armenian (languages of ethnic minorities), and lan-
guages of the colonial powers such as French, English, and German (dominant
languages in terms of social prestige, but minority languages in terms of the
number of speakers).
tutions and the French character of their teaching that we must focus our efforts. This
is what constitutes our residual influence in the Holy Land.” Robert de Caix to the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, La position de la France en Palestine, 28 Oct. 1920, amae, 312-1,
nº404.
39 amae, e 312-1, nº90, Rapport du vice-amiral de Bon, 14/09/1920; amae,Nantes, b, 200, nº84,
Consul of Jerusalem, Rais, to Aristide Briand, mae, 15 June 1921; amae, e 312-32, nº10, 2 July
1928.
40 pro, wo, 106/189, gs1, Advanced French Propaganda in Jerusalem.
41 coca, lpa, and sasa photographic archives.
42 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity.
43 In 1910: 3,560 Roman Catholics, 12,000 Muslims, 5,900 Greek Catholics, 1,600 Protestants.
In 1922, the Catholics represented 25 percent of the Jerusalem-Jaffa area population,
while the Melkites constituted 40 percent of the population of the northern district;
Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late
Ottoman Period and the Mandate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). lpa, 1.1 b,
lb, Melkites, 1936: in the Jerusalem area: 29,679 Latins, 21,800 Melkites, 360 Armenians,
350 siro puro (Syriac Catholic Church), a total of 52,389 Catholics.
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The Catholic community characterized itself by its multilingualism, which
highlights its shifting motivations, its communal self-understandings, and the
complexity and elasticity of its linguistic identities. The community indeed
used French and Italian as languages of instruction, while Arabic remained the
main language of daily communication until the end of the 1920s.
Significantly,HaiducDale places the self-identificationof theChristian com-
munities in the wider historical context of the organization of communal
groups in British Palestine. He points out that later in the 1930s Christian intel-
lectuals, mostly writers, started to qualify Christians with the term ‘minority,’
as a protest to themandate administration, though they had stressed years ear-
lier that they could not be classified asminorities because they were Arabs first
and thus members of the majority population.
The Latin andMelkite (GreekCatholic) communities constituted themajor-
ity of theCatholic community of Jerusalem (and to a larger extent, of Palestine).
According to the British Mandate censuses of 1922 and 1931, and the numbers
that appear in the local archives,44 the Latin community was the most numer-
ous in Palestine (a small Melkite community was present in Jerusalem, most
of the Melkites resided in Galilee). The Catholic community included only
a few Chaldeans, Maronites (14 percent of the Christian population in 1931,
more importantly, were primarily located in Galilee) and Armenians45 (from
ten in 1910 to 500 in 1945, most of them arrived after 1915; they emphasized
the Armenian language, the majority of them attended Armenian Orthodox
schools, while some attended French Catholic schools). The Melkite commu-
nity boasted that it was the only Christian community in Palestine that was
completely Arab, both laypeople and the clergy; they but recurrently com-
plained that they lacked educational institutions of their own.
As far as private schools were concerned, French Catholic schools were the
most numerous; they represented between 75 and 85 percent of the Catholic
schools’ enrollment during the British Mandate period and more than 60 per-
cent of the private schools enrollment. The French Catholic institutions
enrolled the majority of the Christians from Jerusalem until the mid 1920s
and they played an essential diplomatic role in the dissemination both of the
French language and Catholicism. Inside the schools, the journals of the edu-
cational community reveal several references to communal discussions about
the issue of Arabness and local catholicity; the French Catholic brothers also
44 coca, lpa, and sasa.
45 The first vicar arrived in Jerusalem in 1885, when the residence and the church were built
(they have been present at the 4th station of the Via Dolorosa since 1856).
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aimed to educate their pupils in a way that would infuse them with a strong
communal identity. Over time, more indigenous teachers (of Arabic but also
the sciences) were recruited (not more than 30 percent of the personnel until
the beginning of the 1940s).
The number of Catholic schools was disproportionate to the percentage
of the population that was Catholic,46 and these schools played a key role in
raising the educational level of the inhabitants of the Old City. The Collège
des Frères, like the one in Jaffa and Caiffa, continued to expand its activities
under the British Mandate. We consider these two French Catholic schools
as “spaces of encounter” between Christians, Muslims, and Jews and refer
to H. Lefebvre’s47 concept of “space of representation”; according to him the
notions of “space of everyday experience” and “spatial practices” appear as
central to the functioning of the public sphere, this in contrast to “conceived
space.” These two schools can be seen as spaces of encounter and spaces
dedicated to maintaining the Catholic identity of their pupils.
The Vatican archives reveal the role of theHoly See in the Catholic influence
in the Jerusalempublic sphere. According to the Vatican, from the beginning of
the 1920s, they aimed to establish a ‘shared space’ between Latin Catholicism
and the Oriental Catholic communities and the Muslims.48
The Collège des Frères of the New Gate welcomed Christian, Muslim, and
a few Jewish pupils (according to the attendance lists, sefaradim represented
from 6 to 9 percent of the total school population).49 We envisage it as an
intermediate space between that devoted to the educational arena and that of
the brothers’ private communal space, where language choices and language
use were discussed,50 where it became clear which languages they preferred,
they should use, or they simply used.
Sainte Anne’s school welcomed Catholic priests and teachers who devoted
their time to oriental Catholicism; some of them eventually converted to Greek
Catholicism. They discussed the language of the rituals though they functioned
under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Latin Patriarchate and the temporal
46 pro, bb, ed, 38 French Catholic private schools in 1931; 21 British private schools.
47 AndyMerrifield,Henri Lefbvre: ACritical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 109 (and
chapter 6 on space).
48 coca, Melikiti, 2030, Haggear, Ponenza personale. The Bishop evokes the confidence of
the Muslims in the Holy See equity and its protection in Palestine.
49 acj, Rapports, 1928–1933.
50 The order of White Fathers was created by the French Cardinal de Lavigerie in Algeria in
1868, some of them specialized in the study of Islam and oriental Catholicism.
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civil authority of the French consul.51 The domain of Sainte Anne was French
territory where a part of the Nabi Musa procession passes. It faced the eastern
entrance to the esplanade of the Dome of the Rock, and played a role in
the Palm Sunday procession. When French communal space competed for
public space, the procession came from the Mount of Olives to the Church of
Sainte Anne, thus reflecting the importance of the linguistic appropriation and
promotion: French flags, hymns, pupils associations along with Arab Catholic
associations.
During the interwar period, the French consulate set its sights on the grow-
ing Jewish population, while at the same time it tried to exert more influence
on Catholic school life. The French consulate and the schools, each at their
own level, focused on the preservation of the French language. They sought to
accomplish this goal by employing a large proportion of French-speaking stu-
dents in good posts in the administration. They also noted that Jewish and the
Muslim pupils were less numerous at the beginning of the 1930s.
Catholics and the Palestinian Nation
Catholics and the “Modernization”/“Neutralism” of the British
Government Displayed through the English Language
The language question in the public/private educational space of Jerusalem
can be read as a question of language power, power to bring the inhabitants
together or to divide them. The archives of the Catholic schools and the for-
eign consulates reveal a real consciousness of the power of language on the
Jerusalem educational and communal scene. The city embodied the linguis-
tic battle between France and Great Britain; it was a situation that poses the
question of the linguistic policy of the British Mandate in Palestine. There
was no official linguistic policy, but language planning in the public space
can be discerned from the official British discourses on the three communi-
ties.
Palestine government officials, through the organization of the governmen-
tal school system, argued that a unified school system was undesirable. The
desire of the Palestine government to put an end to the Catholic privileges is a
51 During the reception of Cardinal Dubois and the High Commissioner of Beyrouth, the
French role towards the Catholics was reaffirmed. The Congrès français de Syrie was
established in 1919 to investigate the French interests in the Levant. In its correspondence
with the Holy See, the Melkite hierarchy expressed itself in French only, having been
trained in French mostly at Sainte Anne, until World War i.
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recurrent theme not only in the schools, but also in the archives of theminister
of education, H. Bowman.52 TheMandate authorities took direct control of the
former Ottoman public schools and nominal control over a plethora of private
schools (including those of the Zionist organization).53
British administrators claimed that the educational separation of commu-
nities along linguistic lines was a pedagogic necessity, a declaration that was
well received by Palestinian and Zionist nationalist camps.54 Such a policy con-
tributed to the fragmentation of the public space into Jewish and Arab sectors,
each with its own ‘native’ language.55 From the official start of the BritishMan-
date in Palestine, the British foresaw their role as the “sacred task of civiliza-
tion,”56 which implied a change in language planning and the establishment
of an official division of the population into two linguistic groups, an Arabic-
speaking group and a Hebrew-speaking group. The formal British Mandate on
Palestine was ratified by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922.57 Articles 15
and 16 enjoined the Mandate to ensure the rights of the religious communi-
ties to maintain schools for the education of their own members. Article 22 of
the Mandate recognized English, Arabic, and Hebrew as official languages,58
and one year after the Mandate was granted to Britain in Palestine in 1923,
52 coca, 438, Ingenerenza del Governo inglese nelle scuole cattoliche.
53 Arab governmental schools: 171 in Palestine in 1920 to 403 in 1940; 550 Muslim and
Christian private schools.
54 Suzanne Schneider, “Monolingualism and Education in Mandate Palestine,” Jerusalem
Quarterly 52 (Winter 2013), 68.
55 The British classified Hebrew as a ‘mother tongue’ in their 1922 census, though, according
to Schneider (74, note 3), Hebrew could hardly be classified as anyone’s native or mother
tongue on the eve of World War i; McCarthy, The Population of Palestine, 82 (inhabitants
by mother tongue). Interestingly, schools in Yiddish never gained recognition as public
entities “on the ground of that Hebrew was the true native tongue of the Jews,” Schneider,
“Monolingualism and Education in Mandate Palestine,” 71 n. 12. Laura Robson makes the
claim that the Mandate authorities made no accommodation for a non-sectarian public
space.
56 Laurens, La question de Palestine.
57 pro, bb, class bMandate—in contrast to class aMandate, the bMandatewas not destined
for independence; Wolf, “British and French Languages.”
58 Article 15 guaranteed “the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the
education of its own members in its own language while conforming to such educa-
tional requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose.” However, the
Catholic schools were not recognized as public entities by the British Government, rather
they were considered part of the Arab school system. The Education Ordinance, promul-
gated in 1933, recognized this double educational reality (part 1).
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French, which had previously had the status of a semi-official language, was no
longer recognized as the language of examination for all primary, secondary,
and professional schools in Palestine.59 The Education Department (created
in 1922 by the government of Palestine to develop primary education, and sec-
ondary, urban, and rural teacher training), although favorable to the religious
communities’ institutions, separated language from religion in its first piece
of legislation and left each community responsible for the teaching of its own
religion.
At the beginning of the Mandate, the British administration took little note
of education. As the memoirs of the high commissioner Herbert Samuel illus-
trate, the British-sponsored schools lagged far behind the French schools. At
the same time, inside the schools and the entire Mandate administrative,
executive, and judiciary spaces, the personnel faced the institutionalization
of English. From the archives of the British and the schools, the British edu-
cational and linguistic agenda appears as the propagation of an alternative
language culturemodel, the language ideology of theMandate, as for any colo-
nial power, was to reinforce the power structure,mainly through governmental
administration, education, andmass communication.60 Butmore importantly,
the Mandate administration seemed to have thought that ‘modernization’ was
inherent in English and synonymous with economic modernity.61
TheMandate government was animated by practical considerations: for the
government, reading in English was not a cultural exploration but a prepa-
ration for entry into life. The Bowman archives reveal that for director of
the department of education (1920–1936), another language culture beyond
the local vernaculars was perceived as a potential political threat. Humphrey
Bowman promoted a doctrine of education along a ‘native language line’ and
wanted to avoid literary education because the linkage of English to the edu-
cation policy was perceived as a failure,62 as the context of English colonial
education policy was largely based on the British experience in India. In this
respect, Bowman discouraged private and missionary school alternatives—
above all he was virulent against the Catholic schools, which were the most
numerous not only in Jerusalem but also in the major cities of Palestine—he
saw them as institutions of “low calibre.”
59 amae, e 312-32, 26 April 1924.
60 Andrea Stanton, This is Jerusalem Calling: State Radio in Mandate Palestine (Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2013).
61 meca, Humphrey Bowman archives (Director of Education, Mandate Palestine, 1920–
1936), private diary.
62 In 1931, for example, only one in a thousand boys completed secondary education.
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At the beginning of his work at the directorate, Humphrey Bowman pro-
posed a state-sponsored binational version of English public schools (Arab
children could not be expected to speak Hebrew nor Jewish children to speak
Arabic):
the onlyway inwhichwe can hope to get Jew andArab [to] work together
is to get the children to work and play together and that can be only
achieved by having them sit cheek by jowl in the classroom and living in
the same school house. As long as the Palestinian Government is carrying
out the policy of His Majesty’s Government, it is absolutely essential
that every effort should be made to get two Semitic divisions to work
together … The language of Arabs is Arabic; the language of the Jews
is Hebrew. Both races attach very great importance to the education in
elementary schools through their own language. Itwouldbe impossible in
my opinion to have Arabs and Jews in one school as long as the language
difficulty exists and I see no possibility of that language difficulty being
solved.63
In this context, theFrenchCatholic schools faceda large-scale linguistic change
at the beginning of the 1920s: the institutionalization of English and Arabic.
But despite the Palestine government pressures, the French Catholic schools
did not turn into bilingual (English–Arabic) educational institutions. They
continued to value multilingualism.
Language Usage in Catholic Schools
From the beginning of the 1920s onwards the high commissioner stressed
the importance of developing linguistic facility among the employees. There-
fore, though the discussions in the French Catholic schools were not about
the potential ‘anglicization’ of their curriculum, they proposed a progressive
increase in hours of English instruction.
63 Testimony of H. Bowman, Director of Education, 27 Nov. 1936, in the Palestine Royal
Commission Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions (London: His Majesty’s Sta-
tionery Office, 1937), cited in Schneider, “Monolingualism and Education in Mandate
Palestine,” 72. The author stresses the monolingual agenda of the department of educa-
tion of Palestine. It is only the Palestine Royal Commission that praised the work of a
small number of private ‘mixed’ schools and their form of education as playing a role
in bringing the communities together; the government of Palestine never supported this
idea.
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The demand for education among the Arab Palestinian population con-
tinued to draw pupils to the missionary schools, as the government schools
could not offer Palestinian society the opportunities it needed.64 They faced
a structural problem throughout the period of British Mandatory rule in Pales-
tine, whose budget focused on the problems of defense and counterinsurgen-
cies. Fewer Catholic pupils were enrolled in governmental schools than in
other Christian communities (and among them,most of theMelkites attended
Catholics schools in the urban areas65), perhaps because the Latin Patriar-
chate made several declarations against the so-called ‘secular governmental
education.’66 The birth of an urbanmiddle class contributed to the demand for
education and emancipation.67 Until the mid-1930s, a good education was still
based on language education, and foreign languages were still a benchmark, a
key factor in obtaining a good social position in Palestinian society. Frenchwas
essential in education until themid-1920s because, according to themissionar-
ies, the French government, and the Palestinian elite, it mirrored the “universal
values of rationalism and the clarity of expression.”68 That is why enrollment
in the French Catholic schools remained stable during the interwar period.
The Catholic school directors questioned the desirability of French and
English in their curriculum. Arabic instruction began at the 4th grade, and
came to occupy the same number of hours (8 to 12 hours weekly) as French
(though some students did not achieve full competence in their native Ara-
bic), followed by English (between 6 and 8 hours a week during the 1930s). In
these French Catholic schools, the English language was not used as the pri-
mary language in education, in contrast to Terra Santa College (founded in 1926
under the auspices of the Franciscan Custodia di Terra Santa, the second ‘sec-
ondary’ school), and the last grade of the Collège des Frères, which competed
with theArabCollege, a unique secondary governmental school.69 To the ‘more
64 Humphrey Bowman,Middle EastWindow (London: Longmans, Green andCo., 1942), 250–
254; pro, bb, de, annual reports.
65 Most of the Melkite schools were situated in Galilee, and the majority of them were rural
boys’ schools, whose level was fiercely criticized by the White Fathers of Sainte Anne
Seminar in Jerusalem. In the Galilee cities, Latin schools enrolled the majority of the
Melkite students, assa, Annual reports.
66 lpa, reactions to the education ordinance.
67 In 1935, 1 percent of rural girls enrolled, and 40 percent of urban girls.
68 Reem Bassiouney, Arabic Sociolinguistics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009),
212.
69 Paolo Pieraccini, Un universita cattolica a Gerusalemme? L’opera cardinal Ferrari e il colle-
gio francescano di Terra Santa, Rivista Antonianum, 81/1 (2006), 135–161.
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and better English’ promoted by the Mandate government, the French schools
answer was “less and better French.” This meant that schools had to manage
heterogeneous groups of pupils in language teaching; we see evidence of this
in the inspectors’ reports. British and Irish Brothers of the Christian schools
(Baptiste de la Salle) were sent to Jerusalem to teach English. In June 1930,
the director of the Collège des Frères was proud that Keith Roach, then gov-
ernor of Jerusalem, praised the English teaching level in the school.70 English
and Arabic, crucial for earning a diploma under the British Mandate, became
for the French schools a way of preserving French education and of ensuring
that their students found a suitable place in the Palestinian job market. Along
with this official language use policy, social activities took place in colloquial
Arabic, less curbed during the 1920s than during the Ottoman period of ‘fran-
cization.’
Interestingly, French ‘national’ exams proposed in Catholic schools and in
the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (aiu) brought together Jew-
ish teachers of the aiu and the Catholic missionary school teachers, under the
umbrella of the French consulate.71 The archives reveal one attempt to imple-
ment a Hebrew course at the Jerusalem Collège des Frères, in 1934, but the
initiative was aborted with the beginning of the Great Arab revolt against the
British (summer 1936–1939).72 During the period of political turmoil, the Jewish
pupils left these schools.73
Discussions took place about what was called in French ‘l’arabisation des
programmes’ (the arabization process).74 Both schools agreed on the increase
of Arabic, progressively insured by professional language Arabic teachers. In
Sainte Anne, the discussion also touched on the use of and the teaching of
Greek (in the Melkite liturgy and in the curriculum) but the White Fathers
70 acj, Rapports, 1928–1933.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. This was also a result of the position of the Catholic Church towards Zionism.
According to a discussion between Weizman and the Secretary of State Gasparri and
recorded in the Vatican archives, the Catholic Church believed that Jews could return
to Palestine and settle there, but must not act against the interests of other groups.
The Holy See negated Zionism as the restoration of the Jewish Gospel revelation and
condemned the Zionist ‘boldness’ that was responsible for the 1928–1929 and 1936–1939
clashes between the communities.
74 For Daphne Tsimhoni, arabization started only afterWorldWar ii; Christian Communities
in Jerusalem and the West Bank since 1948: An Historical, Social, and Political Study (West-
port, ct: Praeger, 1996).
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opted for the reinforcement of Arabic. They followed on this topic the Melkite
Patriarch who underlined the importance of Arabic.75
Although we do not refer in this chapter to girls’ educational space in Jeru-
salem, it is interesting tomention the case of the girls’ Catholic schools because
it reveals an interesting interplay between political and educational power of
the linguistic agendas of the schools. While like other private girls’ schools
under theMandate, Catholic schools intended to educate future goodmothers
and wives by offering an increase in value on the ‘marriage market’ (as pointed
out by Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah in this volume for the case of Iraq); they also
considered languages as fundamental in the identity-building process of young
girls. The archives of the German Schmidt’s Girls College in Jerusalem, for
example, reveal how this German institution used English to promote German
and Catholic values to its mixed Christian and Muslim pupil population.76
The study of the reactions of the Catholic teachers and pupils at the girls
Catholic schools in the public sphere help us to identify the evolution of a
common ground: progressively, the Christian girls are perceived to be more
free and venture more easily into public spaces than their Muslim peers (the
British officials justified the spatial gender segregation as a way of maintaining
“harim conditions.”)77 Catholic girls’ schools also reflected the same tensions in
Catholic communities, and struggles for loyalty between France and the Holy
See. On one hand Christian girls were separated fromMuslim girls (concretely,
they did not sit on the same benches). On the other hand, the Rosary Sisters
that emerged from the order of the French Sisters of Saint Joseph reflected the
75 The few letters of the Melkite Bishop and Archbishop expressing opposition to Sainte
Anne evoke this tension around the need to teach in Arabic and consider the semi-
nar school as a ‘state’ apart (‘un Etat dans l’Etat’); Mougabgab, le 13 Dec. 1928 to Sin-
cero.
76 The German cultural and linguistic case is better known in regard to the Ottoman period.
In 1885, the Palästina Verein merged with another association and in 1895 became the
Deutschen Verein vom Heiligen Land (Order of Saint Vincent). During the Mandate
period, the Germans established the second training center for girls after the British
administration, almost 100 students, became teachers themselves or got involved at
another level, in the educational development of Palestine. The curriculum was pro-
posed in English (German was only a subject). jssa, Private archives, Schmidts College
Jerusalem; for the Ottoman period, Haim Goren, “Echt katholisch und gut deutsch”—Die
deutschen Katholiken und Palästina, 1838–1910 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2009).
77 Bowman, Middle East Windows, 260. On segregation in the Sisters of St. Joseph schools in
Palestine, assj (diaries) and coca, 451. Ela Greenberg, “Invading Spaces: Challenging the
Private-Public Dichotomy in Girls’ Education in Mandate Palestine,”Hawwa 10, nos. 1–2
(2012), 59.
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desire of indigenous Catholic nuns to offer an education to Palestinian girls
(and in this sense, also preserve the Catholics).
Arabic, Palestinian Nationalism and the Catholic Communities
At the end of the Ottoman period and during the interwar period, French
was presented as a language of coexistence78 by several French and indige-
nous Latin Catholic elites who supported the promotion of an official ‘coexis-
tence between communities’ in the French boys’ schools and girls’ schools.79
The French missionary schools attempted to find a middle ground between
the objectives of the French authorities and the educational and linguistic
objectives of Catholic authorities, in order to promote a modus vivendi within
the schools. Several Greek Catholic (Melkite) parents criticized this neutral
position, as they were more deeply engaged in the Palestinian national move-
ment.80
Thepolitical context ofMandate Palestine exposed teachers and their pupils
to a very public sphere of activism, though most French missionaries avoided
talking about ‘national feelings.’ Politics crept into these two schools, at a
time in which British officials believed very few Catholic were active in the
Palestinian national movement. The schools did not provide meeting spaces
as such to parents and political activity was officially banned, but discussions
between parents, pupils, and alumni took place in and outside the schools,
more generally in an informal way. The Melkite leaders took a clearer position
than the Latin Patriarchate towards Arab nationalism, as the correspondence
between theMelkite Church and the Holy See about the ‘Palestine Fatherland’
makes clear.81 The Melkites clearly affirmed that they constituted an integral
78 Few archives among the Central Awqaf archives of Abu Dis mention the warning to
parents from the Muslim religious authorities and Jerusalem leaders to beware of the
missionary schools. Few cases of intimidation were reported by the directors of the
schools, Central Awqaf archives (Abu Dis), 13/25/2, 31/1/75.
79 amg, nh101, ‘Admission des dissidents dans nos écoles’, Frère Onésime, Visiteur, 1910.
The author of the letter evoked “fewer prejudices … pupils grateful to their masters
and their religion … segregation and separation cannot offer reconciliation.” The girls’
schools, providing education to future mothers, played a role in establishing and main-
taining ‘Christian homes,’ while they continued to enroll a large number of Muslim
pupils.
80 vssa, 108 po 103, 22 Dec. 1929, Apostolic Delegate to the Secretariat of State, Vatican,
reactionof BishopHaggear andvssa, 131 po 115, Palestina 1932–1936, Centro Internationale
per la protezione degli interessi cattolici Minaccia sionista (directors of Catholic schools
in the committee).
81 lpa, Correspondance with the Oriental Congregation, 01/1933, ‘communion avec le prêtre
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part of the national movement and criticized firmly the ‘neutrality’ of the
European consuls and missionaries. After the increase in tentions between
Arabs and Jews that took place in 1928–1929, they moved towards a common
ground ‘imposed’ by the political circumstances in their correspondence with
the Holy See:
Our people are Palestinians and they are summoned by Muslims to walk
with or against them: neutrality is not allowed. [They] would expose
themselves to the greatest dangers if they would not go hand in hand
alongside with the Muslims. They are, in fact, a small minority scattered
among a largemajority of boiling fanaticism. I stand in good relationwith
Muslims to protect my people.82
The French schools’ linguistic policy mirrored the interplay of the European
powers, which was even stronger after the opening of the ymca (Young Men’s
ChristianAssociation)83 inMay 1933. An analysis of their pedagogicalmaterials
shows that a progressively important place was given to local heritage and
the figure of the Palestinian Christians.84 Some Catholic school magazines
emphasized identity as being based on religion, the Arabic language, and local
history, and argued that students were able to study French culture orWestern
culture without losing their identity.85
Both actors, French and British, imported a language system, and their
national languages were appropriated and rejected to different degrees by the
Catholic communities. Thus it seems as inadequate to describe Arabic as ‘the’
language of nationalism, as it is to describe French as simply the language of
the protector of the Catholics.
en arabe … le rite représente l’expression pure et élevée de son idéal national … il
s’attache à son rite comme il s’attache à sa patrie’ (interview with a Catholic Belgian
newspaper).
82 coca, Melikiti, 2030, Haggear, Ponenza personale, Letter of Haggear to Sincero (cardinal,
Propaganda Fide, 13 Dec. 1929—in French in the original letter), “Nos fidèles sont des
palestiniens et ils sont sommés par les musulmans de marcher avec ou contre eux: la
neutralité n’est pas admise. Or nos fidèles s’exposeraient au plus grands dangers s’ ils
n’allaient pas main dans la main aux côtés des Musulmans. Ils constituent, en effet, une
faible minorité éparse au milieu d’une grande majorité bouillante de fanatisme. Je me
tiens en bon rapport avec les musulmans afin de protéger mes fidèles.”
83 amae, Nantes, b, 188 and 200, 18a.
84 acj, French language books.
85 acts, Magazine of the Terra Sancta (Franciscan) College, 1924–1929.
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Both schools, through their relations with the various ecclesiastical insti-
tutions to which they had to pay allegiance (the Vatican, Latin and Melkite
Patriarchates) were instructed not to interfere with temporal powers. The Holy
See insisted from the early 1920s that missionaries should remain neutral and
should not be “agents of colonial powers”; it emphasized the incompatibil-
ity between the roles of language and faith missionaries.86 On a number of
occasions the Vatican and the Latin Patriarchate insisted that themissionaries’
duties not interfere with the temporal powers, and they stated that missionar-
ies should not be “agents of colonial powers,” and reproached them for seem-
ing “more concerned about the interests of their country than the salvation of
souls.”87
Protecting the Catholics?
Catholic Communities, the ‘Most French Oriental Land’ and the
‘Language of Protestantism’
While the doctrine of papal supremacy and the hierarchical organization of
the Catholic communitymight convey an impression of uniformity in Catholic
communal responses, in comparison to themultiple responses of the Anglican
and protestant communities;88 in fact, Catholic actors displayed diversity at
different levels (Rome, French consulate, Latin and Melkite Patriarchates).
The terms of the debate over the functions of English, Arabic, and French
tended to be formulated between an international language, a humanistic and
‘civilization’ language, and the language of God.
French Catholic schools had a monopoly when it came to representing
France because other linguistic and cultural institutions (Cultural Centre, Mis-
sion Laique, Alliance Française89) had not succeeded in establishing them-
selves in Palestine. French schools gradually opened their doors to enroll chil-
dren from the Muslim, and to a lesser extent Jewish, elite. These institutions
(primary, secondary, and vocational education) continued to be used as a plat-
86 amg, Maximum Illud, 30 Nov. 1919, Acta Apostolicae, sedis xi, 440. Nationalism is assimi-
lated to heresia, December 1922, Pie xi, Ubi Arcano Die Consilio.
87 lpa, Circulaire du Patriarche Barlassina, 2 Oct. 1920.
88 Roland Loeffler, Protestanten in Palästina. Religionspolitik, Sozialer Protestantismus und
Mission in den deutschen evangelischen und anglikanischen Institutionen des Heiligen Lan-
des 1917–1939 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 2008).
89 Alliance française (“French Alliance,” founded in 1883) or the Mission Laique française
(“French Lay Mission,” founded in 1902).
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form for French cultural influence and to sponsor Catholic protection, while
also providing an alternative to British linguistic and educational initiatives.
Significantly, the arrival of the Crusaders in Jerusalem and the ‘prise de la
Bastille’ by the people of Paris were celebrated every summer on the 14th of July
in the French schools. For this reason, the French consulate supported them
financially and diplomatically (with annual subsidies, examinations presided
over by a panel of French adjudicators, diplomas equivalent to French ones,
and negotiations with the Ottoman authorities to obtain their authorization
for the teaching and building permits for schools).90
Despite heralding the end of the French Catholic protectorate, the early
1920sweremarkedby symbolic links between the government and theCatholic
religion in France (the canonization of Joan of Arc on 16May 1920, the comple-
tion and consecration of the Basilica of the Sacred Heart in Paris), but also in
theEast (the visit of CardinalDubois to the Levant in 1920was seen as an appro-
priation of the French Levant).91
At the beginning of the 1920s the Vatican and the Latin Patriarchate of
Jerusalem condemned the French nationalist attitude towards the Catholic
schools, but not the teaching of French.92 For the Holy See, this teaching of
French along with Arabic, was also, if not mainly intended to resist to ‘the
language of Protestantism.’
The promotion of the catechism (both text books and religious education)
in Arabic was part of a bigger project directed by the French ecclesiastic Abbé
Guervin from Amiens and approved by the popes Benedict xv and Pius xi
to attempt to preserve the Catholics (via schools, cultural associations, and
international organizations).93 At the end of the 1920s the Catholic authorities
(both local and in Rome)94 required that the French schools implement their
90 amae, Nantes, b, 200, 16 Jan. 1918 and amae, e 312-1, nº83, A. Guerin to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, 16 Oct. 1920.
91 Dominique Trimbur, “Une appropriation française du Levant—La mission du cardinal
Dubois en Orient,” in Patrick Cabanel (ed.), Une France en Méditerrannée—Ecoles langue
et culture française, xixe–xxe siècles (Paris: Creaphis, 2006), 109–128.
92 coca, 465 I Fratelli delle scuole cristiane; 465 I Fratelli delle scuole cristiane, 1671/24 a Sua.
Em. Rev.ma Card Camillo Laurenti, Prefetto della s. Congregazione dei Religiosi.
93 vssa, 33, po. 49, Palestina, 1923–1936, Opera della Preservazione della Fede in Palestina e
scuole cattoliche and sco, 481, Opera della preservazione della Fede in Palestina.
94 The Latin Patriarchate, jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church in theMiddle East was
restored on 23 July 1847 (between the period of 1291, after the last Crusaders left the Holy
Land, and 1847, the Franciscans were the curators of the Christian Holy places and the
legal representatives of the Latin Catholic authorities).
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curricula and develop Arabic teaching rapidly, in order to counter Protestant
educational initiatives (in which Arabic played an important role).95 The Latin
Patriarchate invited the French institutions to improve their teaching of reli-
gion in the Arabic language, and invited the missionaries to provide catechism
classes only in Arabic.96
To promote the international dimension of Catholicism, the Latin Patriar-
chate and the Vatican supported the creation of the Confrérie du Très Saint
Enfant in Bethlehem in 1909, which after only one year became the Archicon-
frérie du Très Saint Enfant. Several months after its establishment, this inter-
national Catholic association, created by the French Brothers from Christian
schools and devoted to the promotion of Catholic values in education, was
already recruiting its members from more than 200 countries. Its journal,
L’Echo de Bethléem, was published in five languages before the beginning of
World War i.97
Arabic, the Language of the “Local Catholics”?
Did the Catholic community view Arabic as a national language and commit
to it as such? The newspaper of Bethlehem, Sawt al-shaʿb (‘the voice of the peo-
ple’), establishedby Issa al-Bandak,98was distributed in and aroundBethlehem
and Jerusalem and to the families of the pupils of these two schools. Differ-
ent articles reveal one aspect of the Catholic answer to the Palestinian Arab
orthodox community claim to be the only ‘indigenous’ Catholics, emphasiz-
ing its ‘Arabness.’ These articles bring elements on the Catholic movement to
assert the rights of the indigenous Catholics in the face of European educa-
tional missionary orders, and to promote Arabic and ‘national’ rights. Several
95 coca, 466 i Protestanti in Palestina; 504 scuole media di lingua inglese in Palestina (to
thwart the Bristish influence); 463 L’ospizio de Tantur, desire to fight against the influence
of the ymca and attract the Catholic youth, but also the other Christians and Muslim
youth. lpa,Circulaire duPatriarche Barlassina, 02Oct. 1920; lpa, General correspondence,
1918–1924, correspondence after the Education Ordinance and the erection of the ymca,
1933.
96 amg, gb351, 1932; amae, Nantes, sofe, nº362, 13 Dec. 1941.
97 Karène Sanchez, L’Archiconfrérie duTrès SaintEnfantdePalestineottomaneetmandataire-
Soutiens spirituels internationaux et locaux à la ‘croisade pour l’ éducation religieuse de
l’ enfance et la jeunesse’ (Paris: Karthala, forthcoming).
98 coca, Latini, Propaganda Fide, 417, Sawt el Chab nº 144, 19 Feb. 1925 (in Arabic) ascaes,
ss (Archivio della Sacra Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici straordinari Segretario di
Stato), Latini e missionari locali chiedono un Patraiarca arabo.
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editions of this newspaper from 1923 to 1925 qualify the Catholics of Palestine
as “members of the Palestinian nation, having the same language, traditions,
uses (‘coutumes’) as the Muslim.”99
The newspaper also evokes a ‘Comité de défense national catholique’: the
title indicates a possible equation between a communal and a national identi-
fication, though we cannot envisage to what extent it represented the Catholic
community in all its different components. This committee was presented as
acting for the promotion of an indigenous clergy and an Arabic Palestinian
patriarchate, to preserve the indigenous interests of the Catholics against the
European clergy and to emphasize the use of Arabic “common to Christians
and Muslim.”100
In their publication, the members of this committee underlined the danger
of foreign institutions in Palestine. The correspondence between the Holy See
and the Latin Patriarchate on this matter gives us an account of the contro-
versy among indigenous Catholics about European education and European
Catholic missionaries, and the feeling of ‘annihilation of their rights’ this Euro-
pean Catholic presence represented. They denounced the “national and patri-
otic fanaticismof someCardinals” and clearly decried the influence ofmission-
ary schools and their negative consequences in terms of the identity building
process.101 With regard to the use of Arabic in Catholic schools, some ele-
ments referred to Khalil Sakakini’s argument after the opening of the national
school Dusturiyya (the ‘constitutional school’ renamed Wataniyya during the
Mandate—a school that used Arabic as the primary language of instruction)
in 1909, in which he advocated a largely secular curriculum.102
This went along with the creation of the first indigenous educational mis-
sionary order, the Rosary sisters. These were Palestinian nuns who originally
belonged to the French Catholic order of the Sisters of Saint Joseph and were
well established in the Ottoman territories and later Mandate Palestine. The
order of the Rosary sisters spread after 1920, and focused on the importance of
an indigenous education given mainly in Arabic. During the Mandate period,
the foundation and thedevelopment of the schools around theArabic language
99 coca, 417, Movimento di xenofobismo contro il clero straniero; nº2080, 1927, article
Shoura, Caire, nº153, 27 Oct. 1927 E fino a quando, nº 150, 6 Oct. 1927, Cose latine.
100 coca, Latini, Propaganda Fide, 417, Sawt el Chab, 2 Aug. 1923, Il risorgimento religioso del
populo arabo catolico in Palestina.
101 But from 1924 these sensitive discussions ceased to appear, most probably stifled by the
Latin Patriarchate.
102 Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine, 29–32.
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was praised both by the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate.103 There was not
an equivalent for boys.
The Vatican’s interest in Arabic as the language of the indigenous Catholics
was already present before the beginning of the British Mandate: Arabic had
an important position in the curriculum at the Pontifical Institute for Oriental
studies, created in 1917 to reinforce the links with the oriental congregations
(the expression referred the Greek Catholics who had been united with Rome
since 1724, but also referred to the Latin community, mainly converted from
Orthodox communities). From the early 1920s, the Holy See expressed the
desire to implant itself in the Palestinian landscape via linguistic choices. But
while supporting the Catholic community of Palestine and the underlying
necessity of addressing it in Arabic in order to address this community in
its mother language and to reinforce a common ground with their Muslim
fellows, the Holy See emphasized the international Catholic sphere and space,
thus detaching, in its declarations, the Catholics from theirMuslim Palestinian
fellows.104
Among the internal discussions in Sainte Anne (between theWhite Fathers
but also with the Melkite hierarchy), some elements underlined the linguistic
aspects: the Melkites were considered part of the larger Arabic world and Ara-
bic was needed to dispel Muslim and other Christian stereotypes of Melkites.
There was also a need to have a level of Arabic sufficient to engage in theolog-
ical and philosophical discussions, and that Arabic could be an aspect of the
common ground in the discussions with the Greek orthodox community.105
Though theHoly See actively supported the Rosary Sisters, it did not support
the Catholic National Committee (after 1927, it disappeared from the archives,
supposedly eliminated by both the Holy See and the Latin Patriarchate). The
variety of the correspondence in the archives leads us to believe that the lan-
guage choices of theCatholic communitywerenot necessarily just responses to
Zionism or efforts to use Islam to mobilize resistance against the British. Inter-
communal rivalries between Latin Catholics and Melkites also led to a more
nuanced yet unique communal reaction.
103 coca, 451, Le Suore del Santo Rosario a Gerusalemme, and R. Génier, La congrégation
des sœurs du Rosaire de Jérusalem (Paris: J. Gabalda et Compagnie, Paris Librairie Victor
Lecoffre, 1913).
104 coca, 426, Progetti di venire in aiuto dei catholici in Palestina; coca, 461, L’opera Cardinal
Ferrari, nº1310, Milan is financially supporting the new Catholic institution.
105 sasa, Motifs d’ insistance sur la langue arabe.
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Conclusion
From the mid 1930s onward, the British administration took on the task of
bringing the inhabitants of Palestine together via a linguistic program; the task
remained unrealized, and had clear consequences in the educational system
(the public as well as the private). The protection of the Catholics was an
official leitmotiv of French cultural and linguistic policy and thenof theVatican
in the Holy Land. Catholics from Palestine were trapped between different
policies that influenced linguistic ideologies and practises: the centralizing
Catholic interests of Romewhich for lay believers first favored French, but later
mostly Arabic; the national interests of Catholic European powers present in
the Holy Land that favored their own languages along with English from the
1930s onwards; and anArabmajority that favoredArabic over and above French
or other western languages.
Until the end of World War ii, Catholic schools remained instrumental in
shaping Palestinian identities, Christian and Muslim; the schools continued
to favor multilingual education, against the monolingual approach of British
actors. French remained part of the curriculum but as an inner-worldly (‘un
bien temporel’) rather than a spiritual (universalist Catholic) good, though
both Latin and Melkite Catholics praised Arabic as their national language.
French should be seen as one element of a complex linguistic andmulticultural
situation inwhich linguistic usage depended on context. French coexistedwith
other foreign languages: Italian, German, and at a later stage English and the
linguistic accommodation of the Catholics was a complex process, languages
being a symbol and a tool in Mandate Palestine.
Language education policy in Palestine included decisions about which lan-
guages were to be used as a medium of instruction and/or taught in schools,
and also included analysis, to some extent, of this policy within its social, eth-
nic, religious, political, cultural, and economic contexts. The repositioning in
Catholic communities towards the use of languages and the role of the Vatican
in fostering divisions/reconciliations in the Palestinian Catholic community
influenced the conceptualization of language as a tool, at the individual and
group level. French, Arabic, and English were perceived as symbolic resources
in this tiny community, as an instrument to counteract conflict. Further socio-
historical and linguistic study should be undertaken to investigate the issue of
the to which extent the Catholic community used a colloquial Arabic different
than that of the Muslim and the Yishuv communities.
The resulting ‘story’ proved to be fragmentary, not only because of its actors’
divisions, but also because of the shifting motivations and self-understandings
of the Catholic community. There are no unifying narratives that describe
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the behavior and beliefs of the Palestinian Catholic community with regard
to the linguistic challenges of the Mandate period and its translations into
the public space of Jerusalem, other than to say that local and international
actors influenced the way this community engaged with (and was perceived
by others). The experience of French missionaries and indigenous Catholics
as they relate to language use and perception in Palestine differed in spirit,
practice, and results.
The Catholic case illustrates and causes us to reassess the complexity of
the functional and symbolic roles of languages in the Middle East between
the two world wars. Further studies on the linguistic agenda of the Catholic
diaspora and its impact on the Jerusalem scene might reveal other aspects of
language use in social, political, and religious processes, of the role of language
in affirming or negating political agendas and self-identities in areas of conflict,
of the entanglement of language use in conflict situations inside Palestine
but also transnationally. A study of the Melkite and Latin responses to the
situation in Galilee to the Peel Commission report of 1937 (according to which
most Melkite areas would be ceded to the proposed Jewish state) would bring
another Catholic sub-narrative on the multifaceted common ground. Finally,
the new digitization of archives, like the photographic collection of the Ecole
biblique et archéologique of the Dominicans of Jerusalem that contains a vast
photographic collection of the Melkite seminar of Sainte Anne, might reveal
possible manifestations of common ground in the public spaces of Mandate
Jerusalem.
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chapter 6
Ottoman Damascus during the Tanzimat: The New
Visibility of Religious Distinctions
A. Massot
In the nineteenth century Damascus was characterized by inter-confessional
tensions that culminated in an attack, in 1860, against the Christian neighbor-
hood of the city; many Christians lost their lives or property. Relations between
religious groups in Damascus during the Tanzimat period were shaped both
by local events and, during this period of foreign intervention and military
defeats, by a variety of issues related to imperial sovereignty. This context led to
a dichotomous image of the Ottoman city and its population: on the one side
Christians were perceived to be allied with foreign powers—France, Russia,
and to a lesser extent England—andon the other,Muslimswere seen as loyal to
the Ottoman authorities. Christians were also at the center of the power strug-
gle between two authorities, the foreign consuls and the Ottoman governors,
and this contributed to a politicization of religious distinctions. This struggle
not only underlined conflicts over space and visibility but was also shaped by
them. In this paper I first explore the political and social context of the Tanzi-
mat and the ways in which public space was transformed into a tool for social
change. Second, I examine the relation between the consuls and the governors,
and address the issue of the struggle for sovereignty and its spatial dynamics.
Finally, I look at the case of conversions as one arena in which these dynamics
materialized.
Laying the Foundations of a New Order: The Tanzimat and
Visibility
The Context of the Tanzimat in Bilād al-Shām
In the first part of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed
a vast array of internal and external changes of an economic, societal, and
political nature. In terms of its foreign policy, the Sublime Porte suffered mil-
itary and diplomatic defeats by Russia in 1812, 1829, and during the Crimean
war (1853–1856). Simultaneously, it faced revolts and internal secession threats
from Greece (1821–1830), Serbia (1804–1817), and Walachia (1829), ultimately
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leading to the independence or autonomy of those regions. The sultan’s rule
over the Bilādal-Shāmwas challengedbyhis ownviceroy of Egypt,Muḥammad
ʿAlī, who conquered the region in 1831 and retained it until 1841. The various
revolts and secessions were in some degree supported by foreign powers. The
empire, conscious of its military weakness, embarked on a vast program of
reforms, which were limited, initially, to the military but soon spread to the
societal and political fields. One of the consequences of these changes was a
reshuffling of existing social and political hierarchies.
In order to finance these costly reforms, the empire took loans from Euro-
pean countries and was forced to allow for a greater intervention of foreign
representatives in its own affairs. New capitulations were signed and foreign
ambassadors and consuls were given greater influence in political matters. The
enactment of the reforms relied on internal cash flows through new forms of
taxation and mandatory military conscription. These changes met with rebel-
lion by various groups in Syria, especially by the Maronites and Druzes in
Mount Lebanon1 and in the Hawran.2 One of the main concerns of the reform-
erswas the promotion of loyalty to the empire in this context of internal threats
and secessions. Inter-confessional relations in Damascus must be understood
in this context of imperial transformations, foreign intervention, and internal
rebellion.
Clothing as a Tool of Reform
Public space, which is understood here to include clothing, visibility, as well as
the built environment, played an important role in the struggles for legitimacy
and power in this changing context. From the start of the Tanzimat period, vis-
ibility and clothing were strongly politicized and thereby shaped into signs of
loyalty. This dynamic was emphasized byMahmud ii (1808–1839) who empha-
sized the idea that the sultan, rather than the state, was to be the focus of
loyalty of the subjects. This new allegiance was to be displayed through cloth-
ing. Mahmud ii saw the adoption of European clothing fashions as a betrayal
that damaged the success of Ottoman production and challenged social hier-
archies. He thus promoted a ‘buy Ottoman’ clothing campaign.3
1 Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge/New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 31; The consular correspondance in the Foreign Office (f.o.)
78/447 describes the issues of taxation in Mount Lebanon at length.
2 f.o. 78/872, Wood-Palmerstone, 28 June 1857.
3 Donald Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,”
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1997), 411.
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His rule was also famous for the abolition of the institution of the Janissaries
in 1826; this actmarked the beginning of the reform period. The lack ofmilitary
preparedness of the Janissaries and their involvement in civil affairs was seen
as the cause of the military weakness of the empire and its defeats at the hand
of Russia.4 A new army was created to replace this institution. At the same
time, a new military hierarchy was adopted and presented to the populace
in new uniforms. Homogeneity was promoted through the imposition of the
fez, which replaced former sartorial customs that were based on status and
represented by various turbans.5 Turbans displayed one’s religion, rank,wealth,
and occupation,while the fez came to represent the equidistance of all subjects
to the state. This change in clothing was part of the centralization process,
which aimed at eliminating intermediaries and shifting relationships of loyalty
and patronage exclusively towards the state. Other measures included the
creation of regional councils designed to give rise to a new group of individuals
who did not belong to the traditional elite.6
While in earlier periods displays of allegiance were predominantly directed
towards local power structures, in this period these displays were shifted
toward the state. The previously flexible internal hierarchy of Ottoman cities
was slowly replaced by a top-down order based on the principle of loyalty
to the state rather than on status. Clothing policies show this new direction
and the attempt to shape the bodies of the Ottoman subjects to promote
political change. This focus on clothing persisted throughout the Tanzimat
period.
Laying the Foundations: The Egyptian Occupation (1831–1841)
The Tanzimat were inaugurated in the capital in 1839 while Muḥammad ʿAlī
was still ruling Bilād al-Shām from Egypt. The Egyptian occupation of the
region introduced significant changes in the political, societal, and economic
fabric of the formerly Ottoman cities. Some of these changes persisted even
after their retreat from Syria.7 Most importantly for inter-confessional rela-
4 Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922
(Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1980), 114–115.
5 Quataert, “Clothing Laws,” 412.
6 George Ramez Tomeh, “Landownership and Political Power in Damascus 1858–1958” (Amer-
ican University of Beirut, 2007), 20.
7 Khālid Banī Hānī, Tārīkh Dimashq wa-ʿulāmāʾiha khilāl al-ḥukm al-Miṣrī, 1831–1840 (Damas-
cus: Dār Ṣafaḥāt, 2007), 191; Bruce Alan Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab
World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
135.
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tions, the Egyptian governor relied heavily on Christians in the administration,
while the power of the Jews was reduced.8 Their power was curtailed even fur-
ther after the arrest or execution of some of the important members of their
community during the infamous blood libel of 1840.9 In the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the JewishFārḥī family hadhad theupperhand in its politi-
cal battlewith theMelkite Baḥrī family, and the former hadobtained important
posts in the financial administration.10 Under Muḥammad ʿAlī, represented in
Damascus by Sharīf Pasha, the Baḥrī family was favored, and Hanna Baḥrī was
awarded the post of financial administrator.11 The house of themufti of Damas-
cus was made into his residence.12 The other members of themajlis were very
critical of Hanna Baḥrī, who was publicly awarded medals; jokes were made to
the effect that he was the actual leader of the country.13 The fact that he was
in charge of the collection of taxes furthered the resentment of the population
against Melkites.14
The reliance of Muḥammad ʿAlī on Melkites can be understood as a result
of the fact that he was supported politically by France, which assumed the role
of protector of Uniate Christians. Jews could only count on the support of Aus-
tria and to a lesser extent England, which eventually allied with the Ottoman
Empire againstMuḥammad ʿAlī.15 FavoringMelkites was away forMuḥammad
ʿAlī to gain further support from his main ally and to secure its eventual mili-
tary intervention against the empire.16 This Egyptian policy was represented
spatially by the building of additional churches and the enlargement of exist-
ing ones.17 This period was also marked by the inauguration of foreign con-
sulates in Damascus, a change that radically altered the political landscape of
the city.
8 YitzhakHofman, “TheAdministration under EgyptianRule,” inMosheMaʿoz (ed.), Studies
on Palestine during the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 321.
9 For a description of the blood libel, see Jonathan Frankel, The Damascus Affair (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10 Ibrāhīm ʿAwra, Tārīkh wilāya Sulāyman Basha al-ʿādil yashtamilu ʿala tārīkh Filasṭīn wa-
Lubnān, ed. al-Kuri Qustanṭin al-Basha (Sayda: Matbaʿāt Dār al-Mukkhāllis, 1936), 90.
11 Mudhakkirat tārīkhiyya ʿan hamlat IbrāhīmBasha ʿala Sūriya, ed. Aḥmad Ghassān Sabanu
(Damascus: Dār Qutayba, 1980), 59.
12 Banī Hānī, Tārīkh Dimashq, 157.
13 Mudhakkirat tārīkhiyya, 59.
14 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 30 August 1860; Hofman, “Administration,” 321.
15 Frankel, Damascus Affair, 19.
16 Ibid., 61.
17 StefanWeber, Damascus: OttomanModernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918) (Aar-
hus: Aarhus University Press, 2009), 2:51–62.
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While many Damascenes had initially supported the Egyptian occupation,
it quickly became unpopular because of increased taxation, military conscrip-
tion, and symbolic spatial actions in favor of the Christians and foreign pow-
ers and against the ʿulamāʾ.18 The use of mosques and schools, the pride of
Damascene society, as barracks for the soldiers or as biscuit factories are often
described and remembered as a source of outrage against the Egyptian occu-
pation.19 Resentments fueled by Muḥammad ʿAlī’s rule were translated into
bitterness towards Christians and especially Melkites.20
The position of Christians in Damascus thus changed during the Egyptian
occupation as a result of the interference of foreign powers, the problem of
Ottoman sovereignty, and the political role of Christian communities. All of
these developments had important consequences on the way Christians acted
and were perceived in the Tanzimat period, as well as on official policies
towards them.
The Ottoman Tanzimat Period: Ambiguities of the Reforms
The Ottomans recovered Bilād al-Shām from Muḥammad ʿAlī in 1841 princi-
pally as a result of the interventionof England. Francedidnot intervenemilitar-
ily on behalf of its ally. The Ottoman state continued the restructuring initiated
byMuḥammad ʿAlī and introduced further reforms. The twomain decrees that
were drafted in the Tanzimat period were the Gülhane edict of 1839, which was
applied to the recovered lands, and the Islahat Fermanı of 1856. The Gülhane
edict promised the instauration of justice regarding the collection of taxes, con-
scription, and the execution of punishments. It guaranteed Ottoman subjects’
property, honor, and life, using the classic vocabulary of the circle of justice.21
A central aspect of the Tanzimat reforms, which had important consequences
18 Banī Hānī, Tārīkh Dimashq, 79, 80.
19 Weber, Damascus, 1:116.
20 Itzchak Weismann, “Law and Sufism on the Eve of Reform: The Views of Ibn ʿAbidin” in
Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (eds.), Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 72.
21 See the decree in Jacob C. Hurewitz (ed.), The Middle East and North Africa in World
Politics (New Haven, ct: Yale University Press, 1975–1979), 1:269; The circle of justice is an
Islamic political concept which shows causal relationships between a just government,
the prosperity of its subjects, the financial resources of the state, and military power. It is
basically the idea that good governance ensures the survival and strength of the state. On
the history of this notion see L.T. Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power
in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice From Mesopotamia to Globalization (New York:
Routledge, 2013).
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for inter-confessional relations, was the emphasis on appearances and public
space, designed to be tools of social and political change.
After the return of the Ottomans to Damascus in 1841, a firman was drafted
for the protection of non-Muslims; this allowed them to wear whatever cloth-
ing they pleased and to ride on horseback without beingmolested. In the same
year, some Christians were attacked in the city of Damascus and their white
turbans—acolor previously reserved forMuslims—were torn off their heads.22
Policies fostering clothing equality were supposed to promote social and polit-
ical equality. However, because such policies were lobbied for by foreign polit-
ical powers, they tended to polarize religious groups. The fact that this firman
was brought from Istanbul to the governor Necip Pasha by the British consul
Mr. Wood indicates the extent of foreign involvement in clothing policies.23
The Islahat Fermanı of 1856 shows a radical change in the legitimization of
power and in the political discourse on subjecthood. The decree of 1839 was
addressed to all subjects of the empire. In contrast, the decree of 1856 was
directed especially towards Christians. The sentence that is used repeatedly
is: “All the Christians and other non-Muslims.”24 This decree proclaims the
equality of all subjects but it is clear that it was drafted primarily to reassure
Christians of their rights and to maintain the ‘privileges’ allegedly awarded to
their leadership by former sultans.25 ʿAlī and Fūʾād Pasha composed this decree
with the help of the French, British, and Austrian ambassadors.26 It was also
a strategic tool to counter the hostile intentions of European representatives
present at the Paris Peace Conference of 1856.27 The decree guaranteed that
no one could be forced to convert or could be harassed because of religious
beliefs.28 Freedom of religion was presented mainly as a question of visibility.
The decree awarded non-Muslims the rights to build churches and synagogues,
to hold crosses in processions, to ring church bells, and to participate in the
council, the political instrument of the Tanzimat. Discourses over religious
22 f.o. 78/447, Wood-Earl of Aberdeen, 20 November 1841.
23 f.o. 78/447, Wood-Necib Pasha, 13 November 1841.
24 Weber, Damascus, 1:316.
25 Ibid., 1:316–318.
26 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Later Tanzimat and the Ottoman Legacy in the Near Eastern
Successor States,” in Camille Mansour and Leila Fawaz (eds.), Transformed Landscapes:
Essays on Palestine and theMiddle East inHonor ofWalid Khalidi (Cairo: American Univer-
sity of Cairo Press, 2009), 69.
27 Ceasar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861 (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2000), 729.
28 Hurewitz, Middle East, 1:316–318.
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rights became associatedwith the increasing visibility andperceived economic
and political success of the Christian population, represented spatially by the
beautiful houses of the Christian elite and the luxurious decorations of the
various churches of the neighborhood of Bab Tuma.29
This decree put an end to the specific status of non-Muslims in the empire
but also enforced the loss of fiscal privileges of the ʿulamāʾ andashrāf, whowere
previously exempt from paying taxes.30 It reminded the population that be-
cause taxes were collected equally from all subjects, everyone could be drafted
into the army.31 Previously, non-Muslims were required to pay a poll tax in lieu
of army service. The conscription of non-Muslims was never put into practice.
Indeed, the majority of Jews and Christians were not eager to send their sons
to the army and the government was not enthusiastic to enroll them.32
Resentments towards the reform decrees, especially the Islahat Fermanı,
existed in many parts of the empire, including Damascus.33 The decrees were
resentedmainly because theymeant increased taxation, conscription, and they
introduced changes in the social hierarchies. The French consul reported that
the famous amir ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī criticized these reforms in his pres-
ence, describing them as contrary to religion.34 All these laws were enacted
in a period in which the intervention of foreign powers and their economic
advantages caused resentment among the population.35 Indeed the decreewas
drafted after the Crimean war, in which France, Britain, and the Ottoman
Empire opposedRussia. The immediate cause of theCrimeanwarwas the com-
peting claims by France and Russia for the protection of the holy places and of
Ottoman Christians. The war corresponds to the arrival of French and British
armies in the vicinity of Istanbul, to their increasing involvement in internal
affairs, and to the increasing debt of the empire.36 It is described in the chroni-
cles asmarking an important turn in inter-confessional relations in the empire.
29 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 30 August 1860.
30 Hurewitz, Middle East, 1:316–318.
31 Ibid., 1:316–318.
32 Aḥwāl al-naṣāra baʿd al-ḥarb al-qaram, ms Catalogue Cheikho (Beirut: Saint Joseph Uni-
versity), 24, 25.
33 Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique des Consuls/Turquie/Damas, Outrey-
Walewski, 19 March 1857 and 25March 1856; Leila Tarazi Fawaz, AnOccasion forWar: Civil
Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 69.
34 Archives Etrangères (a.e.) Correspondance Politique des Consuls (cpc)/ Turquie/Damas,
Bullar-Walewski, 21 January 1857.
35 Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 68–69.
36 Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826–
1876) (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2001), 113.
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The author of Aḥwāl al-naṣāra baʿd al-ḥarb al-qaram, a contemporary Chris-
tian chronicle, explains that Damascene Muslims were against the sultan’s
involvement in thiswar. They expected that negative consequenceswould arise
from it, such as increased conscription and taxation.37 It would also impel the
empire tomakemore concessions to European powers, especially those related
to their protectionof local Christians and their right of intervention inOttoman
affairs. The chronicler recalls that during the war the population was hostile
to the Christians and insults became more common.38 The British consul Mr.
Wood corroborated this observation and reported seeing a circular that called
for the expulsion of foreign consuls and for the execution of the French con-
sul and the Melkite patriarch.39 The drafting of a similar petition occurred in
1841 after the reconquest of Damascus by the sultan under the governorship
of Necip Pasha.40 It is not always clear who took the initiative of writing such
petitions; they were usually signed by famous notables, who were subject to a
certain level of pressure from the governors. Thus, these petitions do not neces-
sarily represent the sentiments of the population. However, when their timing
coincided with periods of publicly expressed resentment towards Christians,
as was the case in 1841 and 1856, it can be assumed that they indicate a certain
level of discontent towards Europeans.
The author of Aḥwāl al-naṣāra baʿd al-ḥarb al-qaram stated that the decree
of 1856 aimed to put an end to this aggressiveness by forbidding insults and
by awarding Christians administrative posts. He noted, however, that this was
not enough to curb resentments regarding the Crimeanwar, as these remained
strong.41 Both the international context and the wording of the reforms led to
bitterness towards Christians and foreign powers.
It should be noted that the Tanzimat reforms, dictated from Istanbul and
enacted in the provinces, were not applied uniformly throughout the Ottoman
lands. The Ottoman ‘state’ apparatus was composed of different levels and
involved a variety of actors, including civilians; thus the border between ‘state’
and ‘society’ was somewhat blurred. Individuals at each of these different levels
of the state, but especially at the city level, had an opportunity to shape the
application of the Tanzimat. Each city, with its own set of political actors,
therefore had a different experience of the Tanzimat period. Christian and
Jewish communities in different regions of the empire also differed in number,
37 Aḥwāl al-naṣāra, 5, 29.
38 Ibid., 5, 29.
39 f.o. 195/368, Wood-Stratford de Redcliffe, 13 July 1853.
40 f.o. 78/447, Wood-Reshid Pasha, 18 October 1841.
41 Aḥwāl al-naṣāra, 5, 29.
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sect, and societal role. For this reason, it is crucial to consider local dynamics
and interpersonal relations together with an exploration of the actual wording
of the reforms in order to grasp the consequences of the reforms on inter-
confessional relations.
Consuls and Governors: Competition and Sovereignty
The Issue of Protection
Beyond the structural factors described above, the politicization of religious
identities was shaped on a daily basis through inter-personal relations, espe-
cially between the consuls and the governor. At the root of many conflicts
between these two individuals lay a difference of interpretation of the Tanzi-
mat.42 The ambiguities in the formulation of the reforms, as well as in the right
of intervention given to representatives of foreign powers, led to a deteriora-
tion of the relations between the consuls and the governor and contributed to
the formation of a sectarian and polarized political landscape. Their numerous
altercations had strong repercussions on the population because the consuls
and the governors came to be seen as representatives of the different reli-
gious communities. Because of their dramatic aspect and visibility, political
and diplomatic conflicts had the tendency to translate into animosities among
the population.
The conflicts that arose often revolved around the issue of protection of
local Christians and Jews. The British, French, Russian, and Austrian consuls
were in constant competition to attract the loyalty of Damascene Christians;
they attempted to do this by presenting themselves as the spokesperson of the
Christians to theOttoman government. They took advantage ofminor conflicts
to expand their influenceby arguing that thehonor of their countrywas at stake
in each of those skirmishes, thus turning them into diplomatic issues.43 Behind
this competition lay a struggle for influence and economic advantage in the
vast territories of the empire. Their interventions in the name of non-Muslims
gave them a gateway into local politics and provided them with negotiating
power with Istanbul.
42 See, for example, the conflict that tookplacebetween the father at the convent ofNazareth
and the consul of France regarding the attribution of French protection to Ottoman
Christians in a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Bourville-Villardel, 7 February 1848.
43 For example, a financial dispute between aMuslim and an Ottoman Christian namedMr.
Maksoud became a diplomatic conflict after the intervention of the English consul Mr.
Wood, in a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Ratti-Menton-Guizot, 23 February 1842.
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The protection statuses were based on different types of rationales. First,
the consuls attributed protection to Ottoman subjects whom they employed.
This protection was thus dependent on an individual’s temporary situation.
However, in this period another idea of protection was developed, this was
based on the religious community to which one belonged rather than on one’s
employment status. To be sure, the claim that foreign powers were the protec-
tors of local Christian and Jewish communities was not a new phenomenon,
but it became a legal reality in the nineteenth century. The rights, previously
vague and ambiguous, of France and Russia to protect, respectively, Uniates
andOrthodox Christians and to administer the holy places were conceded offi-
cially.44 However, the extent of that protection and its practical application
remained a source of confusion. The various consuls, governors, and Christian
Ottomans conceived the status of protégé in a very different manner, and their
conception changed throughout the reform period.45
Initially the status of protégé was exclusively reserved for individuals work-
ing for the consulates. Those protégés, mostly dragomans and writers, were to
be treated as foreigners and benefit from the same rights, including exemption
from certain taxation and extra-territoriality. But the consuls abused this right
and awarded it to individuals who did not work for them. In 1847, when the
French consul was asked by the governor to list the protégés working for the
consul, it became clear that this was an issue of potential conflict. The protégés
knew how to use the consuls for their own benefit and behaved arrogantly. He
also described the outcry that his creation of an official list of protégés had gen-
erated among the Damascene Christians.46
Some individuals benefiting from protégé status also took advantage of
their position to engage in fraudulent financial activities.47 Richard Edwards,
a British traveler who visited Syria in this period, strongly criticized the abuses
of the protection system and related the various intrigues he observed among
the protégés.48 He also described the financial aspect of the protection sys-
44 Orlando Figes, The CrimeanWar: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 109.
45 In 1853, the French and British consuls had an altercation regarding the rights and obli-
gations linked to the status of protégé, after a Brisith protégé was taken into the French
consulate, f.o. 195/368, Wood-Barbet de Jouy, 31 March 1853.
46 a.e. 166/po/d20/3, Annex to de Bourville-Bourquency, 11 December 1847.
47 An example is that of Mr. Gedei, employed by the British consulate, who was charged
with dishonest commercial activities, f.o. 195/368, Wood-Barbet de Jouy, 23 March 1853;
Another example is the dragoman Mr. Misk who used his position to commit financial
fraud, f.o. 195/601, Brant-Bulwer, 6 February 1860.
48 Richard Edwards, La Syrie 1840–1862, histoire, politique, administration, population, religion
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tem and claimed that consular agents, having spent a great deal to attain their
post, would try to regain their resources through the sale of protection sta-
tuses. In turn, protégés would rent their protection to individuals presented
as their coworkers, family members, etc.49 This accusation is corroborated by
the British consul in 1860.50 These practices delegitimized all foreign agents
in the eyes of the population, who saw them as opportunists fleeing their
responsibilities.51 Dragomans also had a considerable amount of power, con-
suls relied solely on their testimony and translations to determine their actions
in relation to the Ottoman governors. Dragomans could use this dependence
to further their own interests, or to blackmail the Ottoman official and in
this manner deliberately worsen the relationship of these two individuals.52
Ottoman subjects who had acceded to foreign nationality could also become
vice-consuls.53
Richard Wood, the British consul in 1846, recognized that abuses of pro-
tection were the cause of many conflicts with the governor.54 The Ottoman
governors resented the attribution of protection because it removed those indi-
viduals from their authority. In 1836 the British consul rationalized the pro-
tection by arguing that dragomans’ subjection to Ottoman authorities would
threaten their integrity and their service to the foreign consulates. He also
recommended that the children of dragomans be awarded protection from
birth rather than when they reached majority in order to ensure the loyalty
of their parents.55 But the protection status was abused to avoid punishment.
Indeed, if a judiciary case involved a protégé, the trial would take place in
the consulate rather than before the Ottoman authorities, and this would
obviously favor the protégé rather than the Ottoman subject.56 One of the
abuses described by Richard Edwards was the practice of granting protection
statuses temporarily to individuals who wanted to escape the law, or win a
trial.57
et mœurs, évènements de 1860 d’après des actes officiels et des documents authentiques
(Paris: Amyot, 1862), 80.
49 Ibid., 77; f.o. 78/291, Farren-Cambell, 18 February 1836 and 28 February 1836.
50 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 15 December 1860.
51 f.o. 195/226, Wood-Canning, 29 July 1844.
52 Edwards, Syria, 79.
53 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 15 December 1860.
54 Foreign Office 195/226, Wood-Canning, 8 April 1846.
55 f.o. 78/291, Farren-Cambell, 28 February 1836.
56 Edwards, Syria, 78.
57 Ibid., 80.
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The distinction between legal and religious protection was not defined
clearly. It was also not clear to what extent Ottoman subjects enjoyed rights
given to foreigners and if Ottoman courts could prosecute foreigners.58 In 1847
the French consul,Mr. de Bourville, who had recently arrived in the city, argued
that claims made by protégés who were trying to escape Ottoman jurisdic-
tion was not justified by any law and that it was contrary to the Capitula-
tions.59
The governors also saw the issue of protection as an impediment to the
enactment of their fiscal reforms. The supposed exemption of foreign nationals
from paying any kind of taxes, the excessive attribution of foreign protection
to Ottoman subjects and especially rich merchants, frustrated governors and
gave the protégés an unfair advantage. For example, in 1846 the governor ʿAlī
Pasha refused to recognize the British protection granted in 184160 to two Jew-
ish merchants, the Harārī brothers, because the protection status could not be
awardedwithout the sultan’s authorization.61 He demanded that they pay a tax
onproperty—the so called ‘virgo’—instead of the individual ferde tax collected
from Ottoman subjects.62 During the Tanzimat, taxation was a very sensitive
issue, as it came to be required of all subjects of the empire and was an indica-
tor of loyalty to themodern state. Even the French consul in 1847 contested the
rationality behind the exemption of taxes for all the protégés and declared that
it would be better to apply this exemption solely to dragomans.63 The issue of
protection, but also conversion, was problematic as it challenged administra-
tive categories and taxation practices and called into question the relation of
the individual to the state.
The relation betweenOttoman subjects who became protégés and the Otto-
man state was complex. They were neither fully foreign nor fully Ottoman
subjects and their relations to the different political actors and the local com-
munities were changeable. This in-between position not only propelled them
to the middle of the political scene but also caused tensions among different
authorities who disagreed about how they should be treated. However, despite
58 Marie Carmen Smyrnelis, Identités et Relations Sociales à Smyrne aux xviiie et xixe siècles
(Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2005), 85.
59 a.e. 166/po/d20/3, Annex to de Bourville-Bourquency, 11 December 1847.
60 f.o. 78/447, Wood-Bidwell, 29 September 1841.
61 f.o. 195/226, Aly Pasha-Wood, 27 March 1846.
62 f.o. 195/226, Wood-Canning, 8 April 1846; f.o. 195/226; Translation of ʿAlī Pasha’s note to
Mr. Wood, 21 March 1846.
63 a.e. 166/po/d20/3, Annex to de Bourville-Bourquency, 11 December 1847.
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of the fact that Christians and Jews were instrumentalized in this power strug-
gle, they had a certain level of agency and couldmake themost of the situation
to further their interests.
Spaces of Competition
The issue of sovereignty and extra-territoriality has spatial dynamics. The pro-
tection provided by foreign powers challenged the individual’s belonging to
the community, the city, and the empire, as it offered them different forms
to escape this relation, principally by attaching oneself to a new territory. By
gaining a protected status, the individual partly extracted himself from the
social fabric of the city and its internal hierarchies, while remaining engaged
in certain aspects of the social and economic life. The attribution of protec-
tion was more than a legal status: it affected the nature of the public space
by enacting administrative, political, economic, and social practices that ques-
tioned the sovereignty of the Ottoman state and the system of local hierar-
chies.
Public space became an important arena in which the struggle for sover-
eignty between consuls and governors materialized. Cases of Christian reli-
gious processions with foreign symbols and displays of foreign flags on
churches have been described elsewhere as examples of the politicization of
public space.64 The public display of Christian religious identity, such as using
crosses in processions, ringing church bells, enlarging churches, and empha-
sizing their outward decoration, contributed to the perception that Christians
benefited economically and politically as a consequence of foreign interven-
tion.65 However, other more mundane spaces were also at the center of those
conflicts. Themarketplace, for example,was an important place of competition
between religious groups. Their protégé status allowed some Christians and
Jews to benefit from the Capitulations by enjoying lower customs tax rates (at
the same level as foreignmerchants, who were increasingly visible in Ottoman
markets during this period).66 Christians and Jews took advantage of those
privileges to build fortunes through the commerce of grain, the sale of Euro-
64 Sibel Zandi-Sayek, “Orchestrating Difference, Performing Identity: Public Rituals in Nine-
teenth-Century Izmir,” inNezarAlSayyad (ed.),HybridUrbanism:On the IdentityDiscourse
and the Built Environment, (Westport, ct: Praeger, 2001).
65 Anais Massot, “Modernization, Communal Space and Inter-confessional Conflicts in 19th
century Damascus,” Syrian Studies Association Bulletin 17, no. 2 (2012): 12–15.
66 Beinin, Workers and Peasants, 45–47; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics:
Damascene Factions andEstates of the 18th and 19thCenturies (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1985),
82.
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pean textiles, tax farming67 or by making loans with high interest rates (20–24
percent) to peasants and farmers.68 Christians employed by the government
had opportunities to enrich themselves.69 In some commercial activities they
rapidly gained the upper hand over the Muslim merchant class. At that time,
many Christians were involved in the production of local textiles and benefited
from advantages in this domain, in part because of their access to English yarn,
which became necessary in order to produce textiles at affordable prices. This
advantage created resentments among Muslim weavers who suffered more
than their Christian counterparts from the introduction of European textiles
in the nineteenth century.70
The economic competition led to increasing tension between Muslims and
Christians; this culminated in violence during the massacre of 1860. The riot
started in themarketplace of Bab al-Barid,which specialized in the sale of Euro-
pean clothing,mostly byMuslims.71 The Christianswho produced local textiles
concentrated their workshops in the Christian neighborhood of Bab Tuma. It is
significant that this neighborhood was described by the British consul in 1860
as a ‘city in itself.’72 During the violence of 1860, the looms of Christians were
destroyed.73 The various events of interpersonal violence involving Christians
during the period from 1840 to 1860 often involved merchants or individu-
als working for them.74 The marketplace was thus a place where resentments
towards Christians and their foreign allies were fueled.
Political aspects intertwined with religious distinctions in this violence, as
it targeted specific Christian communities affiliated with foreign powers. Bab
Tuma, the neighborhoodwhere Catholic institutions were located, was heavily
affected.75 Catholic missions, churches, and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate
were primary targets of the 1860 riots, while the other churches were only
67 Beinin,Workers andPeasants, 45–47; Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics, 82. For tax
farming activities, see f.o. 195/368, Wood-Clarendon, 22 April 1853.
68 f.o. 195/368, Wood-Canning, 28 January 1851.
69 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 30 August 1860.
70 Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics, 71, 74.
71 Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 85.
72 f.o. 78/1520, Brant-Bulwer, 13 June 1860.
73 Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “The Impact of Europe on a Traditional Economy: The Case of Dam-
ascus, 1840–1870,” in Jean Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Pierre Dumont (eds.), Économie et
Sociétésdans l’EmpireOttoman, finduxviiie-débutduxxe siècle:ActesduColloquedeStras-
bourg, 1er–5 Juillet 1980 (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique,
1983), 422; Beinin,Workers and Peasants, 49.
74 For example, see f.o. 78/447, Wood-Necib Pasha, 13 November 1841.
75 Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 100.
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affected by the general fire in the neighborhood.76 Mikhāʾīl Mishāqah, an eye-
witness of the events, related that the main aim of the 1860 revolts were the
Franciscan and Lazarist monasteries situated in the Catholic part of Maḥalla
al-Naṣāra.77 He argued that this violence was a consequence of the arrogant
behavior of the Christians of Damascus.78 Another contemporary chronicler
described the resentments of the population in this period as directed against
the ‘Franj’ or Europeans.79 This specific targeting of Catholic and Greek Ortho-
dox institutions demonstrates the political aspect of the violence of 1860. The
violence directed towards Catholic andGreekOrthodox places sought to target
the influence of France and Russia. The British consulate, the main ally of the
Ottoman Empire, was left untouched.80
Even though in certain areas of the city the politicization of religious iden-
tities created a tense atmosphere between religious groups, strong links of
solidarity between Muslims and Christian continued to exist in certain neigh-
borhoods, especially in the extra-muralMaydan. This area represented the local
faction that often rebelled against the governor and the imposition of taxes and
conscription. In this neighborhood, trade alliances in the booming commerce
of grain were concluded across religious groups.81 The grain trade made up a
significant portion of Syrian exports. Many new opportunities for a vast num-
ber of Damascenes and peasants were created in this field.82
During the events of 1860, Christians of this neighborhoodwere not attacked
by the crowd and were protected by the local leaders.83 On various occasions,
the inhabitants of Maydan displayed a strong neighborhood solidarity that cut
across religious lines. For example, in 1857, during the controversy regarding
the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the Melkite inhabitants of Maydan—
who supported the patriarch—were arrested after a fight with the opponents
of the patriarch, many of whom were protégés or worked for the government.
76 Chantal Donzel-Verdeil, “Les Jésuites de Syrie (1830–1864): Une Mission auprès des Chré-
tiens d’Orient au début des Réformes Ottomanes” (PhD diss., University Paris iv Sor-
bonne, 2003), 166; Mikhāʾīl Mishāqah, Kitāb mashhad al-ʿayan bi-ḥawādith Sūriya wa-
Lubnān, ed. Milham Khālis ʿAbduh and Andrawus Hanna Shakhashiri (Cairo, 1908), 248;
Weber, Damascus, 2:53–61.
77 Mishāqah, Kitāb mashhad al-ʿayan, 248.
78 Ibid., 242.
79 Aḥwāl al-naṣāra, 22.
80 Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 85, 89.
81 Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics, 62.
82 Ibid.
83 f.o. 195/601, Brant-Russell, 16 July 1860; Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 85–89.
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A delegation composed of Christians and Muslims fromMaydan then came to
demand the releaseof their neighbors andultimately attacked the residences of
the opponents of the patriarch.84 Thus, the public spherewasnot characterized
by conflict in every area of Damascus. Although religious divisions were of
political importance in the nineteenth century, one must keep in mind that
in reality all groups were internally divided and that neighborhoods, as well as
other societal units, remained strong bases of political solidarity.
The Issue of Sovereignty at the Heart of the Conflict
As the adoption of the fez demonstrated, clothing was a tool of political and
social transformation. However, ways of dressing also became an important
point of contestation in political struggles between different authorities. The
case ofMelkites wearing religious hats illustrates this struggle over sovereignty.
In 1842, following a previous attempt in the 1820s,85 the Greek orthodox clergy
managed to obtain a firman from the sultan forbidding Melkite priests from
wearing skullcaps or black headdresses similar to theirs, as these symbolized
their belonging to the clergy. The Melkite priests were thus forced to dress as
common people.86
The French consul described the dilemma that he faced in this conflict. He
considered this firman unfair and wished to prevent its application, but he
was also conscious that the Capitulations only allowed him to protect Latin
Catholics. The extension of this protection toUniateswas tolerated in this early
period of theTanzimat but only on anoccasional basis. In order not to be forced
to takeoff their hats, theMelkite priests refused to goout of their houses.87With
the encouragement of the French consul someof themeventuallywent outside
wearing the aforementioned hats.88 The governor, Necip Pasha, arrested them
immediately. He then summoned one of the priests and asked him if he was
a subject of the Sublime Porte or of France. When the latter responded that
he was a subject of the sultan, Necip Pacha replied that while Uniates used
to be the loyal subjects of the Porte, this was no longer the case because they
disobeyed his directives and preferred to address themselves to the consul to
resolve their problems.89
84 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Outrey-Walewski, 19 March 1857.
85 Mikhāʾīl Mishāqah, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 116.
86 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Ratti-Menton-Guizot, 4 January 1842.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Sieur Sayour-Beaudin, 3 January 1842.
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This example shows that clothing had become a locus of intra-Christian
competition and was intertwined in questions of loyalty towards the Ottoman
state. Conflicts between different Christian communities did not occur in a
vacuum, butwere inscribed in the general politics of the city, involving not only
the Ottoman state but also different political factions from among the larger
Muslim population.
Another case that illustrates problems of sovereignty caused by foreign
interventionwas the practice of sending petitions. The fact that someOttoman
subjects chose to address the consuls instead of the governors to file complaints
or ask for favors was at the root of the tensions between those two parallel
authorities. The petitions addressed to the consuls can be seen as challenges
to Ottoman authority over its subjects and as part of a strategy by foreign
powers to extend their jurisdiction in the empire by means of administrative
practices.90 In the nineteenth century, many social, residential, administrative,
and visual practices were perceived as political statements and as ways of
taking sides in the conflict of sovereignty between the Ottoman Empire and
foreign powers.
In cases of interpersonal or intercommunal disputes, there were a vari-
ety of possible authorities that Ottoman subjects could appeal to. While this
enlarged their political possibilities, the presence of various authorities could
also impede the ability of the plaintiff to obtain rapid retribution, especially
when those cases became symbolic struggles for sovereignty.
The relations between consuls and governors were not only influenced by
relations between the Porte and foreign powers, but also depended on power
strategies. Governors’ actions were linked to factional struggles in the empire.
The period of the Tanzimat was characterized by ideological and political
conflicts in Istanbul. Those conflicts revolved around debates on internal and
external policy-making. Those divergences of opinion coincided with political
factions that emerged around two main institutions, the bureaucracy (the
Porte) and the entourage of the Sultan (the Palace), which was linked to the
military institution. Those two factions disagreed regarding the nature of the
Ottoman state and the role of the sultan, especially after the Gülhane edict of
1839.91 The balance of power tipped alternatively in favor of one or the other
groupduring the period from 1830 to 1860, generating shifts in imperial policies.
The governors that were sent to Damascus often belonged to the faction of
the Palace, as was the case with the aforementioned Necip Pasha. The French
90 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Ratti-Menton-Guizot, 7 May 1841.
91 Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam, 43, 44.
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consul in 1858 accused themilitary leaders of being involved in incitinghostility
to the privileges of Europeans in the empire.92 They opposed certain reforms,
especially those aimed at improving the situation of Christians and foreign
consuls. Governorswere ordered to solve issues arising betweenChristian sects
in a rapidmanner in order to avoid their evolution into diplomatic problems.93
However, in many cases, they did not follow those directives and, for a variety
of reasons, exacerbated conflicts. They also tended to avoid the application
of imperial decrees and ministerial letters.94 This political faction particularly
resented the firman of 1856 because they saw it as a foreign imposition that
was contrary to the interests of the Ottoman state, and because it represented
the power of the bureaucrats.95 They especially refrained from applying the
reforms concerning public space, which could work as faits accomplits in the
favor of foreign consuls and Christian communities.
Consular agents were also involved in power struggles. They were either
appointed from abroad or selected from within the consulate’s employees. In
either case a fierce competition took place.96 Once in power they pushed for
the appointment of governors who would favor their interests and attempted
to bring about their dismissal when they frustrated their goals. The accusation
of mistreatment of Christians was an easy way to delegitimize governors. The
competition for influence between consuls of European countries, especially
between France and Britain, played an important role as well in their relation
with the governors.97
Thus both governors and consular agents acted on the basis of various
rationales, including consideration of international politics, factional struggles,
and career enhancement. Those dynamics had the consequence of increasing
92 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Outrey-Walewski, 3 March 1858.
93 Selim Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), 52.
94 For example, Osman Pasha, the governor of Damascus in 1848, refused to apply the
order he received from Istanbul to punish the Damascenes who had attacked the funeral
procession of the former consul of France, Mr. Combes, while it was entering the city
center, as it was considered as an offense to the population, a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas,
Garnier-de Lhuys, 12 December 1848.
95 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of
Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 3
(1990), 266.
96 Edwards, Syria, 76–77.
97 See, for example, the attempt by the British consul to get rid of Necip Pasha because of
his good relation with the French consul and to replace him with ʿAlī Pasha, who favored
British andAustrian interests, a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Ratti-Menton-Guizot, 7May 1841.
ottoman damascus during the tanzimat 173
societal tensions, and reinforcing divisions between communities, especially
those concerning issues of visibility and public space.
Conversion as a Case Study
Conversion to Islam and Apostasy
The issue of conversions aptly demonstrates the difficult relations between
governors and consuls as well as the problems of sovereignty triggered by the
intervention of foreign consuls. Conversion, which was problematic, involved
the symbolic and often physical crossing of religious and social borders. The
decree of 1839 made it legal, and the punishment of apostasy by death was
abolished in 1844. The abolishment of the death penalty for apostasy was pro-
moted by foreign powers in 1843, after diplomatic problems arose in Istanbul
when an Armenian who had converted to Islam, then returned to his previ-
ous religion andwas sentenced to death for apostasy from Islam. This sentence
created a profound diplomatic crisis.98 Foreign powers intervened to prevent
the application of this sentence, and that intervention created problems of
sovereignty.99 The decree of 1856 restated the legality of conversion.100 It was
clear, however, that the Ottoman Empire did not wish to allow for conversion
from Islam.
In most cases of conversion, the problems of apostasy were posed by con-
verts to Islam who wished to return to their former religion.101 Thus, the Otto-
man Empire conceived a legal process in order to avoid the death penalty in
those cases by proving the invalidity of the first conversion. This was done by
arguing that the first conversion had not been completely voluntary. This pro-
cess meant that diplomatic issues could be avoided and discussions regarding
the legality of conversion from Islam could be circumvented.102
Such cases of conversions from Christianity or Judaism to Islam put the
empire in an uneasy position, and contributed to what Selim Deringil calls the
98 See thedescriptionof the events inDeringil,ConversionandApostasy, 67–11; Abu-Manneh,
Studies on Islam, 12.
99 Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 38.
100 Selim Deringil, “There is no Compulsion in Religion: On Conversion and Apostasy in the
LateOttomanEmpire: 1839–1856,”ComparativeStudyof SocietyandHistory42, no. 3 (2000),
556.
101 Those are the vastmajority of the cases described by the French and British ForeignOffice
archives. Some of those cases will be described below.
102 Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 44.
174 massot
“Imperial Headache.”103 This type of conversion infuriated the original com-
munity to which the convert had belonged and called for the intervention of
foreign consuls. A strictly regulated official legal process was put in place in
order to ensure the voluntary nature of the conversion and to avoid further
complications.104 State officials were advised not to let the population know
about those cases, in an effort to calm potential tensions.105 These cases were
to be referred to Istanbul directly, while in previous years the provincial govern-
ment had dealt with them locally. This practice indicates that such cases were
very sensitive for the empire and bureaucrats were clearly hoping to minimize
the potentially conflictive consequences of these conversions.106 Governors,
however, sometimes made matters worse by publicizing them. The clergy was
also aware of the sensitive nature of conversions. When Mr. Khalīl, a Muslim,
wanted to become Christian, the Greek Orthodox, Melkite, and Syrian Ortho-
dox bishops refused to accept him into their church for fear of complications.
He thus became Protestant.107
The French and British consuls of Damascus described at length various
cases of conversion that were imbricated in political conflicts. For example, in
1850 aGreekOrthodoxwomanwanted to convert to Islam togetherwithher son
to follow the example of her husband. They went to see the judge, but when
the boy was asked if this was what he wanted, he responded in the negative.
After the case was made public, the woman was taken under the protection
of the pasha but she was then kidnapped by a group of Greek Orthodox who
took her to the Russian consulate. A diplomatic struggle erupted between the
Russian consul and the pasha regarding the future of the child.108 Because
consulateswere places beyond the jurisdiction of theOttoman representatives,
they often served as refuges or prisons in cases involving local Christian or
Jewish individuals who ran into conflict with the Ottoman authorities.
In the various provinces of the empire, the conversion cases often involved
women and children. Indeed, many women converted in order to divorce or
103 Ibid., 28–66.
104 Ibid., 44.
105 Ibid., 38, 62.
106 Ibid., 66; TheBritish consulMr. Timoni describes the case of three children, twoChristians
and one Jew, who converted to Islam but then reverted and were sent away to prevent any
problems after they took refuge in the British consulate, f.o. 195/226, Timoni-Canning, 26
August 1846; Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 38, 49.
107 f.o. 195/601, Brant-Alison, 20 April 1858.
108 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Vallegue-de la Hitte, 21 May 1850.
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to obtain guardianship over their children.109 For instance, in 1846 a Melkite
woman converted to Islam in order to divorce her husband andmarry aMuslim
man but then changed her mind. Sāliḥ Bey, the kaymakam, sent a letter to the
British consul—whohadbeencalled to interveneby theMelkite vicar—stating
that he would not prosecute her and knew of the discussions that took place in
Istanbul two years before. However, when the case was brought to the council,
SāliḥBeypublicly announced that this apostasywaspunishable bydeath.A few
days later, however, the woman miraculously escaped and Sāliḥ Bey forbade
anyone to look for her. He also punished the man who had convinced her to
convert. The British consul understood that Sāliḥ Bey had to publicly threaten
the woman in order to satisfy the members of the council, especially two who
were particularly ill-disposed towards Christians and foreign powers, but that
in reality he wanted to get rid of the case as discreetly as possible.110
This example shows that the strength and authority of the governors had a
determinant influence on the resolution of the cases of conversion, especially
when it involved foreign representatives. The governors were concerned both
about reinforcing their local legitimacy to prevent rebellion and about satis-
fying foreign representatives who could appeal to Istanbul to replace them.
Unfortunately, strengthening their legitimacy in the eyes of the local popu-
lation often required showing strong resistance to foreign powers’ interfer-
ence. They thus had to find a balance between those two objectives. Each
governor struck this balance in a different manner. This dynamic explains
the seemingly hypocritical speech often used by governors and the reasons
they politicized some cases while treating others in a more discreet man-
ner.
Children could also use conversion to escape their parents’ authority; such
was the case of a seventeen years old Melkite girl who, because of the ill
treatment she received from her mother, decided to become Muslim in order
to be emancipated.111
Conversion had strong spatial dynamics because it was a shift of loyalty to a
different authority. For example, in 1847, a Catholic Latin called Antoine/Selim
Madim, who had converted to Islam many years before and married a Mus-
lim woman, passed away. He was taken to be buried in the Muslim cemetery
when the dragoman of the French consul stopped the procession and affirmed
that he had returned to his original faith and had to be buried in the Christian
109 Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 38, 58.
110 f.o. 195/226, Timoni-Canning, 2 December 1846.
111 a.e. Serie d/166po/ d20/3, Beaudin-Baron de Bourquency, 14 April 1847.
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cemetery. While the governor was being consulted on the subject, the drago-
man buried him in secret in the Christian cemetery with the benediction of
the priests of Terra Santa. A diplomatic conflict followed between the governor,
Musa Safveti Pasha, who belonged to the faction of the Palace, and the con-
sul of France; each claimed that the deceased was from their religion.112 Safveti
Pashawrote to the French consul and accused him of acting in contradiction to
the Capitulations. The latter denied this accusation and argued that there was
no mention of this type of situation in the Capitulations.113 The head priest of
Terra Santa then wrote to certify that the man had reverted to Christianity and
had wanted to divorce his wife. The governor disregarded this letter and asked
for the dragoman to be punished for overstepping his authority. The following
day the latter was attacked in the marketplace.114 Clearly the politicization of
converts could continue even after their deaths.
There was also a problem of inheritance behind this attempt to prove that
the deceased had reverted. Since his family had remained Christian, they could
not inherit from aMuslim. They could, therefore, have tried to prove his rever-
sion in order to inherit from him and disinherit his wife. The brother of
Antoine/SelimMadim, EliasMadim,was imprisonedby Safveti Pasha for enter-
ing the house of his brother and taking indemnities on his inheritance.115When
EliasMadimwas asked in court what his nationality was, he responded that he
was a subject of the Porte and a protégé of the Terra Santa convent because this
institution paid his share of the taxes. Upon this declaration, he was thrown
into prison and kept there for seven days. Ultimately the wife of Antoine/Selim
Madim was given her part of the inheritance and the rest was appropriated by
the judge.116
Even if there was a question of inheritance in the case of Antoine/Selim
Madim, the proactive intervention of the consul and the pasha demonstrates
that the question went beyond a strictly financial issue. It showed the will
to claim a soul, in a sort of spiritual competition that was in fact inherently
political: tombs were visual and symbolic representations of communities.
The burial of a man in a Muslim or Christian cemetery, located in different
areas in the city, represented the superiority of one group over another, and
112 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Safveti Pacha-Bourville, 18 February 1847.
113 a.e. Serie d/166po/ d20/3, Tippel-Safveti, 23 February 1847.
114 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Bourville-Safveti Pacha, 27 February 1847.
115 a.e. Serie d/166po/d20/3, Tippel-Baron de Bourquency, 3 February 1847.
116 a.e. Serie d/166po/d20/3 Annex to Tippel-Baron de Bourquency, 3 February 1847, “Ques-
tions posées au nommé Elias Nadim, frère du défunt Antoine Nadim par Mr Baudin
chancelier du consulat et ses réponses.”
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a political victory during a period in which conversion was a major subject of
discussion and a basis for foreign involvement. In this politico-social context,
conversion thus became a betrayal of one group and an allegiance to another
authority.
Cemeteries were an important way to mark the presence of a community in
a city, in addition to being a place of reunion and memory. It is significant that
in 1854 the British consul petitioned the governor to demand the construction
of a Protestant cemetery in the city for British and American subjects in order
to anchor the community in the religious landscape of Damascus.117
Conversions between Christian Sects
Similar cases of contested conversions also took place between Christian com-
munities; these were even more complicated for the Ottoman Empire to han-
dle.118 These conversions were, like conversions between Islam and Christian-
ity, also linked to issues of loyalty and foreign influence. Uniates were seen
as betraying the Ottoman Empire because of their relation to France and the
reign ofMuḥammad ʿAlī. Converts to Protestantismwere seen as influenced by
the British, while Orthodox were accused of connivance with Russia and the
Greek revolts.119 Conversions increased the prestige of the respective powers
because the international battle for influence also took place on the grounds
of faith. In intra-Christian polemics, the different communities accused each
other of a lack of loyalty towards the empire, because of their alliance with
foreign countries.120 Loyalty and religious identity were thus strongly associ-
ated.
Conversion was also linked to a fiscal concerns. Indeed, converting to other
Christian sects and seeking foreignprotection couldbe away to escape extreme
taxation.121 When a hundred Greek Orthodox from the village of Ḥāṣbiyya,
an area populated by Christians and Druzes, converted to Protestantism in
1844, the Greek Orthodox bishop wrote a letter to the Patriarch of Damascus
accusing the converts of having become English.122 Theywere then attacked by
members of the Greek Orthodox church, Maronites, and Druzes, who threat-
117 f.o. 78/1028, Wood-Earl of Clarendon, 1 February 1854.
118 Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 42.
119 Aḥwāl al-naṣāra, 20, 21; Masters, Christians and Jews, 130–169.
120 Masters, Christians and Jews, 107.
121 a.e. cpc/Turquie/Damas, Lewizey-Guizot, 6March 1844, 8December 1843, and30Novem-
ber 1843.
122 f.o. 195/226,Annex toWood-Canning, 4March 1844, “Translationof amemorial addressed
by 100 Orthodox Greeks from Hasbeya to Mr. Consul Wood.”
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ened them with death if they did not return to their former faith.123 Their
conversion not only called into question their relation to the Ottoman state
but also their right to reside among their former coreligionists. They thus
asked for the protection of the British consul in Damascus, Mr. Richard Wood.
He first refused to offer protection, claiming that England did not wish to
use religion in order to increase its influence. He even complained about
the actions of missionaries, who behaved in a manner that was detrimental
to the interests of England.124 Apparently, British and American missionar-
ies used to promise to pay the taxes of individuals who converted to Protes-
tantism.125 The question of financial responsibilities appears to be at the heart
ofmany issues of conversion. Taxationwas closely linked to communal belong-
ing.
Mr.Wood seemed very reticent at first to get involved in this case, and wrote
to thepasha refuting the accusations that his agentswere the causeof this affair.
He did not hesitate to state that this conversion was the consequence of the
despair of the converts in the face of excessive taxation. He then reassured the
pasha that whatever their religion, the inhabitants of Ḥāṣbiyya were not under
British protection.126
However, as the case evolved and the Protestants were persecuted, they
wrote insistent letters to the British consul, asking for his intervention.127 The
governor of Damascus, upon learning about this mass conversion, held an
exceptional council in order to determine the best possible response to this
affair. Some members of the council argued that if the Christians converted
in order to escape their condition as subjects of the sultan by using foreign
powers, then it was a legally reprehensible act of treason.128 Eventually, the
Protestants were expelled from their houses in Hasabiyya andwhile the British
consul demanded the punishment of those involved, the Russian general con-
sul in Beirut threatened to intervene if any action was undertaken to humil-
iate the Greek Orthodox of Hasabiyya.129 In the end the pasha of Damascus
123 f.o. 195/226, “Deposition of Nicola Haslab, one of the professing Christians Protestants of
Hasbeya to the British cancelleria,” 27 June 1844.
124 a.e. cpc/ Turquie/Damas, Lewizey-Guizot, 24 March 1844.
125 Ibid.
126 f.o. 195/226, Wood-Canning, “Translation from a Letter from Wood to His excellency Ali
Pasha,” 29 May 1844.
127 f.o. 195/226, Annex to Wood-Canning, 4 March 1844, “Translation of a memorial”; f.o.
195/226, “Deposition of Nicola Haslab,” 27 June 1844.
128 a.e. cpc/ Turquie/Damas, Lewizey-Guizot, 24 March 1844.
129 f.o. 195/226, Wood-Canning, 8 October 1844.
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ceded to the pressure of the British consul who accused him of indifference
and of not respecting the firman stating that Christians will not be persecuted
in the empire.130 However, Halil Pasha—the Kapudan Pasha131—and the Rus-
sian general consul in Beirut then reminded him that he should support the
patriarch who alone was responsible for his community even if some of them
converted.132 Indeed, the Protestant churchwas not recognized in theOttoman
Empire until 1847.133 Instead of punishing those who pressured the Protestants
to return to their original faith, they told the pasha of Damascus that he should
encourage them and facilitate their enterprise.134
These conflicts over conversion show the politicization of Christian com-
munal identity, which became an additional space of confrontation between
the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers. The different communities reacted
strongly against those intra-Christian conversions. They saw them as a double
treason that damaged the prestige of the church and increased the fiscal bur-
den of the rest of the members of the community who still had to pay taxes for
the converted person.135
Ambiguities of Subjecthood
Based on the study of these cases of conversion, it can be observed that two
different notions of subjecthood coexisted in this period, a perennial one based
on the community as the basis of state-society relations and tied to the land,
and another based on the individual, one that took into account his mobility,
both physical and religious.
The conflict between these two notions of subjecthood took root in the
reform decrees themselves. The reform decrees showed a desire to unite the
population and gain the loyalty of the Ottoman subjects. This unity took two
different directions. It was underlined both by a will to reinforce the unity of
130 Ibid.
131 The Kapudan Pasha is the grand admiral of the navy of the Ottoman Empire.
132 f.o. 195/226, Annex toWood-Canning, 8October 1844, “Letter of his ExcellencyHalil Pasha
to his Excellency Aly Pasha”; f.o. 195/226, Basilios-Aly Pasha, 21 September 1844.
133 f.o. 195/291, Wood-Lord Cowley, 8 January 1848.
134 f.o. 195/226, Annex toWood-Canning, 8October 1844, “Letter of his ExcellencyHalil Pasha
to his Excellency Aly Pasha”; f.o. 195/226, Basilios-Aly Pasha, 21 September 1844.
135 Smyrnelis,Une Societé hors de Soi, 71. Taxes were not reassessed often, and thus every year
the village had to pay the same amount of taxes, regardless of changes in the number
of inhabitants. The taxes on villages instituted by the Egyptians in Damascus had still
not been reassessed in 1858, f.o. 198/13, “Report on the Finances of Damascus,” 1858–
1860.
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the religious group, which can be called a policy of themillet, and the ideology
of an all-inclusive Ottomanism. The two policies contradicted each other.136
While Ottomanism was based on the direct relationship of the individual to
the state, the policy of themillet reified the religious community as the basis of
subjecthood. While individuals were legally allowed to change their religion,
the decree of 1856 institutionalized the religious communities in terms of their
hierarchy and organization.137 The legalization of conversion challenged the
authority of the patriarch and the local Christian clergy. Rebellion against the
leadership of the church was facilitated by the rise of the Uniate churches.
Individuals or groups could threaten to join the Uniate church or vice versa
in order to achieve their goals.138
Nevertheless, in order to regulate the administration of religious groups, the
decree of 1856 strengthened the patriarchs’ and laity’s authority over their com-
munity and harmonized their internal hierarchy. It attributed salaries to the
clergy139 and created boards composed of both clerical and lay elements in
which government officials would have a say.140 While giving religious leaders
a stronger voice in cases of conversion, this policy also reduced their auton-
omy.141
The bureaucrats found themselves struggling in their attempt to create a
social unity on ideological bases and both strategies of fostering unity were
simultaneously employed. Those differing objectives may help explain in part
the confusion that existed concerning the objectives of the reforms and the
practical policies adopted during this period. The lack of clarity of the reforms
thus led to a complex situation in which civil servants had difficulties in decid-
ing how to act, who to punish, and whose authority to enforce. These confu-
136 Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy, 31, 38.
137 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 15; Bernard
Heyberger, Les Chrétiens Du Proche-Orient: Au Temps de la Réforme Catholique (Syrie,
Liban, Palestine, xviie–xviiie siècles) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1994), 63–107.
138 For example, when the Melkite patriarch decided to replace the existing traditional cal-
endar of Christians in theMiddle East with the Gregorian calendar promoted by the Pope,
part of the church categorically refused this reform for political or religious reasons. The
Uniates in Damascus who refused to adopt the Gregorian calendar mandated by Rome
threatened to join the Greek Orthodox church, a.e.cpc, Turquie/Damas, Lamartine-
Comte Walewski, 2 October 1857.
139 Hurewitz, Middle East, 1:316–318.
140 Masters, Christians and Jews, 139.
141 See the decree of 1856 in Hurewitz, Middle East, 1:316–318; Smyrnelis, Une Société hors de
Soi, 42.
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sions and ambiguities also gave various actors more leeway to shape the man-
ner in which the reforms were understood, applied, modified or resisted.
In conclusion, the Tanzimat period, characterized by imperial restructuring,
foreign intervention, and internal rebellions, turned public space into both an
instrument of social transformation and a stake in political struggles. From the
Egyptian occupation onwards, the political, social, and economic role of Chris-
tians in Damascus was shaped by the structure of international relations, by
the reform decrees, and by interactions on the local level between different
power representatives. Ottoman societies were composed of a variety of actors
who participated in the practice of political power and directed the ways in
which the vaguely formulated andambiguous reformswere applied locally. The
consuls and the governors, representing two power institutions, were instru-
mental in determining the interpretation and enactment of the reforms. Their
relationship was punctuated by struggles for sovereignty, especially concern-
ing the issue of protection. The consuls and the governors functioned as two
parallel authorities that competed for recognition and legitimacy through their
involvement in local conflicts. In this context, specific places in the city became
the locus of inter-confessional tensions, as the spatial dynamics of the events of
1860 indicate. Public displays such as sartorial customs and the built environ-
mentwere also used by all parties to bolster their positions; daily practices thus
contributed to the political polarization of religious groups. The case study of
conversion demonstrates that in the context of the Tanzimat, faith became an
issue of loyalty and sovereignty. Conversion developed into a political shift of
allegiance. Spiritual competitionwas a continuation of international politics at
the local level. The legal, political, and social difficulties arising from the cases
of conversion point to the transitional nature of the Tanzimat period, during
which the relations between the empire and its subjects were radically trans-
formed. Because of the tensions between notions of individual and communal
subjecthood in the reforms, relations between non-Muslims and the Ottoman
state were unclear. This lack of clarity allowed for the involvement of a variety
of actors speaking in the name of Ottoman Christians. While this involvement
provided economic and political opportunities for some individuals, it led to a
general deterioration of inter-confessional relations, and this had dire conse-
quences for the Christians of Damascus.
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chapter 7
The King is Dead, Long Live the King!
Jewish Funerary Performances in the Iraqi Public
Space
A. Schlaepfer*
Introduction
This article engages in an analysis of the two royal funerals that took place
in 20th Iraq—that of King Fayṣal (1933) and King Ghāzī (1939)—and Jewish-
Muslim interactions in the Iraqi urban space. The processions organized after
their death by their subjects “of every creed” were numerous. Muslims, Jews
and Christians alike repeatedly proceeded in the streets of Iraqi cities cov-
ered in black, beating their breast (men), moaning loudly (women) and cov-
ering their faces and chest with mud. Extensively commented on by officials
and witnesses, these events offer a unique glance at the way Iraq’s numerous
communities invested the public space and at how they interacted in it. For
non-Muslim citizens such as the Jews, these occasions represented an oppor-
tunity to assert their desire to coexist with other communities, their struggle
against sectarianism (ṭāʾifiyya), loyalty to the State, the king and the Iraqi Arab
nation. By studying these ceremonies as performances—whereby participants
show others what they are doing in order to influence their judgment—the
paper aims at shedding light on the function of these ceremonies and the role
played by Jews in the Iraqi public space. Fayṣal being more popular among
Iraqi Jews than his son Ghāzī, one could expect the ceremonies organized by
Jews in the memory of Fayṣal, to be more expressive of their grief than those
organized in the memory of Ghāzī, but the following analysis will prove oth-
erwise. Based on testimonies from internal and external actors alike (accounts
by Iraqi Jewish witnesses, journalists, correspondence between teachers at the
Alliance israélite universelle and the headquarter in Paris, British and Ameri-
can officials), the article intends to demonstrate that the Jews’ public expres-
sion of grief was not proportionate to the degree of sympathy they actually
* I am very grateful to Daniel Barbu, Aomar Boum, Eva Nada and the editors of the present
volume for their thorough reading of this article and their invaluable comments.
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felt for their monarchs. By comparing the behavior of Iraqi Jewish participants
to the ceremonies—such as street processions, public speeches, chants, phys-
ical and oral expressions of grief, as well as the media coverage—organized
after Fayṣal’s death and those that took place after Ghāzī’s death, it will show
that the performances of the Jewish mourners responded to the necessities of
the socio-political context at the time of the kings’ death, rather than that of
grief.
The Jewish Funerary Ritual as a Performance
According to Durkheim, the grief expressed during a particular ritual is emi-
nently social and independent of the individual’s affective state. The grief is
a collective assertion that the individual consents to be part of rather than a
spontaneous or personal expression of sadness.1 Participants in a ritual thus
deliberately play a role and act in a similar fashion as they would in a theatre
play: Contrary to everyday life, they show spectators what they are doing in
order to influence their judgement. Pursuing the analogy with acting, Turner
defines the ritual as aperformance, duringwhichmessages are communicated.2
But the distinction between actors and spectators is less clear in a funeral: par-
ticipants act and watch at the same time during a funerary ceremony, while it
is not the case in a theatre play. In this sense, the funeral is closer to Bakhtin’s
reading of the medieval carnivalesque. Throughout the carnival, he argues, the
participant who is both actor and spectator parodies and imitates real life with
costumes, chants and dances. The process is similar with funerals: Mourners
play a role as both actors and spectators in the ceremonies. Their motion, text
and clothing are not pure fiction, they imitate real life in a caricature fash-
ion. And by playing real life in a caricature, the carnival—like the funeral—
temporarily suspends social order, and thus symbolically forces out boundaries
of the everyday life. Rules are consequently overthrown, hierarchies reversed,
and the structure turned over.3 This liminal phase is a moment during which
a breach is momentarily made possible between all social, ethnic or religious
boundaries.4 Participants reach a state of communion that transcends all these
1 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. (London: Courier Dover
Publications, 2012), 397–400.
2 Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Performance, (New York: paj Publications, 1988), 72–98.
3 Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984), 7.
4 For the rites of passage and liminality, see Arnold van Gennep, Les rites de passage: étude
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ordinary barriers and together they unite. Turner names this slippery moment
of epiphany communitas or anti-structure.5 For an Iraqi such as the Jews, the
temporary absence of structure characteristic of the communitas represented
an ideal opportunity for them to send an explicit message to others, as they
could be as visible and as vocal as the other communities could be. Citizens
are equal in mourning, one could say.
The Funerary Ritual: Between Predictability andMalleability
In a Hobsbawmian reading of modern history, the repetitive nature of tradi-
tions is important, especially in aperiodof crisiswhen stability needs to be con-
stantly reaffirmed, through established and regular public practices. Repeated
traditions imply continuitywith thepast and thus give the impression that they
remain unaltered over time.6 The Middle East in the post-Ottoman era in par-
ticular was a period of great changes. The sharif Ḥusayn of Mekka (Fayṣal’s
father) had long aspired to obtain an Arab Kingdom or Caliphate, but had
instead inherited the small Kingdom of Hejaz, and lost it almost immediately.
His son ʿAbdallah was appointed King of Jordan, while Fayṣal became King
of Iraq, after a first and unsuccessful coronation in Syria. Needless to say, the
Hashemite monarchies were desperately seeking homogeneity, stability and
strength, precisely because the context indicated otherwise. Such traditions as
royal funerals were therefore crucial for themonarchy to reassert its power, sta-
bility and control over its subjects.
Despite these efforts, however, many aspects obviously varied in practice,
from one funeral to another. For instance, the sharif Ḥusayn of Mekka died
in 1931 in Amman, and Fayṣal died in 1933 in Switzerland. Originally, both
systématique des rites, (Paris: E. Nourry, 1909); Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and
Anti-Structure, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
5 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process, 94–97.
6 Traditions are a “set of practices, […] of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate
certain values […] by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.” Eric
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 1. See also the article in the same volume by David Cannadine, “The
Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the ‘Invention of
Tradition’, c. 1820–1977”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition,
105: “[…] in a period of change, conflict or crisis, it might be deliberately unaltered so as to
give an impression of continuity, community and comfort, despite overwhelming contextual
evidence to the contrary.”
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their bodies were supposed to be taken to Jerusalem at some point. In the
case of Ḥusayn, the body did arrive in Jerusalem by car where the procession
met representatives of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Jewish Agency, as well
as of various Muslim and Christian societies, at the Old City’s Herod’s Gate.
The coffin was then carried into the Dome of the Rock and to the Mosque
of Al-Aqsa, and the burial eventually took place next to the Haram area. A
small window was opened in the wall of the holy place in order to connect
it symbolically to Ḥusayn’s tomb. The British High Commissioner for Palestine
asserted that “no untoward incident of any kind occurred during the funeral”.7
However, in the case of Fayṣal’s body, a religious ceremony was also originally
supposed to take place in Jerusalem on its way from Haifa to Baghdad, but the
coffin was “taken direct to Baghdad by air”,8 in order to avoid potential political
excitement, according to British officials,9 because at the time of Fayṣal’s death,
interreligious tensions were much higher.
The difference shows how the socio-political context influences the way
the ceremony is held. “Men resemble their time more than they do their
fathers”,10 states the French historian Marc Bloch, quoting an Arab proverb.
In other words, the funeral not only serves the purpose of a ritual as a pre-
established and predictable set of movements, but also acts as a malleable,
“elastic and dynamic”11 product, in which a mosaic of elements interact and
converge.12 Parts of a funeral therefore follow the rule of predictability, while
other parts vary according to a changing context and therefore follow the rule of
malleability. Both similarities and dissimilarities signal a message; The former
express the need for hegemony, while the latter—the focus of the present
article—unveil the surrounding socio-political context.
7 “High Commissioner for Palestine, Jerusalem to colonial Office, 11 June 1931,” in Records of
the Hashimite Dynasties, A Twentieth Century Documentary History, ed. Alan de L. Rush,
Vol. 4, (Slough: Archive Editions, 1995), 428–431.
8 “Paraphrase telegram from High Commissioner for Palestine to Colonial Secretary, Lon-
don, 11 September 1933,” in Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 11,
777.
9 “Telegram fromForeignOffice, London toMrMurray, Rome, 9 September 1933,” in Records
of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 11, 776.
10 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. (New York: Knopf, 2004), 27–29.
11 David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monar-
chy and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c. 1820–1977”, 106.
12 Julia Kristeva, Sēmeiōtikē: recherches pour une sémanalyse, (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 146.
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The Jews and Their Monarchs
In August 1921, Fayṣal b. Ḥusayn, son of the Hashemite dynasty of the sharifs of
Mekka, was enthroned King of Iraq. Twelve years later, in September 1933, he
died of a heart attack in Interlaken (Switzerland). He was succeeded by his son
Ghāzī, aged 21, who ruled over Iraq for six years, before he was killed in a car
crash in April 1939. His son Fayṣal ii succeeded him under the Regency of his
uncle ʿAbdAl-Ilāh, until he became of age (hewas then three years old). During
the July 1958 Revolution, themonarchywas overthrownby theGeneral ʿAbdAl-
Karīm Qāsim, and all members of the royal family were killed, thus putting an
end to the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.
In the collective memory of Iraqi Jews, Fayṣal is most commonly remem-
bered as a good sovereign, to which all sorts of benefits are attributed, such
as promoting religious tolerance. In a speech he delivered a few weeks before
his coronation during an official visit to the Jewish community in July 1921 he
declared: “There is no such thing as a Jew, a Muslim, or a Christian. There is
simply one thing called Iraq.”13 Accordingly, Fayṣal’s death is seen as a turning
point, after which the “golden age” came to an end. IbrāhīmAl-Kabīr,14 the Jew-
ish accountant General of the Ministry of Finance, writes:
Faisal was succeeded by Crown Prince Ghasi who was proclaimed King
of Iraq immediately after the death of his father. King Faisal was a genius
with a great intellect, tremendous memory and deep and long sighted
political acumen. His death created a vacuumwhich could never be filled
and historians will record it as a turning point in the destinies of the Arab
world and perhaps beyond it.15
Inversely, Ghāzī, known to be close to ultra-nationalistic circles and unsympa-
thetic to the Jews, aroused fear and suspicion. Al-Kabīr continues:
13 Philip Willard Ireland, ʿIraq: A study in Political Development, (London: J. Cape, 1937), 466.
14 Ibrāhīm Al-Kabīr (1885–1973) was born in Baghdad in 1885. After the Iraqi State was cre-
ated, he was hired by the minister of Finance Sāsūn Ḥasqayl, and became Chief Accoun-
tant in 1926. Hewas known as Abū al-ʿumla “father of currency” by his colleagues, because
he was in charge of introducing an independent currency in Iraq. He is the author of an
unpublished autobiographical pentalogy (1963–1970).
15 Ibrahim Al-Kabir, My Governmental Life, or Story of a Dream, 1964 (unpublished manu-
script), 86–87.
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Ghasi was a man of mediocre intelligence, immature judgement and
foresight. He was weak, irresolute and soon fell under the influence of
young army officers. He was very friendly with me and in conversation
he called me “My brother Ibrahim”. I felt, however, I could not rely on
the moral and material support I got from King Faisal in my dealing
with unscrupulous ministers. My apprehensions were not unjustified
and I expected that the shaky foundation of the State would soon be
undermined.16
Similarly, Iṣḥāq Bar Moshe,17 a young Baghdadi Jew, recalls memories from his
childhood in an autobiographical trilogy. He reports a conversation he heard
between two adults right after Fayṣal’s death in Bayt Fī Baghdād:
– Fayṣal loved the Jews and protected them.
– And nobody knows how it will be after him, with Ghāzī.
– They say he is the opposite of his father; that he tends not to like the Jews.
– Fayṣal knew the Jewish community notables and used to receive them.
– He is from the old generation; he did not have prejudices or passionate
hostility towards the Jews.18
RobertMéfano, deputy director of the Alliance israélite universelle (aiu) school
in Baghdad, describes the backroomatmosphere in themilieu of Jewish leaders
and public figures when Fayṣal died. Emergency committees, meetings and
gatherings were convened and strategies were elaborated:
Beside grief, Jews are anxious about their future, too. One could see that
as soon as the news spread, Jews met in groups in order to speak about
tomorrow, as [Fayṣal’s] heir is not known to be well-disposed towards
Jews, as was his father. The young sovereign has always been the hope
of extremist nationalists of the country.19
16 Ibid.
17 Iṣḥāq Bar Moshe (1927–2003) was born in Baghdad in a religious family. He studied at the
Faculty of Law and left Iraq in 1950. His autobiographical trilogy (Al-Khūrūj min Al-ʿIrāq
(1975) Bayt Fī Baghdād (1983) Ayyām Al-ʿIrāq (1988)) is an extremely rich account of the
every day life of a Jewish family in the old Baghdad. He died in Israel in 2003.
18 Iṣḥāq Bar Moshe, Bayt fī Baghdād, Jerusalem, Manshūrāt Rābiṭat al-Jāmiʿiyyīn al-Yahūd
al-Nāziḥīn min al-ʿIrāq, 1983, 227–229.
19 “Robert Méfano, Baghdad, 13 September 1933”, aiu Archives. “A la douleur de la perte du
roi s’ajoutait l’ anxiété de l’avenir. On pouvait voir, aussitôt la nouvelle répandue, des Juifs
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Fayṣal was much popular and appreciated among Jews than was his son
Ghāzī. But the question that rises at this point is the following: is the Jews’
expression of grief to the death of their monarchs related to the degree of
sympathy they felt for them?The following comparisonbetween the two sets of
ceremonies will bring elements of answer to this question through an analysis
of the performances and their messages.
Fayṣal’s Death (1933)
Fayṣal I died of a heart attack in Bern (Interlaken) on 8 September, 1933. Before
being sent back to Baghdad, his body followed a long itinerary, first from
Switzerland to Brindisi in Italy. From there the body “was embarked on an
Italian boat and towed alongside H.M.S. Despatch” to Palestine, in a coffin
“conveyed on a horse-drawn carriage”.20 During the journey, the coffin was
taken into pieces, as its dimensions were too big, for the room designed for
that purpose. After the body had arrived in Haifa on 14 September, the coffin
was “taken direct to Baghdad by air”21 on 15 September.
In Baghdad, the news of his death spread early in the morning of 8 Septem-
ber 1933. Right after the afternoon prayer, processions of people were formed
and representatives of every community started to proceed through the city
“beating their breasts and wailing dirges”, according to the American Consul
General in Baghdad, Paul Knabenshue (1883–1942). “Members of guilds carried
banners proclaiming their membership in a particular trade” and “black robed
women on the house tops wept, wailed and moaned”.22 Another eyewitness,
Gerald de Gaury, a British official and close friend of the Iraqi monarchs, gives
a similar account on the general attitude of the crowd: “Long before the hour
of arrival the streets were lined by inhabitants, the great majority crying with-
out restraint.” The women, according to him were also “covered in their usual
se réunir en de colloques où il était question du lendemain, l’héritier ne jouissant pas de la
même réputation de bienveillance à l’égard des Juifs. Ce souverain jeune a de tout temps
été l’espoir des nationalistes extrémistes du pays.” [Original spelling].
20 “Message and letter from Captain Drummond, hms Despatch, 14 September 1933,” in
Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 11, 779.
21 “Paraphrase telegram from High Commissioner for Palestine to Colonial Secretary, Lon-
don, 11 September 1933,” 777.
22 “Mr P. Knabenshue, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 19 September 1933,” in
Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 11, 793–794.
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black veils and cloaks, lined the balconies and roof-edges, where they rocked
andmoaned and shrieked in unison andwere but little less subdued than their
men.”23
A mourning of seven days was declared, during which all shops closed,
amusements banned, and flagswere flown at half-mast.When the body arrived
in Baghdad on 15 September accompanied by Fayṣal’s brother and officials,
the body was placed on a gun-carriage, with “a large portrait of the late king,
draped in black crepe, while the top of it was surmounted by about a dozen
Iraqi flags on small flag staffs”. The procession passed across Maude Bridge, to
the Royal Court, where more than five hundreds official guests were waiting
to join the procession. All eventually arrived together at the royal tomb that
had been built next to the Parliament House. After the booming of ninety-
nine guns and prayers “the funeral of King Faisal i came to an end”.24 All eye-
witnesses, especially Westerners who were not used to these expressions of
grief, insist on the fervor of the crowd. De Gaury writes: “When the whole
people of a city or countryside are mourners, as was the case at the death of
King Faisal and later at the death of King Ghazi, then the scene is to Euro-
peans truly eccentric.”25 At times, Knabenshue is also moved by the “outpour-
ing of deep emotion” and deeply impressed by the “uncontrollable crowd”
and “thousands of excited Arabs […] bemoaning the untimely death of their
king”.26
Robert Méfano, head of the aiu, sends a report to the headquarters in Paris
on 13 September, in which he describes a specifically “Jewish procession” that
took place on 10 September, i.e. two days after Fayṣal’s death was announced. It
appears from the report that Méfano did not personally attend the ceremony,
as he asked the Great Rabbi and President of the Jewish community Sāsūn
Khaḍḍūrī,27 leading organizer, to give him a precise account of the procession.
According to his testimony, the procession started at 3 pm, with about 1000
people gathered in the schoolyard of the Midrash school.28 All teachers wore
23 Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad, The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy, (New York:
I.B. Tauris, 2008 (1961)), 91.
24 “Mr P. Knabenshue, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 19 September 1933,” 793–
794.
25 Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad, 93.
26 “Mr P. Knabenshue, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 19 September 1933,” 794.
27 Born in Baghdad in 1886, Sāsūn Khaḍḍūrī became Great Rabbi in 1928, and President of
the Jewish community (raʾīs al-ṭāʾifa) in 1931. He occupied this position until his death in
1971 (except for a few years in the 1950s).
28 The Midrash Talmud Torah school opened in Baghdad in 1832–1833. In 1880, about 1000
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black armbands and the Great Rabbi addressed two prayers; the first one to
“the soul of the great king whose death has prematurely snatched him from his
nation and its children”,29 and the second to Ghāzī, his son, so that he finds the
strength and wisdom to rule his subjects. Finally, the Great Rabbi delivered a
speech that made all members of his audience cry.
At 3.30 pm, the group started to walk, headed by 2000 students, “a burning
candle in hand”, followed by theGreat Rabbi and other rabbis. After them came
notables, Jews organized by quarter, and women wearing black “tcharchafs”.
Soon, more than 1000 bare-chested men, “beating their chest with both hands
on the rhythm of kettledrum”,30 joined the procession from adjacent streets.
The group was then divided into three parts, each scanning in turn an oration
from the Jewish poet al-Baghdādī.31 While one group was singing, the others
were beating their breasts “according to the Arab custom”. According to the
Great Rabbi, some 55,000 people32 were chanting:
“O, people, make your tears flow
Ghazi’s father, the hard-working, is no more.
You disappeared from among us, our King,
You have left, leaving us in grief
The king of the Arabs is gone
Abandoning his cub
O dear Ghazi, our precious
In you, we put all our hopes, after him”
Members of the Jewish procession held banners with such inscriptions: “The
Israelite communitymourns your loss, O father of Ghazi”; “All our condolences
go to you, O Ghazi, we will die for you”; “All our eyes cry”. When they arrived
at the Royal Court, speeches were delivered. And according to Méfano, non-
Jewish witnesses were so moved by these expressions of grief, that they “spon-
pupils studied in the school, and in 1913, about 2700. The graduates from the Midrash
Talmud Torah founded the Zilkha Yeshiva in 1840. For more on theMidrash school system
and curricula, see the contribution to the present volume by Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah:
“Jewish Education in Baghdad: Communal space vs. public space”.
29 “Robert Méfano, Baghdad, 13 September 1933”, aiu Archives.
30 Ibid.
31 Méfanomentions “the Jewish poet fromBaghdad”. Hemost likely refers to the 11th century
Arabic poet of Jewish origin Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī.
32 Local press reported 60,000.
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taneously spoke”33 publically and in good terms of the Iraqi Jews. Somemoving
“incidents” were reported, such as the story of a Muslim man who ran towards
the Great Rabbi, in order to personally thank him in the name of the Muslims
for the Jews’ expression of grief. Other Muslim members of the crowd climbed
up a ladder and shouted that Jews andMuslims were brothers. The procession
came to an end at around 10.30 pm. When the Jews left the Palace, it was dark
and all lights were turned off. Thousands of people were chantingmonotonous
orations andbeating their chest rhythmically, whilewomenweremoaning. Old
men were marching next to the children, in a gloomy atmosphere. Police offi-
cers were said to have offered the old rabbis to drive them back home.
The succession of all these performances offered an “impressive” sight, ac-
cording to the report. The witness Iṣḥāq BarMoshe also expresses his astonish-
ment, while giving a very similar account of the events:
I remember vividly King Fayṣal’s death. I remember that all men of our
house went out in the streets to see the enormous funeral procession.
One could read real grief on everyone’s face […] The day the funeral
procession took place, after his body was sent back from Switzerland, is
unforgettable. I heard people from inside and outside the house asking
God to have mercy upon the king, and spoke well of him. All men wore
a special cap that the king used to wear and that they named after him,
fayṣaliyya.34
Méfano concludes his report by stating that the procession and participation
to the national mourning was successful in terms of recognition, contrary to
the Christian community whose representatives were criticized for their “lack
of effusiveness”. King Ghāzī is said to have been impressed by the Israelites and
while the nationalist newspaper Al-ʿĀlam al-ʿarabī looked at this demonstra-
tion of grief with suspicion, other newspapers openly blamed the attitude of
the nationalist newspaper, that was consequently asked tomake up for its tact-
lessness, in a following issue. “In conclusion, according to h.e. the Great Rabbi,
a great reversal took place in favor of the Jews”.35
Several pieces of evidence lead to the conclusion that the prevailingmessage
of the communitas is one of religious harmony and solidarity. First, the sim-
ilarity between the processions organized by Jews only, and those organized
33 “Robert Méfano, Baghdad, 13 September 1933”, aiu Archives. “s’ improvisèrent orateurs”
[Original spelling].
34 Iṣḥāq Bar Moshe, Bayt fī Baghdād, 227–229.
35 “Robert Méfano, Baghdad, 13 September 1933”, aiu Archives.
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by non-Jewish Iraqis is striking. The Jews’ expressions of grief are modeled
on that of the other ceremonies. Méfano stresses that the ceremony followed
the “Arab custom”, and Ibrāhim al-Kabīr writes that all processions followed
“the old fashioned Arab style”:36 men beating their chest, womenmoaning and
wearing black, the crying, the chanting and the scanning; everything in the Jew-
ish ceremony echoes the other ceremonies. Second, their “spontaneity” and
“effusiveness” is acknowledged by King Ghāzī himself. Third, non-Jewish Iraqis
physically and orally engage in these performances of ecumenical nature. As
the procession unfolds, non-Jewish mourners join: the cortege starts with 1000
people and ends with 55,000, or more. Similarly, non-Jews are said to be chant-
ing with Jews, climbing the ladder to thank the Great Rabbi, and policemen
are reported driving old and tired Jews back home. All these elements illustrate
the complete—yet temporary—collapse of the ordinary social structure, and
allow the anti-structure to emerge. This is characteristic of the liminal phase,
when unordinary things become possible. The carnivalesque allows mourners
to imitate real life in a caricature fashion—and in this case an ideal life, where
interreligious harmony prevails.
The context surrounding Fayṣal’s deathwas one of transition: independence
had just been achieved (1932), and all hopes were at first entertained. But the
massacre of hundreds ofAssyrians in thenorthern part of Iraq inAugust 1933 by
the army led to a general feeling of insecurity among non-Sunni communities.
In the Iraqi press, Assyrians were depicted as a threat to the Iraqi national
security and unity.37 Consequently, theworst threat for Jewswas being accused
of ṭāʾifiyya—sectarianism, and for not being enough engaged in interacting
with other communities. In these performances and in the way they were
reported by media coverage, emphasis had therefore to be placed precisely on
this interaction; its spontaneity, solidarity, and intensity. And when Méfano
compares the weak Christian performance to the “effusive” one organized by
the Jews, when he reports the king’s approval and the fact that the nationalist
newspaper Al-ʿĀlam al-ʿarabī has been ostracized because of its anti-Jewish
position, he states that the effort was crowned with success. The community
representative therefore tacitly acknowledges that the ritual has a very specific
social function in a very specific political context. Following Marcel Mauss’
interpretation of magic rituals, the ceremony can be said to have been truly
effective.38
36 Ibrahim Al-Kabir, My Governmental Life, 86.
37 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76.
38 See for example: Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, “Introduction à l’analyse de quelques
phénomènes religieux”, Mélange d’histoire des religions, (Paris: F. Alcan, 1909), 15.
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King Ghāzī’s Death (1939)
King Ghāzī died on April 3rd at 11.30 pm, following a car crash on his way
from his private radio station to Qaṣr Al-Zuhūr (Royal Palace). According to
the official report, “as he went over the conduit at high speed, the front wheels
must have left the ground, so that, when he tried to bear to the left, he had
no control. The car ran into a telegraph pole which cracked and fell forward,
smashing his head”.39 The newspapers were suppressed the morning after,
even though they were printed too early for the news to be published. The
news started to spread anyways, and the suppression was accordingly received
with suspicion by public opinion.40 Rumours accusing the British of being
responsible for the king’s death consequently spread like wildfire. Later that
day, three communiqués were issued; in the first one, the king’s death was
announced, the second one contained a medical report in response to the
rumours, and the third one announced the accession to the throne of his son
Fayṣal ii and the appointment of Amir ʿAbd Al-Ilāh as Regent.41
The king’s body was immediately transported to the Royal Court, but the
car was left untouched for days, in order to show evidence to the thousands of
onlookers that it was an accident, and not a murder. Ibrāhīm Al-Kabīr visited
the scene several days after it took place and writes:
39 Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad, 110.
40 “American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, Despatch No. 1275, with
enclosures, 12 April and further communication,” in Records of the Hashimite Dynasties,
ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 629.
41 Despite British insistence that Prince Zayd should be regent instead of ʿAbd Al-Ilāh, the
proposition was overruled by both the British chargé d’affaires based in Baghdad, Mr.
Houstoun-Boswall and Nūrī Al-Saʿīd, who thought that Amir Zayd’s wife was “ambitious,
venal […], susceptible to German influences and in touch with all sorts of untouchable
circles in the Middle East”. Right after the crash, Queen ‘Aliyā’ is said to have asked Dr.
Sinderson, the king’s personal physician, to give him a strong injection, while he was
dying, insisting that he should name a Regent before he dies. She then said that he had
murmured ʿAbd Al-Ilāh, the Queen’s brother. It was considered evidence by the council
of ministers and the decision was approved by a joint session of Senate and Chamber of
Deputies on 6 April. “Telegram from American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State,
Washington, 6April 1939,” inRecordsof theHashimiteDynasties, ed. AlandeL. Rush, Vol. 12,
607. “Mr Houston-Boswall, Baghdad to Foreign Office, London, 6 April 1939,” in Records of
the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 608–609. Matthew Elliot, “The Death
of King Ghazi: Iraqi Politics, Britain and Kuwait in 1939,” Contemporary British History, 20
(3), 75.
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His death was followed by rumors that he was the victim of a plot engi-
neered by Nouri Al Said with British connivance. Many people were
invited to visit the scene of the accident and with some colleagues I did
the same and saw the badly damaged car resting against a tree a short dis-
tance from Qasr-al-Zehour. There could be no doubt about the accident,
particularly when Ghazi was known to be a reckless driver and speed
addict.42
While the body was being transported to the Royal Palace, groups of people
already started to follow the coffin, with “mourners, wailing, beating their
breast and tearing their hair in the intensity of their grief”.43 According to
Gerald de Gaury: “Ghazi was mourned by the emotional people of Baghdad
with great intensity. From early morning processions of people weeping and
beating their breasts passed through the main streets and the wail of women
gave a macabre note to an unforgettable scene.”44
On 5 April, the official funeral took place. At 8 am, the procession left the
Royal Court, heading to the mausoleum in Aʿdhamiyya, where King Fayṣal and
King ʿAlīwere buried. They arrived there at 9 am. Prayerswere recited in front of
thousands ofmourners, and a salute of ninety-nine gunswas fired. According to
Houstoun-Boswall, British chargé d’affaires based in Baghdad, the crowd was
in “a fever of hysteria”. Iraqis who attended the procession were crying. Some
women “abandoned themselves to hysterical grief”, “covering their heads and
breasts with mud from the gutters”.45 The fātiḥa was read and the body was
interred. Similarly, the journalist who reported for Iraq Times, wrote that “the
police had a formidable task to perform in maintaining order owing to the
general feeling of hysteria prevailing among the populace”.46 The American
representative Knabenshue described the event as “impressive”,47 and was
surprised to see “soldiers and even policemen sobbing like children”.48
42 Ibrahim Al-Kabir, My Governmental Life, 101–102.
43 “Houstoun-Boswall/Halifax, Baghdad, 11 April 1939,” in Records of the Hashimite Dynasties,
ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 617.
44 Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad, 111.
45 “Houstoun-Boswall/Halifax, Baghdad, 11 April 1939,” 618.
46 Iraq Times, 6 April, 1939, in Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12,
639.
47 “Telegram from American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 6 April
1939,” 607.
48 “Houstoun-Boswall/Halifax, Baghdad, 11 April 1939,” 617.
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In a similarway toFayṣal’s funeral in 1933,members of the Jewish community
throughout the country publicly expressed their sorrow, by organizing cere-
monies in honor of their “beloved king”.49 Robert Méfano, now director of the
Reemah Kadoorie Jewish school for girls (aiu) in Basra, sent a fully detailed
description of the reaction of the school authorities to Paris. According to the
report, the flag was immediately flown at half-mast. Within an hour of the
announcement of the king’s death, he asserted, all the pupils gathered in the
schoolyard, in tears. Teachers ran to the local fabric store—which opened espe-
cially for this occasion—and sewed banners and armbands for the school’s
scouts. All girls wore their black overallswithout the usualwhite collar. Rapidly,
a procession led by two teachers dressed in black “from top to toe” started to
proceed; one held a portrait of the king, the other an Iraqi flag. Two tall students
held a black banner with the following inscription: “The mourning Alliance
Israélite schools offer their condolences to Faiçal ii, to the Queen Mother and
to the Hashimi family.” 550 girls were followed by boy scouts with black arm-
bands holding a banner with the inscription: “Our beloved King is dead, long
live the King”. When the group left the school, it was joined by members of the
aiu Alumni Association and the Jewish Youth Association. The fanfare, cov-
ered by a black veil played a funeral march, while two groups of pupils sang,
in turn. The first group sang: “Our beloved King is dead, we mourn for him
from the bottom of our heart”; and the second group responded: “we mourn
for him”. Women moaned, and men beat their chests rhythmically, following
the “Arab custom”. Some people covered their faces with mud. Progressively,
various members of the city’s population also joined the procession including
Jewish notables, and a dense crowd of non-Jews. The mourning crowd eventu-
ally reached the Governorate building, where a State representative officially
thanked them for their condolences and greeted their spontaneity. Méfano
insists on how emotional the scene was: “I could not describe to you how emo-
tional the procession was. Those who saw them along the way could not hold
back their tears.”50
A memorial service organized by the aiu teachers took place at the school
again, a few weeks later (23 April). The local authorities, the President of
the Jewish community in Basra Sāsūn ʿĀbid,51 and numerous Jewish nota-
49 Al-Thughūr, Basra, April 1939 (exact date unknown), aiu Archives.
50 “Robert Méfano, Basra, to President of aiu Paris, 14 April 1939”, aiu Archives. “Nous ne
saurons vous décrire combien le cortège était émouvaut. Le long du parcours ceux qui le
voyaient passer ne pouvaient contenir leurs larmes.” [Original spelling].
51 Born in Baghdad in 1898, Sāsūn ʿĀbid settled in Basra after the First World War. Active
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bles attended the ceremony. In his speech, the President of the community
repeatedly declared the community’s loyalty to its “Arab nation” (li-ummatina
al-ʿarabiyya) and towards its “admired king” (al-malīk al-muʿaẓẓam). And he
concluded with these three words: “God. The King. The Nation (al-waṭan).”52
The service was followed by a speech delivered by a young pupil. In the words
of the school’s director, “every time she addressed the portrait of the late king,
her heartrending voice would make all the people cry, without exception”.53
The ceremony ended with a funeral lament composed by one of the teacher,
and sung by a group of twenty girls and twenty boy scouts. The ceremony is
said to have “moved the Muslim element”. Al-Thughūr, a newspaper known to
be unsympathetic to the Jews, printed Sāsūn ʿĀbid’s speech word by word, and
commented favorably on the ceremony.
The rules of predictability impose certain ritual similarities with Fayṣal’s
funeral, in terms of organization, media coverage and efficacy. The crying, the
moaning, the beating, the black covering, and the “Arab custom” in general are
said to have “moved” the Muslims, as well as the State representative and the
national press, who acknowledge their efforts and sympathy. But the dissimi-
larities andmalleability of the ceremony need to be explored, too. Two aspects
in particular emerge from the comparisonwith the 1933mourning ceremonies;
the feeling of tragedy and the importance of pan-Arab nationalism.
First, the ceremony is organized “within an hour of the announcement”,
while it took the Baghdad school community two days to organize a Jewish
procession when Fayṣal died in 1933. The report insists that the local fabric
store was opened especially for the occasion, that some people covered parts
of their body with mud, and that women wore black “from top to toe”, which
was not the case in 1933. The carnivalesque, here, serves to imitate real life, by
highlighting its dark side—and not anymore its ideal one. For example, the
girls wore their usual black overall during the funerary ceremony, but they just
removed the white collar, so as to be totally dressed in black. And in Méfano’s
single report, theword “black” is used five times. Generally speaking, the Jewish
in politics there, he was appointed President of the Jewish community in Basra (raʾīs al-
ṭāʾifa). After the Second World War, he moved back to Baghdad and to Canada after the
1958 Revolution, where he died in 1990.
52 Al-Thughūr, Basra, April 1939 (exact date unknown), aiu Archives.
53 “Robert Méfano, Basra, 27 April 1939”, aiu Archives. “Une jeune fille de l’école de Reemah
Kaddourie a prononcé un discours. Chaque fois qu’elle s’adressait au portrait du defunt
Roi, avec des accents déchirants, tous sans exception versait des larmes.” [Original spel-
ling].
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response to Ghāzī’s death is thus described as more committed and expressive
of the grief provoked by the loss of their sovereign. His death is perceived as a
tragedy and not—as was the case with Fayṣal in 1933—as a spontaneous and
almost miraculous moment of epiphany between members of “every creed”.54
The feeling of emergency is very salient in 1939 and the ceremonies organized
by Jews in 1939 took a much more dramatic turn than in 1933.
Matthew Elliot concludes that Ghāzī was killed as “a result of a conspiracy
betweenNuri and Abdulillah (and possible Aliya too) encouraged by appropri-
ate hints from the British”.55 To clarify the question whether the British were
responsible or not for Ghāzī’s death—it goes without saying—is far beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, it aims at assessing the impact of this context of
conspiracy speculations, on the way the funerary ritual performed by the Jews.
At the time of Ghāzī’s death, Iraq was experiencing a period of unprecedented
tension. The situation was characterized by a strong polarization, leading to
the formation of two factions: the pro-Nūrī Al-Saʿīd on the one hand, who sup-
ported the British, and the pro-Ghāzī on the other hand, who advocated a rap-
prochementwithGermany. His car crash and the supposed British involvement
in it contributed to increase the polarization and to intensify the animosity.
The first clashes started very quickly after the announcement of the monarch’s
death. Typewritten pamphlets were distributed and speeches were delivered,
in which the British were accused of murder. Houstoun-Boswall had to be per-
sonally escorted by the Criminal Investigation Department, and despite his
numerous requests “to restore calm and to suppress the false rumours”,56 the
tension was at its peak. The car of another British official was attacked in
Ramadi. Shopswere closedand “streets patrolledby troops andarmoredcars”.57
After the British Consul in Mosul tried to quieten the people by addressing
them from his balcony, members of a mob forced their way inside the house,
and one of them “hacked himdown”58 with a pickaxe. British reports insist that
the German propaganda directed by the ambassador Fritz Grobba was indi-
rectly responsible for thedeathof the consul inMosul and for rumours accusing
the British of having killed Ghāzī.59 Some members of a secret society formed
54 “Mr P. Knabenshue, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 19 September 1933,” 793.
55 Matthew Elliot, “The Death of King Ghazi: Iraqi Politics, Britain and Kuwait in 1939,” 76.
56 “Houstoun-Boswall/Halifax, Baghdad, 11 April 1939,” 618.
57 “Telegram from American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 6 April
1939,” 607.
58 Matthew Elliot, “The Death of King Ghazi: Iraqi Politics, Britain and Kuwait in 1939,” 68.
59 “Telegram from American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, 18 April
1939,” in Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 665.
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by students and civilians were sentenced from three to fifteen years’ imprison-
ment with a fine of ten dinars by court-martial for inciting to rebel against the
State, and some were sentenced to fifteen lashes.60 But the word had already
spread: the rumour was said to have found an audience in Beirut and Dam-
ascus, broadcasted on German radio and reported in the Italian press.61 The
consequences of these accusations directly affected the Jews, who were often
perceived as allies of the British. In Kirkuk for example, anti-Jewish demon-
strations took place at the same time as those against the British.62 So, were
the rumours to intensify and were the Jewish leaders not to express full loyalty
to their king, their sincere sadness and total dissociation fromBritish supposed
intrigues against the monarchy, unwanted consequences could be felt.
Second, Ghāzī had led a harsh pan-Arab campaign for legitimizing the occu-
pation of Kuwait, mainly through his own radio broadcast.63 And unlike his
father who prioritized the Iraqi nature of the national identity at a time when
the modern State of Iraq had to be built from scratch in accordance with the
British, Ghāzī had turned his back on the colonial power and promoted pan-
Arabism as a discursive tool against it. Pan-Arab terminology and references
were accordinglyunprecedentedly strong in thepublic space. In thePalestinian
poet Akram Zuʿaytar’s speech delivered on a commemorative ceremony that
took place on the final day of mourning (14 May) in Baghdad, references to
Arabism were very strong. The word “Arab” was used seventeen times.64 Mir-
roring this trend, the influence of the pan-Arab terminological repertoire is
also prominent in the speech delivered by the President of the Jewish commu-
nity in Basra. The term “Arab” was used six times—four times accompanied
with the word “nation” (al-ummaal-ʿarabiyya),65 typical of the pan-Arab reper-
toire.
Here, the language used in the public space unveils a socio-political con-
text heavily charged in favour of a pan-Arab and pro-German community of
60 “Extracts from the IraqTimes, 27April 1939,” in Records of theHashimiteDynasties, ed. Alan
de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 667–669.
61 “British Embassy, Rome to Lord Halifax, fo, London, 5 April 1939,” in Records of the
Hashimite Dynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12, 656–657.
62 “American Legation, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, Despatch No. 1275, with
enclosures, 12 April and further communication,” 630.
63 MatthewElliot, “TheDeath ofKingGhazi: Iraqi Politics, Britain andKuwait in 1939,” 65–70.
64 “Al Bilad newspaper, 18 May 1939. Enclosure to report fromMr Houston-Boswall, Baghdad
to LordHalifax, London,” in Records of theHashimiteDynasties, ed. Alan de L. Rush, Vol. 12,
686–689.
65 Al-Thughūr, Basra, April 1939 (exact date unknown), aiu Archives.
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discourse, that Jews needed to adopt fully and at all costs if they wanted to
crown their efforts with success, as they did when Fayṣal died. This time, the
message of religious pluralism and desire to coexist at peace with other com-
munitieswas not enough for the Jews. Contrary to Fayṣal’s deathwhere empha-
sis was given to their will to interact with other communities, the attention
was much more focused on loyalty towards the State, the king, and the Arab
nation.
Conclusion
In these times of mourning, the public space becomes a political arena for
performance, where less influent elements of the society temporarily become
visible byusing thepowerof communitas. This paperhas shown that in Septem-
ber 1933 as well as in April 1939, Iraqi Jews seized the opportunity to take over
the public space, and send aperformedmessage. Themessage varied according
to the context: religiouspluralismwas themessage at Fayṣal’s deathwhen strug-
gle against sectarianism and promotion of Iraqi homogeneity prevailed, while
loyalty to the Arab nation and king dominated the discourse in the 1939 cere-
mony, afterGhāzī’s intensepan-Arab campaign in all arenas of thepublic space.
From this difference, we can conclude that even though the Jewish mourners
may have—or may have not—been affected by the loss of the monarchical
figure, the way they acted in the public space does not indicate the degree of
intensity of their emotions during the ceremonies. Rather, it provideswith tools
to understand the values or necessities of the State at the time of their taking
place.
During a more recent funeral of a Hashemite monarch, that of King Ḥusayn
of Jordan who died on 7 February 1999 in Amman, the communitas once
more proved its function. The reporter insists that Ḥusayn’s death gathered
presidencies from all around the world, “to pay their last respects” to the king.
Bill Clinton, George Bush, Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, Hafez Al-Assad,
Boris Yeltsin, Benjamin Netanyahou, Hosni Mubarak and many others, were
present. Despite the obvious similarities with the other Hashemite ceremonies
examined in this paper, the message of the communitas is very new and much
more international. King Ḥusayn of Jordan’s funeral is said to have greatly
contributed to the advancement of the peace process in the Middle East.
The journalist presents a man who managed to “balance the pressures of the
Arab world” and he emotionally announces that the “secretary general of the
Damascus-based Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was able to
shake the hand of President of Israel EzerWeizman. The first time anything like
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that has happened.”66 In other words, themessage is one of necessity for peace
in the Middle East, between Israel and the Arab States.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Records of the Hashimite Dynasties, A Twentieth Century Documentary History, ed. Alan
de L. Rush (Slough: Archive Editions, 1995), volumes 4, 11 & 12, covering the death of
King Ḥusayn (1931), King Fayṣal (1933) and King Ghāzī (1939)—National Archives,
Washington dc and National Archives, London.
Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Paris
Ibrāhīm al-Kabīr, MyGovernmental Life, or Story of a Dream, 1964 (unpublished manu-
script), Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, Or Yehuda.
BarMoshe, Iṣḥāq.Bayt fī Baghdād. Jerusalem:ManshūrātRābiṭat al-Jāmiʿiyyīn al-Yahūd
al-Nāziḥīn min al-ʿIrāq, 1983.
De Gaury, Gerald. Three Kings in Baghdad, The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy. New York:
I.B. Tauris, 2008.
Secondary Sources
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich. Rabelais and His World. Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1984.
Bashkin, Orit. New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2012.
Bloch, Marc. The Historian’s Craft. trans. New York: Knopf, 2004, 27–29.
Cannadine, David. “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British
Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c. 1820–1977.” in Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger (eds.). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983, 101–164.
Cole, Juan. “Iraq in 1939: British Alliance or Nationalist Neutrality toward the Axis?”
Britain and theWorld 5, no. 2 (2012): 204–222.
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. trans. London: Courier
Dover Publications, 2012.
Elliot, Matthew. “The Death of King Ghazi: Iraqi Politics, Britain and Kuwait in 1939.”
Contemporary British History, 20 (3), 63–81.
Enders, Armelle, “Le héros national, problème d’histoire contemporaine,” in Cather-
66 “King Hussein Funeral Service, c-span, Washington, 8 February 1999,” http://www.c-span
.org/video/?120220-1/king-hussein-funeral-service (Consulted on 31 March 2014).
204 schlaepfer
ine Mayeur-Jaouen (dir.), Saints et héros du Moyen-Orient contemporain, Paris: G.-
P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002, 37–46.
Goffman, Erving, Forms of Talk, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981.
Hubert, Henri. and Mauss, Marcel. “Introduction à l’analyse de quelques phénomènes
religieux,”Mélange d’histoire des religions Paris: F. Alcan, 1909.
Ireland, Philip Willard. ʿIraq: A Study in Political Development. London: J. Cape, 1937.
Kristeva, Julia. Sēmeiōtikē: recherches pour une sémanalyse. Paris: Seuil, 1978, 146.
Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Turner, Victor. The Anthropology of Performance. New York: paj Publications, 1988.
,TheRitual Process: Structure andAnti-Structure. London: Routledge andKegan
Paul, 1969.
Van Gennep, Arnold. Les rites de passage: étude systématique des rites. Paris: E. Nourry,
1909.
Wien, Peter. “The Long and Intricate Funeral of Yasin al-Hashimi: Pan-Arabism, Civil
Religion, and Popular Nationalism in Damascus, 1937.” International Journal of Mid-
dle East Studies 34, no. 2 (2011): 271–292.
© y. wallach, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004323285_009
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc License.
chapter 8
Jerusalem between Segregation and Integration:
Reading Urban Space through the Eyes of Justice
Gad Frumkin
Y. Wallach
Introduction
Jerusalem is seen as an archetypal example of a divided city, where extreme
ethno-national polarization is deep rooted in a long history of segregation. In
this chapter I challenge this perception by re-examining urban dynamics of
late Ottoman and BritishMandate Jerusalem, while questioning themanner in
which urban segregation is theorized and understood.
In the past few decades, there has been a reinvigorated scholarly discus-
sion of urban segregation, driven by the challenges of difference and diversity.1
Entrenched segregation between different groups (defined by race, ethnicity,
religion or class), or the “parallel lives” of different communities, living side by
side with little contact, are seen to undermine the multicultural model of the
late twentieth century. At the same time, mechanistic models of integration
through urbanmixing are increasingly challenged, and it is no longer accepted
as evident that segregation is alwaysundesirable.Nor is it obvious that everyday
contact between different communities necessarily helps to engender greater
understanding and dialogue. Scholars have been debating how to locate the
discussion of urban encounter and segregation in the lived experience of the
city. Writing on this topic suffers from the idealization of urban cosmopoli-
tanism, on the one hand, or, conversely, describing segregation in overdeter-
mined terms. To avoid this double pitfall, closer attention to the historical and
spatial context is necessary, aswell as close examination of socioeconomic real-
ities. One suggestion, that I follow in this chapter, is to focus on life histories.2 By
1 This chapter forms part of ‘Conflict in Cities and the Contested Stated’ project, funded by
the esrc’s Large Grants Programme (res-060-25-0015). For a comprehensive overview of
the scholarly discussion of urban segregation, see Laura Vaughan and Sonia Arbaci, “The
Challenges of Understanding Urban Segregation,”Built Environment 37 (June 2011): 128–138.
2 G. Valentine, “Living with Difference: Reflections on Geographies of Encounter,” Progress in
Human Geography 32, no. 3 (2008), 323.
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focusing primarily on the specific viewpoint of an embodied subject, it is pos-
sible to explore the matrix of social relations as they are played out in urban
space. Following individual urban histories also allows a consideration of dif-
ferent sites and places across the city and beyond, facilitating a multi-scalar
approach that looks at a series of sites as well as the city as a whole. The spa-
tial biographies of individuals are thus an effective way to test and challenge
common assumptions on ethnic boundaries, their meaning and depth.
In fact, in the context of Palestine/Israel there is a growing interest in per-
sonal histories as ameans of social andurbanhistory. As elaboratedbyRochelle
Davis,memoirs andautobiographieshave thepotential to challengeofficial his-
tories by bringing in the experience of the everyday.3 Salim Tamari and Issam
Nassar see autobiographies as a way to bring the voices of marginalized groups
and aspects of their lives that have long beenmissing from the dominant politi-
cal accounts ofmodernPalestine’s troubledhistory.4 Tamari andNassar, in their
work at the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, have been closely involved in the
publication and study of fascinating autobiographical sources from lost diaries,
memoirs, and photo albums.5
This chapter looks at urban segregation in lateOttomanandBritishMandate
Jerusalem primarily through the eyes of one individual—Justice Gad Frumkin.
Born in 1887 in the Old City of Jerusalem to an influential Hassidic Ashke-
nazi publisher, Frumkin started his career as a Hebrew journalist. In 1908,
attracted to the causes of Ottomanism and Zionism, he developed political
ambitions to run for the Ottoman Parliament, and studied law in Istanbul.
After the 1917 British occupation of Jerusalem he was appointed judge, as a
result of the intervention of the Zionist leader ChaimWeizmann, and was pro-
moted almost immediately to the Supreme Court, where he served for nearly
thirty years. He was the most senior Jew in an official position during theMan-
date, and had close ties with the Arab elite; he was the only leading Zionist to
have direct contact with the Mufti Hajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī in the 1920s. In the
1930s he was involved in negotiations with prominent Arab Palestinians for
a bi-national regime in Palestine, but his efforts were rejected by the Jewish
Agency. His illustrious career was terminated in 1948, when he was effectively
3 Issam Nassar and Salim Tamari (eds.), Dirasāt fī l-tārīkh al-ijtimaʿi li-bilād al-Shām: qiraʾat fī
l-siyar wa-siyar al-dhatiyya (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Dirasāt al-Filasṭīniyya, 2007).
4 Ibid.
5 Among the publications of the Institute, see Issam Nassar and Salim Tamari (eds.), Pil-
grims, Lepers & Stuffed Cabbage: Essays on Jerusalem’s Cultural History (Jerusalem: Centre for
Jerusalem Studies, 2005); Salim Tamari, Year of the Locust: A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of
Palestine’s Ottoman Past (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
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ousted from the Israeli Supreme Court. Frumkin was a member of the rul-
ing establishment throughout most of his life. But as his career developed, his
strong ties with Arab Palestinians were increasingly at odds with tendencies
within the Jewish-Zionist Yishuv (society) in Palestine. Thus Frumkin inhab-
ited a position that was simultaneously at the center and themargins; he called
into question the definition of these categories as they are applied in Pales-
tine/Israel.
The main source for this chapter is Frumkin’s published memoir, Derekh
Shofet beyerushalayim [The path of a judge in Jerusalem (Tel Aviv, 1954)].6
The memoir is rich with anecdotes and observations of everyday life in late
Ottoman and British Mandate Jerusalem. Frumkin is especially attentive to
details of space, which makes him very useful for this discussion. He takes the
trouble, for example, to describe the layout of the Ottoman Serai (governor
offices), and the exact office arrangement in the Supreme Court during the
Mandate. The memoir is hardly a new source: it has been used extensively by
Israeli historians suchas IlanPappeandTomSegev,who study the lateOttoman
and British Mandate period.7 However, these historians relied on the memoir
primarily to examine thepolitical dynamics betweenZionists andArabs during
theMandate. Theydidnot look at Frumkinhimself, or use hiswriting to rethink
boundaries and interactions between communities in Jerusalem. Frumkin was
studied in depth only by the legal historian Nathan Brun, who focused on his
dismissal from the Israeli Supreme Court.8
When considering thememoir, we should bear inmind that it waswritten in
the early 1950s. An obvious concern is the reliability of Frumkin’s descriptions
of lateOttoman Jerusalemaftermanydecades; andwhile one cannot accept his
accounts literally, there is ample evidence to show that Frumkin drew heavily
on his personal archive to write the book, and he did not rely solely on his
memory. But a further concern is the ideological bias of the book.Written after
his ousting from the Supreme Court, the memoir was undoubtedly designed
to defend his legacy and his contribution to the Zionist project and to the
establishment of Israel. In such a context, Frumkin was likely to downplay
details that could compromise his Zionist credentials. In one example, he
omittedhis relationswith a leading anti-Zionist Jewishmemberof theOttoman
6 All translations are mine.
7 Tom Segev,One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the BritishMandate (London: Little
Brown, 2000).
8 Nathan Brun, “ha-Kavod ha-Avud shel ha-Shofet ha-Elyon: Parashat i Minuyo shel ha-Shofet
Frumkin le-Beyt ha-Mishpat ha-Elyon be-Yisrael,”Kathedra 101–102 (1992): 151–190, 159–186.
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Parliament, Emmanuel Carasso.9 There is a felt tension between the author’s
desire to recount his own life story, andhiswish toportrayhimself in a favorable
light in the eyes of his Israeli readers. This ambivalence marks the memoir
and makes it a fascinating source that often needs to be read against the
grain. Especially interesting are Frumkin’s descriptions of his close relations
with the Arab Palestinian elite, or his Ottomanist disposition: these should be
seen as understated, as he had little incentive to overstate aspects that could
only detract from his image. Alongside the memoir, this chapter is based on
Frumkin’s earlier writings: his journalistic articles in the Hassidic Habatselet
newspaper between 1905 and 1909; his letters and notes, kept in his personal
archive (at the Central Zionist archives); his translation of the Ottoman codex,
the Majalla; and his legal writings and court rulings, compiled and published
in Hebrew.10
To provide an overall picture of the complexity of encounter and segregation
in Jerusalem, I focus on a series of “micro” spaces, divided schematically to
“residential spaces,” “civic spaces,” and “work spaces.” However, this analytical
categorization does not imply that these are not thought of as separate spaces;
quite the contrary, commerce, labor, political activity, and social relations were
interlinked and often occurred in the same environment.
Residential Spaces: Segregation and Integration in the Old City
Jerusalem is typically described as a city that has always maintained a high
level of residential segregation along ethnic and confessional lines. In Euro-
pean guide books and travel accounts from the early nineteenth century, one
encounters the layout of Jerusalem arranged along four confessional quarters:
Christian,Armenian, Jewish, andMuslim. Thebasic cross shapeof the city,with
twomain streets cutting north-south and east-west, separating these four quar-
ters, was the organizing principle through which Jerusalem was encountered,
experienced, and understood by western visitors and scholars; this principle is
still dominant in the historiography.11
9 Nathan Brun, Shoftim u-mishpetanim be-Erets Yiśra eʾl: ben Kushta li-Yerushalayim, 1900–
1930 (Jerusalem: Magnes, Hebrew University, 2008).
10 GadFrumkin,Majalat aḥkamal-aṣliyya: kovets dineha-tsedek (Jerusalem: [s.n.], 1928); Gad
Frumkin, Pesakim nivharim shel Gad Frumkin shofet be-vet ha-mishpaṭ ha-ʿelyon le-Erets-
Yisra eʾl, 1920–1948, ed. Shalom Kassan (Tel Aviv: Y. Tsʾetsʾik, 1962).
11 Ruth Kark, Jerusalem and Its Environs: Quarters, Neighborhoods, Villages, 1800–1948, Israel
Studies in Historical Geography (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001).
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This historical perception has ramifications for the present condition of the
city. Influential mayor Teddy Kollek, who ran the city between 1965 and 1993
and orchestrated the “unification” of Jerusalem after the 1967 occupation of
East Jerusalem, explained his philosophy in the following terms:
Within the Old City Walls there were [historically] separate quarters:
the Christian quarter, the Armenian, Greek, Ethiopian … Coptic, Jewish,
Muslim, etc. The [quarters] maintained good relations between them,
with ups and downs, formany centuries.We are continuing this tradition.
Jerusalem is not a melting pot, we are not trying to make “Goulash”
from everybody. It’s a mosaic of different cultures and civilisations living
together in one city. We are interested in preserving this state of things
and this will be the city’s character in the future.12
Kollek’s rhetoric celebrated age-old, voluntary segregation as a recipe for toler-
ance and cultural diversity. However, in practice Kollek’s policies were highly
discriminatory: the construction of Jewish-only neighborhoods and the neglect
of Palestinian neighborhoods under the pretense of “non intervention” left
Palestinians without adequate planning and public services.13 Thus, Kollek
used the “mosaic” metaphor to justify the creation of a checker-board pattern
of self-segregated Jewish neighborhoods and Arab “ghettos” locked between
them. More recently, in the 2000s, Jerusalem’s “natural” polarization along
ethno-national lines has been presented as a key reason for its inevitable polit-
ical division between Israelis and Palestinians.14
The dominant notion of the four historical segregated quarters was chal-
lenged persuasively by Salim Tamari, who argued that such quarters did not
exist in the local imaginary of the city before the late 1930s, and that the Old
City was farmoremixed in confessional terms. Tamari based his reading on the
memoirs of Wasif Jawhariyya, a musician and a civil servant in the Jerusalem
municipality, a Christian Arab who was born and raised within the supposed
confines of the Muslim quarter during the late Ottoman rule.15 Portraying an
12 Jacob Malchin, “Interview with Teddy Kollek, 1984,” Yahadut Hofshit (September 2009),
www.free-judaism.org.
13 Amir Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed, Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of
Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1999).
14 Yisrael Kimchi, “The Operational and Metropolitan Framework of Jerusalem,” in Forty
Years in Jerusalem 1967–2007, ed. Ora Ahimeir and Yaacov Bar Siman Tov (Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2008), 11–21.
15 Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar, The Storyteller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif
Jawhariyyeh, 1904–1948 (Northampton, ma: Olive Branch Press/Interlink Publishing, 2013).
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intricate picture of inter-communal links and relationships based on patron-
age, trade, business, and neighborly relations, Tamari argues that the image
of Jerusalem as a segregated city divided into ethnic-denominational quarters,
was a projection of western scholars and visitors that became reality when it
was imposed on the city during theMandate era. Locally, the citywas perceived
through neighborhoods or localities (maḥallāt) that were ethnically and reli-
giously mixed.
How do Tamari’s conclusions apply also to Jewish residential patterns in
Jerusalem? The historiography has presented the Jewish quarter in the south-
east area of the Old City as a centuries-old spatial-demographic reality.16 And
yet the term Jewish quarter (ha-rova ha-yehudi), almost never appears in local
Hebrew sources before the twentieth century. Rather, we find the term “Street
of the Jews” Reḥov Ha-Yehudim referring to a main street and its side streets,
with dominant Jewish (Sephardic) presence since the fifteenth century.17 This
area was not, however, exclusively Jewish, nor did all Jews reside in this locality.
In late Ottoman census documents18 and in the Islamic court records19 we find
ample evidence of a Jewish presence in virtually all parts of the city. Ashkenazi
Jews arriving in the city in large numbers from the middle of the nineteenth
century chose to settle in the localities of al-Wad andBab al-Hutta, in the north-
east parts of the city, as noted in surveys of historical Jewish presence in the
“Muslim quarter.”20 In memoirs of Jews such as Frumkin, David Yellin, and
Yitzhaq Shiryon who resided in these areas, we find no indication that they
perceived themselves as living outside the Jewish area of Jerusalem.21 Nor is it
16 YehoshuaBen-Arieh, Jerusalem in theNineteenthCentury: TheOldCity, vol. 1 (NewYork: St.
Martin’s Press, 1984); YehoshuaBen-Arieh, Jerusalem in theNineteenthCentury: Emergence
of the NewCity, vol. 2 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); Kark, Jerusalem and Its Environs.
17 This observation is based on a digital survey of the two most important Hebrew newspa-
pers in Jerusalem, the Frumkin’s Habatselet (1870–1911) and Eliezer Ben Yehuda’s Tsvi and
ha-Or (1884–1915). Both newspapers are available electronically at http://www.jpress.org
.il/view-hebrew.asp (accessed October 2014).
18 Adar Arnon, “Population Censuses in Jerusalem in the Later Ottoman Period,” Cathedra 6
(December 1977): 95–107; Adar Arnon, “TheQuarters of Jerusalem in theOttoman Period,”
Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 1 (1992): 1–65.
19 Amnon Cohen, Elisheva Simon-Pikali, and Eyal Ginio, Yehudim be-Bet ha-Mishpat ha-
Muslemi: Hevrah, Kalkalah ve-Irgun Kehilati bi-Yerushalayim ha-ʿOthmanit: ha-Meʾah ha-
Tesha ʿEsreh (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2003).
20 Shabtai Zecharia, Batim ve-Mosadot Yehudim ba-Rova ha-Muslemi ba-Ir ha-Atika (Jeru-
salem, 1985).
21 David Yellin, Yerushalayim shel temol (Jerusalem: ha-Ṿaʿad le-ḥotsaʾat kitve Daṿid Yelin
Hotsaʾat R. Mas, 1972); Yiẓḥak Shiryon, Zikhronot (Jerusalem, 1943).
jerusalem between segregation and integration 211
clearwhy theAshkenazi and Sephardic communities, given their differences in
ritual, language, and culture, should naturally reside in the same part of town.
Gad Frumkin was, in his own words, one of the “children of al-Wad”—
a locality in the heart of the Old City that housed the Serai (government
house) and the mufti’s house. Al-Wad was a predominantly Muslim area that
had a large Jewish presence around the turn of the century; it was made up
of Ashkenazim (mostly Hassidic) and North African Jews. According to 1905
census documents, Jews made up at least 45 percent of households.22 The
area was known in Hebrew as “Hebron Street,” as it housed a large number of
Ashkenazi Jews who originally settled in Hebron before coming to Jerusalem.
There were numerous synagogues and Jewish religious schools in the area.
The Frumkins lived in a small compound with two little courtyards, the family
print shop, and a small synagogue. The compound bordered on the mansion
of the Jerusalem mufti from the Ḥusaynī nobility. The Ḥusaynīs were also
Frumkin’s landlords, and they had good relations with Gad’s father, Yisrael Dov
Frumkin. In the 1920s this fact facilitated the connection betweenGadFrumkin
and Hajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the grand mufti and rising political leader of Arab
Palestine.
In thememoirswe finddetailed descriptions of thewebof relations between
Ashkenazim and Arabs. These relations focused on economic matters—com-
merce, work, and real estate; as well as civic and political matters. But connec-
tions with non-Jews were also a necessary feature of Jewish religious life, as
Jews regularly relied on gentiles to perform certain forbidden tasks on Jew-
ish festivals and on the Sabbath, such as making fire and turning lamps on
and off. Thus we find in the memoirs the story of “der Bashitke,” Mūsā Bashītī,
an Arab coal vendor, who used to buy the leavened bread (chametz) from
the Ashkenazi communities during the Passover season. “Reb Moshe,” as he
liked to refer to himself, spoke excellent Yiddish and Ladino, and used to fin-
ish his workday smoking a pipe in a Sephardic cafe in the “Street of the Jews”.
The everyday reliance on gentiles for religious reasons meant that Jews had to
reside in proximity to non-Jews, and an exclusive Jewish residential commu-
nity was simply unthinkable. An account published in Frumkin’s newspaper,
the Habastelet, on a visit to the Jewish neighborhood of Neveh Tsedek outside
Jaffa, records the complications involved in living in an exclusive Jewish com-
munity through this somewhat humorous conversation between the reporter
and a local Jew:
22 Arnon, “Population Censuses in Jerusalem.”
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“There is no neighborhood of gentiles nearby … and what do you do on
Sabbath and festivals?”
“Let us be thankful to the thieves … it is a real miracle, that the thieves
have made this place their favorite place.”
“Aha, so you catch the thieves andmake them into ‘Sabbath gentiles’?”
“Why are you turning everything upside down? … it’s more simple and
straightforward. When the residents saw the situation [with the thieves],
they petitioned the government to place a garrison here, and they—the
gendarmes—they protect us from fire and also light the way for us when
the need occurs.”23
An interesting gaugeof the level ofAshkenazi-Arab interaction is theuseofAra-
bic words and idioms in Yiddish. A 1930s study of “Palestinian Yiddish” spoken
in Jerusalem and Safad found no less than 700 expressions, idioms, words, and
terms borrowed fromArabic: from everyday greetings and obscenities to build-
ing trade terminology, weighs and measurements, and agricultural terms.24 In
comparison, the study found only 35 expressions borrowed from Ladino, the
language of Sephardic Jews, and these were limited to food and household
objects. This suggests that Ashkenazimhad closer interactionswith Arabs than
with Sephardim; and that the Ashkenazi-Arab encounters were frequent and
diverse, encompassing aspects of business, politics, and administration, along-
side everyday social life.
One way to track the interaction between the different communities is
through movement in the city. The quotidian rhythms of urban life often
receive little attention in discussions of segregation and polarization, which
typically focus heavily on residential patterns, and therefore provide a more
static understanding of urban space. When looking at historical periods, res-
idential patterns are easier to research as they can be mapped with the aid
of archival evidence such as census documents. In contrast, the daily routes
of people through the city are by necessity ephemeral and difficult to recon-
struct a century later. However,movement is key to the formation of the subjec-
tive experience of the city, and it necessarily involves chance encounters. The
paths and roads used reflect, no doubt, wider social and political patterns; but
they also leave room for accidental meetings. Interestingly, Frumkin chooses
to introduce Jerusalem to his readers not through a static mapping of the city,
23 Habatselet (27 April 1908).
24 Mordecai Kosover, Arabic Elements in Palestinian Yiddish: TheOld Ashkenazic Jewish Com-
munity in Palestine, its History and its Language (Jerusalem: R. Mass, 1966).
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but rather through “walking tours,” following the footsteps of his errands and
leisurely escapades as a child. Rather than bringing his readers to the iconic
sites of the Old City, such as the Wailing Wall or the Holy Sepulchre, Frumkin
describes small alleys, shops, and vendors; he pays most attention to Ashke-
nazi institutions and merchants, but is careful to describe other tradespeople
and officials. One such description, of his errands to the Ottoman mutassarif
(governor) offices, starts with the shop of a Sephardic Jew, before crossing the
yard of Serai, through a crowdofMuslimvillagers, bumping into the twoAshke-
nazi mukhtars (appointed representatives); ascending to the governor offices
he encounters Turkish clerks and the head of the district’s Ottoman education,
a local nobleArab; and all this is timed carefullywith the arrival of theOttoman
pasha with his carriage, from his residence outside the city gates, through al-
Wad Street to the Serai, so that the necessary form can be signed in time. This
account demonstrates that the necessities of business, commerce or subsis-
tence required everyone (from the pasha to humble villagers) to travel through
the city, and in this process to inevitably encounter members of other commu-
nities and social classes.
At the same time this image of high level of residential “mixing” and frequent
interaction should not create the impression that religious and ethnic identi-
ties did not matter. Nor is it my intention to portray late Ottoman Jerusalem as
an idyll ofmulti-ethnic harmony. Such nostalgic portrayals exist, but Frumkin’s
memoirs are not one of them. Frumkin himself maintains that the frequent
encounters did not lead tomutual understanding: “Arab and Jewish courtyards
were adjacent, and the childrenmet and quarrelledwith each other: thesewere
two separate worlds lacking any mental or cultural proximity.”25 From other
accounts we also know of common street fights between Ashkenazi boys on
the one hand, and Arab and Sephardic boys on the other.26
Frumkin’s descriptions of late Ottoman Jerusalem resonate with recent
debates on urban multi-culturalism. While ethnic difference, inclusivity, and
openness are celebrated (at least in rhetoric) in many global cities, there are
also fears for community cohesion, and the danger of “living together sepa-
rately,”27 with communities leading “parallel lives” in the same city.28 Some
25 Gad Frumkin, Derekh Shofet Beyerushalaim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), 323.
26 Jacob Yehoshua, Ḥakhamim bi-Yerushalayim ha-yeshanah (Jerusalem: R. Mas, 1968).
27 Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod, Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Con-
temporary Jerusalem (Princeton, nj: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991); Ghazi Falah, “Living
TogetherApart: Residential Segregation inMixedArab-JewishCities in Israel,”UrbanStud-
ies 33, no. 6 (1 June 1996): 823–857.
28 Ted Cantle, Daljit Kaur, Mohammed Athar, Chris Dallison, Andy Wiggans, and Harris
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scholars and policymakers are concerned about the detrimental effects of “vol-
untary segregation,”29 others point out that physical proximity and “mixing”
is no guarantee for mutual understanding or fruitful dialogue.30 In my view,
it is counter-productive to think of “segregation,” “integration,” and “inclusive-
ness” in absolute terms and as simple dichotomies. Rather, these terms refer
to a spectrum of possibilities that are not always quantifiable and measurable
and rely much on subjective perceptions. Furthermore, inter-communal inter-
action can take onmany shapes; two communities can have strong commercial
interactions with a minimal number of intermarriages, for example.
Frumkin relates that his more meaningful encounters with Arabs occurred
not in the street but rather in domestic space. Frumkin’s father had close
relations with Arab elite families such as the al-ʿAlamīs, al-Ḥusaynīs, Quṭb, and
others. Frumkin’s involvement in municipal and Jewish communal affairs, his
dealing with the Serai as well as his commercial activities put him in contact
with these families, and they were frequent visitors at Frumkin’s house in
al-Wad. His father’s links with Arab scholars and public figures meant that
Frumkin grew up to become more familiar with Arab Jerusalem than the
average Ashkenazi boy. He also received private Arabic lessons at home, and
spoke and understood Arabic well even before he departed for law studies in
Istanbul.
In 1905 the family decided to move out of the Old City to a more convenient
house closer to Jewish residential developments outside the walls. As Salim
Tamari has observed, residential neighborhoods outside the walls were more
segregated along ethnic and confessional lines than neighborhoods in the Old
City.31 Issues of landownership and investment, according to Tamari, were the
prime reason for the segregated nature of extra-mural development. It is note-
Joshua, Review of Community Cohesion in Oldham: Challenging Local Communities to
Change Oldham (Coventry: Institute for Community Cohesion, 2006).
29 O. Valins, “Stubborn Identities and the Construction of Socio-Spatial Boundaries: Ultra-
Orthodox Jews Living in Contemporary Britain,” Transactions—Institute Of British Geog-
raphers 28 (2003): 158–175.
30 I. Cole and B. Goodchild, “Social Mix and the ‘Balanced Community’ in British Housing
Policy—A Tale of Two Epochs,” GeoJournal 51, no. 4 (2000): 351–360; John Clayton, “Every-
day Geographies of Marginality and Encounter in the Multicultural City,” in New Geogra-
phies of Race and Racism, ed. Claire Dwyer and Caroline Bressey (Aldershot, uk/Burling-
ton, vt: Ashgate, 2008); A. Amin, “Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diver-
sity,”Environment and Planning a 34 (6) (2002): 959–980.
31 PhilippMisselwitz and Tim Rieniets (eds.), City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of
Conflict Urbanism (Basel/Boston: Birkhäuser, 2006).
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worthy, however, that the Frumkins did not choose to settle in one of these
Jewish-only neighborhoods, but rather chose Reḥov Haḥabashim (“Abyssinian
Quarter”), a mixed area populated with wealthy Arabs, Jews, and Europeans.
The quarter was popular with Jewish intellectual modernists, such as Eliezer
Ben-Yehuda and David Yellin, as well as more recent Zionist immigrants. The
area was the center of modern Jewish education in Jerusalem: it housed the
arts and crafts school Bezalel, the German-sponsored school Lemel, and its
teachers’ seminar, the Bnei Brith Library, and a commerce school.32 The area
teemed with young students and teachers, many of them from the Jewish
colonies or new arrivals in Palestine, what is often referred to as “the New
Yishuv.”
Frumkin, an 18-year-old Hassidic Jerusalemite, was not naturally close to
these circles. However, through various chance encounters he found himself
drawn to these “youth of the Abyssinians,” as he refers to them. He joined
their discussions, and partook in their gymnastics, singing, dancing, and out-
door excursions, walking in the moonlight westwards to the fields at the out-
skirts of the city. Fascinated and attracted to the new milieu, Frumkin was
moving away from the Hassidic modernist circles of his father towards Zion-
ist notions of Jewish identity and the Jewish future of Palestine—this was
manifest in his 1909 wedding to Hannah Eisenberg, the daughter of a citrus
magnate from the Zionist colony Rehovot. In his memoirs he attributes his
ideological transformation to the new surroundings of the Abyssinian quar-
ter and the encounters they facilitated. During his wanderings in the “Latin
quarter of Jerusalem,” as he describes the neighborhood, Frumkin established
contacts with the Zionist leadership, and this took him later to the agricul-
tural colonies, to Jaffa, and later to Istanbul and London as a representa-
tive of the Jewish “New Yishuv.” However, moving out of the city walls also
allowed him to develop his ideas in another direction—that of integration in
the local Arab environment and the Ottoman system. In the early twentieth
century, Zionism, Ottomanism, and integration with the local Arab society did
not seem to be contradictory options. New civic spaces, emerging in the late
nineteenth century, were able to contain and support these different trajecto-
ries.
32 Shabtai Zecharia, Merkaz ha-Haskala ha-Yerushalmi (Jerusalem: Sasar, 1996).
216 wallach
New Civic Spaces
The question of civic and public space in Middle Eastern cities has long been
contested in the historiography.33 Some scholars, from Weber onwards, have
argued that Islamic cities traditionally were characterized by an absence of
civic spaces. In contrast with medieval European cities, Middle Eastern urban
centers lacked municipal organization and autonomous guild-like socioeco-
nomic structures, and this manifested itself in their urban layout. Some schol-
ars of Jerusalem who have followed this line of thinking, emphasized the lack
of European styled civic spaces such as impressive city squares or monumen-
tal civic buildings in Jerusalem prior to the twentieth century; they saw this
as symptomatic of the “primitive” character of Ottoman Jerusalem and Islamic
cities in general.34 In contrast with this approach, other scholars of Islamic
cities have often stressed the importance of city markets, coffeehouses, bath-
houses, the main mosque and its square, as archetypical social spaces of con-
gregation and encounter. Others still have questioned the validity of a Eurocen-
tric framework and terminology to study Middle Eastern cities.35
What has gone largely unnoticed in the scholarship on Jerusalem was the
emergence of new civic spaces as part of a dramatic re-organization of the
late Ottoman city. The development of Jerusalem in the late nineteenth cen-
tury has been described in terms of growth and expansion, with themain story
being the spreadof the city beyond the citywalls. This description characterizes
scholars hostile to Ottoman legacy, such as Yehshua Ben-Aryeh, and also those
more sympathetic, such as Alexander Schölch.36 And yet the development of
the city in the final decades of Ottoman rule involvedmore than simply expan-
sion: it spelled a profound re-articulation of urban layout and civic identity,
modeledonEuropeannotionsof public space andcivic institutions. Thenewly-
founded municipality played a key role in this transformation. A municipal
33 For an overview see Nezar AlSayyad, Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim
Urbanism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); Seteney Shami, Publics, Politics and Partic-
ipation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Social
Science Research Council, 2009).
34 Ben-Arieh, Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century: The Old City; Ben-Arieh, Jerusalem in the
Nineteenth Century: Emergence of the New City; David Kroyanker, Adrikhalut bi-Yerusha-
layim: ha-beniyah ba-ʿIr ha-ʿAtiḳah (Jerusalem: Keter, 1993).
35 AlSayyad, Cities and Caliphs.
36 Alexander Schölch, Palestine in Transformation, 1856–1882 (Washington, dc: Institute for
Palestine Studies, 2006).
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hospital, an archaeological museum, a theater, a railway station, a municipal
garden, and a privately-sponsored public library were among the new estab-
lishments opened during this period. The center of the city—politically and
economically—shifted decidedly westwards, from the inner parts of the Old
City and theHaram environs to the area of Jaffa Gate. This was the result of offi-
cial initiatives, local private entrepreneurship, and European influence. Jaffa
Gate emerged as the modern town center and boasted several post offices,
banks, cafes, hotels, shops of imported goods and themain transport hub. Espe-
cially prominent were several photographers’ studios whose huge trade signs
can easily be seen in photographs of the area from this period. Young Frumkin
had his picture taken in one of these studios, like other aspiring middle-class
Jerusalemites (image 1). It was also the site of the newmunicipality offices, the
rebuilt Ottoman barracks, and the town clock tower, erected in 1906. The new
center developed on the seam line between the Old City and the new parts,
connecting the two in an organic way. The commercial buildings that sprang
up concealed the city walls, obscuring the difference between the “Old City”
and Jerusalem’s new parts. A continuum of public open space stretched from
the inner parts of the Jaffa Gate, through the small plaza in front of the gate,
alongside Jaffa Street and the Mamilla road, to the newmunicipal gardens fur-
ther up the road. Clearly these developments reflected European notions of
modern urbanity, and some western visitors, searching for the biblical city,
were shocked and disappointed to arrive at the Jaffa Gate where Jerusalem
seemed “as commonplace as a Parisian suburb.”37 Yet for Jerusalemites and the
Ottoman authorities, the new town center was a showcase of the city’s moder-
nity andprogress. This site facilitated frequent anddiverse interaction between
tourists and residents and between the different ethnic/religious groups. But
furthermore, by providing an urban context to the new Ottoman framework,
it also created the possibility of a shared identity that did not exist previously
in the Old City, despite frequent and amicable interaction between different
groups.
The urban re-organization of Jerusalem was predicated on the Tanzimat,
Ottoman political and administrative reforms.38 The new Ottoman citizen-
ship law of 1869 promised equality to all citizens, regardless of their confes-
sional identity. This was the administrative basis of new civic institutions such
Jerusalem’s municipality (located outside the Jaffa Gate), which included Jews
and Christians as city councilors. Similarly, the new clock tower, positioned
37 Pierre Loti, Jerusalem (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1915), 42.
38 Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890–1914 (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1985).
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figure 8.1 Photographer: Garabed Krikorian. Gad Frumkin as a youngman. Jerusalem
(1905–1908?). Courtesey of the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel.
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above the Jaffa Gate, reflected the new perception of universal time that ap-
pealed to all residents.39 It differed from confessional ways of thinking and
marking time, such as Islamic calls for prayer and the bells of Christian
churches.
Gad Frumkin grew up in this transforming landscape; he watched these
changes with great interest. After the family moved to the new part of the city,
youngGadcontinued towork inhis father’s print shop in al-Wad, travelingdaily
by foot to and from the Old City. He recounts that there were two routes to
walk from the Abyssinian area to al-Wad. The quiet and shorter route passed
through the sparse settlement north of the Old City, alongside Jewish and
Muslimhouses, through vineyards and groves, and entered the city through the
Damascus Gate. Frumkin recalls fondly the “fields of ripening wheat, the song
of the birds chattering from the top of the olive trees” in the pastoral landscape
north of the Damascus Gate.40 The other route was busier and longer and
took Frumkin through the hustle and bustle of Jaffa Street, past the municipal
gardens, and the city center of Jaffa Gate; it was this route which was to shape
Frumkin’s life and outlook. The dramatic 1908 revolution, as experienced by
Frumkin in the new city center of Jerusalem, had a determining impact on his
future career.
In 1906 Frumkin became the managing editor of his father’s newspaper, the
Habatselet. He changed the character of thenewspaper, introducingmorenews
reports on events in Jerusalem, Palestine, and theOttoman Empire. TheHabat-
selet reported more on general developments in Jerusalem, not only those
regarding the Jewish communities, but also international news, articles on sci-
ence and exploration, and translated prose, for example articles by the French
writer Jules Vernes. With the outbreak of the 1908 “Young Turk” revolution,
Habatselet was early to announce the dramatic reinstitution of the Ottoman
constitution on a full page; it celebrated the new age of freedom and equality
with special reports from Jerusalem and Jaffa. Soon afterwards the newspaper
started to refer to the local Jews as “Ottoman Jews,” rather than “subjects of the
Sultan.”
In Jerusalem, the revolution was marked and celebrated in a large event in
the Jaffa Gate area: a procession from the Ottoman barracks inside the walls,
through Jaffa Street to the municipal gardens outside the walls. Frumkin, who
was keen to witness the event, arrived at the municipal gardens directly from
39 Yair Wallach, “The Governor and the Oud Player,” in The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs,
Governor of Jerusalem 1918–1926, ed. Nirit Shalev-Khalifa (Tel Aviv: Eretz Israel Museum,
2010), 76–87.
40 Frumkin, Derekh Shofet Beyerushalaim, 130.
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the print press, in his work clothes. “Where are the celebrating Jews? Are they
taking part in this celebration, are they voicing their opinions in public?” he
asked himself.41 He noticed the almost complete absence of Ashkenazi Jews,
while the Sephardim, who were present in large numbers, “intermingled with
the Arabs, and together they were more interested in cracking nuts, drinking
lemonade and listening to the army band playing in the intervals between
speeches than in the speeches themselves.”42 Frumkin camehomearoundmid-
night and wrote an article on the demonstration; he concluded by calling on
Jewish youth to study Arabic and Turkish, “so that they can follow the events
and prepare themselves to become equal partners in the new system.” The fol-
lowing day he discovered that his father (still the chief editor of the newspaper)
haddeleted these lines calling for Jewish integration in thenon-Jewish environ-
ment. Y.D. Frumkin apparently believed that this call for integration went too
far. The issue of studying languages other thanHebrewwas extremely sensitive
in the Ashkenazi community, and in conservative circles this idea was strongly
resisted out of fear that they would lose control over the younger generation.43
Gad Frumkin was outraged by his father’s intervention, and confronted him at
the newspaper offices in al-Wad. Their short and angry exchange ended with
an irrevocable break between father and son, as Gad quit the room without
asking permission. The father’s small cluttered office in the closed confines
of the al-Wad print shop appears in Frumkin’s description as the complete
opposite of the open space of exciting possibilities of the municipal gardens.
While Y.D. Frumkin’s attitudeswere relatively liberal andopen for anAshkenazi
Orthodox Jew, his horizons proved ultimately too limited and insular for his
son. Young Frumkin decided to embark on his own separate way: first he con-
templated establishing his own newspaper, then decided to travel to Istanbul
to study law, in the hope of running for the Ottoman parliament. He left Pales-
tine several months later against the wishes of his father, who actively tried to
prevent him from doing so. The description of this formative break between
an Orthodox father and a modern son challenges the perceived boundaries
between Palestine’s Orthodox Jewish community (“Old Yishuv”) and the Zion-
ist “New Yishuv.” It appears that Y.D. Frumkin, albeit skeptical and critical of
political Zionism, did not try to stop his son from associating with those in
Zionist circles. He was willing to accept his marriage into a family of Zion-
ist colonists, but would not allow him to preach in favor of active integra-
41 Ibid., 146.
42 Ibid.
43 Menachem Friedman, Hebrah bemashber legiytiymasyah: haYishuv hayashan haʾashkna-
ziy, 1900–1917 (Jerusalem: Bialik institute, 2001).
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tion in Arab and Ottoman Palestine. And for Gad Frumkin, it would seem
that the Arabic language promised political integration and modern citizen-
ship.
Frumkin’s association of Jerusalem’s new civic spaces with public life and
politics in modern Arabic is reminiscent of Habermassian terms, where the
public sphere (defined in abstract, rather than urban terms) is a place for ratio-
nal dialogue on the public good. Frumkin preached for participation in public
life based on an exchange of ideas that would go beyond cross-ethnic practices
of socializing around commerce and entertainment. Hence his disparaging
comments on the crowd in themunicipal gardens, who preferred to crack nuts
and listen to the orchestra rather than pay attention to political speeches.44 Yet,
considering the performativity of practices of political participation, it is evi-
dent that the new possibilities of modernity within the Ottoman system did
not demand necessarily an explicit articulation in political speeches. Rather,
these possibilities were embodied in practices and woven into life through
manifold physical and sensory experiences in these civic spaces. We find such
experiences in memoirs of other Jerusalemites, such as the Arab Muslim sol-
dier Iḥsān al-Turjimān, the Arab Christian musician Waṣīf al-Jawhariyya, or
the Jewish journalist Yaacov Yehoshua; these authors mention looking at the
clock tower, reading news telegrams posted outside the Ottoman post offices,
talking about politics with friends in a Jaffa Gate cafe, listening to the army
band playing patriotic tunes in the municipal gardens, or purchasing western
clothes in a shop of imported goods. All of these activities involved a continual
redefinition and articulation of identity for local Jerusalemites. The Ottoman-
ist vision, whether articulated in high modern Arabic language or not, allowed
members of Jerusalem’s diverse communities to come together and celebrate
a common identity that was tied closely to the civic spaces of the city. This
Ottoman vision lost its appeal during World War i as the campaign of harsh
military repression alienated the city’s population from the Ottoman regime.45
In 1917, British occupying forces were welcomed by the overwhelmingmajority
of the population. And yet this unanimity soon disappeared as British plans for
Palestine became known. The British pledge to make Palestine into a “Jewish
NationalHome” opened a rift between local Jews and theMuslimandChristian
population, who increasingly defined themselves in national terms, as Arab
Palestinians. The very samecivic spaces thatwereusedduring the lateOttoman
44 The Habermassian framework of the public sphere as a site of rational exchange was
thoroughly critiqued, and its usefulness in Middle Eastern contexts was also questioned.
See Shami, Publics, Politics and Participation.
45 Tamari, Year of the Locust.
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period for popular celebrations becamebattlegrounds betweennascent ethno-
national visions. In April 1920 the plaza in front of the Jaffa Gate became the
site of the first violent anti-Zionist riot in the history of modern Palestine (the
“NabiMusa uprising” or “Easter riots”). This was only the beginning of a violent
conflict that continued throughout the twentieth century and beyond.
Work Spaces
Political developments during the British Mandate encouraged Arab Palestini-
ans and Jews to see themselves in antagonistic terms, as competing ethno-
national communities. The tendency towards residential segregation in Jeru-
salem intensified,with the construction of Jewish andArabmiddle-class neigh-
borhoods in the new parts of the city. Frumkin himself was one of the founders
of Rehavia, a Jewish-only bourgeois neighborhood. His decision to move there
from amixed neighborhood dominated by the Arab elite can certainly be read
as a statement in favor of Jewish-Zionist separatism.However this reading is too
simplistic. Frumkin continued to come into daily contact with Arab circles, in
his work as a judge in the courts. Through his professional role and social con-
tacts, Frumkin remained committed to Jewish-Arab dialogue and integration,
unlike most leading Zionist figures.
Discussions on segregation and integration in divided and polarized cities
have treated issues of labor and trade, when compared with residential pat-
terns, as largely secondary. Without a close analysis of the spaces of work and
commercial encounters, one can easily fall into a trap of imagining these cities
as sharply divided between zones of clear identity, with movement across the
divide limited to aminimum. Such a picture can bemisleading. In BritishMan-
date Palestine, the labor market and commerce were an arena of competition
and cooperation. As social historian Deborah Bernstein has shown, political
leaderships on both sides attempted to restrict economic exchange between
communities. The Zionist leadership championed Jewish labor and produce,
while the Arab leadership promoted a boycott of the Jewish sector.46 How-
ever, economic relations continued even in sites that were highly segregated,
such as the Hebrew city Tel Aviv.47 In Jerusalem, it seems, economic ties were
46 DeborahBernstein,ConstructingBoundaries: JewishandArabWorkers inMandatory Pales-
tine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
47 Deborah Bernstein, Nashim ba-Shulayim: Migdar ve-Leumiyut be-Tel Aviv ha-Mandatorit
(Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 2008).
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stronger than in other cities. Arabs and Jews used the same commercial center
along Jaffa Street. Government offices were more mixed than other work envi-
ronments: the Mandatory courts at the Russian Compound, in which Frumkin
worked, were one example.
Frumkin became a judge in Jerusalem’s county court in 1918. His appoint-
ment was secured through the intervention of Chaim Weizmann with the
British authorities. Weizmann saw Frumkin as a natural candidate to be the
Zionist representative in the court system. While Frumkin himself objected to
being presented as the “Jewish judge,” hewas happy to receive amonthly salary
from the Jewish Agency to complement his income from the courts.48 Within
less than two years, Frumkinwas promoted to the SupremeCourt (1920), where
he served for 28 years to become the most senior judge. Frumkin was the only
Jewish judge in the Supreme Court, alongside Arab Palestinians and British
judges. He was, effectively, the highest-ranking Jew in an official position in the
Palestine Mandate.
The courts were located in the Russian Compound, the large enclosure built
by the Tsarist Empire in the 1850–1860s to accommodate Russian pilgrims to
Jerusalem. The compound was taken over by the Ottoman authorities dur-
ing the war and used for military and administrative offices, and the British
found the large modern buildings similarly useful. The compound was located
northwest of the Old City, between the commercial Jaffa Street and the pres-
tigious street of European consulates, schools, and hospitals (later named by
the British “Prophets Street”). In residential terms the area wasmixed between
local Jews, Muslims, Christians, and European residents. The courts were the
site of frequent encounters of Jews, Arabs, and British officials. Translators,
lawyers, litigants, prosecutors, witnesses, judges, police, journalists, and visitors
mingled on a daily basis. The fact that Frumkin shared offices with Arab col-
leaguesmade him unique among prominentmembers of the Zionist elite. Few
Zionist public figures came in direct daily contact with large numbers of Arab
Palestinians; even fewer considered Arab Palestinians as their peers. Frumkin
describes his own encounters in the 1930s in the following words:
I encounter Arabs every day. They are the majority of my “customers” in
court, I come across them as friends … finding myself—sometimes inad-
vertently, in conversationwithArabmen of all factions coming to visitmy
friends the Arab judges in the office, and listening to the conversations of
48 Brun, “ha-Kavod ha-Avud shel ha-Shofet ha-Elyon: Parashat i Minuyo shel ha-Shofet
Frumkin le-Beyt ha-Mishpat ha-Elyon be-Yisrael.”
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young Muslim and Christian clerks in the court, and students in the law
school.49
Frumkin describes these frequent encounters as the background to his initia-
tives for dialogue with the Arab Palestinian leadership. Frumkin was close to
theZionist political leadership, butwas highly critical of its dismissive attitudes
towards the “Arab question.” Frumkin repeatedly warned against the repercus-
sions of neglecting Jewish-Arab relations. His criticismwas reminiscent of sim-
ilar warnings made by leading Sephardic figures such as Yoseph Chelouche50
and Eliyahu Elayashar,51 who also had close professional and personal familiar-
ity with Arab Palestinian society.
Frumkin’s comments can be read as an affirmation of the “contact hypothe-
sis” which stipulates that the best way to promote social integration and reduce
prejudice is to bring different social groups together in an everyday context.
In the early 2000s scholars were celebrating the “thrown togetherness”52 and
cosmopolitanism of cities with high levels of diversity, arguing that everyday
situations of encounter can do much to foster conviviality. Geographer Valen-
tine Gail has questioned this optimism, showing that daily contact between
different social groups alone is not sufficient to produce higher levels of respect
or understanding.53 Clearly it was not simply corridor conversations with his
Arab colleagues that propelled Frumkin to adopt a critical approach to Zion-
ist policies on the Arab question. His daily experience was embedded in his
personal trajectory and life history. The connection between his family and
elite Arab families; his command of the Arabic language and Islamic law; his
childhood in a predominantly Muslim part of the Old City; his studies in Istan-
bul, alongside Arab students—all these experiences shaped Frumkin’s willing-
ness to engage with Arab Palestinians and to be receptive to their ideas and
thoughts. This engagement did not stop at small talk and instances of civility,
but rather involved continuous professional activities of intellectual produc-
tion in the Supreme Court.
The work of the court demanded that Frumkin and his colleagues maintain
continual and daily professional conversation. In some cases, ethno-national
identity appeared to have played a role in legalistic differences and disagree-
49 Frumkin, Derekh Shofet Beyerushalaim, 323.
50 Yosef Eliyahu Chelouche, Parashat Hayay 1870–1930 (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2005).
51 Elie Eliachar, Living with Jews (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).
52 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005).
53 G. Valentine, “Living with Difference: Reflections on Geographies of Encounter,”Progress
in Human Geography 32, no. 3 (2008): 323–337.
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ments between himself and the Arab judges.54 And yet there is ample evi-
dence of opposite examples, in which Frumkin and his colleagues collaborated
closely. One such crucial case was the 1922 ruling by Frumkin and Justice ʿAlī
Jārallāh to denyus citizens an extra-territorial status. Jārallāh andFrumkin, rul-
ing against the opinion of the British judge, effectively terminated theOttoman
system of privileges (Capitulations) that allowed western nationals impunity
from the local legal system.55 Frumkin was personally close to Jārallāh, and
recalls with nostalgia their walks home from the courts, down Prophets Street
to Frumkin’s house in theMusrara neighborhood. The shortwalk lasted for long
minutes as the two men stopped every few steps, engrossed in their discus-
sions. “I used to call it ‘conversing ourway home,’ rather thanwalking home,” he
writes.56 Indeed, Frumkin’s encounters did not end within the court premises,
and developed into social relations and friendships. No doubt his earlier ties
with the Arab elite, through his father’s involvement in publishing and local
Jewish affairs, were the basis of these close relations. Various social and offi-
cial functions brought Frumkin into contact with prominent members of the
Arab elite, and he entertained his Arab colleagues for dinners at his home.
His house was a meeting point for Arabs and Zionist officials.57 He was the
only Zionist figure to have direct personal contact with the grand mufti, Hajj
Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, who emerged as the political leader of Arab Palestinians.
Frumkin’s daughter’s wedding in the King David Hotel in 1936 was attended by
a large number of distinguishedArab guests (image 2), includingAḥmad Samīḥ
al-Khālidī, educator and head of the Arab College, Justice Muṣṭafā l-Khālidī
(Supreme Court, later Jerusalem mayor 1938–1944); the mayor of Jerusalem
Ḥusayn Fakhrī l-Khālidī; and Mūsā l-ʿAlamī, crown prosecutor and private sec-
retary to the high commissioner. This was only a month before the outbreak of
the Great Arab Revolt (1936–1939) directed against pro-Zionist British policies
in Palestine.
54 In 1942, Frumkin ruled against an appeal by the Ashkenazi community to recognize it as a
separate religious community; he asserted instead that there is a single Jewish community
in Palestine. His Arab colleague, Justice Francis Khayyat, argued that Jewsmake up several
separate congregations. Supreme court 42/109, 1942, in Frumkin, Pesakim nivharim shel
Gad Frumkin shofet be-vet ha-mishpat ha-ʿelyon le-Erets-Yisra eʾl, 1920–1948.
55 Ibid., 32–57.
56 Frumkin, Derekh Shofet Beyerushalaim, 241.
57 See themeeting between ChaimArlozorov, head of the political department in the Jewish
Agency, with supreme justices Khayyat, Khalidi, and Jarrallah, 16 February 1932. Arlozorov,
Yoman Yerushalayim, available online: http://benyehuda.org/arlosoroff/jj_feb1932.html
(February 2014).
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figure 8.2 Photographer: Tzvi Oron 10 March 1936. “The Frumkin-Broida wedding”, King David
Hotel, Jerusalem. Left: Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi, (head of the Arab College); Third
from left, Daniel Auster, (deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, General Zionists party); Fifth
from left, Justice Mustafa al-Khalidi (Palestine Supreme Court Judge, Jerusalem
mayor 1938–1944); Third from right: Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi (Mayor of Jerusalem
1934–1937); Second from right: Musa al-Alami (Crown prosecutor and private
secretary to the High Commissioner). Central Zionist Archives, nzo/636156. Curtsey
of the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel.
These professional and social encounterswere formative for Frumkin’s polit-
ical outlook; the special environment of the court, as a mixed work space, and
the close and daily engagements with his Arab colleagues, propelled him to
embark on a political initiative. In the early 1930s, against the background of
growing tensions between Arabs and Zionists, Frumkin held a series of talks
with Mūsā l-ʿAlamī, state prosecutor, an advisor to the high commissioner. Al-
ʿAlamī, a Cambridge graduate and a member of the Arab aristocracy, was close
to the leading Ḥusaynī family. Frumkin held al-ʿAlamī in high regard, and was
impressed by his professional and unbiased attitudes in the court. The two dis-
cussed a bi-national framework that could accommodate the national desires
of Arabs and Jews. Significantly, their discussions included not only the issues
of immigration and legislative institutions, but also emphasized cultural and
economic integration, and called for language classes in Arabic and Hebrew,
and open labor markets in both sectors. These principles stood against offi-
cial Zionist policies of cultural and economic isolation. In 1936, after the out-
break of the general Arab strike, Frumkin embarked on a peace initiative in
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which he enlisted to his cause four other leading Zionist figures from Jewish
industry, agriculture, and the academic world. In meetings with al-ʿAlamī, they
developed a detailed work plan to stop the escalating conflict. This was prob-
ably the most serious attempt of this kind during the British Mandate. Loyal
to the Zionist leadership, Frumkin informed the Jewish Agency executive on
the initiative, and allowed the negotiations to be taken over by Moshe Shertok
(Sharet), head of the political department. As Gershon Shafir has argued, the
model of “capitalist bi-nationalism” advocated by Frumkin’s group ran against
the model of national and economic segregation championed by the Labor
Settlement Movement.58 The dominant Zionist labor party rejected the agree-
ment, objecting strongly to restrictions on immigration and to the opening-up
of labor markets. Shertok was left with no choice but to effectively terminate
the negotiations.59 Soon afterwards, Frumkin’s confidant,Mūsā l-ʿAlamī, joined
the preparations for an Arab armed revolt and negotiated the supply of arms
from the Italian fascist regime.60 Frumkin himself remained loyal to the Zionist
leadership, but decided to refrain from further political intervention, as he real-
ized that his efforts did not reflect thewishes of the JewishAgency. This extraor-
dinary episode, which became known as the “initiative of the five,” remains
understudied today.61
The Supreme Court served as a common work environment of intellectual
labor, where Arabs and Jews met each other as peers. While in many ways it
was exceptional in British Mandate Palestine, the experience of a shared work
and trade environment was certainly not exceptional, especially in Jerusalem.
Labor and commerce served as prime reasons for bringing people together till
58 G. Shafir, “Capitalist Bi-nationalism in Mandatory Palestine,” International Journal of Mid-
dle East Studies 43, no. 4 (2011): 611–633.
59 Yizhak Herzog, “Contacts between the Jewish Agency and the Palestinians, the Arab Side:
1936–1938,” in Arabs and Jews during the British Mandate: A New Approach to Historical
Research, ed. Ilan Pappé (Givʿat-Haviva: Peace Study Centre, 1995), 11–42.
60 Nir Arielli, “Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939,”British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies 35 (2008): 187–204.
61 The scholarship on bi-nationalist ideas in the Zionist Yishuv has largely focused on
the Brith Shalom, a group of European immigrant intellectuals with limited experience
and knowledge of Palestine. Frumkin’s initiative is mentioned in this context, although
Frumkin was careful to distance himself from Brith Shalom in his autobiography. On this
issue see Susan Rolef, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times ([Haifa]:
Shikmona Publishing Co., 1970); Avraham Sela, “Sihot ve-Magaʾim beynManhigimAravim
Falastinim le-veyn Manhigim Tsionim 1933–1939,” Ha-Mizrach Ha-Hadash 22–23 (1972–
1973): 401–423, 1–21; Joseph Heller, Mi-Berit shalom le-Iḥud: Yehudah Layb Magnes ṿeha-
maʾavaḳ li-medinah du-leʾumit (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2003).
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the very end of the British Mandate. The new market for fruit and vegetables,
Mahne Yehuda, located at the heart of Jewish neighborhoods was co-owned by
an Arab villager from Silwan, and depended almost entirely on produce from
nearbyArab villages sold bywomenvillagers.62Arab traders continued to come
to the market until the end of November 1947, when the civil war broke out.63
Despite attempts from the two national leaderships to minimize economic
contact between the two sides, economic relations persisted and in Jerusalem
they were probably stronger than in other places. While residential patterns
clearly moved in the direction of segregation, commerce and labor continued
to bring Arabs and Jews together and create sites of encounter throughout the
city. However, it is noteworthy that the strong everyday trade and commerce
relations did not acquire a political dimension similar to Frumkin’s initiative.
Only in rare cases did Arab-Jewish social and economic ties translate into
joint political action. In most cases, they proved insufficient against violent
extremism. For example, the Mahne Yehuda market, a site of common and
daily Arab-Jewish interaction, was also a stronghold for the extreme Zionist
militias—the Irgun and Stern Gang.64 These militias frequently targeted Arab
civilians and were involved in planting bombs in Arab markets and cafes. All
this strengthens Valentine Gail’s caution regarding the political potential of
daily contact between different groups.
With the escalation of hostilities in 1946–1948, the courts’ area, the Rus-
sian Compound, became a fortified zone, to which a special pass was required.
Arab-Jewish tensions ran high even inside the protected area of the courts,
and some Jewish solicitors refused to attend hearings in fear of being attacked.
Frumkin, who received death threats signed by a militant Arab group, trav-
eled to the court directly by car and would have his driver waiting for him
outside, in case of any eventuality. How different was this environment from
the early 1920s walks of Frumkin and Judge Jārallāh down Prophets Street to
their houses in the mixed neighborhood of the Abyssinians and Musrara. The
space for random interaction and chance encounters through movement in
the city was closing down, leading to the partition of the city into two parts
in 1948.
62 N. Shrem, Shuk ha-Bazar Mahne Yehuda 1929 (Jerusalem: Zionist Library, 2009).
63 Dan Michaeli, “Native” of Jerusalem in Health and Defence systems (Tel Aviv: Ministry of
Defence, 2006).
64 Shrem, Shuk ha-Bazar Mahne Yehuda 1929.
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Conclusion: Urban Encounters, UrbanMovement
Through the eyes of one remarkable resident, Justice Gad Frumkin, this chap-
ter challenges the perception of as Jerusalem an age-old segregated city of
ethnic enclaves. His detailed accounts of the Ashkenazi community in the al-
Wad area contradict the dominant paradigm of the four confessional quarters.
In contrast to the common image of Jerusalem as a “mosaic city,” in which
confessional groups resided in segregated enclaves, it is clear that residential
patterns of late Ottoman Jerusalem involved high levels of mixing, while the
development of the new city led to greater segregation, especially during the
late Mandate period. Yet in order to assess the dynamics of encounter in urban
space, one has tomove away from the focus on residential patterns and a static
understanding of the city. I examined civic spaces and workplaces as sites of
encounter that did not conform to a territorial parceling of the city into “Arab”
and “Jewish” parts. Civic spaces such as themunicipal gardens, which emerged
in the late nineteenth century, presented new places of interaction that were
closely related to an inclusiveOttoman identity. These spaces allowed Jews and
Christians to think of themselves as equal members of an Ottoman political
community alongside Muslim citizens. These abstract notions were embod-
ied in events such as celebrations, concerts, and political demonstrations that
took place in the late Ottoman town center. With the demise of the Ottoman
empire and the establishment of the British Mandate, these civic spaces lost
their common appeal, as the political horizons they represented no longer
existed.
Spaces of commerce and work are also key to an understanding of Arab-
Jewish interaction. Frumkin’s ownworkplace, theMandatory courts in theRus-
sianCompound, provided one example of a sharedwork environment inwhich
members of different groups met daily and cooperated. Frumkin’s negotia-
tions with Arab colleagues over a bi-national framework prove that sustained
interaction can open up political possibilities. The courts were unusual in that
they provided a shared arena for intellectual discussion, and yet work relations
between Arabs and Jews were commonplace in Jerusalem, as we know from
other accounts and places, such as theMahne Yehuda fruit and vegetable mar-
ket.
An investigation of the dynamics of sharing space must take into account
the different social relationships and dynamics existing in the same space, and
the diverse uses of space. The Frumkin’s house in the Old City, for example,
housed not only the family but also a small synagogue and the Frumkin’s
print shop. The family’s social relations with their neighbors and landlords,
the Ḥusaynī family, extended into political issues and business dealings. Socio-
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spatial networks of different scales joined in creating the differentmeanings of
space.
No less important is the question of movement in analyzing cross-ethnic
encounters. Discussions of urban polarization often neglect patterns of flow
through the city. Urbanmovement is transitory and ephemeral, and yet it plays
an important part in the daily reproduction of the urban experience. These
movements inevitably bring together people from different groups, thus cre-
ating a farmore complex picture than simple dichotomies. Movement through
the city is rarely random, but is rather predicated on a set of conditions—from
urban layout to economic opportunities and political rights. Within this given
framework, motion can nonetheless create new possibilities in space and soci-
ety: it can open new routes, both literally and metaphorically.
Movement through the city plays a key role in Frumkin’s description of
Jerusalem; it was chance encounters that shaped his perception of the city
and of himself. As his memoirs illustrate, it was impossible to walk through
the Old City without encountering members of other ethnic groups and this
illustrates how reductive it is to perceive the city as a flat and static mosaic.
After moving to Reḥov Haḥabashim (“Abyssinian Quarter”), outside the walls,
repeated encounters with young Jewish students increased Frumkin’s fasci-
nation with Zionism, while his daily walks through the modern city center
attracted him to the possibilities of the Ottoman system. Frumkin’s walks with
the Arab judge, Jārallāh, down Prophets Street are perhaps the best symbol
of the everyday possibilities of ethnic diversity in work and residential areas,
and stand in sharp contrast to the segregated and fortified city of the late
1940s.
As I argue in this chapter, close urban proximity, and frequent and amicable
contacts between different groups, do not necessarily lead to social integration
or joint political alliances. Frumkin’s case proves that places and conditions of
proximity can facilitate political dialogue.Nevertheless, contact and familiarity
in themselves are not sufficient: in Frumkin’s case, his entire life trajectory and
social position as a member of the Jerusalem elite was no less significant to the
formation of his political horizons.
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chapter 9
Refugee Camps and the Spatialization of Assyrian
Nationalism in Iraq
L. Robson
Introduction
During the interwar period, Iraq became home to a number of Assyrian com-
munities who had been displaced by Ottomanmassacres and the exigencies of
World War i. The refugee camps created to house them soon became spaces
where international organizations operated as state-like actors, determining
the layout of the physical space, running local bureaucracies, and distribut-
ing goods and services. At the same time, the experiences of these refugee
communities provided a foundation for diaspora groups to create nationalist
and separatist political narratives for international distribution. The transna-
tional nature of Assyrian and Armenian refugee communities, combined with
the semi-permanent nature of their camp dwellings and their dependence on
external entities for their maintenance, lent these spaces a sense of separa-
tion from the emerging urban and rural landscapes of the new Iraqi state. This
essay examines how such camps contributed tominoritizing not only commu-
nities but spaces, and helped to further strands of Iraqi and Arab nationalism
that were coming to view minorities as an entry point for western interven-
tion.
The particulars of the refugee regime, as embodied especially clearly in the
example of the Baʿquba refugee camp in Iraq, set the stage for a permanent
role for refugee camps in the mandate states of the interwar Middle East.
Theywere conceived not just as institutions for immediate humanitarian relief
but as places for the preservation and continuance of Armenian and Assyrian
“national” identities while the refugeeswaited for the emergence of a sovereign
state. In the absence of any practical movement towards sovereign nationhood
for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine, the British government and the League
of Nations presented such refugee camps as visible evidence of the League’s
and the mandate powers’ theoretical commitment to principles of national
sovereignty.
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Nationalism and Humanitarianism
The refugee regime in postwar Iraq emerged out of two longer-term trends:
westernmission interest in Assyrian communities that dated to the nineteenth
century, and its extension in the form of massive aid campaigns in Britain,
France, and the United States, spearheaded by missionary and church groups
during the course of World War i. The construction of Assyrian identity as
specifically national, rather than religious, communal, or ethnic, owedmuch to
themachinations of westernmissionary intervention and interest in the region
prior to thewar. Its furthering in the context of the postwar refugee crisis in part
reflected the mission origins of refugee aid and the nature of the international
campaign to raisemoney and awareness for the plight of displaced ex-Ottoman
Christians.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the European powers—partic-
ularly Britain, France, and Russia—began to develop the idea of serving as
“protectors” of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as a mode of
intervening in the failing Ottoman state as well as appealing to a growing evan-
gelical interest in easternChristians in their respective domestic spheres.Many
of these relationships were formalized in the set of treaties, collectively known
as the “Capitulations,” established between the weakened Ottoman state and
the rising European empires.1 In a number of cases, external European interest
in the political benefits of alliances with these communities overlapped with
an increased missionary presence interested in establishing a western Chris-
tian presence in what was increasingly called and understood as the “Holy
Land.” The nineteenth-century rise in biblical archaeology and mass evangel-
ical tourism, particularly in Britain and the United States, led mission orga-
1 For detailed discussions of this system of “protections,” see Benjamin Braude and Bernard
Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, 2
vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982); Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
ArabWorld: TheRoots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001); Youssef
Courbage andPhillipe Fargues,Chrétiens et juifs dans l’ Islamarabe et turc (Paris: Fayard, 1992);
and Xavier de Planhol, Minorités en Islam: géographie politique et sociale (Paris: Flammarion,
1997), as well as descriptions in broader histories of the empire like Donald Quataert, The
Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Halil Inalcik et al.
(eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, 2 vols (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Fadil Bayat, al-Dawla al-ʿUthmaniyya fī l-majal al-ʿArabī:
dirasa tārīkhiyya fī l-awḍaʾ al-idariyya fī ḍawʾ al-wathāʾiq wa-l-masādīr al-ʿUthmaniyya ḥaṣran
(Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 2007); and Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream:
The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923 (New York: Perseus, 2005).
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nizations to begin to establish outposts across the Ottoman sphere, particu-
larly in the Levant. Since proselytizing to Muslims constituted a crime in the
Ottoman Empire, and the small Jewish communities who were sometimes
a target of mission efforts remained largely unresponsive, missionaries often
turned their attention to localChristian communities,who theybelievedwould
benefit from western-style education and exposure to the practices of west-
ern Christianity.2 This three-way association between local Christian commu-
nities, western missions, and the machinery of European diplomacy went a
long way in shaping the fate of these communities through the twentieth cen-
tury.
The small Assyrian Christian communities of the nineteenth-century Hak-
kari region (encompassing parts of modern-day northern Iraq, northwestern
Iran, and eastern Turkey) became targets of this western Christian attention
in an especially intensive way. Like other indigenous Christian communities
in the Middle East, throughout the nineteenth century the Assyrians had been
objects of interest for British and American Protestant missions; unlike most
of these other Christian communities, the Assyrians also interested archaeolo-
gists. The rising Europeanmissionary presence in theHakkari region coincided
with a number of archeological excavations of the ancient ruins of Nineveh
and Babylon, and especially with the discovery of the Nimrud palace of Ashur-
nasirpal ii in 1848.Missionaries drew on these recent discoveries of pre-Islamic
Assyrian greatness to promote the idea of this branch of eastern Christians as
direct descendants of this ancient empire. “The present Assyrian,” onemission-
ary wrote in 1929, “does represent the ancient Assyrian stock, the subject of
Sargon and Sennacherib … The writer has knownmen who claimed to be able
to trace their own lineal descent from King Nebuchadnezzar.”3 As historical
sociologist Sami Zubaida notes, this “constructed Assyrian identity could then
2 On this history of western Christian missionary activity in the Middle East, see especially
Eleanor H. Tejirian and Reeva Spector Simon, Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two Thou-
sand Years of Christian Missions in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press,
2012); Heleen Murre-van den Berg (ed.), New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the
Middle East in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Mehmet Ali
DoganandHeather J. Sharkey (eds.), AmericanMissionariesand theMiddleEast: Foundational
Encounters (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011); and Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of
Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2008).
3 W. Wigram, The Assyrians and their Neighbors (London: Bell Press, 1929): 178–179; also cited
in Madawi al-Rasheed, Iraqi Assyrian Christians in London: The Construction of Ethnicity
(Lewiston, ny: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), 42.
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drawon two sources of favourable associations: ancient national ancestry and a
Christianity which forged linked with the dominant European powers.”4 It was
during the late nineteenth century that western missionaries began to popu-
larize the word “Assyrian,” previously only one of a number of possible desig-
nations for these Christians and not themost prominent, as amode of identify-
ing the present-day community with the ancient empires. Originally, this idea
may have been suggested by local assistants to the excavations like the Assyr-
ian activist Hormuzd Rassam; certainly it buttressed community ambitions for
local autonomy, as well as romantic missionary imaginings of an untouched
“original” Christian community.5
Consequently, evenbeforeWorldWar i, thebeginnings of a re-categorization
ofAssyrian identity fromcommunal and ethnic tonationalwere alreadyunder-
way. The centralization ofOttoman authority in the final years of the empire, as
the Ottoman state tried to take firmer hold of its borderlands, also assisted this
process, as Assyrian leaders sought to defend their longstanding autonomy in
Hakkari and resisted closer surveillance and incorporation into the Ottoman
sphere.6 In this fight, many Assyrian leaders saw their association with west-
ern missionaries and archeologists as potentially beneficial to their cause, and
began to adopt a mission-derived language of national independence for their
own purposes.7 The missionary presence also created new venues for the dis-
4 Sami Zubaida, “Contested Nations: Iraq and the Assyrians,”Nations and Nationalism 6, no. 3
(2000): 373.
5 J. Coakley, The Church of the East and the Church of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
5. Until the early twentieth century, the Assyrians generally referred to themselves as nesto-
ryaye, theNestorianmillet, anOttoman designation that had no national or ethnic overtones.
Protestantmissionarieswere especially anxious to erase the designation “Nestorian” from the
community they had decided to champion, as it referred to a “heretical” theology. For the
dual Assyrian/missionary making of this new version of Assyrian nationalism, see particu-
larly Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Chaldeans and Assyrians: The Church of the East in the
Ottoman Period,” in Erica Hunter (ed.), The ChristianHeritage of Iraq (Piscataway, nj: Gorgias
Press, 2009), 157–161.
6 On this point, see especially Michel Chevalier, Les montangnards chretiens du Hakkari et
du Kurdistan septentrional (Paris: Departement de Geographie de l’Universite de Paris-Sor-
bonne), and Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Light from the East (1948–1954) and the De-
Territorialization of the Assyrian Church in the East,” in Wim Hofstee and Arie van der Kooij
(eds.), Religion Beyond its Private Role in Modern Society (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 115–134.
7 For detailed accounts of the Assyrian encounter with westernmissions, see particularly John
Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western Christian Missions,
Archeologists, and Colonial Powers (Leiden: Brill, 2000), and Coakley, The Church of the East
and the Church of England.
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semination of this new national identity, asmission schools became important
educational institutions for Assyrians and the printing press allowed for the
publication and distribution of both religious and secular material in modern
Aramaic.8
As the war approached and the Ottoman government broadly began to view
its Christian subjects as potential threats to the state, the Assyrian relationship
with the beleaguered Ottoman administration began to erupt into violence.9
The increasingly hostile encounters betweenAssyrian Christians and aMuslim
Turkish dominatedOttoman government gave Assyrian supporters in theWest
further reason to describe the community as a religiously persecuted “nation.”
In 1915 and 1916, when Armenians and Assyrians were being massacred in the
eastern reaches of theOttomanEmpire,western groups like theAmericanorga-
nizationNear East Relief called for donations not only to relieve the suffering of
those Armenian and Assyrian populations dispossessed and persecuted in the
war, but also to save their existence as civilized Christian “nations” facing the
wrath of a benighted, barbaric Muslim rage.10 This kind of rhetoric predicated
international aid on the premise that donors were not only rescuing individual
victims but also preventing the disappearance of national bodies, thus casting
the idea of a postwar assimilation into the new states of Syria and Iraq as a kind
of national and even racial annihilation. This rhetoric of aid, and its dissemina-
tion through church and diaspora networks, helped to legitimize and reinforce
the creation of the Assyrian refugee camp as a space for the expression of a
specific form of national statelessness.
This narrative ofAssyrianChristiannationhood and civilization versus Turk-
ish Muslim barbarism represented an especially prominent trope in the reams
8 Murre-van den Berg, “Chaldeans and Assyrians,” 158.
9 Anumber of recent scholarlyworks advocate labeling this violence an “Assyrian genocide”
to be acknowledged alongside the Armenian genocide. On this point and on the numbers
of Assyrians deported and massacred, see especially David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance,
Protection: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World War i (London:
Gorgias Press, 2006); Hannibal Travis, Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire,
Iraq, and Sudan (Durham, nc: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), and idem, “The Assyrian
Genocide: A Tale of Oblivion and Denial,” in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), Forgotten Genocides:
Oblivion,Denial, andMemory (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Cathie
Carmichael, Genocide Before the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); and
Sébastien de Courtois, Le génocide oublié: chrétiens d’orient, les derniers araméens (Paris:
Ellipses, 2002).
10 On this point see especially Keith Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Arme-
nian Genocide Survivors and theMaking of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927,”Amer-
ican Historical Review 115, no. 5 (2010): 1315–1339.
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of petitions sent from Assyrian diaspora communities to the British govern-
ment and the various representatives at the Paris peace conference. The Assyr-
ian National Associations of America, based in New York and with branches
throughout New England, advocated for an independent Assyrian state to be
carved out of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia on precisely these grounds:
… the centuries have proved that the Turks are incapable of reform, and
the Arabs are not accustomed to any form of government. The history of
Turkish Government and its cruel deeds are known to the world; fertile
lands lie sterile under the dead hand of the Turk, whereas Assyrians in
their country are successful in every branch; they are an intelligent, indus-
trious and prolific race. Assyrians have lived under centuries of cruelty
and persecution. Their faithfulness to their nationality and religion have
saved them from extermination.11
This focus on racial extermination provided a useful counterpoint to the idea
of Assyrian absorption into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state such as
those being proposed in Palestine and Iraq. Many of these petitions laid out
lengthy descriptions of an ancient Assyrian Christian nation in danger of total
eradication without western intervention and recreation as a sovereign or
semi-sovereign space.
For Assyrian diaspora communities in the West, this rhetoric of ancient
Christian nationhood was especially powerful because it represented a crucial
modeof assimilation. By accepting andpromoting ideas of TurkishMuslimbar-
barism set beside Assyrian and Armenian national and religious commitment,
they could claim a space in “Western civilization” that would make absorption
into the United States, France, England, and Australia (among others) an eas-
ier task. In some cases, particularly in the United States, this claim to Christian
nationhood could make it possible to claim the legal category of “white” and
its corresponding legal and political privileges.12 These diaspora conversations,
which promoted a vision of minority nationalisms invented in the context of
latenineteenth-centurymissionary activity, lent legitimacy to themaintenance
of Assyrian refugee camps as separate national spaces in the postwar context.
11 Executive Committee, Assyrian National Associations of America, memo on “The New
Assyria,” 29 March 1919, National Archives Kew Foreign Office (henceforth fo) 608/274.
12 See Sarah Gualtieri, Between Arab andWhite: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian Amer-
ican Diaspora (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
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Baʿquba
The first Armenian/Assyrian refugee camp in Iraq, set up in the northern
village of Baʿquba, became a space within which these longstanding tropes
were explicitly rendered into a new physical and spatial reality. Set up to house
Armenian and Assyrian communities who had found themselves engaged in
a military campaign against Russia in the final stages of the war, it became a
physical manifestation of British ethnographic categorizations and of British
and League commitment to the principles of national sovereignty, and served
as one of the initial examples of how refugee camps could themselves begin
to operate as political spaces independent of the states in which they were
located.
At Urmia in the spring of 1918, a group of Assyrians originally from the
Hakkari region, along with a small and mostly local Armenian force, were
engaging in battle against the Ottomans (and, sporadically, against local Kur-
dish tribes as well). That June, a British force sent from Hamadan landed in
Urmia and informed the holdouts of the British military advance to Sarin
Qalʾaa. The remainingAssyrians andArmenians evacuatedUrmiaunderBritish
protection and left for Hamadan, where the British formally incorporated the
Armenian soldiers into theBritish armyandcharged themwith the taskofmov-
ing and protecting the refugees. Anticipating the declaration of British control
overwhatwould become Iraq, British officialsmarched theAssyrian andArme-
nian communities several hundredmiles to the village of Baʿquba, just north of
Baghdad, where a camp was under construction to serve as a temporary solu-
tion to the refugees’ homelessness.
At this juncture theBritishhold onMesopotamia, and thenature of its future
governance, was still very uncertain. There was considerable resistance to the
imposition of British rule across Iraq, and already several anti-colonial soci-
eties encompassing both Sunnī and Shīʿī leaders had sprung up in the cities to
organize the anti-British campaign. Though founders of the nascent League of
Nations were in discussions with the British over the precise nature of its rule
over Iraq and the nature of the proposed “mandate” system, it had no formal
mechanisms yet in place to provide oversight or suggest policy. Indeed, these
mechanisms remained weak throughout the mandate period; as Peter Sluglett
has recently put it, “The framers of the mandate system thought they were
improving on colonialism, but given the fact that they all had ‘conventional’
colonial empires of their own, and given the poverty of the regulatory machin-
ery, the outcome was not all that different from the colonized countries.”13 At
13 Peter Sluglett, “An Improvement onColonialism?The ‘a’Mandates andTheir Legacy in the
244 robson
any rate, the nature of mandate rule in Iraq did not really solidify for another
several years, until after a widespread revolt in 1920 forced the reformulation
of the mandate for Mesopotamia into the Kingdom of Iraq via the 1922 Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty and initiated a partial devolution of power into Iraqi hands.14 The
creation of the Baʿquba campwas therefore very much under local control and
dictated initially by the British officials on the ground, in cooperation with a
refugee Assyrian military leadership with whom the British had established a
relationship.
The inhabitants of Baʿquba now included 24,579 Assyrian refugees, nearly
all originally from Hakkari, along with 14,612 Armenians from Van, Mosul, and
Urmia. The British officials in charge made decisions about the camp’s admin-
istration without much contact or input from London and none at all from
Geneva. They viewed the camp as having three central purposes: first, to house
refugee populations on a temporary basiswith a view towards repatriation; sec-
ond, to promote, record, and “preserve” what they understood as the national
MiddleEast,”InternationalAffairs90, no. 2, (2014), 425. Thequestionof thedegree towhich
themandate systemrepresenteda genuinelynew formof government versus a repackaged
European imperialism has received extensive notice. In general, scholars of the Middle
East have viewed it as little more than a fig leaf for the continuation of earlier forms of
British andFrench imperial rule; for someexamples, see particularlyNadineMéouchy and
Peter Sluglett (eds.), The British and FrenchMandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden:
Brill, 2004); Philip Khoury, Syria and the FrenchMandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism,
1920–1945 (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1987); Daniel Neep, Occupying Syria
under theFrenchMandate: Insurgency, Space, andStateFormation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Elizabeth Thompson,Colonial Citizens: RepublicanRights, Paternal
Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon; Laura Robson, Colonialism and Chris-
tianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011); Jacob Norris, Land
of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905–1948 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013); and Daniel Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A
Case Study of Iraq, 1929–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Historians viewing
the League from a European perspective have sometimes had a slightly different view of
the nature of the mandate system; see, for example, Susan Pedersen, “TheMeaning of the
Mandates System: An Argument,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (2006), 560–582,
which assigns a bit more importance to the distinction between colonial and mandate
governments.
14 On the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the widespread revolt of 1920, and the
reformulation of themandate into theHashemitemonarchy, see particularly Reeva Simon
and Eleanor Tejirian, The Creation of Iraq, 1914–1921 (New York: Columbia University Press,
2004); Charles Tripp, AHistory of Iraq (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000); and
TobyDodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and aHistoryDenied (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003).
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cultures of the Armenians and Assyrians; and third, to create an orderly “mod-
ern” space distinct from the geographical location and therefore essentially
mobile. All three of these premises becamemodels for understanding refugees
and the place of camps in the new international order. Although Baʿquba did
not last long, it provided a model on which the British and the League based
their understanding of the postwar refugee problem and the range of possible
solutions into the interwar period, as the conceptual framework for an inter-
national refugee regime was solidified, standardized, and incorporated into
international legal and political structures.
The basic premise of the camp at Baʿquba was that it represented a tempo-
rary solution and that the refugees were preparing for repatriation and reset-
tlement. The refugees themselves were passionately in favor of an eventual
repatriation toHakkari andUrmia, as was demonstrated by any number of lob-
bying efforts and a failed attempt by the Assyrian leader Agha Petros to take a
group back into Hakkari in 1920. Dr. J.M. Yonan and PepaMirza, bothmembers
of the Assyrian National Committee based in Urmia during the war, appealed
to the British Legation in Tehran for assistance in resettling the Assyrians back
intoUrmia on the basis of theirmilitary assistance to the British and the refusal
of the Persian government to offer assistance. “These are the conditions and
these are the sacrifices,” they wrote,
and we therefore pray the Allies and most especially Great Britain 1.
To return our people to Urumia [sic] 2. To grant our people protection
without which is would be impossible to reside in Urumia. We would
especially beg that protection be granted and guaranteed to the mem-
bers of the Central National Committee who had been very active in the
arrangements of National affairs and therefore have incurred the spe-
cial enemity [sic] of Turks and Kurds and Persians who are pro Turk-
ish.15
Another Assyrian statement of political goals, sent from a committee to the
British headquarters in Baghdadwith a view towards having it read at the peace
talks, requested “re-establishment in own country under British protection,”
clarifying that this meant the region of “Kurdistan up to line of Jezireh-Seri-
Bash-Kala and Persian territory between Lake Urmi and Turkish frontier,” and
“Government recognition of PatriarchMarshimmun as head of nation,” accom-
15 J.M. Yonan and Pera Mirza, memo on “The Assyrian People and their Relations with the
Allies in the Present War,” Dec. 1918, fo 608/274.
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panied by an assurance that “if granted these things hope to live peaceablywith
Kurds under British protection.”16
Suchdemands did not indicate a national determination to acquireAssyrian
nation-state sovereignty but rather a desire to return to the relatively autono-
mous political position the Assyrians had enjoyed in the late Ottoman period,
in the same geographical space. Even the redoubtable Surma Khamman, sister
of the late patriarch and enthusiastic advocate for Assyrian affairs in London,
despite her practiced promotion of Assyrian national identity to sympathetic
British officialdom, proposed that membership in an independent Kurdistan
might represent a viable future for the Assyrians: “Should prefer British pro-
tection and mandate for Hakkiari district, but recognize this impossible. If
Kurdistan independent could live there in Hakkiari in old homes with Kurds,
supposing armament provided for self-protection.Much prefer this alternative
[to repatriation to Persia or Turkish territory].”17
British advocates forAssyriannationhood, though, constructed this enthusi-
asm for return as an expression of national commitment, and began to prepare
for mass refugee resettlement as part of a creation of autonomous Assyrian
and Armenian nation-states—this despite the fact that already the idea of
autonomous Assyrian and Armenian states had clearly been rejected as a gov-
erning principle of a postwar order. As a London official minuted in 1919, “The
new Mesopotamia will give the Assyrians their real desiderata (i) security and
(ii) union in a single state (though this state will of course not be a national
Assyrian state, but Arab-Kurdish-Syriac).”18 Nevertheless, the fiction of a future
sovereign nation-state governed refugee camp administration and planning. It
also began to produce the narrative that statelessness was not merely a con-
dition of lack of citizenship, but rather a condition of citizenship in a state
that did not actually exist as a political entity. Refugee statelessness, therefore,
emerged as a concept that applied to Assyrians andArmenians but not to Turk-
ish or Kurdish displaced populations, and camps like Baʿquba were presented
as a solution specifically designated for “national” populations in a condition of
temporary limbowhile their stateswere being created. Consequently,while the
British and French taking over their newmandated territories in Iraq and Syria
pursued tactics of sedentarization and local resettlement for displaced Kur-
dish, Yedizi, and Arab populations in the borderlands,19 they grouped Arme-
nians and Assyrians in “refugee camps” (itself a relatively new concept) that
16 Memo from Political Bureau Baghdad to London, 11 March 1919, fo 608/274.
17 Surma Khassan to Matran, 5 May 1920, t 1/12603.
18 Minute on Political Bureau Baghdad memo, 11 March 1919, fo 608/274.
19 On this, see especially Seda Altug, “Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, Land
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had the specific and explicitly stated purpose of acting as a waystation on the
path to sovereign statehood and expressed a nationalized political landscape.
This aspect of the camp did not emerge immediately, as there were many
casualties of the long trek fromHamadan to Baʿquba andmanywho did survive
the journey were in poor health upon their arrival. Initially, conditions at the
camp were chaotic and unsanitary; one British army officer working there
reported a stream of destitute arrivals and more than eighty deaths daily in
the early days of the camp. But as time went on and it became clear that the
camp was at least a semi-permanent institution, in the absence of any viable
possibility of immediate repatriation, the British officers in charge of the camp
began to organize its population to reflect and prepare for a future in which
both Armenians and Assyrians would have their own nation-states.
A memorandum on the camp reported an initial process of separating refu-
gees by ethnicity into defined national spaces: “For the first month or so the
people were all mixed up, Armenians and Assyrians together. But as they
became more settled, a census was held, and the people arranged throughout
the sections according to their tribal divisions and affiliations.”20 The British
camp administrators also set up committees to deal with “questions of national
customs and religious duties,”21 which they considered central to the preser-
vation of Armenian and Assyrian national character until the communities
could be reconstituted in a “homeland.” To that end, daily life in the camp
included instruction in Armenian and Syriac for the children, classes in tra-
ditional Armenian lace-making and sewing for the women, and the careful
recording of Armenian and Assyrian customs.
The conception of the camp as a space for the preservation of the “race”
became central to the stated principles of the British officers in charge.
H.H.Austin, the campcommandant, recorded that this ideahad tobe conveyed
and enforced to the refugees themselves:
The proportion of deaths among newly-born infants at one time became
so high, particularly with the Assyrians, that I pointed out toMar Shimun
there seemed, in the opinion of my medical officers, to be good reason
for believing that mothers were in the habit of purposely overlying their
and Violence in the Memories of World War i and the French Mandate (1915–1939)” (PhD
thesis, Utrecht University 2011), and Nelida Fuccaro, The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial
Iraq (London: Tauris, 1999).
20 Memoranda, 6; also quoted in Jo Laycock, ImaginingArmenia:Orientalism,Ambiguity, and
Intervention (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 168.
21 Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 168.
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babies shortly after birth … I begged him to appeal to mothers to do
everything in their power and to take full advantage of the facilities
afforded by our maternity wards, to rear up their infants. The nation
was already so reduced in numbers by their sufferings during the war
that it was simply race suicide if this high death rate amongst babies was
allowed to continue. In response to my request the Patriarch issued a
proclamation to all mothers, and expectant ones, exhorting them for the
sake of the future welfare of the nation to give every care to newly-born
children.22 [Emphasis added]
Such language indicated the degree to which British and American adminis-
trators were engaged in constructing particular kinds of narratives about the
camps as national spaces and about the refugees as survivors of an attempted
holocaust, and needed the assistance of Assyrian and Armenian collaborators
to broadcast these messages to the refugees themselves. As Dudley Northcote,
one of the British officials in charge of the Armenian sections of the camp,
noted in a letter home,
If you are an ordinary regimental officer in a British regiment, it is aston-
ishing how little opportunity you have of getting to know anything about
the natives of Messpot [sic], because of course all your work is with your
ownmen, but now it is part ofmy job to study 1300Armenianmen,women
and children.23 [Emphasis added.]
He added in a different context how utterly dependent he was on his “head-
man,” who had spent some of his early years in the United States and could
speak English “after a fashion.”24
Under British authority, the camp became a disciplined and self-contained
space in which access to Arab and Kurdish Iraq was restricted and government
and social organization was entirely internal. The military officers in charge of
its administration imagined it as a carefully organized,mapped-out institution:
The whole camp which covers roughly an area of one square mile has
been divided into three areas: ‘a,’ ‘b,’ and ‘c’ respectively. Each of these
areas are subdivided into sections, varying from 11 to 13 in number in each
22 H.H. Austin, The Baʿqubah Refugee Camp: An Account of Work on Behalf of the Persecuted
Assyrian Christians (London: Faith House, 1920), 42.
23 Letter to “Mamma,” 3 Dec. 1918, Northcote papers (henceforth np), British Library.
24 Northcote to “Papa,” 11 Dec. 1918, np.
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area. Over each area there was a British officer, and each section had a
British officer looking after it assisted by 3 or 4 British soldiers.25
Another observer praised the way the “tribal census” had made a mapping out
of the ethnic territory of the camp:
As a result of the “General Post,” theArmenianswere all located in ‘a’ area;
whilst ‘b,’ and ‘c’ were occupied byAssyrians,whowere arranged through-
out the sections in accordance with their tribal divisions and affiliations.
The supply, and other questions of administration and discipline were
greatly simplified in consequence.26
The Assyrian and Armenian children in the orphanage section of the camp
were kept mainly separate: “The large cook-house and bathing-sheds were
common to both Armenian and Assyrian children; but they worked at lessons
and played apart—each nationality having its own school tents, and giant-
strides, horizontal and parallel bars, swings, see-saws, etc.”27
Camp schools also revolved around this idea ofmaintaining collective racial
and ethnic memory. Levon Shahoian, who was eleven years old at the time of
his sojourn in Baʿquba, recalled the schooling as little more than a process of
recollection: “For days at end our sole curriculumwas repeating out ownnames
and family names.Wehad to stand up and repeat our, aswell as our father’s and
mother’s name, the names of our siblings, and the city or village from where
we had been exiled.”28 Armenian nationalist history and language, along with
English lessons taught by a group of American missionaries, constituted the
remainder of the curriculum.
Employment was entirely controlled by the British military, which put the
men in the camps to work distributing supplies and building roads, drains,
and other infrastructure. Some of these jobs were outside the camp, but they
were assigned andpaid through the British army anddid not involve significant
contact with the Kurdish and Arab populations in the surrounding area. Such
contact as did occur was often hostile, with sentries firing on Arabs approach-
ing the camp in an attempt to “prevent Arab thieves getting into one part or
another of the camp at night, and stealing animals and private property of
25 Memoranda, cited in Laycock, Imagining Armenia, 158.
26 Austin, The Baʿqubah Refugee Camp, 20.
27 Ibid., 24.
28 Levon Shahoian, On the Banks of the Tigris (London: Taderon Press, 2012), 50.
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the refugees and others.”29 During the initial stages of the camp’s setup, small
groups of Assyrians had put up outposts for themselves and their livestock out-
side the camp, but as tensions rose between the refugees and the local Arab
andKurdish populations theywere ordered to return to the camps, “where they
were less likely to bemolested at night byArab thieves.”30Muchof the evidence
points to considerable resentment on the part of local Arab and Kurdish popu-
lations over the British, Assyrian, and Armenian appropriation of property and
aggressive defense of the camp.
The idea of repatriation and resettlement thus dominated the physical setup
of the Baʿquba camp as well as its daily administration and the relationship
of Armenian and Assyrian refugees with the surrounding areas. Through 1919,
officials like Dudley Northcote declared that the repatriation of the refugees
had been delayed only because of the difficulties of crossing hostile Kurdish-
held territory on theway toHakkari, Urmia, or Erevan.As the termsof thepeace
accord became clearer in 1920, the situation of the refugees became muddier;
many of the British administrators running the camp were unwilling to drop
the idea of repatriation, even as its impossibility became abundantly evident.
F. Cunliffe-Owen, Director of Repatriation in the Baʿquba camp, told the British
government as much in 1920:
My conclusions are therefore:—Either (i) Continue the present mode of
living with hopes of and efforts for repatriation. In this case the commu-
nity cannot be self-supporting … Or (ii) Accept the idea that repatriation
is not within the range or practical politics as yet and settle the commu-
nity in zones which must be found and where the people would have to
resume their customary avocations. This could of course entail an ini-
tial outlay and would be largely experimental in strange surroundings. I
myself recommend the first course.31
Such conversations were also governed by increasing concern in London about
the costs of the camps and the Frenchmandate government’s refusal to provide
financial assistance.
When in August of 1920 the British authorities finally made the decision to
close Baʿquba, citing the danger posed by the Arab uprisings around Iraq, the
fate of the refugees depended on their ethnicity. Initially, they were moved en
29 Austin, The Baʿqubah Refugee Camp, 57.
30 Ibid., 58.
31 Cunliffe-Owen, Memorandum regarding administration of Refugee Camp at Baʿqubah,
1920, t 1/12603.
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masse north to Nahr Umar, where they were again divided into Armenian and
Assyrian quarters with separate administrations. As many Armenians hope-
fully awaited the creation of an independent Armenian state as proposed in
the Treaty of Sèvres, the British government and the League of Nations simulta-
neously proposed other resettlement alternatives for the Armenians. One pro-
posal hadArmenian refugees placed on an agricultural colony inKirkuk; others
suggested similar rural settlement plans in Syria. Neither of these plans proved
acceptable to the refugees themselves, who categorically refused to cooper-
ate, and the British decided simply to evacuate all the camp’s inhabitants with
a small sum of money to find other accommodation. When this policy was
implemented in the fall of 1921, most of Baʿquba’s Armenian residents were
transported to Transcaucasia, as the closest possible option to repatriation in
the now-defunct Armenian nation-state, while the Assyrians in Baʿquba camp,
on the other hand, were mainly moved to another refugee camp at Mindan,
outside Mosul.
The refugee camps and the subsequent settlements had thus created a
rural landscape in which Assyrians constituted a markedly separate political
and geographical entity, supported by an external power and placed within
restrictive circumstances. This alteration of the rural landscape to create a
defined, limited, and fragmented space for Assyrian minority communities
was supported by the Iraqi government, who paid part of the costs of the
agricultural settlement plan through tax relief and, in some cases, financing
of agricultural projects, infrastructure, and housing. Despite this funding, the
Iraqi government and emerging Iraqi and Arab nationalist movements came
to view these communities with suspicion, as foreign elements representing a
potential threat to the sovereignty of the state. This overlaying of the category of
“minority” onwhatwas essentially an imported refugee community dependent
on outside sponsors had long-term and broadly negative consequences for
Iraq’s other Christian communities, who did not have the same spatial or
political distance from the Iraqi state.32
32 On the construction of a more unified “Church of the East” encompassing both Chaldean
and Assyrian branches in various historical periods, see especially Murre-van den Berg,
“Chaldeans and Assyrians.” Because of their origins as refugees and the enclosed nature
of the camps, this particular Assyrian community had relatively little contact during the
immediate postwar period with other eastern Christian groups in Iraq; the fact that their
primary political relationships were with the British isolated them in a different way from
other religious and ethnic “minorities” in Iraq.
252 robson
Pointing theWay to a Broader Refugee Regime
Although mass migration of displaced peoples had of course characterized
wartime prior to the twentieth century, World War i marked the beginning of
an international approach to refugees that defined them first and foremost as
stateless and thus a responsibility on the international state system. The Assyr-
ian andArmenian refugee camp that aroseunderBritish supervision atBaʿquba
predated the emergence of a comprehensive refugee regime under the author-
ity of the new League of Nations, and the nature of the relief arrangements
in these early camps and settlements served to shape emerging international
refugee policy.
The beginnings of an international refugee regime did not come until 1921,
some years after private relief organizations as well as various Allied govern-
ments had engaged in the creation of refugee camps across the former Arab
provinces of the Ottoman empire. Its first formal iteration was the appoint-
ment by the League of a “General Commissioner for the Russian Refugees,”
at the suggestion of a group of humanitarian agencies including the Interna-
tional Red Cross. The slot was filled by the redoubtable Fridtjof Nansen, who
was charged with the task of either finding ways to repatriate refugees to Rus-
sia or finding employment for them in their new homes. When, the following
year, a new Soviet decree stripped the refugees of their citizenship, Nansen
turned his attention to the possibilities of formal legal asylum elsewhere. This
development followed on the heels of the collapse of the short-lived Repub-
lic of Armenia, which created another wave of Armenian refugees fleeing their
territory’s incorporation into Turkey or the Soviet state and rendering the idea
of “repatriation” impossible for Armenian refugees holed up in camps in Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Nansen’s creation of the Nansen Passport system,
at its core, represented an attempt to deal with the loss of the repatriation solu-
tion for these Russian and Armenian refugees.33
At the same time, despite the expansionof eligibility for theNansenpassport
to “Any person of Assyrian or Assyro-Chaldean origin” in 1928,34 the League
and its associated refugee institutions were already beginning to differentiate
between cases like the Russian refugees, for whom emigration, asylum, and
eventual assimilation into a new home country were considered desirable,
and distinct “national minorities” like the Armenians and Assyrians, for whom
33 On the Nansen Passport, see Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian
Genocide Survivors.”
34 “Arrangement of 30 June 1928 Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees
of Certain Measures taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees,” lnts, 89, p. 63.
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some sort of eventual sovereign space was envisioned and who were being
held in enclosed, potentially mobile camps specifically for this purpose. Such
distinctionswere even clearer in the cases of refugeeswhowere not recognized
as political entities at all. During the course of an investigation of non-affiliated
refugees in need of the League’s assistance, private groups pointed out any
number of small groups of refugees across Europe:
150 Assyrians and a small number of Montenegrin refugees in France,
19,000 Assyro-Chaldeans in the Caucasus and Greece, 9,000 Ruthenes in
Austria andCzechoslovakia, 100,000 refugees in central Europe, including
10,000 former Hungarians in Austria, France, and Romania, 16,000 Jews in
Romania, and 150 Turks in Greece who had been ‘Friends of the Allies.’35
The ensuing discussion in the Council included the observation that “themere
fact that certain classes of persons are without the protection of any national
Government is not sufficient to make them refugees,”36 and it was decided
that only the Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldeans, and Turks—all of whom claimed
identities that had already been constituted as part of a recognized refugee
national group—would be eligible for League assistance.
In the context of theMiddle East, then, the premise that the communal and
national identities of Armenian andAssyrian refugees represented the primary
reason for international intervention on their behalf—intervention that other
refugees, not recognized as “minority” national entities, did not merit—had
been constructed and disseminated to both the refugees themselves and an
international funding audience through the institutionalization of postwar
refugee camps like Baʿquba. Further, the camps created a de facto situation
of a moveable, compact, ethnically homogenous “homeland,” one which the
League considered could be moved and recreated as a sovereign or semi-
sovereign political space when the opportunity opened up.
Ironically, this role—to maintain a nationality until such time as its claims
could be realized—rendered refugee camps and settlements, originally con-
ceived in the context of the crisis of war, a permanent part of the new geopolit-
ical landscape of the Middle East. Refugee camps emerged as spaces not only
for humanitarian intervention but also for a display of national sovereignty. As
such, they demonstrated the League’s commitment to the nation-state system,
even when the League’s members could not see their way clear to the creation
35 Skran, Refugees in Interwar Europe, 114–115.
36 Cited in Skran, Refugees in Interwar Europe, 115.
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of an Armenian or Assyrian state that would require intensive westernmilitary
and financial assistance to remain viable. The maintenance of refugee camps
and settlements as quasi-sovereign spaces (possible only because their host
nations were under colonial domination) was intended as a public display of
the League’s ideological orientation towards national sovereignty.
Conclusions
The refugee camp at Baʿquba was constituted under a British leadership that
assumed Armenian and Assyrian national identity as a primary organizing
principle, both in terms of governing approaches and physical space. The spa-
tial dimensions of this refugee experience shaped the concept of the ethnic
minority in the new Iraqi state, first by creating camps where ethnic nation-
alisms could be emphasized, reified, and even invented, and then by moving
these dependent refugee communities under British protection to relatively
enclosed and homogenous spaces that would become permanent features of
the new nation. Under this model, minorities were not just identifiable eth-
nic, linguistic, or religious communities; they were also constituencies whose
negotiations with the Iraqi state necessarily involved a third, imperial, power.
Assyrians and Armenians were thus constituted as a threat to the concept of
Iraqi sovereignty and to Arab national unity. This postwar understanding of
what minorities meant to the new states and their national movements now
began to extend to other ethnic and religious communities who had not his-
torically had this relationship with outside powers, whowere not refugees, and
who were Arabized to a much greater degree.
Even more centrally, refugee camps themselves now became a new kind
of political space, designed to represent the concept of national identity and
demonstrate the international order’s commitment to universal national sover-
eignty. In the absence of any political will to create Armenian or Assyrian
states, refugee camps nevertheless could operate as a public demonstration
of the League’s maintenance and promotion of the principle of sovereignty
for various ethno-nationalisms. In imagining the refugee camp as an enclave
for specifically national minorities, the British and the League created a new
geopolitical institution that would eventually become a primary feature of the
twentieth-century Middle Eastern political landscape.
refugee camps and the spatialization of assyrian nationalism 255
Bibliography
Archival Sources
lnts = League of Nations Treaty Series, United Nations Treaty Series. Available online:
https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONOnline.aspx
National Archives, Kew
Foreign Office (fo)
Treasury (t)
np = Northcote Papers, British Library, London
Works Cited
Altug, Seda. “Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, Land and Violence in the
Memories ofWorldWar i and the FrenchMandate (1915–1939).” Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht
University, 2011.
Austin, H.H.TheBaʿqubahRefugeeCamp:AnAccount ofWork onBehalf of the Persecuted
Assyrian Christians. London: Faith House, 1920.
Bayat, Fadil. al-Dawla al-ʿUthmaniyya fī l-majal al-ʿArabī: Dirāsa tārīkhiyya fī l-awḍaʾ
al-idariyya fī ḍawʾ al-wathāʾiq wa-l-masādīr al-ʿUthmaniyya ḥaṣran. Beirut: Markaz
Dirasat al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabiyya, 2007.
Braude, Benjamin and Bernard Lewis (eds.). Christians and Jews in theOttomanEmpire:
The Functioning of a Plural Society. 2 vols. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982.
Carmichael, Cathie. Genocide Before the Holocaust. New Haven, ct: Yale University
Press, 2009.
Chevalier,Michel. Lesmontangnards chretiensduHakkari et duKurdistan septentrional.
Paris: Departement de Geographie de l’Universite de Paris-Sorbonne.
Coakley, J.F. The Church of the East and the Church of England: A History of the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury’s AssyrianMission. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Courbage, Youssef and Phillipe Fargues. Chrétiens et juifs dans l’ Islam arabe et turc.
Paris: Fayard, 1992.
de Courtois, Sébastien. Le génocide oublié: chrétiens d’orient, les derniers araméens.
Paris: Ellipses, 2002.
Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Dogan, Mehmet Ali and Heather J. Sharkey (eds.). American Missionaries and the
Middle East: Foundational Encounters. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011.
Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923. New York:
Perseus, 2005.
Fuccaro, Nelida. The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq. London: Tauris, 1999.
Gaunt, David. Massacres, Resistance, Protection: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern
Anatolia DuringWorldWar i. London: Gorgias Press, 2006.
256 robson
Gualtieri, Sarah. Between Arab andWhite: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian Ameri-
can Diaspora. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
Inalcik, Halil, et al. (eds.) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–
1914. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Joseph, John. The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western Chris-
tian Missions, Archeologists, and Colonial Powers. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
Khoury, Philip. Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–
1945. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1987.
Laycock, Jo. Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity, and Intervention. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2009.
Makdisi, Ussama. Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion
of the Middle East. Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2008.
Masters, Bruce. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarian-
ism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Méouchy, Nadine, and Peter Sluglett (eds.). The British and French Mandates in Com-
parative Perspective. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Murre-van den Berg, Heleen. “Chaldeans and Assyrians: The Church of the East in
the Ottoman Period,” in Erica Hunter (ed.), The Christian Heritage of Iraq, 157–161.
Piscataway, nj: Gorgias Press, 2009.
. “Light from the East (1948–1954) and the De-Territorialization of the Assyrian
Church in the East,” in Wim Hofstee and Arie van der Kooij (eds.), Religion Beyond
its Private Role in Modern Society, 115–134. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
(ed.). New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Neep, Daniel. Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space, and State
Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Norris, Jacob. Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905–1948.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Pedersen, Susan. “TheMeaning of theMandates System:AnArgument.”Geschichte und
Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (2006): 560–582.
de Planhol, Xavier. Minorités en Islam: géographie politique et sociale. Paris: Flammar-
ion, 1997.
Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
al-Rasheed, Madawi. Iraqi Assyrian Christians in London: The Construction of Ethnicity.
Lewiston, ny: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998.
Robson, Laura. Colonialism and Christianity inMandate Palestine. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2011.
Shahoian, Levon. On the Banks of the Tigris. London: Taderon Press, 2012.
Silverfarb,Daniel.Britain’s InformalEmpire in theMiddleEast:ACaseStudyof Iraq, 1929–
1941. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
refugee camps and the spatialization of assyrian nationalism 257
Simon, Reeva and Eleanor Tejirian (eds.). The Creation of Iraq, 1914–1921. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004.
Sluglett, Peter. “An Improvement on Colonialism? The ‘a’ Mandates and Their Legacy
in the Middle East.” International Affairs 90, no. 2 (2014): 413–427.
Tejirian, Eleanor H. and Reeva Spector Simon. Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two
Thousand Years of Christian Missions in the Middle East. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2012.
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gen-
der in French Syria and Lebanon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Travis, Hannibal. “The Assyrian Genocide: A Tale of Oblivion and Denial,” in Rene
Lemarchand (ed.), Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, andMemory, 123–136. Phil-
adelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.
. Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan. Durham,
nc: Carolina Academic Press, 2010.
Tripp, Charles. AHistory of Iraq. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Watenpaugh, Keith. “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors
and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927.” American Historical
Review 115, no. 5 (2010): 1315–1339.
Wigram, W. The Assyrians and their Neighbors. London: Bell Press, 1929.
Zubaida, Sami. “Contested Nations: Iraq and the Assyrians.”Nations andNationalism 6,
no. 3 (2000): 363–382.
© h. müller-sommerfeld, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004323285_011
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc-by-nc License.
chapter 10
The League of Nations, a-Mandates andMinority
Rights during theMandate Period in Iraq
(1920–1932)*
H. Müller-Sommerfeld
For the new state of Iraq, created after the political end of theOttoman Empire,
1920 meant the beginning of a “shared history”1 with the League of Nations
(LoN) andGreat Britain. From its twelve years ofmandate administration until
1932 I deal with two issues in this essay.2 The first is the different political lan-
guages concerning a-Mandates.While the LoN conceived of them as territorial
international administration, most Iraqis saw them rather as “colonial rule.”
The second issue, which I cover in the larger part of the paper, comprises the
system of minority protection under the international law of the LoN and its
perception in Iraq. In Geneva, it was understood and handled as a legal protec-
tion shield for encroachments of nationalist majorities against minorities, but
at the same time it was closely linked to the conception of a unitary nation-
state, in which minorities should not be entitled to form a state within a state.
Iraqi minorities themselves perceived and used these minority rights in differ-
ent ways, as the contrasting cases of Iraqi Jews and Assyrian Christians show.
From the many other minorities in Iraq I consider just these two using new
materials from the archive, notably that for Assyrian Christians, of the LoN in
the Library of the United Nations Office Geneva (unogl).
In this essay I aim to consider the independent role of the LoN in the
history of Iraq, and the Middle East, which to date is overshadowed by the
* A draft of this essay was presented at the lucis conference: Common Ground? Jews, Chris-
tians and Muslims in the Middle East, 26–27 September 2013, University of Leiden. For their
generous invitation and great hospitality I thank Heleen Murre-van den Berg, Léon Buskens,
Daniel J. Schroeter, Petra de Bruijn, Farah Bazzi, Femke Groeneveld, Laura Prak, Tijmen
Baarda, and Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah.
1 Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, “BetweenMetropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research
Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Frederick Cooper
and Ann L. Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–58.
2 Based on my unpublished post-doctoral research on politics and religion during the monar-
chy in Iraq.
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mandatory power of Great Britain, and France respectively. It seems that the
last two moments in the process of silencing the past, described by the Haitian
anthropologist and historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, namely, “the moment of
fact retrieval (the making of narratives)” and “the moment of retrospective
significance (the making of history in the final instance)” (emphasis in the
original), were very effective till this day.3
a-Mandates: Different Political Languages
The LoN came into political existence after World War i as a result of the
negotiations between the victorious powers at the Peace conference in Paris
from 1919 to 1920.4As the first global inter-governmental organization it set high
political goals, as the preamble of the act establishing it, theCovenant from 1919
already reveals:
to promote international co-operation, to achieve international peace
and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the
prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by
the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the
actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of
justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings
of organised peoples with one another.
Beside this overall idealistic shift in international politics, us president Wood-
row Wilson (1913–1921) further imposed in Paris the foundation of mandates
as an administrative form against colonial rule and territorial annexations.5
3 Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995),
26. The first twomoments are “fact creation (the making of sources)” and “fact assembly (the
making of archives).”
4 At present the best review essay of the vast academic research on the LoN are Susan Pedersen,
“Back to the League of Nations,” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–1117. On
chronology, the people involved, and the activities of the LoN, cf. Martyn Housden, The
League of Nations and the Organization of Peace (London: Pearson, 2012).
5 At present, we do not have an updated and in depth examination of the origin and com-
plicated elaboration process of mandates at the Paris Conference. Further research should
consider the inter-governmental negotiations from 1917 to 1919, the role of non-governmental
pressure groups such as the League of Nations Union, and the strong support of the Labour
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Their legal skeleton formed Article 22 of the Covenant of the LoN, which com-
pared to its other articles, is quite long and solemn in tone. Pursuant to this
article, mandates were based on the principle “of well-being and develop-
ment” of the “backward people.” This “sacred trust of civilisation”6 was con-
ferred to the Mandatory Powers, but remained under the international con-
trol and supervision of the LoN “until such time as they [the indigenous peo-
ples] are able to stand alone.”7 In their conceptual framework mandates were
thus foremost a formof international administration as political and economic
trusteeships,8 a task for government modernization and development aid, and
not a “late form of colonialism,”9 as it is widely accepted in research stud-
ies on Iraq and the Middle East. The mandate system, termed by the LoN as
“a new conception in international law and a novel experiment in colonial
Party. Despite its publication date, the most authoritative study about the mandates is still
the comprehensivemonograph of the renowned political scientist QuincyWright,Mandates
under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930 [repr. 1968]). The
most recent history emphasizing theAfricanmandates is the two-volume account ofMichael
Callahan, Mandates and Empire (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999 [repr. 2008] and A
Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and Africa, 2004); in “idem”, “Mandated Territories are
not Colonies: Britain, France, and Africa in the 1930s,” in Imperialism on Trial: International
Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective, ed. R.M. Douglas, (Lanham, md: Lexington
Books, 2006), 1–20. See Susan Pedersen’s new study: TheGuardians: The League of Nations and
the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
6 The French version of article 22 uses “unemission sacrée de civilisation,” which from this very
beginning shows that the French andBritish governments had different interpretations of the
mandate system and later, in practice, they did not alter from their original perceptions.
7 The total of 11 mandates were later differentiated as a-, b- and c-categories. a-Mandates were
Iraq, Palestine/Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon (former Ottoman provinces); b-Mandates
were Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, Cameroon, Togoland (largely former German territories);
and c-Mandates were German New-Guinea, Nauru, South Pacific and South-West Africa (to
be administered as integral portions of the territories of mandatory powers).
8 Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to
Iraq and Beyond, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 73–91; Antony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of
International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of
Nations,” International Law and Politics 34 (2002): 513–633.
9 Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (ed.), The British and French Mandates in Comparative
Perspectives, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia 93 (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 2004), 2. The British and French have largely overshadowed the autonomous pres-
ence of the LoN in the Near East. The independent political role of Geneva has been almost
forgotten.
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policy,”10 in this regionprevented the territorial annexation and introduction of
colonial rule after 1918. The policy of “no-annexation” was a guiding principle
of us president Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference concerning the former
territories of the Ottoman Empire, as he formulated in article 12 of his famous
“Fourteen Points” statement before the us Congress in January 1918. Even if
Article 22 of the Covenant of the LoN results from a highly complicated edi-
torial process, we must recall that the British Labour Party and the League of
Nations Union (Robert Cecil) were deeply involved behind the scenes. For the
Labour Party, the anti-colonial orientation of the mandate system as an inter-
national form of government was a main political topic on their agenda.11 The
a-Mandates in the Middle East were thus a historical seam in colonial history,
and one must remember that Labour government announced the termina-
tion of the British mandates in this region: Ramsay McDonald in Iraq (1924
resp. 1929) and Clement Attlee in Palestine (1947). As an international form of
administration on behalf of the LoN, a-Mandates were an aid to state develop-
ment in theMiddle East, and thus anobstacle to the installment of colonial rule
over the conquered territories. They forced the governments of Great Britain
and France to join the new world order of political self-determination and
decolonization after 1918, even if London and Paris did so half-heartedly and
each in their own way. There is presently little well-founded research on the
functioning of the mandate regime in Iraq in practice over the twelve years.
Investigations on the economic aspects would throw new light and thus bring
about a rethinking of the mandates. They were precursors of decolonization
and set up the more comprehensive developments that followed after the end
of World War ii. It seems, however, that the label “colonial past” in the Middle
East fits more ideologically, since it confirms the dominant political opinion of
10 LoN, Ten Years of World-Cooperation (Geneva: League of Nations, 1930), 330.
11 Henry R. Winkler, “The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain 1914–1919,” Rutgers
University Studies in History 7 (New Brunswick, nj: Rutgers University Press 1952, [repr.
1967]); in “idem”, “The Development of the League of Nations Idea in Great Britain 1914–
1919,” The Journal of Modern History 20, no. 2 (1948): 95–112. This article, which is more
than sixty years old, proves that thorough research on the elaboration of the Mandate
system at the Paris Peace Conference is needed, especially as complex correlations were
never analyzed in depth. Somehow, this topic escapes research and historiography. Helen
McCarthy did not includeMandates in her dissertation which is published under the title
The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism,
c. 1918–45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). Stephen Howe, in his in-depth
and recommended study Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire,
1918–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), omits a wider consideration of the
Mandates.
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imperial exploitation through the “West,” dividing “properly” the good and bad
actors. Even if the b- and c-Mandates did not directly effect colonial rule, the
mandate system generally required that colonial powers discuss and rethink
the character and legitimacy of that rule.12
The trusteeship-conception of the mandates never spread widely in Iraq,
and not only because of its complete novelty. It was probably due to the fact
that British forces militarily conquered the three Ottoman provinces of Basra,
Baghdad, andMosul from 1914 to 1918. In 1920, the status ofmilitary occupation
was transformed, in Europe, into themandatory regime,which at this timeonly
existed in the form of Article 22 of the Covenant of the LoN, and had yet to
be worked out in Geneva. The de facto beginning of the mandate regime in
Iraq was delayed by the de jure Ottoman status of the territory. This came to
end after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923 and the recognition
of the border line between Turkey and Iraq in December 1925, when Turkey
renounced her territorial rights over the province of Mosul, which is discussed
below.
Another important factor for the non-acceptance, misunderstandings, and
extraordinary aversion for the term “Mandate” in Iraq—it was generally omit-
ted from official documents—was the widespread international doctrine of
national political self-determination before the end of World War i. In Jan-
uary 1918 us President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed this formula as one of
his famous 14 points for the new world order.13 For a great part of the Mid-
dle Eastern population, though not the whole, this promise nourished strong
hopes for political independence. But they obtained instead the constitution-
ally sophisticated mandates; even politicians did not know exactly what they
were or should be. Given the British and French status as conquerors in the
Middle East, the possibility that themandates would be equated with the well-
known colonial rule was therefore quite likely. Political propaganda was prob-
ably also at work: in 1919 Vladimir I. Lenin, head of government of the Russian
sfsr (1917–1924), termed the mandates a “fig-leaf” for colonialism.14 Sir Percy
12 Susan Pedersen, “The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument,” Geschichte und
Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (2006): 560–582.
13 As recently shown, this brilliant formula was found by Vladimir I. Lenin. The communists
in Russia dealt with it extensively long before Wilson and other politicians in western
states addressed it. The latter adopted this political slogan because of its great popularity
and widespread appeal in the eastern countries of Europe. Jörg Fisch, Das Selbstbestim-
mungsrecht der Völker. Die Domestizierung einer Illusion (Munich: Beck, 2010), 151–154.
14 Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of
the East, 22 November 1919: “Andwhen they talk of handing outmandates for colonies, we
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Cox, the first BritishHighCommissioner for Iraq (1920–1923), assumed that this
colonial understanding of mandates was due to a bad translation of the term
mandate intoArabic, or incorrect renderings in theArabic press, after theman-
date idea became known in Paris.15 Nationalistic circles in Iraq, a great number
of Iraqi politicians, as well as the Muslim population and its religious schol-
ars, all remained unenthusiastic about the mandate right up until its end in
1932. Formost of them, Great Britain was a political sovereign, first of an infidel
Christian government and second, a mandatory power with limited political
authority. Thus, the political language of most Iraqi politicians, the popula-
tion, and the LoN were divided by a deep gulf that was never crossed, rather
it remained a permanent gap in what should have been common ground.
System of Minority Protection of the League of Nations
In the development of minority rights under international law, the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919–1920 represented a historic climax.16 In those heydays of
nationalism minority rights were considered a necessary legal protection
against the political and cultural majorities that were created by the new polit-
ical borders in central and eastern Europe. The new nation-states created after
the disintegration of the defeated multinational and multi-religious Prussian,
Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires in World War i thus had to sign
treaties or make declarations with special provisions for the protection of
minorities.17 For them, these were a necessary part of becoming a member of
the LoN, and this meant their international recognition.
know very well that it means handing out mandates for spoliation and plunder-handing
out to an insignificant section of the world’s population the right to exploit the majority
of the population of the globe.” Lenin, Collected Works, trans. George Hanna (Moscow:
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1965), 30:151–162.
15 The Letters of Gertrude Bell, vol. 2 (1927 [repr. Teddington, 2006]), 87–88.
16 From the vast legal literature, cf. Péter Kovács, The Protection of Minorities under the
Auspices of the League of Nations, in The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights
Law, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 325–344; Li-ann Thio,
Managing Babel: The International Legal Protection of Minorities in the Twentieth Century,
International Studies in Human Rights 81 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005), 27–98.
17 In total, fifteen agreements of this type were concluded in Paris on the “model” of the
Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, signed
at Versailles, on 28 June 1919. Other treaties were for example: Treaty of Peace between
the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, 10 September 1919 (Part iii Section v
Arts. 62–69); Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria,
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The LoN developed the first and to date the only system of minority protec-
tion under international law. It brought together the forerunners of religious
and national protection rights into the triadic concept of “racial, religious, and
linguistic protection.”18 It was based on the principle of equality before the law
and pledged for minorities the same civil and political rights the majorities
had, and conferred them additional special cultural and religious rights such as
the freedomof religion andworship; self-administration and self-organization,
including the right to own charitable organizations, social institutions, schools,
etc.; and the right to use minority languages in schools and the public domain.
Two aspects were essentially new for this advanced system of minority
protection,which shouldbeunderstoodaswell as legal positivediscrimination.
First, its placement “under the guarantee of the LoN,”19which beforewas vested
into the Great Powers and often gave them the opportunity to interfere in the
internal constitution of other states. “Under the guarantee of the LoN” meant
that the legal provisions could not be modified without consent from Geneva,
that anymember of the Council of the LoNwas entitled to call attention to any
infraction or even a danger of infraction of minority rights, that the Council
may thereupon take such action as it deems appropriate. The second aspect
consisted in granting a special right for minorities to submit petitions with
grievances to the LoN, if they considered that their rights were violated by their
governments.20
This protection of racial, religious, and linguistic minorities under interna-
tional lawwas also central to a-Mandates. In Iraq, it was implemented with the
27 November 1919 (Part iii Section iv. Arts 49–57), Treaty of Peace between the Allied
and Associated Powers and Hungary, 4 June 1920 (Part iii Section vi Arts 54–60); Treaty
of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers with Turkey, 24 July 1923 (Part i
Section iii Arts 37–45). Cf. Carole Fink, TheMinorities Question at the Peace Conference, in
The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, ed. Manfred Boemeke, Publications
of the German Historical Institute (Washington: German Historical Institute, 1998), 249–
274.
18 All relevant documents from 1920 to 1930 are compiled in LoN, Protection of Linguistic,
Racial or Religious Minorities by the League of Nations. Resolutions and Extracts from the
Minutes of the Council, Resolutions and Reports adopted by the Assembly, relating to the
Procedure to be followed in questions Concerning the Protection of Minorities, c.8.m.5.1931.i,
Geneva2 1931.
19 The legal basiswasArticle 12 of the PolishTreaty of 1919,whichwas identical in allminority
agreements.
20 Martin Scheuermann, Minderheitenschutz contra Konfliktverhütung? Die Minderheiten-
politik des Völkerbundes in den zwanziger Jahren, Materialien und Studien zur Ostmittel-
europa-Forschung 6 (Marburg/Lahn: Herder Institute, 2000).
the league of nations, a-mandates and minority rights 265
legal system under constitutional law21 and again confirmed by the Iraqi Dec-
laration of Guarantees to the Council of the LoN fromMay 1932, towhich I refer
later.
For the officially recognized Iraqi religious minorities these minority rights,
which grew out of western European politics and thought, did not bring about
any radical change on the ground. They did not abolish, but continued their
Ottomanmillet-system, last amended by the reform edict of the Sublime Porte
in February 1856 (hatt-i hümayun). This pertains especially to themaintenance
of their self-organization and administration and their own religious jurisdic-
tion and courts, which were anachronistic when compared to the otherwise
modern judicial system introduced in Iraq. It seems as if the LoN and Great
Britain were not as brave as Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his government in
Turkey in the 1920s, when they radically abolished the traditional religious
infrastructure of minorities, even though other problems were created in this
process.22
However, Iraqi minorities perceived the minority protection under interna-
tional law very differently. The leaders of the Jewish community rejected them
entirely, on the grounds of their identification as Arabs, and therefore already
an integral part of the new Iraqi state and society; for this reason the Jews
refused any special treatment. By contrast, for the religious and ethnic minori-
tieswhohadnot beenofficially recognized, the special protection rights offered
a historic chance for their societal and communal transition into the newpolit-
ical age. This was particularly true for Assyrian Christians, Bahaʾis, and Kurds,
all of whommade extensive use of them.
Iraqi Jews
Thehistory of Iraqi Jewry and theminority rights of the LoN canbe told quickly.
A month after the British military conquest of Mosul, in November 1918, fifty-
eight prominent Baghdadi Jews came as political-economic representatives of
the three mostly urban communities of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, and peti-
21 Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, signed at Bagdad, 10
October 1922 (Cmd. 2370 Treaty Series No. 17 [1925]); Articles 6, 12, 13, 16, 18, 69, 73, 75, 78,
79, 80, 112 in the Constitution of 1925.
22 The most serious result was that the recognized religious minorities lost their status as
legal entities. Their leaders could no longer operate as official representatives of their
communities to address their needs and interests to the government on a legal basis.
They were not able to conduct their own businesses, for example, to sell properties. Thus,
their dependence on state authoritieswas increased and reached a critical pointwhen the
appointment of a new chief rabbi or patriarch was needed.
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tioned the British Acting Civil Commissioner Arnold T. Wilson (1918–1920).
They asked for the preservation of the “free opportunity for economic and edu-
cational development”; these they believed to be the main pillars that would
guarantee their history and communal life in the country. Thepetitioners asked
for British citizenship, since they mistrusted the ruling political and adminis-
trative abilities of local politicians and inhabitants. But theirmain concernwith
such a local government was its “very strong theocratical character due to the
dominance of religious feelings which are unreconcilable with the idea of giv-
ing to alien confessions any sort of privilege or rights.”23 Therefore, at the end
of 1918 Jewish representatives voted in the referendum for direct British admin-
istration.24 Later, the mandate regime fulfilled their expectation in part, since
it meant a dual governmental organization: a British administration and Arab
government, with King Fayṣal i as its head (1921–1933). Nevertheless, Iraqi Jews
remained loyal citizens, they identified themselves with the new body politic,
and their representatives worked closely with the government. This attitude
was not only because of strategic reasons, which minorities must always bear
inmind, but also because of their identification and self-understanding as part
of the Arabic culture and history of the country.25
Essentially, the communal aim of Iraqi Jewry after 1920 was integration and
not segregation from the new social and political fabric. Although their doubts
about Arab political rule never changed fundamentally, their representatives
continued to oppose steps to obtain recognition as a national minority. In view
of the termination of the mandate regime in 1932, the far-sighted statesman
Sasun Hisqail (1860–1932), member of the Iraqi delegation to Geneva, once
more emphasized before the LoN that Iraqi Jews consider themselves as Iraqis
and therefore do not need special minority rights.26 It should be mentioned
that at this time several international Jewish organizations, such as the Joint
23 “The Jews of Baghdad Petition for British Citizenship at the End ofWorldWar i,” published
in The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times, ed. Norman A. Stillman (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 1991), 256–258.
24 l/p&s/10/755, Self Determination in ʿIraq, English Text, Febr. 1919/Arabic Text, May 1919,
24.26/Decl. No. 13 (5)-Baghdad;Decl. No. 14 (3)-Musul, in IraqAdministrationReports 1914–
1932, vol. 3, ed. Robert L. Jarman (Slough: Archive Editions, 1992), 26.28. 61.67.
25 Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq (Stanford, ca: Stanford
University Press, 2012), 1–57.
26 air 23/806, Secret Report. Appendix a The Jews of Iraq, 9th July 1934, in Records of Iraq,
1914–1966, vol. 7, ed. Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland (Slough: Archive Editions, 2001),
630. S. Hisqail was a member of the Ottoman parliament (1908–1918), minister of finance
in Iraq (1920–1925), and Baghdad deputy to the parliament.
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Foreign Committee,27 the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the American Jew-
ish Committee refrained from intervening on behalf of Iraqi Jews at the inter-
national level and respected the rejection by Iraqi Jews of minority rights.28
Concerning the years after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, there
were no traces of this reluctance.
Assyrian Christians29
In the broad spectrum of oriental Christianity, Assyrian Christians represent a
singular ecclesiastical tradition because of their dyophysite Christology, which
distinguishes them from other oriental Christians. With a history dating back
more than 1,500 years, this ancient Syriac-tradition was widespread from
Mesopotamia to India. At its height, the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian
Church of the East, as it is known today, numbered several million. After the
Mongol invasions and devastations in the Middle East, the Church of the East
never regained its previous greatness. Its members retreated to mountain-
ous areas in northern Mesopotamia, northwest Iran, and southeastern Turkey,
where they merged into a tribal confederation. Under this status, Assyrian
Christians entered the new political order of nation-states after World War i.
For them,minority protection rights became, over the years, an important argu-
ment in their long struggle against their communal integration into the Iraqi
state and society. Themain aim for thepatriarchal family andmost of the tribes,
especially for the leadingTiyari andTkhuma from theHakkari region (so-called
“mountaineers”), today in Turkey, was to preserve their traditional tribal iden-
tity, organization, and religious-political order with the Catholicos as spiritual
and temporal leader. Assyrian Christians fought a fierce battle on the national
and international levels; this lasted until 1948, when Catholicos Mar Shimun
Eshai (1908–1975) finally advised his flock in Iraq to integrate as loyal citizens.30
Even though the issue of minority rights for Assyrian Christians reached
its climax after the period considered here, the events between 1920 and 1932
cannot be easily summarized, as in the case of Iraqi Jews, because archival
27 unogl, LoN Archives, s345/No. 2/28–33, Iraq Minorities: The Joint Foreign Committee
was a merger of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and Anglo-Jewish Association and
addressed foreign matters.
28 American Jewish Committee, “Meeting of the Executive Committee,” 14 February 1932,
Rights of Minorities in Iraq, available online: www.ajcarchives.org, accessed January 2014.
29 For the sake of historical accuracy I use this term, though the term “Assyrians” is more
widespread in the literature.
30 Letter toMar Khnanisho, 9 August 1948, in Light from the East Published by the Patriarchal
Council, Inc. of the Church of the East. A Collection of 27 Issues from 1948 to 1954, 1.1 (1948), 7.
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and other newly published sources compel us to examine other perspectives
than those usually presented in the official historiography of Assyrian Chris-
tians.
After 1920 Assyrian Christians in Iraq were in quite a different situation
than that of Iraqi Jews, not just because of their tribal constitution and tough,
almostmilitant identity. After the barbarities of the Ottomans and Kurds at the
beginning ofWorldWar i, most Assyrian Christians fled from southeast Turkey
(Hakkari) to northwest Iran, sinceChristianswere generally considered traitors
in Turkey. Furthermore, because of moving battle fronts after the end of 1917
and their unsuccessful rebellion against the Turks, most Assyrian Christians
ended up trekking southward to the British occupied zone in Mesopotamia.31
Starvation and cold on these long dramatic flights of approximately 47,000
persons32 caused several thousand deaths and further decimated the ancient
Apostolic Church of the East (ace), even beyond the traumatic massacres at
the hands of the Ottomans and Kurds during and following 1915.33
The vast majority of Assyrian Christians in Iraq were thus refugees, with the
exception of smaller tribes in the Barwari region (in the Dohuk governorate,
Mosul province), who had lived there from ancient times. Until 1921 they
found shelter in the British camps in Baʿquba near Baghdad and afterwards
in Mandan, east of Mosul.34 From the outset, their primary aim was to return
to their mountain homes, which were now in Turkish and Iranian territory,
but various schemes on their account proved unsuccessful, as the Turkish and
Iranian governments rejected the refugee policy.
31 See the eyewitness account in An Assyrian Odyssey Covering the Journey of Kasha Yacoub
Yauvre and his Wife Mourassa from Urmia to the Court of Queen Victoria 1879–1881 and The
Exodus of Assyrians from their Ancestral Home 1918, comp. and annot. by Youel A. Baaba
(Alamo: Youel A. Baaba Library, 22000), 81–132. See also Joel E. Werda, The Flickering
Light of Asia, or the Assyrian Nation and Church (Chicago, 1924 [repr. 1990, 2011]), 60ff.;
Mohammad Gh. Majd, Persia in World War i and its Conquest by Great Britain (Lanham,
md: University Press of America, 2003), 209–218, 243–250.
32 Unofficial figure in L’Asie Française 174 (Oct. 1918–Jan. 1919), 158.
33 Hannibal Travis, Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 237–276; Sébastien de Courtois, The Forgotten
Genocide: Eastern Christians, the Last Arameans, trans. Vincent Aurora (Piscataway: Gor-
gias Press, 2004).
34 InOctober 1919 they numbered 24,579 persons. (Office of the Civil Commissioner, “Memo-
randa on theArmenian andAssyrian Refugees at present in CampBaʾqūbaMesopotamia,”
Baghdad 1919). For a detailed presentation see also Herbert H. Austin, The Baqubah
Refugee Camp: An Account of Work on Behalf of the Persecuted Assyrian Christians (Lon-
don, 1920 [repr. 2006]).
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Beside these external dire straits, Assyrian Christians were also internally
weakened, due to leadership rivalries at the ecclesiastical and the secular/polit-
ical level. Theywere unsettled until themid-1920s. InMay 1920 the sick Catholi-
cos Mar Shimun Paulus died in Baʿquba and Mar Shimun Eshai, who was 12 at
the time, was consecrated one month later as his successor. This triggered the
vehement protest of the Mar Abimalek Timotheos from Trichur/India (1878–
1945), who felt he should be involved as a high ranking ecclesiastical figure.35
The conflict was solved when Mar Abimelek Timotheos was named as regent
of Mar Shimun Eshai until his coming of age. At the secular/political level,
General Agha Petros (1880–1932) was a main actor in the battle for the polit-
ical cause of the Assyrian Christians, who sought autonomy, and failing that,
a semi-independent status in the corner of the three countries of Iraq, Turkey,
and Iran.36 In addition, several Assyrian Christians from around theworld peti-
tioned the relevantpoliticians, beginning at theParis PeaceConference in 1919–
1920 and continuing until the Conference of Lausanne in 1922–1923.37
Lady Surma (1883–1975), aunt of the new Catholicos, was a crucial longtime
player in charge of the secular/political affairs of the ace.38 Allied with her
brotherDavid d’Mar Shimun (1889–1974), father ofMar ShimunEshai and com-
mander of the Assyrian Levies, she fought unwaveringly to secure the ancient
religious-political identity and order of the ace in the new world of nation
states; for most Assyrian Christians, living under Arab rule was unimaginable.
When faced with the reduction of the mandate regime in Iraq from twenty
to four years in April 1923,39 they were deeply upset. Lady Surma reported to
35 The official version presents Theodore d’ Mar Shimun, The History of the Patriarchal
Succession of the D’Mar Shimun Family (Mar Shimun Foundation 22008), 97–101. Related
to the protest of Mar Timotheos Abimalek see Mar Aprem Mooken, The History of the
Assyrian Church of the East in the Twentieth Century with Special reference to the Syrian
Literature in Kerala (Kottayam: St. Ephrem Ecumenical Research Institute, 2003), 138–142.
36 He worked together with the British government in London, with Sir Percy Cox in Iraq,
and with the French and Turkish government. The biography and role of Agha Petros in
the history of the ace still remain to be written.
37 JosephYacoub, LaQuestionAssyro-Chaldéenne, les Puissances Européennes et la Société des
Nations (1908–1938) (Lyon: University of Lyon ii, 1984), 1:91–126, 135–181.
38 For a rather hagiographic presentation, see Claire Weibel Yacoub, Surma l’Assyro-chal-
déenne (1883–1975) dans la tourmente de Mésopotamie, Peuples et cultures de l’Orient
(Paris: Harmattan, 2007).
39 The Treaty of Alliance with Iraq of October 1922 stirred up fierce debates in Great Britain,
e.g., in the House of Commons on 20 February 1923 (hc, Deb 20 Febr. 1923, vol. 161
cc2399–2471, also available online Hansard 1803–2005 http://hansard.millbanksystems
.com/, accessed February 2014). As a result, the new British-Iraqi Protocol of the 30th
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William A. Wigram (1872–1953), former head of the mission of the Archbishop
of Canterbury to the Assyrian Christians and a longstanding supporter of the
ace, about their petition to Sir Henry Dobbs, the British High Commissioner
for Iraq (1923–1928). She summarized their situation and claims as follows:
In July 3rd (os) we had a meeting here in Bebaydi of the Assyrian chiefs
and Bishops, to discuss their future, in case, that British did leave ʿIraq
after 4 years. To go under Turkey again is out of the questionwith themall;
as to their relations with Arab Governments, they are willing (as long the
British Government remains in ʿIraq, and are allied with them) to work
with and be in harmony with them; but all their doings to go through
British officials. The Assyrians are very unwilling to put themselves direct
under Arab Government.40
In addition to the known anti-Arab/Islamic feelings and identity of the leading
Assyrian Christians, their claim for political autonomy was based on three
pillars. The first was the British “promise” of political support for an “Assyrian
homeland” (a promise which remained unproven and unconfirmed despite
British archival investigations), on the basis of their alliance with Great Britain
in World War i.41 Despite this conflict, the British government was an indirect
supporter of the ace through the Assyrian levies. This military unit offered
the only stable source of income for Assyrian Christians in Iraq. The second
pillar of their anti-Arab position was their awareness of the inter-church aid of
the Archbishop of Canterbury and other Anglican clerics, which Lady Surma
established anew with her visit to London in 1920, though their Catholicos
had denounced it in the 1910s. Later, when the patriarchal family realized that
they would not receive any support in their political aims from the British,
the minority rights of the LoN became the third pillar. Mar Shimun Eshai in
of April, 1923 was concluded; this reduced the Mandate term to four years (Cmd. 2120,
London 1924).
40 air 23/449, “The Residency Baghdad 4th August 1923 to Lady Surma Mar Shimun,” in
Minorities in the Middle East: Christian Minorities 1838–1967. Assyrian Communities in the
Levant and Iraq, Part i, 1880–1938, vol. 7, ed. Bejtullah D. Destani (Slough: Archive Editions,
2007), 208.
41 This later became the British “betrayal,” very firmly pronounced in The Assyrian Tragedy
(Annemasse: Granchamp, 1934 [repr. 2010]) and Yusuf Malik, The British Betrayal of the
Assyrians (Chicago: Assyrian National Federation, 1935). The British side presents John
Fisher, “Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and British Policy towards the Assyrians,
1917–45,”Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 215–235.
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particular used these rights as a last straw and weapon to achieve his goal
of maintaining his position as Catholicos (religious and temporal head of the
ace).
A crucial date for the history of Assyrian Christians in Iraq was the recogni-
tionof theborder linebetweenTurkey and Iraq inDecember 1925. This decision
nullified their hopes of recovering their former homes in Hakkari, since this
region remained part of Turkey and its government categorically refused to
resettle any Assyrian Christians on Turkish soil.42
Before turning to events after December 1925, let us look first at the inquiry
of the frontier commission of the LoN inMosul at the beginning of 1925, as this
inquiry was important in several respects. Turkey and Great Britain quarreled
about the location of the border between Turkey and Iraq from the end of
1918. Ankara insisted that Mosul province be a legal part of Turkey and thus
that the southern line of the province be the border to Iraq. London believed
that because the territory had already been conquered the northern line of the
province should be its border. As expected, their bilateral negotiations failed,
and the Mosul dispute was brought before the LoN. What followed was one of
the LoN’s most prominent successful arbitration cases in its history—for Great
Britain and Iraq, but not for Turkey.43 The inquiry of the frontier commission
in Iraq in 1925 was part of this mediation procedure in Geneva, but it was also
a further touchstone for the LoN’s system of minority protection in the Middle
East. Though to date it has not been explored deeply,44 we can say that it was
a multi-dimensional clash of political and cultural differences—a dialogue of
the deaf and mute, between the “civilized world” and “backward people.”
In application of the principle of political self-determination and minority
protection, the frontier commission of the LoN had a threefold task. First, to
42 John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western Christian
Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Powers, Studies in Christian Mission 26 (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 2000), 175–185.
43 Fromcurrent research studies, see AryoMakko, “Arbitrator in aWorld ofWars. The League
of Nations and theMosul Dispute, 1924–1925,”Diplomacy& Statecraft 21, no. 4 (2010): 631–
649; Sarah Shields, “Mosul, the Ottoman Legacy and the League of Nations,” International
Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3, no. 2 (2009): 217–230; Stephen J. Stillwell, Anglo-
Turkish Relations in the Interwar Era, Studies in British History 73 (Lewiston, ny: Mellen,
2003), 67–120; Mesut Özcan, “Border Concept and Turkey-Iraq Border,” Turkish Review of
Middle East Studies 13 (2002): 41–85. See also Joseph Yacoub, La Question, 2:245–273.
44 Péter Kovács, “Paul Teleki et le réglement de l’affaire de Mossoul dans la Société des
Nations,” Miskolc Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (2004): 156–187; István Klingham-
mer and Gábor Gercsák, “Der ungarische Geograph Pál Teleki als Mitglied der Mossul-
Kommission,” Cartographica Helvetica 19 (1999): 17–25.
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hear the three parties in conflict: the governments of Turkey, Great Britain, and
Iraq; second, to collect data and information about the conflict; and third, to
determine the wishes of the population directly concerned, on the question of
whether the province of Mosul should be part of Turkey or Iraq. Its members
were the Swedish diplomat and head of the commission Carl Einar af Wirsén
(1879–1946), the geographer and former prime minister of Hungary Pál Teleki
(1879–1941), and theBelgianofficerAlbert Paulis (1875–1933). They spent almost
three months from January to March 1925 in Iraq in the company of British,
Iraqi, and Turkish advisors. But since their main commitment was to the prin-
ciples of impartiality and the formation of independent opinions, they were
eager to demonstrate their independence, and especially feared the domina-
tion and influence of British officials, which were well known in Geneva. On
this ground, the LoN troika planned, for example, to go alone and in secret to
the destinations in the more rural areas of the Mosul region. After intense dis-
cussions they heeded British advice and usedmilitary escorts. Despite difficult
odds the officials from Geneva managed to consult a large part of the popula-
tion in theprovinceofMosul; anddeterminedat the end that amajority favored
political affiliation to the Iraqi state.
The hearing of tribal leaders (maliks) and chiefs of the Assyrian Christians45
took place on 7 February 1925. A few days later they submitted a petition to
the troika asking for a direct LoN mandate for their homelands, and failing
that, a British protectorate. If their territories were to come under Turkish or
Iraqi sovereignty, nothing would remain for them but emigration.46We cannot
ignore the fact that Assyrian Christians clearly expressed their unwillingness
to live under Arab-Iraqi or Turkish governance. This aspect, and not persis-
tent persecution or “Islamic oppression” as their historiography would have us
believe, should be seen as themain characteristic of their history in these years.
In its final report, the frontier commission considered a variety of solutions
for the disputed territory. Without the presence of the mandatory power it
would be better for Mosul province to belong to Turkey, since Turkey’s polit-
ical situation was more stable than that of Iraq. The partition of the Mosul
45 The commission estimated their total number around 25,000. Of these, 5,000 were from
Persia, 14,000 were in the Mosul province, and 6,000 were from the Hakkari region. LoN,
c.400.m.147.1925.vii, Question de la frontière entre la Turquie et l’ Irak. Rapport présente
au Conseil par la Commission constituée en vertu de la résolution du 30 septembre
1924/Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq. Report submitted to the Council
by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924, 16th July
1925, 5–90, here 82.
46 unogl, LoN Archives, s14/d19, Assyriens.
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province on racial considerations was not recommended because the popula-
tionwas ethnically intermingled.47 Finally, they favored the “Brussels” line; that
is, if this was to be the final border and the province of Mosul was to belong
to Iraq, then the prolongation of the mandate of the LoN—actually lasting
until 1927—would be indispensable, at least for twenty-five years. The com-
mission advised that special regard should be paid to the establishment of a
Kurdish administration, that a representative of the LoN should be appointed
to smooth out complaints and grievances of the minorities on the ground, and
special measures should be taken for these minorities, such as assurances of
religious freedom and the establishment of their own schools. Assyrian Chris-
tians should have a certain local autonomywith its own officials. Eventually, in
the process of its practical implementation, most of these recommendations
were skipped.
After further tough negotiations in Geneva, on 16 December 1925 the “Brus-
sels” line was ultimately declared as the border between Iraq and Turkey. The
British efforts to recover the Hakkari region for the Assyrian Christians were
unsuccessful; they were now unequivocally under Turkish sovereignty. On this
basis and according to the wishes expressed before the frontier commission,
the leaders of the Assyrian Christians petitioned Sir Henry Dobbs on 14 Febru-
ary 1926. Since this petition, written in English and modern Syriac, is mostly
unknown, I quote a long passage:
But on the 17th December 1925 we learned that the League of Nations
declared Mosul for Iraq under the British Mandate with its temporary
boundary, and that our land was to remain in the Turkish Territories,48
[so by learning this] our hopes were frustrated. While this is fact, now
our mind is not changed and our requests are the same first one which
has been submitted to your Excellency, i.e. either our small lands under
the British Mandate, to be returned at any possible way, if not, we beg
to immegrate us to any of the British Colonies were [where] the climate
and water would suit us, and [where] we would be relieved from our
47 LoN, c.400.m.147.1925.vii, Question, 87.
48 This refutes J. Joseph’s assertion that the decision of the LoN was not communicated to
the Assyrian Christians, most probably because it was suppressed by the mandatory gov-
ernment (ModernAssyrians, 185). It would be interesting to knowhowAssyrianChristians
in Iraq indeed learned just one (!) day after the official decision in Geneva. Joseph further
states, incorrectly: “Not aware that their settlement claims had been forfeited, the Assyr-
ians looked naively forward to the day when their wrongs would be righted …” In what
follows here, we do not see any naiveté.
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anxieties, miseries and dark future; because in Iraq we cannot live in any
way. As our request is simple and we are a very small nation (or family),
we trust that the British Government will take a kind action, and we shall
be granted one of the two humble requests. We believe that our request
will be heard and will receive a favourable [sic] reply.49
The main signatories of the petition were David d’ Mar Shimun, Lady Surma,
and twenty other tribes, which I quote in their original English spelling:
1. Mar Yosip Metropolitan of Shamsdinan, Tergawar & Margawar; 2. Mar
Zaya Serguis, Bishop of Jeloo, Baz and Beekon; 3. Lower Tiary; 4. Upper
Tiary; 5. Thkoomar; 6. Jeloo; 7. Baz; 8. Deiz; 9. Gawar; 10. Shamsdinan; 11.
Barwar;50 12. Marbisho & Eil; 13. Ttal; 14. AlBas, 15; Sarra-Mamidayee; 16.
Timarydvan; 17.Noodez; 18. Leivon; 19.Guiramoon; 20. Barmayeed’Urmar.
This petition reached Geneva, but in April 1926 the file was noted “no action.”51
Lack of available documentation makes it impossible for us to reconstruct
the reaction of the unsuccessful petitioners. Apparently, no signs of protest
followed.
Despite thiswill to emigrate, in 1926 themandatory and Iraqi administration
began to settle the Assyrian Christians in the northern part of Mosul province,
close to Turkey. At the end of 1928, H.A. Foweraker, British Assyrian Settlement
officer, reports about their situation:
The Assyrians have now grown accustomed to their situation in ʿIraq.
Their relations with the officials of the ʿIraq Government are good and
a number recently petitioned the Mosul liwa authorities stating that
they wished in future to deal directly with the local officials without
interference from their Patriarch, the Mar Shimun. Poverty no longer
exists among themand through their thrift and the large pay derived from
their employment in the Levies, they have become man for man more
prosperous than their Kurdish, Yazidi, andChristianneighbours [sic]. The
49 unogl, LoN Archives, r610/11/50818/25888, Délimitation de la frontière entre la Turquie
et l’ Irak.
50 Those mentioned are Hassan Eshoo, Shamasha Salim, Yonan Hormizd, Syamoo Tooma,
but not their chief, Mar Yalda Yawallaha, of whom we will hear in 1932.
51 unogl, LoN Archives, r610/11/50818/25888, Délimitation de la frontière entre la Turquie
et l’ Irak.
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fears of thePatriarchal Party are, however, being justified.As theAssyrians
grow in prosperity and establish themselves in scattered villages, they are
showing themselves more and more inclined to throw off the yoke of the
Patriarchal authority, andLady Surma is keeping the youngPatriarch,Mar
Shimun so jealously to her apron strings that he is losing prestige and
touch with his peoples.52
Beside these internal leadership conflicts, which can be gathered also from
other external sources, the almost treacherous tranquility described here did
not last very long. It ended with the new Treaty of Alliance between Great
Britain and Iraq of 30 June 1930, which was concluded in preparation for
the termination of the mandate regime in Iraq in October 1932. But at the
end of 1929, after the British and other supporters of the Assyrian Christians
learned that this treaty did not contain clauses for minority protection, a
storm broke out in London. Captain Anthony H. Rassam (1883–?), son of the
well-known archaeologist Hormuzd Rassam (1826–1910), went to northern Iraq
to collect fresh information on the ground. After his return, in June 1930,
he founded the Iraq Minorities (Non-Moslem) Rescue Committee,53 and in
September 1930 sent a voluminous petition of over eighty pages to Geneva, to
which the previously mentioned Arnold T. Wilson made substantial contribu-
tions.54
Besides this short-lived committee of A. Rassam,55 we must mention two
other important andwell-established groups that advocated onbehalf of Assyr-
ian Christians. The first, founded in 1925, is the British Assyrians and IraqChris-
52 fo 731/13027, Intelligence Report No. 25, 5 December 1928, para. 537, in Records of Iraq
1914–1966, vol. 5, ed. Alan de L. Rush (Slough: Archive Editions, 2001), 309.
53 Themembers of the committee wereWilliam Ch. Emhardt, Secretary of the Ecclesiastical
and Racial Relations Commission of the Episcopal Church of America and of the Assyr-
ian Relief Committee, George F. Gracey, Francis N. Heazell, W.B. Lane, Archibald H. Sayce,
William A. Wigram, the Assyriologist David S. Margoliouth, Herbert W. Ward, Hugh Sey-
mour Hall (treasurer), and E. Hollands (secretary). Initially, the committee was supported
in part by the Archbishop of Canterbury, but he later distanced himself from A. Rassam.
54 unogl, LoN Archives, r2317/6a/22528/655 Jacket 4+5, Iraq. Situation of Assyrian Chris-
tians in Iraq.
55 After some further letters toGeneva and three appeals for donations (dated 31 January 1931,
17 August 1931, and 31 October 1931), it seems that he refrained from further relief actions.
Only the last appeal was published by Nelida Fuccaro, “An Appeal from The Iraq (non-
Muslim)Minorities Rescue Committee, 1931,” in TheModernMiddle East: A Sourcebook for
History, ed. Camron M. Amin et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 240–243.
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tians Committee56 and the second is the Iraq Committee57 of the League of
Nations Union (lnu). Given the lack of research about their (common?) activ-
ities andoverlappingmemberships, at presentnoaccurate conclusions arepos-
sible.Most probably, the IraqCommittee of the lnucame into existenceduring
their collective efforts to safeguard minority rights in Iraq in the time after the
termination of themandate. The outstanding classical scholar Sir Gilbert Mur-
ray (1866–1957), chairman of the lnu, was deeply involved in this matter. In
May 1931 he sent a draft declarationwith suggestions forminority protection in
Iraq, but unexpectedly refrained from pursuing his proposals just one month
later.58 Nevertheless, his intervention succeeded: in May 1932 the Iraqi govern-
ment was constrained to give a Declaration of guarantees before the Council
of the LoN.59 It was the most comprehensive declaration ever given to Geneva:
Nine of a total of sixteen articles concern issues of minorities (freedom of reli-
gion, cultural autonomy, etc.).
Mar Shimun Eshai and his supporters were alarmed by the upcoming ter-
mination of the mandate regime in Iraq. The political outlook to remain in
Iraq without British protection opened a new round in their irreconcilable bat-
tle against the Iraqi government and their societal integration into the Iraqi
state and society. After internal consultations, Mar Shimun Eshai sent peti-
tions on 20 and 23 October 1931 to Geneva, in which he stated that it was
impossible for them to live in Iraq without British protection. As before, in
February 1926, he asked for the resettlement of Assyrian Christians outside
Iraq, this time in a European country.60 However, again Mar Shimun Eshai’s
56 By Leo S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1924–1929), the befriended Henry
S. Lunn (1859–1939), Methodist reverend, editor of the Review of the Churches and a for-
gotten transnational ecumenical figure. Its president was Randall Davidson, Archbishop
of Canterbury (1903–1928).
57 In the 1930s theirmemberswere Sir GilbertMurray (president), ReginaldM. Banks (House
of Commons), Lord Willoughby H. Dickinson (British liberal parliamentarian and one
of the founding leaders of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship
through the Churches), Reverend Alan Don (as representative of the Archbishop of Can-
terbury), Martin (editor of the New Statesman and Nation), J. Gilbert Browne (brigadier
of the Assyrian Levies in Irak (1925–1933)), Frederick Lugard (member of the Permanent
Mandates Commission of the LoN), the aforementionedGeorge F.Gracey, David S.Margo-
liouth, Ronald S. Stafford (former Administrative Inspector inMosul),WilliamA.Wigram,
and Arnold T. Wilson.
58 unogl, LoN Archives, r2315/6a/21103/655, Mandate over Iraq. Cessation of the Mandate.
Correspondence with various individuals and associations, 50.70–78.
59 LoN Official Journal, July (1932), 1347–1350 (a.17.1932.vii).
60 unogl, LoN Archives, r2318 Jacket6/6a/22528/655, Situation of Assyrian Christians in
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efforts were unsuccessful. In growing despair before October 1932 the patriar-
chal family, the Assyrian levies, and other tribal leaders reversed themigration
plan of October 1931 and resorted to pressuring the British Mandate admin-
istration to grant their request for a homogenous “national” settlement. The
Assyrian levies started a mutiny and announced that the termination of their
military service for Great Britain would begin on 1 July 1932. Simultaneously,
a “national” petition of 17 June 1932 was sent to Sir Francis Humphrys, British
High Commissioner for Iraq (1929–1932). It comprised nine demands, includ-
ing the official recognition of Assyrian Christians in Iraq as a “millet” (a sep-
arate nation), and not merely a racial or religious minority; the restitution of
their former territories in the Hakkari region or, if this was not possible, the
allocation of an autonomous territory in the Amadiya district (close to the
Turkish border) with the recognition of Mar Shimun Eshai as temporal leader;
financial compensation for lost church properties; political representation in
the Iraqi House of Deputies; and the establishment of schools and a hospi-
tal.61
In this crucial historical moment the faction opposed to Mar Shimun, usu-
ally silenced in the official historiography, also gained momentum. Mar Yalda
Yawallaha of Barwari (1890–1950) and his supporters sent a counter-petition to
the Iraqi government, and this was transmitted to the LoN. This small group
of dissenters asked that the demands of Mar Shimun Eshai and his followers
should not be considered, since they were aimed at “his own benefit and those
of his relatives and friends” and this group asked that they be “permitted to live
in peace and tranquility under the Iraqi flag.”62 The commitment of the small
tribe of Barwari Assyrian Christians to the Iraqi state and their resistance to the
course of action of the patriarchal family and leading tribes can be explained,
at least in part, by the fact that they had been settled in Iraq for a long time and
had long considered it their homeland.
Neither the demands ofMar Shimun Eshai nor those ofMar Yalda Yawallaha
of Barwari were fulfilled. Iraq gained full sovereignty on 3 October 1932 and
became a member of the LoN. For Assyrian Christians this was the fulfillment
of their political nightmare, i.e., Arab-Islamic rule without British protection.
Iraq, 5–6. The petition of 20 October 1931 (fo 371/16033) is published in Records of Iraq
1914–1966, vol. 6, ed. Alan de L. Rush (Slough: Archive Editions, 2001), 572.
61 It is published in Iraq Administration Reports 1914–1932, vol. 10, ed. Robert L. Jarman
(Slough: Archive Editions, 1992), 475–476.
62 unogl, LoN Archives, r2318 Jacket6/6a/22528/655, c.p.m. 1298, Situation of Assyrian
Christians in Iraq, 143–144.
278 müller-sommerfeld
Their exasperationwas enormous.Mar ShimunEshai began a flood of petitions
to the LoN; he resorted to the “sacred minorities’ guarantees,” as he called
them once in a letter to Geneva (4 August 1933). At this point, the situation
on the ground changed completely. Iraqi Kurdish armed forces attacked the
rebellious tribes of Assyrian Christians, which began a collective move to the
French mandated territory. The suppression of the rebellion got out of control
and ended in a civilian massacre. After these traumatic events, for Assyrian
Christians a life in “peace and tranquility” was no longer within the realm of
possibility, rather a new protracted and exhausting stage of their concrete de-
territorialization63 began; this did not end until their resettlement in Syria was
brought to an end in 1937.
In conclusion, this brief presentationof theLoN, a-Mandates, and the system
of minority protection under international law reveals in Iraq a shared history.
The political hopes for the national sovereignty of large parts of the Iraqi
population hindered the wider understanding of a-Mandates as international
administration and political trusteeship on behalf of the LoN against a much
more familiar formula of British colonial rule. This uneasy situation, somehow
“lost in translation” (P. Cox), did not find a political common ground during
the twelve years of the mandate. The shared history of the LoN and Iraq was
based rather on asymmetric entanglements, as the encounter of the frontier
commission in 1925 and the mandatory declaration of guarantees of May 1932
show.
The system of minority protection under the guarantee of the LoN reveals
further gaps in common ground. Iraqi Jews rejected it completely, while Assyr-
ian Christians and their British advocacy groups used minority rights exten-
sively for the preservation of their historical religious-political church orga-
nization in the new world order of nation-states. This history of the Assyrian
Christians offers a unique example of the achilles heel of the system of minor-
ity protection of the LoN in limiting state sovereignty, and also generally in
its entire history of minority protection. Even if the case of the tiny commu-
nity of Assyrian Christians in Iraq is singular, it shows clearly, that without the
LoN things would certainly have taken another course, as would their resettle-
ment to Syria under the direct responsibility of the Council of the LoN. Thus,
63 That is to say, preparing the ideological de-territorialization in 1948, when Mar Shimun
Eshai officially renounced his temporal powers over the ace. See Heleen Murre-van den
Berg, “Light from the East (1948–1954) and the de-territoritorialization of the Assyrian
Church in the East,” in Religion beyond its Private Role in Modern Society, ed. Wim K. Hof-
stee and Arie van der Kooij, International Studies in Religion and Society 20 (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 2013), 115–134.
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focusing on the LoN as an independent actor leads to a more comprehensive
understanding of the history of Assyrian Christians of Iraq. This may be true of
the broader Middle East, but this remains to be revealed.
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chapter 11
“Soundtracks of Jerusalem”: YouTube, North
African Rappers, and the Fantasies of Resistance
A. Boum
Known derogatively to students as awacs,1 a group of idle security officers
stood in the corners and alleys leading to different buildings of Cadi Ayyad
University Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences in Marrakesh. The students,
dressed in Palestinian scarves known as kufiya, gathered, walked, and stood in
lines celebrating the international Day of Jerusalem (yawmal-Quds); theywere
unfazed by the security guards’ watchful gaze.2 They sang poems commemo-
rating the Islamic identity of the city, carried Palestinian flags and banners of
its symbols, and pasted flyers of theDomeof the Rock and al-AqsaMosque over
campus walls.
Since independence the Moroccan government has kept a close surveil-
lance on university campuses, which presented political threats to its survival.
Political life inside university campuses was managed by the Union Nationale
des Étudiants du Maroc (unem) through its chapters in cities such as Rabat,
Casablanca, Marrakesh, and Fès. Since its establishment in 1956, the activi-
ties of unem “closely paralleled those of outside political forces opposed to
the regime.”3 unem sided with leftist secular political forces opposed to the
monarchy until the early 1980s when its leadership started to be dominated by
students affiliated with Islamic movements. The rise of Islamic political ide-
ologies as a political alternative to less popular Marxist ideas, especially after
the fall of the Soviet Union, became obvious through the students’ affiliations
within the unem and its branches in different Moroccan campuses. Despite
the fact that all ideological camps, with a few exceptions, within the unem
support the Palestinian cause including the question of Jerusalem, the Islamic
1 awacs, which stands for the mobile long range radar surveillance and air defense control, is
used by students to refer to security officers on campuses.
2 Al-Quds is the Arabic name of Jerusalem; it is known inHebrew as Yerushalayim. Throughout
the paper I use the word Jerusalem to refer to the city without any ideological connota-
tions.
3 Clement Moore and Arlie Hochschild, “Student Unions in North African Politics,”Daedalus
97, no. 1 (1968), 29.
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discourse of Palestine began to replace the Marxist revolutionary discourse of
independence and the right of self-determination.
On the Day of Jerusalem the majority of Moroccan university campuses
are decorated with the red, black, and white colors of the Palestinian flag
as a way of expressing the self-identification of Moroccan universities with
Palestinian students and joining in their struggle for Jerusalem. Their political
manifestations have also served as a critique of the political attitudes of Arab
leaders toward the city. Recently, however, unem lost a significant part of its
political power as a result of decades of internal ideological fights among its
Marxist, Leninist, pan-Arab, and Islamic factions. The ideological fights have
also weakened the organization and mirror the fractured national political
system and fragile political parties that provided leadership for these students.
Nevertheless, the question of Palestine and Jerusalem has remained one
of the few issues of agreement within the weakened national student body.
As I walked around the covered alleyways, flags, books, leaflets, and songs
about Jerusalem and the struggle for Palestinian independence dominated
each display stand. I was, however, struck by a number of cds of the Palestinian
rap groupdamononeof the stands. Before I started leafing througha collection
of books, brochures, and leaflets, Samir, an undergraduate student, noted:
You can have one. They are free. All thanks to YouTube. If we do not
download them and circulate them, nobody will listen to them even
though they are available online. You known … dam is the best hip
hop group to ever sing for Palestine and Jerusalem. I do not like rap
music or hip hop but dam for me is like Mahmoud Darwish. Unlike
the fantasy of resistance of these new Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian
rappers dam likeDarwish are real voices of resistance. dam is both online
and offline. [North African rappers’] only place of resistance is in the
world of YouTubewhere few people who have themeans and time to visit
are aware of their existence.4
Samir, a member of the banned Justice and Charity Movement, later informed
me that online political activism is a form of escapism from reality and that
online hip hop is useless without offline political engagement. He argues that
North African students and youth have escaped to the Internet instead of
challenging regimes of power through direct political participation in and
outside university campuses.
4 Samir, engineering student, interviewed in October 2012.
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I like what the Internet did to the regimes across the Arab world. It
exposed their political lies as well cultural and social hypocrisies. We
knew that our internal cuisine smells very bad, but before the Internet
very few were bothered by the smell. They were rarely exposed to it. Now
we could take our laundry and expose it to the outside world to see.
They cannot ignore [it] anymore. But is this enough … I think it is not
… Without direct, on-street challenge, the Makhzan has nothing to fear,
after all howmany people have time to surf or [can] afford to be wired to
the Internet.5
In the last decades, the Internet, and especially YouTube, has served as a setting
forMiddleEasternhiphopartists andNorthAfrican rappers to voice their polit-
ical, cultural, and social grievances over the question of Jerusalem. YouTubehas
partially allowed rural and urban North African youth to go beyond the lim-
ited spaces allowed by state-regulatedmedia and political parties’ newspapers.
Youth and hip hop artists appropriate existing media images and historical
narratives of Jerusalem, re-contextualize them, and produce new narratives of
the city through a syncretic collage6 and political pastiche.7 By using YouTube,
youngNorthAfrican rappers capitalize on the techniqueof sampling and juxta-
posing images, speeches, andhistorical documentationof Israeli andArab state
media and recycle them into new texts with new meanings. This allows Pales-
tinian andotherArab youth to “float in cyberspace” through a “virtualmobility”
that challenges state discourses.8 Nevertheless, these musical scripts of resis-
tance against state regimes of power lack practical and real civil and political
engagement and the potential of a “threatening” political contestation on the
ground.
Unlikeprevious studies onPalestinianmusic and songsof resistance,9 I focus
largely on an emerging generation of North African hip hop artists and their
use of cyberspace, and especially YouTube, to express their political defini-
tions and cultural attitudes about Jerusalem and the conflicting narratives of
its ownership. I highlight a corpus of North African hip hop songs on YouTube
5 Samir, engineering student, interviewed in October 2012.
6 Katherine Hoffman, Collage: Critical Views (Ann Arbor, mi: umi Research Press, 1989).
7 Joanna Demers, “Sampling as Lineage in Hip-Hop” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2002).
8 Miriyam Aouragh, “Confined Offline, Traversing Online Palestinian Mobility through the
Prism of the Internet,”Mobilities 6, no. 3 (2011), 391–392.
9 Moslih Kanaaneh, Stig-Magnus Thorsén, Heather Bursheh, and DavidMcDonald, Palestinian
Music and Song: Expression and Resistance since 1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2013).
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by rappers such as Mouad Belghouat known as ‘El Haqed,’ Lotfi Belamri nick-
named ‘Lotfi Double Kanon,’ the Keeb brothers, and Mohammed El Guitoni
also named ‘Guito’N.’ I argue that despite the political beliefs held by many
North African hip hop artists and university youth, YouTube allows them to
expose the political weakness of Arab governments; North African hip hop
YouTube scripts of Jerusalemare carnivals of resistance that fetishize Jerusalem
without a real threat to the agencyof the Israeli orNorthAfrican states and their
entrenched official discourse about the city. It is a fact that Arab hip hop net-
works of cyber-resistance have allowed youth to create through YouTube new
landscapes of contention over Jerusalem and interpretations of past histories
of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Using Frank’s concept of hip advertising as resistance, I argue that although
rappers contend that they are creating radical countercultural movements,
they are in fact caught up in a virtual conformist world dominated by adver-
tisement and consumer capitalism. As part of an emerging youth subculture,
Samir and other students contend that Jerusalem hip hop is a harmless form of
cultural dissent. There is a feeling of paradox between expressions of resistance
on YouTube and the objectives of emerging youth countercultures. In this con-
text, North African hip hop songs about Jerusalem become spectacles in the
sense that YouTube turns their presumed discourse of resistance into a con-
text of social disengagement and political alienation. They are distracted from
openly and directly engaging reality as they are drawn into the interactive and
sometimes self-promotional spectacle of YouTube.10
Jerusalem inModern Islamic Politics
Jerusalem is by far the most visible and significant subject of contention not
only in Palestinian-Israeli political debates, but also in Jewish and Muslim
literary representations: in bank notes,11 poems,12 songs,13 European travelo-
10 There are few studies that look at states and the use of social media in the context of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The work of Rebecca Stein andMiriyamAouragh deserves
special mention, see Rebecca Stein, “StateTube: Anthropological Reflections on Social
media and the Israeli State,” Anthropological Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2012): 893–916; Miriyam
Aouragh, PalestineOnline:Transnationalism, the InternetandConstructionof Identity (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
11 Michael Bonine, “Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock: Banknotes of Piety, Politics and
National Idenity,” ibns Journal 48, no. 4 (2009): 27–42.
12 For example, Mahmoud Darwish, “Fil al-Quds.”
13 David McDonald, My Voice is my Weapon: Music, Nationalism and the Poetics of Pales-
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gues,14 photography,15 and the literary works of Israeli and Arab scholars.16 The
diverse and often conflicting Jewish andMuslim religious loyalties to Jerusalem
have servedas thebase for attachment to theplace and its religious sites. Rashid
Khalidi writes,
Most importantly, central though Jerusalem is to the Palestinians and to
their self-image, it is also central to the self-image of their Israeli adver-
saries. Forboth, it is important todayas a space, andhistorically, over time,
as an anchor for modern identity. Yet the Israelis control Jerusalem, and
are able to expropriate, excavate, label, and describe antiquities there as
they please.17
This competition and struggle over religious narratives of Jerusalem, its holy
sites, and their historical meanings have captured Arab and Muslim popula-
tions in and outside Israel/Palestine especially after the 1967 war. In the Arab
world, a wider gap began to take shape between states and youth over what
members of younger generations see as their uncontested and humiliating
tinian Resistance (Durham, nc: Duke University Press, 2013). Also see Moslih Kanaaneh,
Stig-Magnus Thorsén, Heather Bursheh, and David McDonald, Palestinian Music and
Song: Expression and Resistance since 1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013);
JoachimBraun,Music inAncient Israel/Palestine: Archaeological,Written andComparative
Sources (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002); Nasser Al-Taee, “Voices of
Peace and the Legacy of Reconciliation: Popular Music, Nationalism, and the Quest for
Peace in the Middle East,”Popular Music 21, no. 1 (2002): 41–61.
14 Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, “Jerusalem Travel Literature as Historical Source and the Cultural
Phenomenon,” in Yehoshua Ben-Arieh and Moshe Davis (eds.), Jerusalem in the Mind
of the Western World, 1800–1948 (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 1997), 25–46; Jean-
Luc Nardone, La representation de Jérusalem et de la terre sainte dans les récits de pèlerins
européens au xvi siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2007); Marie-Christine Gomez-
Geraud, Le crépuscule du grand voyage: les récits des pèlerins à Jérusalem (1458–1612) (Paris:
Honoré Champion Éditeur, 1999).
15 Emmie Donadio, “Seeing is Believing: Auguste Salzmann and the Photographic Represen-
tation of Jerusalem,” in Tamar Meyer and Suleiman Mourad (eds.), Jerusalem: Idea and
Reality (New York: Routledge, 2008), 140–154; Issam Nassar, Photographing Jerusalem: The
Image of the City in Nineteenth Century Photography (Boulder, co: East European Mono-
graph, 1997).
16 Ahmad Harb, “The Image of Jerusalem in Modern Palestinian Literature: A Preliminary
Study,” International Journal for Literary Studies 38, no. 1 (2008): 2–22; Meyer and Mourad
(eds.), Jerusalem: Idea and Reality.
17 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: the Construction of Modern National Consciousness
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 18.
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political subjugation to Israeli policies. Mahdi El Mandjra writes that Arab
leaders have forsaken the real battle over Jerusalem and instead use it as a
“springboard for other ends.”18While Arab youth take to the street to denounce
what they see as the linguistic, religious, and urban “Judaization”19 of Islamic
and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and show their support for its Palestinian
residents, El Mandjra argues that Arab leaders are more concerned with main-
taining their traditional power; Arab leaders have succumbed to what he calls
“the overpowering force of linguistic terrorism,”20whichnegatively reinterprets
Islam as a force of destruction and silences Muslim and Christian rights over
Jerusalem.21
In 1975, during the fourth Islamic Conference of foreign ministers held in
Jedda, Saudi Arabia, King Hassan ii (1961–1999) called for the establishment
of the al-Quds Committee as a separate unit within the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (oic). He became its president until his death in July
1999 when he was replaced by his son Mohammed vi. Twenty years after
1975, the Islamic Fund for Jerusalem (Bayt Mal al-Quds) was established to
raise funds for the conservation of the Islamic character of the old city of
Jerusalem. The donations have been used mostly to help residents of East
Jerusalem and support public institutions including al-Haram al-Sharif and
al-Quds University.22 In his political approach to the question of Jerusalem,
Hassan ii argued that Muslims should demand only Muslim sites such as
al-Aqsa Mosque and not the Western Wall.23 In 1979, in clear opposition to
Hassan ii’s initiative, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had major disagreements with
Hassan ii over his support and reception of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
called for an annual commemoration of Jerusalem on the last Friday of the
18 Mahdi ElMandjra,Humiliation à l’ ère dumega-impérialisme (Casablanca: Najah El Jadida,
2003), 83.
19 Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Nadia Abu El Haj, “Translating Truths: Nation-
alism, the Practice of Archeology and the Remaking of Past and Present in Contemporary
Jerusalem,”AmericanEthnologist 25, no. 2 (1998): 166–188; ThomasAowde, “TheMoroccan
Quarter: A History of the Present,” Jerusalem Quarterly 7 (Winter 2007): 1–16.
20 El Mandjra, Humiliation à l’ ère du mega-impérialisme.
21 El Mandjra, Humiliation à l’ ère du mega-impérialisme, 91. Also see Mahdi El Mandjra, Al
Quds, symbole et mémoire (Marrakesh: Éditions Walili, 1996).
22 Yitzhak Reiter, Jerusalem and its Role in Islamic Solidarity (New York: PalgraveMacMillan,
2008), 139.
23 Moshe Maʾoz, Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel: The Ambivalence of Rejection, Antago-
nism, Tolerance and Cooperation (Portland, or: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 17.
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month of Ramadan.24 The event gained great momentum each year and has
been celebrated all over the world, especially in the last decades, in which
rallies in support of Palestinians took placeworldwide, even inwestern capitals
such London and Washington, dc. These protests denounced Zionism and
Israeli policies toward Palestinians in general and Jerusalem in particular.25
Beyond these official political celebrations of and contentions over the sta-
tus of Jerusalem and its Islamic character, the Arab and Israeli political struggle
over control of the historical narrative andmemory of Jerusalem has also been
fought through songs, poetry, literature, and material culture. Recently, Israeli,
Palestinian, and Middle Eastern youth have turned to rap music and hip hop
to enact and reinforce their cultural and religious views of the city through
sonic forms of resistance. This movement started first on campus universi-
ties where the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem has always been a central
point in the political agenda of the various chapters of North African students
unions.26 These movements were also connected to the cultural and musical
productions of Jerusalem and Palestine; productions that allowed the songs
and poems of Nizār Qabbānī,27 Umm Kulthūm, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb,
Nihād Wadīʿ Ḥaddād (known as Fayrūz), Mahmoud Darwish, Aṣṣala Naṣrī,28
and Julia Boutros29 to dominate the soundscapes of North African university
campuses.
24 Christiane Gruber, “Jerusalem in the Visual Propaganda of Post-Revolutionary Iran,” in
Meyer and Mourad (eds.), Jerusalem: Idea and Reality, 168–197. Also see Behrouz Soures-
rafil, Khomeini and Israel (England: i Researchers Inc., 1988).
25 It should be noted that following the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Chief Rabbinate of
Israel declared YomYerushalayim/JerusalemDay a religious holiday to commemorate the
reunification of East andWest Jerusalem under Israeli control.
26 Aomar Boum, “Youth, Political Activism and the Festivalization of Hip-Hop Music in
Morocco,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (eds.), Contemporary
Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed vi (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2013), 161–177.
27 Nizar Qabani, “al-Quds,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
uso8NvkaMlg, accessed 15 April 2015.
28 Aṣṣala Naṣrī, “Ya oula al-qiblatayn,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
QFxz4QPZaXg, accessed 15 April 2015.
29 Julia Butros, “win al-malayin, al-shaʿb al-ʿarabi win,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=WdIeSUEu0vo, accessed 15 April 2015.
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Jerusalem: Musical and Poetic Battlefields
Even before the June 1967 Six-Day War changed the geographic map of Pales-
tine/Israel and led to Israeli control of East and West Jerusalem, a different
battlefield of songs andmusic betweenArab and Jewish composers and singers
had already dominated Middle Eastern musical landscapes. Produced during
the 1960s, the historical songs of “Yerushalayim shel zahav” [Jerusalem the
golden] by Naomi Shemer30 and “Zahrat al-madāʾin” [The flower of cities] of
Fayrūz reflected the artistic and sonic wars over Jewish and Muslim rights to
the sacred city. These songs symbolized the lyrics of contestation and division
between Muslim/Arab and Jewish/Israeli parties vying for ownership of the
city.
“Yerushalayim shel zahav” was produced in the days leading to the 1967
war. Teddy Kollek, the mayor of West Jerusalem, commissioned Shemer to
compose the song quickly, by 14 May, for listeners of the 1967 Israel Song
Festival. Three weeks later Israel launched a series of air strikes against Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan and took control of all of Jerusalem on 7 June 1967, and the
song became part of the national folklore and an anthem of victory. In the eyes
of Dan Almagor, “Yerushalayim shel zahav” changed the history of the Middle
East:
The song was played constantly on the radio throughout this period
(before the 1967War). Had it not been for the song, it’s doubtful that there
would have been such readiness to change and conquer the city. This
was before Gush Emunim and messianism. This song has extraordinary
historic import. Paratroopers at the Western Wall didn’t pray. They sang
the song.31
“Yerushalayim shel zahav” came to symbolize amoment in Israeli memory and
collective identity to the extent that it became a state-sponsored song. In fact,
in 1968 Uri Avnery, a member of the Knesset, proposed that the song be the
national anthem instead of “Hatikvah” [The hope]. Avnery saw “Hatikvah” as
a song that did not speak for the Arab and Christian classes of Israel. Avnery
stated:
30 “ ‘Jerusalem of Gold,’ Israel Festival Song, Strikes Gold,”Billboard, 21 October 1967, 44.
31 Michal Palti, “Song of Peace and Song ofWar: From ‘Jerusalem of Gold’ to ‘Darkenu,’ Israeli
Songs become Symbols, and Teach us about their Times,”Haʾaretz, 15 April 2002. Available
online: http://www.haaretz.com/culture/books/song-of-peace-song-of-war-1.47653.
292 boum
My position then was essentially a protest against “Hatikvah.” I wanted to
propose an alternative song that had a chance of being accepted. I still
think that “Hatikvah” is appropriate neither for the Hebrew population
nor theArabpublic in Israel. It is a song about the yearning for Zion, about
homesick longing, and it doesn’t deal with life in this country. “Hatikvah”
also separates Jews from the rest of the citizens of Israel.32
Despite this debate about the song and its meanings for different members of
Israeli society, it managed to capture the soul of Israelis during the 1960s and
express their hope and pride.
“Yerushalayim shel zahav” became a symbol of Jewish identity and hope to
such an extent that Steven Spielberg ended his film Schindler’s List with the
song as survivors of the Holocaust lined up outside the Walls of Jerusalem.33
Despite this celebration of the song among many sections of Israeli society,
many Palestinian citizens of Israel argue that the song is more an artistic
expression of Jewish narratives and Zionist ideology than the possibility of a
Jewish-Muslim coexistence within the city. Azmi Bishara, the former leader of
the Balad Party in the Knesset, contends that the song celebrates a collective
“Israeli and Zionist wall” between Jews andArabs.34 This is a view reflected also
in some Palestinian hip hop songs that protest what they see as Israeli musical
violence towardArabs and Israeli artistic silenceover the Islamicheritageof the
city. JosephMassad also highlights this Zionist focus of the song and juxtaposes
it to Fayrūz’s “Zahrat al-madāʾin.” In her song, Fayrūz stresses the religious and
historical diversity of the city:
It is for you that I pray O city of prayer.
It is for you O with beautiful building, O flower of the cities.
O Jerusalem O Jerusalem O Jerusalem O city of the prayer I pray.
Our eyes are set out to you everyday.
They walk through the porticos of the temples.
Embrace the old churches.
And wipe the sadness away from the mosques.
Despite the introductory stanza of “Zahrat al-madāʾin,” which highlights the
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic character of the city, Fayrūz and the Raḥbānī
32 Ibid.
33 Many Israelis objected to this use of the song at the end of the movie and a new music
replaced “Jerusalem the Gold” in the Hebrew version of Schindler’s List.
34 Lawrence Joffe, “Soundtrack to the State,” Jewish Quarterly 195 (2004): 19–24.
“soundtracks of jerusalem” 293
brothers (Manṣūr and ʿAṣṣī) emphasized the Christian and Islamic history
of the city in their composition of the song.35 If “Yerushalayim shel zahav”
symbolized the Jewish claim over the city, Arab listeners adopted “Zahrat al-
madāʾin”; in the larger sonic battles over Jerusalem, “Zahrat al-madāʾin” is still
one of the most celebrated songs in the Arab world.
Fayrūz and the Raḥbānīs built on the tradition of Arab nationalist artists and
their songs for JerusalemandPalestine in the 1960s. This traditionbeganmostly
in EgyptwithUmmKulthūmandMuḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. UmmKulthūm
and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb sang for an Arab ideological and military fight against
Zionism and a “military march” toward Palestine. Their voices reflected the
general support of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his anti-Western and anti-Zionist
stand. In her songs “Filisṭīn” and “Rājiʿun,” Umm Kulthūm sings about the rifle
and celebrates an Arab optimism about Nasser’s leadership and hope for a
recapture of the city. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb stresses the urgency of taking over the
western part of the city and highlights its Christian and Muslim connections
more than its Jewish character. Inhis famous songonPalestine, ʿAbdal-Wahhāb
seems to be calling onNasser to take back Arab lands lost to the Israelis in 1948.
He laments the long Israeli occupation; Islamic imageries of jihad dominate
the song as ʿAbd al-Wahhāb reminds Arabs to take their swords out of their
shields in historical references to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyubī’s capture of Jerusalem.
In addition, these Egyptian songs strongly advocate the urgent need to protect
the churches and mosques of the old city. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb also sings of Jesus
of Nazareth as a martyr crying over the fate of the city as he encounters the
Prophet Muḥammad; in this way he indirectly highlights the Jewish-Christian
divide over Jesus.
However, with the Palestinian/Arab Nakba of 1967, UmmKulthūm and ʿAbd
al-Wahhāb songs were muted in sonic Arab landscapes as Fayrūz’s “Zahrat al-
madāʾin” became an Arab folkloric hit. In Morocco, local songs about Palestine
and Jerusalem were largely produced through musical groups that dominated
the national scene in the 1970s. These included the Larsad group’s song “Anti
lana”36 [Youbelong tous], al-Sihamgroup’s song “Fin al-haqiqa”37 [Where is the
35 Joseph Massad, “Liberating Songs: Palestine Put to Music,” in Rebecca Stein and Ted Swe-
denburg (eds.), Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture (Durham, nc: DukeUni-
versity Press, 2005), 175–201. Christopher Stone, “Fayruz, the Rahbani Brothers, Jerusalem,
and the Leba-stinian Song,” inMeyer andMourad (eds.), Jerusalem: Idea and Reality, 198–
204.
36 Larsad, “Anti Lana,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECmMTv2coXI.
37 Essiham, “Fin al-Haqiqa,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
u3KPRbr3MSk, accessed 15 April 2015.
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truth], Jil Jilala’s song “Ya ʿArabi ya Muslim” [O Arab OMuslim],38 and Nass El-
Ghiwane’s “al-Quds.”39 The musical narratives of these songs were dominated
by the themes of pan-Arabism and the Islamic dimension of the city, as well
as the Christian character and history of the city.40 Zionism was critiqued as a
danger to Christian and Muslim symbols of the city. The pan-Arab and Islamic
dimensions of these songs guaranteed their circulation on Morocco’s public
radio and television channels as well as their distribution on cassette tapes
without government censorship. These groups echoed the messages of Fayrūz
and Egyptian singers.
Online Sharing, Contestation, and Hip Hop Artists
In her work on the use of the Internet in Palestinian camps and the state of
Palestinian cybercultural networks and activity, LalehKhalili contends that the
“Internet’s ability to undermine the sovereignty of nation-states and forge new
political and national identities is underutilized.”41 Cyberspace has allowed
Arab youth and Palestinian refugees to stay tuned to what happens daily in
Jerusalem and other Palestinian communities inside the West Bank and
Gaza.42 In her work on Palestinian Internet usage, Aouragh uses what she
calls Palestinian online mobility to describe Palestinian utilization of Inter-
net technology in reaction to Israel’s offline military checkpoints.43 The de-
territorialized and decentralized Internet space theoretically empowers many
Palestinian andMiddle Eastern communities to engage in new social, cultural,
and political discussions through open access websites such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, and YouTube, and allows dissenting communities to bypass a state’s techni-
cal obstacles to unlimited sharing of video online. For example, for many Mid-
38 Jil Jilala, “Ya ‘arbi ya muslim,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
lTQF6Ahoyik, accessed 15 April 2015.
39 Nass El Ghiwane, “Ya Qods,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
YWTqcMzJCn0. accessed 15 April 2015.
40 Mohamed Dernouny and Boujemâa Zoulef, “La naissance d’un chant protestataire: le
groupe marocain Nass El Ghiwane,”Peuples Méditerranéens 12 (July–September 1980): 3–
31.
41 Laleh Khalili, “Virtual Nation: Palestinian Cyberculture in Lebanese Camps,” in Stein and
Swedenburg (eds.), Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture, 144.
42 Miriyam Aouragh, “Confined Offline, Traversing Online Palestinian Mobility through the
Prism of the Internet,”Mobilities 6, no. 3 (2011): 375–397.
43 Ibid., 377.
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dle Eastern youth, the usefulness of YouTube is its “simple, integrated interface
within which users could upload, publish, and view streaming videos with-
out high levels of technical knowledge … YouTube set no limits on the num-
ber of videos users could upload, offered basic community functions such as
the opportunity to link to other users as friends.”44 For North African youth
YouTube provides a new platform for data sharing as users provide informa-
tion towhich a large anddiverse audiencehaveopendaily accesswith feworno
restrictions. YouTube is therefore a challenge to traditional statemedia because
of its capacity as a broadcast medium, archival storage, and a social network.45
Technologically savvy young North Africans have been empowered by You-
Tube to produce their own news and dispatch it to millions of viewers. On
manyoccasions, the traditional stateministries of information ofNorthAfrican
countries have been challenged by these emerging voices of dissidence and
they have, at times, been humiliated by the counter hegemonic discourse
and political strategies of these new dissidents. For instance on 8 July 2007,
Mounir Agueznay a young Moroccan from Targuist, a poor town from the
northern province of al-Hoceima, was dubbed “Targuist Sniper” when he used
his camera to capture instances of gendarmerie bribery.46 Targuist Sniper is an
exampleof a generationof young citizen journalistsmotivated to embarrass the
symbols of the authoritarian state in virtual landscapes by providing evidence,
in this case, of how widespread bribery is among the security services. Despite
the relative freedom of expression that the Internet grants these rebels, the
state occasionally intervenes to discipline potential trailblazers who could be
ordinary citizens, journalists, and rappers.
The songs of Mouad Belghouat, aka “El Haqed,” have translated the griev-
ances of Moroccan youth and especially the February 20Movement. Since 2011
El Haqed has been arrested three times by the Moroccan police over songs
critical of the monarchy, the state police, and state symbols. For instance, the
prosecution claimed that the rapper broke the law by insulting state figures in
a video posted on YouTube titled “Klab al-dawla” [State dogs], which features
an assemblage of photos of the king and his advisors.47 The song was produced
44 Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, YouTube: Online Video and Participatory Culture (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2009), 1.
45 Ibid.; Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop it (New Haven, ct: Yale
University Press, 2008).
46 Al-Qarra tv, Le “Sniper de Targuist” révèle son identité, YouTube video: https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=9IMy7iay4xw, accessed 15 April 2015.
47 El Haqed, “Klab al-dawla,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
EAyZ7R5xmvk, accessed 15 April 2015.
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in 2008 and performed by El Haqed on multiple occasions and places before
he was arrested. El Haqed refused to be silenced by these legal cases and
imprisonment and continued to draw attention to his songs on the national
and international level. Describing his music as “prison rap” (rap mhabsi), he
noted in an opinion published in Al-Jazeera titled “My journey to rap, politics
and prison”:
[Prison rap] expresses reality and sings about freedom, breaking down
the borders and chains.We need to understand the power of prison rap in
the context ofmost rappers being littlemore thanmarionettes, wholesale
puppets of power. You can count the number of truly political rappers on
one hand. And yet, the small number makes our music that much more
powerful. The intellectual and cultural prison only made our music more
powerful. The state still doesn’t get that.48
In this context of dual struggle over social media, Middle Eastern youth includ-
ing hip hop artists managed to attract attention in the saturated public spheres
of the Internet by gaining visibility through online discussions of issues such
as education, political representation, migration, drugs, and unemployment,
among other topics. Equally important, rappers have managed to circumvent
the laws and restrictive platforms of communication and journalism in North
African states.49 However, at times, these states have outmaneuvered these
rebellious youth by coopting some rappers and through the “balkanization”
of revolutionary rap and hip hop rebel youth. For example, if we map rap-
pers’ politics inMorocco we can identify a number of artists who became close
to political parties or state agencies while creating a false consciousness of
state contestation. As the majority of hip hop singers rap for the state in state-
organized and funded festivals such asMawazine,50 the fewwho dared to cross
the imposed sacred limits and redlines risk ending up in prison for insulting
state officials. In Tunisia, the rapper Alaa Yacoubi (alias “Weld El 15”) also faced
a similar legal case after producing a song “Boulicia kleb” [Police are dogs] in
48 El Haqed, “My Journey to rap, politics and prison.” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2014/10/my-journey-rap-politics-prison-201410671050228296.html,
accessed 15 April 2015.
49 Mark LeVine has looked as some of the issues involving the creation of a new musical
hybridity, see “The New Hybridities of Arab Musical Intifadas,” Jadaliyya (2011). Also see
Mark LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008).
50 Aomar Boum, “Festivalizing Descent in Morocco,”Middle East Report 263 (2012): 22–25.
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which he denounced police brutality. In the meantime, North African states
are looking for ways to manage, control, and police the Internet and thereby
muzzle the growing opposition of a large population of unemployed and dis-
enchanted youth.
While Moroccan youth lead North Africa in terms of Internet use and con-
nectivity, North Africa’s youth are increasingly connected to social media and
virtual worlds and spend more of their time in cybercafés or connected to per-
sonal computers than socializingwith their peers. TheMoroccanhiphopgroup
H-Kayne captures this phenomenon in their album “Jil jdid” [New generation],
which highlights the overuse and addiction of Moroccan and North African
youth to cyberspace. The YouTube video shows a teenager transported into the
emergency roomafter spending a sleepless night chatting and surfing the net.51
The song emphasizes issues that arise from cybermarriage and dating, pornog-
raphy, and musical piracy:
New Generation
Addicted to the Web and the dot com
New generation
Oh Generation: what’s up with you?
New generation
Addicted to Youth of the web and the dot com
Slash chat rooms Slash msn
+++
Do you have webcam
Generation Bill Gates
Generation Addicted to Facebook
Culture of msn
Generation of wifi, YouTube and nice cars
+++
Generation computer and plasma tv
Our parents are perplexed
Hooked youth to the computer
No need for hard labor
Help us find a job
We are tired of being unemployed
+++
51 H-Kayne, “Jil Jdid,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaMov67_r24, ac-
cessed 15 April 2015.
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Everyone is standing idle in neighborhoods
Living in the world of the Internet
Because reality is virtual
I rather stay in cybercafé
Than stay idle in neighborhood streets.
This song highlights the extent to which cybercafés and personal computers
have replaced cafés or neighborhood corners as places of social and political
interactions. Before cybercafés dominated the streets of North African cities,
neighborhoods (singular lhouma and zanqa) served as spaces where unem-
ployed youth contested the failures of states to improve their economic and
social conditions and spent their idle time leaning against neighborhood walls
or watching television in cafés.52
In this shifting cultural environment where cyber-connectivity has changed
social relations, youth have found refuge in the virtual world where they decry
the attitude of Arab governments toward the Palestinian issue. Studies of North
African attitudes toward the Palestinian question have generally ignored polit-
ical discourse about Palestine in music. Jerusalem has been at the center of
thismusical tradition of political activism.Widely circulated, Nass al-Ghiwane,
Jil-Jilala, and Essiham produced and performed many songs on al-Quds (Je-
rusalem) in which they highlight a sense of religious conflict and resistance.
These songs emphasize the same sense of sadness that the Lebanese singer
Fayrūz demonstrated in her famous song about Jerusalem “Zahrat al-madāʾin.”
Unlike Fayrūz, however, these popular groups stressed the Islamic dimension
of Jerusalem and ignored its Christian and Jewish aspects. Their focus was on
the lost peace and the danger of Zionism as a colonial movement. However,
despite their despair, the songs always end with a sense of hope. For instance
Essiham’s “al-Quds” ends as follows:
We came back to you, al-Quds
In an Islamic march
The old days will come back
52 Boum, “Youth, Political Activism and the Festivalization,” in Maddy-Weitzman and Zisen-
wine (eds.), Contemporary Morocco. For rap songs that reflect this culture of neighbor-
hoods see, Moroccan rapper Don Bigg’s “Wald zanqa,” YouTube video: https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=PdP42vUkkKk; Moroccan rap group H-Kayne’s “F-L’Houma”
YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVIYJHdvL0; and Moroccan rap-
per’s Muslim’s “Harb lhwam,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d_ZH
-VRMMsI.
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And you will be free and Arab
Jerusalem is for us God
The house is for us God
We will pray in Jerusalem
In the late 1990s, young North African artists turned to hip hop to produce
songs that highlighted the economic situation in Gaza and the West Bank,
Palestinian political disunity, and Islamic yearning for Jerusalem. These songs
were indirectly yet strongly connected to the political musical productions of
Nass al-Ghiwane, Jil-Jilala, and Essiham, to the extent that Moroccan rappers
reproduced phrases from their songs in their hip hop lyrics. Rappers fromAlge-
ria, Tunisia, andMorocco linked Palestinian political struggles in Gaza and the
West Bank to Jerusalem. TheAlgerian Lotfi Belmri alias “Lotfi Double Canon,”53
the Tunisian Mohamed El Guitoni alias “Guito’n,” the Tunisian Hamada Ben
Amor alias “El Général,”54 the Moroccan “Keeb Brothers” (Abdelkrim and Ilyas
Kib),55 the Moroccan Mouad Belghouat alias “El Haqed,”56 and the Moroc-
can al-Imbrator57 produced songs that describe the popular political views of
young North Africans on the subject of Jerusalem. For instance, in his song
“Hnaya lawlin” [We are first], El Haqed mocks the official political discourse
on Jerusalem and Palestine:
We are first
We recognized the independence of America
Meanwhile nobody recognized us
Now they recognized Israel
Even as the President of Bayt Mal al-Quds
Is Amir al-Muʾminin [a reference to King Mohammed vi]
Think hard and try to understand
In contradictions we have a record of achievements
53 Lotfi Double Kanon, “Palestine,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
DxcQzwGannk, accessed 15 April 2015.
54 El General & Guito’n, “Direction Palestine,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=C1m701wEXnc, accessed 15 April 2015.
55 Keeb brothers, “Gaza Holocaust,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
-UaGO6RjBio, accessed 15 April 2015.
56 El Haqed, “hnaya huma lawlin,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
SqnAu7tQDgc, accessed 15 April 2015.
57 Al-imbrator, “For Palestine,” YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Cks2A0U5qTY, accessed 15 April 2015.
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In these lines, El Haqed underscores the negative feelings that young North
Africans express toward the way Arab governments have handled the issue of
Jerusalem. Similar rap lyrics highlight the failure of post-independence North
African leaders to regain ownership of Jerusalem and protect its Islamic her-
itage.
The “Fantasy of Resistance” and North African Rappers
In many songs, North African rappers claim that, unlike Arab leaders, their
rap lyrics represent a critical way to engage what they call “Israel’s occupation
of Muslim lands,” even as Arab leaders abandon their “religious obligation to
Jerusalem.” Jerusalem is usually mentioned either implicitly or explicitly by
these artists who echo the central place of the holy city in the political beliefs
of North African youth. Jerusalem is not only celebrated through references
to Fayrūz, Julia Boutros, but also Qurʾanic verses and other Islamic historical
events, particularly Jerusalem’s capture by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyubī. Lyrics are
largely framed around Islamic interpretive registers inwhich Jews andMuslims
are thought to be fighting a religious war over historical rights and memories
sacred to Jerusalem. In his song on Palestine, Lotfi Double Kanon begins with
a quote from an unnamed Islamic orator speaking about the importance of
Jerusalem. The quote reads:
Jerusalem’s future is clear
Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine, Arab, Muslims, Sky, and the earth
We will not acknowledge Jewish occupiers
On the sacred land
They should be expelled
Resistance will not be defeated
After this sample, the rapper proceeds to narrate a historical story of an existen-
tial conflict between Jews andMuslims that starts with the Balfour Declaration
and continues in the present where:
Jews are fighting Islam
+++
Jerusalem in their hands
Muslims are silent
+++
Do not waste your time
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The Qurʾan has already said it
Jews won’t be happy until we follow their religion
+++
Jews are gaining time
To continue their settlement
From the eastern bank to the western one
They wish to take this land by force
+++
Al-Aqsa mosque the first qibla
Where the Prophet prayed with the prophets behind him
Now Jews have encircled it with wires
They love to own it
The only left is the Wailing Wall
Palestinians are still waiting for Arabs
To take the swords of Salah al-Din
We invade them as he did
What is taken with force is gained through force
One of the dominant features of North African hip hop productions about
Jerusalem is the use of musical and image borrowing, or the use of samples.
Sampling allows the rappers to politically legitimize and historically frame
their voices through the inclusion of Islamic references and other historical
events. The Islamic dimension of the lyrics is supported by a set of appropri-
ated images using the technique of political mashups, which usually involves
putting together different sources and material to create a new political nar-
rative.58 Like African American rap lyrics, North African hip hop songs of
Jerusalem are full of “history, political critique, innuendo, sarcasm and wit.”59
YouTube permits these rappers to add another dimension of sampling to their
songs through the incorporation of pre-recorded sounds as well as images in
the sonic narrative of the artistic product. In theConquest of Cool, Frank argues:
[T]aking for granted that youth signifiers are appropriated, produced, and
even invented by the entertainment industry, recent writers argue that
resistance arises from the ways in which these signifiers are consumed
by the young, used in ways that are divergent or contradictory to their
58 Bingchun Meng, “From Steamed Bun to Grass Mud Horse: E Gao as Alternative Political
Discourse on the Chinese Internet,”GlobalMedia andCommunication 7, no. 1 (2011): 33–51.
59 Joanna Demers, “Sampling the 1970s in Hip-hop,”Popular Music 22, no. 1 (2003), 41.
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manufacturer’s oppressive intent. Whatever form prefabricated youth
cultures are given by their mass-culture originators ultimately doesn’t
matter: they are quickly taken apart and reassembled by alienated young
people in startling novel subcultures. As with the counterculture, it is
transgression itself, the never-ending race to violate norms, that is the key
to resistance.60
In the relative absence of social and political spaces where North African
youth can express their opinions as members of the public sphere without fear
of prison, YouTube provides a venue for these artists to express themselves
through digital remixing,61 music videos, and reused footage62 with limited
state censorship. At the center of youth’s contestation is the artistic appropria-
tion of images and sounds taken from their original context and transformed—
repurposed and denatured—with the aim of parodying the initial story and
message. For example, the voices of Shimon Perez or Arab leaders are included
in the context of a Palestinian child calling for economic help or mourning a
dead relative. This remixingof past andpresent texts and images transforms the
meanings of original texts and allows the young rapper to exercise a counter
symbolic violence through the radical modification of the text. Accordingly,
the “reciprocal archive that is YouTube, in which every video uploaded can be
downloaded for a remix, has resulted in a remarkable number of videos which
often, though not always, engage in a critical dialog withmainstreammedia.”63
Through collage, remixing, andmashups,NorthAfricanhiphop artists produce
a new text that theoretically challenges both Arab leaders and Israeli politi-
cians. However, this contestation remains largely an online form of erasure and
has yet to lead to any radical transformation of the offline narrative.
Equally important, North African hip hop artists rely on overdubbing to
mute Israeli soundtracks and doctor their voices to create a new dialogue
and therefore reinstate an Islamic memory of Jerusalem online. Through this
approach, these artists participate in a cultural resistance that transformsmov-
60 Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture and the Rise of Hip
Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 17.
61 Eli Horwatt, “A Taxonomy of Digital Video Remixing: Contemporary Found Footage Prac-
tice on the Internet,” in Iain Robert Smith (ed.), Cultural Borrowings: Appropriation, Re-
working, Transformation, 76–91 (Scope: An Online Journal of Film and Television Studies,
2009).
62 Sérgio Dias Barnco, “Music Videos and Reused Footage,” in Smith, Cultural Borrowings,
111–121.
63 Eli Horwatt, “A Taxonomy of Digital Video Remixing,” in Smith, Cultural Borrowings, 76.
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ing images and footage “into a malleable databank … of archival interven-
tions [which] reveal and subvert historical engineering by appropriating the
very weapons of ideological control, revising them to reflect the traumatic and
repressive realities of their creation.”64 The semioticmanipulation of the image
or the sound enables the rapper to participate in an “online” urban transforma-
tion of Jerusalem critical of the “offline” Israeli Judaization of its Islamic sites.
In response to what the rapper sees as the “Israeli theft of Palestinian land,” rap
lyrics are largely based on a similar concept of violence and countercultural
resistance, which consciously take official texts and denature them as a way to
mock their narrative and void it of any historical legitimacy.
However, while North African hip hop YouTubers claim that their postings
incarnate real social relations, Guy Debord would argue that they are phony
moments of dissent as well as a refutation of social life itself. Youth escape into
YouTube platforms gives them the “semiotic privilege”65 to critique the state
and its approach to Jerusalem. Al Imbrator, a young rapper from Casablanca,
reflects this feeling in a song titled “For Palestine”; it was made in 2009:
For Palestine tears fall
In the middle of destruction, siege and poverty
Night is long and life is bitter
They killed Arafat, Cheikh Yassine and Mohammed al-Dora
Still free, still with strong will
Still see children holding rocks and do not fear death
Martyr here, bombing there and People shout “Allah Akbar”
++++
Arabs for their interests forsaken you
If you see us quiet it is not our fault
Our rulers have forgotten Islam
As long as night lasts, the light of dawn will rise.66
Despite the rappers’ belief that their lyrics are means of resistance and Islamic
dissent, many university students argue that their online dissent is a fantasy
activism,which “may domore harm than goodby focusing attention away from
64 Ibid., 86.
65 Hal Foster,Recordings:Art, Spectacle, CulturalPolitics (Port Townsend,wa: BayPress, 1985),
173.
66 Al-imbrator13, “shoufa b3ida/For Palestine.” Online: http://al-imbrator13.skyrock.com,
accessed 15 April 2015.
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the hard work of actually engaging in ‘real-life’ politics.”67 In this context, hip
hop songs could be deceptive forms of contestation and Debordian specta-
cles.68
Largely based on cultural jamming, which stitches pieces from existing pic-
tures and videos and makes a collage of still and moving images as well as
music, the Jerusalem hip hop YouTube video is a virtual form of countercul-
tural memory whose objective is to challenge the official Israeli ownership of
Jerusalem and its sites. By relying on mashups and cultural jamming, North
African rappers are victims of Slavoj Zizek’s plague of virtual fantasies,69 where
the fantasy is a “mirage, it is not hiding something, it is freestanding, self-
sufficient, and certain in its presence … Fantasy is that which bridges a sub-
ject and the lost object which the subject is constituted by, his primordial
cut. The subject, a linguistically produced subject, is entirely ‘phantasmatic.’ ”70
Apart from the violence that rappers exercise on official state images, texts, and
sounds of Palestine and Jerusalem, their dissent rarely undermines offline offi-
cial discourse and political positions about Jerusalem; therefore, it is limited
in its potential to produce change. In their desire to challenge hegemonic dis-
courses of Jerusalem and “liberate” the holy sites of the city through their songs,
these rappers ironically and unconsciously reproduce the system andmaintain
youth conformity and obedience to state political structures. Like hip coun-
terculture in the 1960s, the Jerusalem North African hip hop YouTube video
could potentially drive a newyouth culture of online escapism just like hip con-
sumerism drove the wheels of capitalist consumption in the United States.
Conclusions
In the last decade, hip hop has emerged as a cultural youthmovement through-
out North African societies. Young artists have used it to express their views
about social, political, and economic issues in their respective societies. They
have also utilized YouTube musical videos of their songs to denounce broader
Islamic and Arab issues, including the position of Israel and that of Arab gov-
67 Sandra Smeltzer and Douglas Keddy, “Won’t You Be My (Political) Friend? The Changing
Face(boo) of Socio-Political Contestation in Malaysia,” Canadian Journal of Development
Studies 30, nos. 3–4 (2010), 428.
68 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 1983).
69 Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997).
70 Mickey Vallee, “The Media Contingencies of Generation Mashup: A Zizekian Critique,”
Popular Music and Society 36, no. 1 (2013): 76–97.
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ernments toward the question of Jerusalem. Their rap lyrics are a Debordian
détournement of the official state discourse; they deconstruct its underlying
and uncontested official truth through parody and satire. Through mashups
and critical lyrics North African rappers have been able to gain virtual inde-
pendence and fame as fans continue to comment on their songs and YouTube
video postings. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these songs and their producers
on YouTube and other forms of social media will transform the political dis-
course on Jerusalem. Computer literacy and accessibility in North Africa is still
limited despite growing access to cybercafés and ownership of personal com-
puters. Most rappers also speak to a specific category of the population and do
not have an influence on a large number of users.
Rappers arenot onlywell-informedof the realities ofMiddleEasternpolitics,
but they are also aware of its historical details and complexities. However, the
use of mashups as forms of contestation of official discourses of Jerusalem do
not explain the historical dynamics of the conflict, the future of the city, and
the possibilities at the disposal of its Jewish,Muslim, andChristian contestants.
Accordingly, North African rap songs of Jerusalem are cultural spectacles that
reinforce past historical events and present political realities. They engage in
a re-editing of sounds and images and bricolage of new texts of parody and
mockery usually forgotten once we turn off our computer and watch televised
news reports about the daily realities of urban and economic violence by
Palestinians and Israelis in the sacred city of Jerusalem.
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